DDR responses are increasingly called for in a wide variety of different political and security contexts. It is important, in particular, to recognise that interventions have increasingly been required in situations where there has not been a definitive end to conflict and where ongoing tensions and instability are a major feature of the political and security environment. It is clear that very different strategic and programme responses are often required and that there is no single blue print or approach that will work in all contexts. A number of broad political and security contexts have been defined and are highlighted in the table below along with a summary of the potential implications for DDR programming. These are highlighted in the table below; Click on each Scenario to view the documents.

Type A. Clear military victory by one party to the conflict Link to Documents
✓Clear balance of power & some ability to enforce law & order
✓Functional (to some extent) & at least identifiable command & control structures for armed groups
Potential implications for DDR programming
✓DDR process likely to be a component of restructuring of security architecture and wider SSR.
✓Reintegration/integration of losing sides forces may be organized or more ad-hoc.
✓Some ex-combatants on “losing side” may spontaneously return to communities.
Type B: Cessation of violence through intervention of 3rd party force Link to Documents
✓International intervention in form of peace support operation or stabilization force (under UN Chapter 8 mandate or similar) without clear agreement of all parties to the conflict.
✓Security situation likely to remain fluid with localized tensions and ongoing violence.
Potential implications for DDR programming
✓Likely to include DDR/SSR initiatives but depth and degree of local ownership and buy in likely to be limited and progress slow.
✓PSO may be called on to carry out DDR responses amongst ad-hoc groups/individuals who emerge out of the bush or enter localized peace agreements
Type C. Cessation of violence through agreement negotiated with main warring parties Link to Documents
✓Security situation likely to remain precarious but some form of “balance of power’ exists or emerges.
✓May include mechanisms for international observation/verification activities / interventions e.g. a PSO
Potential implications for DDR programming
✓Broad principles for a DDR and SSR process likely to be on the agenda during negotiations and may include elements of SSR and wider political reforms for power sharing.
✓Agreement may include modalities for the handling of certain group’s e.g. key commanders, vulnerable groups etc.
Type D: No peace agreement or ceasefire – ongoing conflict Link to Documents
✓Ongoing conflict or insecurity–which may take the form of asymmetrical attacks even under areas nominally under control of one group.
✓Lack of clear command or other structures with which to negotiate a peace accord with insurgent groups and/or no political will.
Potential implications for DDR programming
✓Assistance may be called for; to help support the opportunistic reintegration of individual ex-combatants or groups – and wider community based initiatives to reduce violence.
✓Responses may be called for or operationalized at specific locations or hot spots in an attempt to deescalate tension or as part of attempts to create incentives for some groups to renounce violence or join political processes.
Type E: DDR in context of military restructuring or downsizing Link to Documents
✓In some situations SSR or military restructuring has been undertaken even in the absence of conflict – as a result of security sector reviews and wider developments/reforms.
Potential implications for DDR programming
✓National Governments may request support in terms of thinking through and operationalizing how those being affected by such processes should be handled and effectively reintegrated.