Beyond Demobilization

Challenges and Opportunities for Security Sector Reform in the Central African Republic
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Table of Contents

i  Foreword
ii Executive Summary
1  Introduction
2  Part 1: Concepts of Reform and their Application
   2  Concepts of Security Sector Reform
   3  CAR in Comparative Perspective
5  Part 2: Relevant Background and Prospects for Reform
   5  Historical background
   7  Current Sub-Regional Security and International Context
   8  Socioeconomic Backdrop
   8  Policy Response and International Support
   9  Prospects for Security Sector Reform
   9  Toward a Discourse on Human Security
10 Part 3: Mapping out the Security Sector: Functions and Challenges
10  Overview of Actors
13  A. State Controlled Actors
   - The Central African Armed Forces (FACA)
   - The Gendarmerie
   - The Presidential Guard
   - The National Police
   - The Municipal Police
   - Customs and Environmental Protection
   - Intelligence Services
   - Ministry of Defense
Table of Contents

- Ministry of the Interior and Security
- Ministry of Justice

18  B. Democratic oversight actors
- The National Assembly
- Civil society groups

19  C. Non-state actors of the security sector
- Private Security Companies
- Remnants of Militias and Self-Defense Groups
- Rebel Groups
- Self-Defense Groups
- Zaraguinas
- Archers
- Poachers

20  D. International Partners
- Regional actors
- France
- DDR/PRAC
- CEMAC/ FOMUC
- BONUCA
- The European Union
- United States
- IFIs
- Other Partners

24  Part 4: Economic Governance, Budgetary and Human Resources

29  Part 5: Conclusions and Recommendations

32  Part 6: References
This analysis is part of an effort to investigate the links between disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) programs and efforts at army integration and security sector reform (SSR) in the Great Lakes Region. The two processes have been identified in key national and international policy statements and debates to be the priority for peace and stabilization. However, in both stable and post-conflict transitions they remain a real challenge. The Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration program (MDRP), provides financial and technical support to seven national DDR programs in the region. As such, it is playing a modest but important role in advancing the security sector reform agenda. This is particularly relevant as the MDRP partnership moves to its final stage and solutions beyond the DDR process are explored. While the World Bank does not directly engage in SSR, it finds itself in a unique position to accompany such a process, and assist its national and international partners in the design and establishment of responsible, effective, and accountable security sectors.

In August 2006 an initial case study on DDR/SSR linkages was launched in the Central African Republic (CAR) in response to requests from the Central African Government and the World Bank country team for the CAR. The MDRP-led mission engaged Government and partners on frank and open discussions on SSR/DDR linkages, institutional, governance, and public finance management aspects of the security sector, and potential longer term reform efforts. Key partners including the UN, the EC and France were actively involved. The mission was led by Dingamadji Madjior Solness from the MDRP Secretariat and comprised of Ely Dieng from the World Bank’s Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction Unit, as well as Dr. Boubacar N’Diaye, Consultant on governance and security and Gilles Gauvreau, Consultant on budget issues and public expenditures.

This working paper was written by Dr. Boubacar N’Diaye at the request of the MDRP and based on the mission’s findings. Dr. Ndiaye is an Assistant Professor at the College of Wooster, Ohio and consults globally on security and governance. The paper was reviewed by Bernard Harborne, Sigrun Aasland, and Muriel Tschopp in the World Bank.

The World Bank mission and the Government of CAR were greatly assisted in their efforts by MDRP partners in Bangui, in particular the United Nations Bureau in the Central African Republic (BONUCA), the European Commission, the Government of France, and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). Various civil society organizations also provided invaluable inputs. However the content of this report does not reflect the views of either institution, and remain the sole responsibility of its author.

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The political process since elections in 2005 clearly represents a window of opportunity for security sector reform in CAR. Seizing this opportunity would require continued support from key international partners, and could contribute to ending the recurring political role of the armed forces, while making the sector better equipped to deal with current and future security challenges. Key observations of the assessment include:

- An undersized and aging national army in large part accounts for lack of security. The Central African Armed Forces (FACA) and other security forces in the country are undersized, lack proper training, and equipment. Consecutive military regimes have created an ethnically imbalanced and politically divided army. Salary arrears and lack of secure storage facilities for arms and ammunitions add to the general insecurity. Due to lack of funds to pay salaries and pensions, soldiers who otherwise would have been discharged stay on the force, and new ones are not recruited.

- Lack of clarity on attributions and jurisdiction of the different security actors. This is particularly true for the distinction between the national and municipal police, as well as the governance role of relevant ministries and the national assembly. For purposes of governance, oversight and re-establishment of trust, it will be important to include civil society and parliament in the broader concept of the ‘security community’ in a reform process.

- A narrow concept of security. The Government’s discourse has so far focused almost exclusively on restructuring and improving the staffing and material situation of the FACA, rather than taking a global approach to SSR encompassing governance, oversight, and sound principles of financial management.

- A deepening spiral of non-state security actors continues to destabilize the country. Armed bands and rebels along the main provincial roads continue to kidnap children of herdsmen for ransom and to attack traders. In response, the herders have organized themselves into self defense groups, adding to the array of non-state security actors. Remnants of militias and self-defense groups, while largely addressed by PRAC, prevail in parts, and arms remain in circulation. Recent rebel attacks illustrate the precarious inability of the state to defend its territory outside Bangui, particularly in the north and centre. Further, private security providers have yet to be adequately regulated and monitored.

- Expenditure management of the security sector suffers weaknesses that affect the ability to deliver basic services. Monitoring reports on budget execution and public expenditures are not issued on a regular basis, and standard expenditure procedures are rarely used. The Defense Department has access to funds beyond its budgetary allocation, such as the direct special tax collected on airplane tickets, and from military escort services to local officials, aid providers, and business people who want to travel inside the country. The payroll system for all civil servants including security sector personnel is inefficient.

- Important strategic and oversight bodies exist but remain untapped. Various Government entities such as the Supreme Council on National Defense and the National Assembly Defense and Security Commission could help spearhead a reform process.

- Various bilateral and multilateral agreements to curb cross border crime and enhance regional security have had limited impact. CAR is located in the heart of a particularly volatile region, and instability in Chad, Sudan, Uganda, Congo-Brazzaville, and the DRC all continue to adversely affect security in CAR.

- Support from the international community in the area of security has been limited and not well coordinated. For security sector reform to succeed, sustained and coordinated international support will be required, while at the same time ensuring that the process is nationally owned and led.
Introduction

1. The Central African Republic (CAR) represents the all too familiar profile of the African state emerging from a protracted period of recurrent political and security crises and armed rebellion: barely functioning state institutions, an economy in shambles, an impoverished population, and a security apparatus in disarray. As a result, it faces at once daunting challenges, but also unique opportunities to reform, including a genuine overhaul of its security sector.

Background for the analysis

2. This paper analyzes the connection between the country’s political and economic crises and current environment, and its governance of the security sector. Highly dependent on external funding and support for its development process, the temptation may be great to have structural and policy reforms be dictated from the outside. Just as in other areas, however, the success of reforms in the security sector will be dependent on the extent to which their initiative, conduct, and monitoring are nationally owned and led. Hence, at the same time as the Central African security challenges must be analyzed along institutional, governance, and political dimensions, the analysis must also be carried out in keeping with the general guidelines for security sector assessment, as suggested by the OECD DAC.1

Experience shows that reform processes will not succeed in the absence of commitment and ownership on the part of those undertaking reforms. Assistance should be designed to support partner governments and stakeholders as they move down a path of reform, rather than determining that path and leading them down it. A major problem in the area of security system reform in some regions, particularly in Africa, has been a lack of local input to and ownership of the emerging reform agenda.1

3. In addition to this fundamental criterion, the OECD has proffered a useful framework for mapping and analyzing security sectors, developing tools for sensible security sector reform and governance. That framework thoroughly informs this report. Among other things, it entails the need to adopt a country specific approach, that emphasizes optimum utilization of scarce resources, encourages all (national, regional, international) stakeholders’ involvement, and critically, “strengthen[s] institutional frameworks and human capacity for managing the security system in a manner consistent with sound democratic governance practices and transparent financial governance.”2

Structure of the paper

4. In order to examine and assess CAR’s security sector and opportunities for reform, this report first briefly discusses the concepts of security sector reform (SSR) and security sector governance (SSG), and then takes a brief look at SSR experiences from other countries. Part two provides a brief historical background and socio-economic analysis of CAR, and discusses implications for the prospects for reform. Part three maps out the key actors of the security sector. Part four provides an overview of economic governance of the security sector. Finally, Part five concludes and makes recommendations for reform toward a more accountable, responsible, and effective security sector.

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2 Ibid
Part 1: Concepts of Reform and their Application

Concepts of Security Sector Reform

Security sectors unraveling

5. For decades, African states have treated the security apparatus - and security issues in general - as completely separate from other economic, social, and political activities. Security issues were widely considered the reserved domain of the executive branch and more specifically, the head of state. By the end of the 1980s, the deep economic crisis that ravaged most African countries made reforms of the entire state structure and functioning indispensable. With erosion of power, inadequate funding, resource mismanagement, among other reasons, the security apparatuses in many countries were rapidly decaying, and unable to fulfill even basic functions. Consequently, where the state was challenged (and many were as African states were undergoing reconfiguration in the 1980s and 1990s and civil societies became emboldened), national armies were incapable of defending incumbent governments against armed domestic enemies, much less of protecting its population.

Human Security

6. The protection from abject poverty and total material destitution is arguably at the heart of the safety and security responsibilities of any democratic state. It was in the context of the reevaluation of the role of the African state in the 1990s that the concept of human security gained currency. Beyond its emphasis on the safety, security, and well-being of the individual, human security also encompasses political, socioeconomic and psychological dimensions that were overlooked in the erstwhile conception of security as protecting status quo and the head of state. With the advent of pluralism, multiparty democracy, and participation in the 1990s, security came to be viewed as a public good, with all members of the national community having a stake in its governance. Slowly but surely, the necessity to improve the standing and performance of the security sector, to reform it or even to transform it radically, became more and more salient throughout the continent, if only in rhetoric. In time, it became accepted by development partners as self-evident. The link between security sector and good governance was becoming undeniable with all the policy implications for all involved.

What is Security Sector Reform?

7. The security sector refers to the totality of means, institutions, organs, and agencies of the state charged with providing safety and security to the state, its institutions, and its inhabitants. In this sense, the security sector would be comprised not just of the main state controlled core security institutions such as the military, paramilitary, police, and other uniformed forces, but also of intelligence agencies and other socioeconomic protective bodies. Since democratization has also meant the acceptance of security as a public good in which many stakeholders play a role, it has become accepted to broaden the security sector to formal or informal oversight bodies such as the parliament and civil society organizations.

8. Given the security environment in Africa, non-statutory bodies involved in that security environment, such as private security companies and non-state controlled armed groups, are also part of the security sector. Some scholars and practitioners have made a distinction between “security sector” and “security community,” the latter encompassing mostly actors that concern themselves with ‘democratic governance’ in the security sector (Ball & Fayemi 2004).
9. **Security sector reform (SSR)** is an eminently political process that must result from the unequivocal political will of the leadership of a state and involve a broad array of actors. SSR (sometimes interchangeably used with security sector transformation, SST) refers to all the political and technical processes of profoundly altering in an organized and systematic manner the overall setup and workings of the security sector. This is often as a result of the realization that the *status quo* is no longer desirable, acceptable, or tenable. Reform often takes place over a longer period and may be incremental. Ball and Fayemi introduce a difference in degree between reform and transformation. The latter, they argue, is deeper, more holistic, aims to change the culture governing the security sector, and targets the power relationship in order to introduce democratic values of accountability, and respect for human rights. Furthermore, transformation also supposes a modicum of democratic institutional capacity building (ibid).

10. **Security sector governance** is a companion to SSR and is the ultimate objective of reforming or transforming the old security sector setup and management toward a new setup and *modus operandi*. The rules and processes that govern the sector and importantly, the course of action that led to them, need to be based on democratic principles and values of inclusiveness, transparency, accountability and respect for human rights. The SSR model seeks the establishment of a responsible, accountable and effective security sector *conducive to development, poverty reduction and democracy*. Security sector governance also involves the inclusion of formal and institutional oversight bodies, such as the parliament, as well as informal and non-state controlled oversight entities and actors such as the media, civil society groups, and individuals as legitimate stakeholders and partners in the delivery of safety and security.

### CAR in a comparative perspective

11. To better understand the challenges and opportunities for reforming the security sector in CAR, reference to similar experiences and lessons from other parts of the world can be useful. Experiences in tackling post authoritarian and post civil war situations in West Africa could be particularly relevant. A recent comprehensive study of security sector reform in sixteen West African states reached among others, the following conclusion: “[The] wholesale political, institutional and security breakdown resulting from a civil war, quite unsettlingly, seems to offer the best hope for a thorough transformation of the security sector, provided the appropriate commitment and sustained sponsorship of an external actor” (Bryden and al., 2005, p. 222). CAR exhibits several of *prima facie* characteristics which, according to the authors of this study, tend to offer the best odds for carrying out thorough reforms of the state’s security apparatus and practices in order to provide security for the state and its populations.

12. Similarly, Heiner Hanggi argues that post-conflict situations cannot be truly overcome unless and until a security sector reform dimension is made central to efforts at peace building and economic recovery (Hanggi 2005). In her study of the challenges inherent in rebuilding post conflict societies, Nicole Ball also emphasizes the tremendous difficulties that still confront those who tackle the task, though the international community has had the benefit of accumulated experiences and lessons throughout the 1990s, in Europe, Latin America and Africa (Ball 2001). Among these lessons, Ball argues, is the critical necessity for the international community to remain engaged for the long haul if the peace-building and reconstruction process is to be successful (ibid). It is now recognized that such a reconstruction will not likely succeed and peace preserved if SSR is not a critical component of the post-conflict package. Experience also suggests that an external power that sponsors, partially finances, and oversees a post conflict country’s efforts to transform its security sector is essential to long term success.

13. Finally, in analyzing CAR’s situation, the Liberian experience can be useful. After the strides taken with the help of the international community following a lengthy and devastating civil war, Adedeji Ebo has, in a recent study, critically examined the efforts under way for the transformation of a broken down security sector (Ebo 2005). Ebo observes that Liberia’s security predicament grew out of a “*security structure for a (sic) preservation and protection of privileged interests*” (p. 28) that subordinated everything to this objective.

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3 OECD/DAC, Security System Reform and Governance, p. 12
Scrutinizing the ongoing efforts at reform, Ebo found them wanting in several areas particularly their lack of vision, their neglect of the need for democratic control and oversight, local ownership, role of civil society and the excessive concern with operational and tactical efficiency. His recommendations include an all-encompassing, broad-based, national as well as regional strategy starting with a “security policy review” and a reform that integrates and balances democratic and participative governance, local ownership, international actor involvement, and short and long term goals. While there are several differences between Liberia and CAR, including in the intensity and level of destruction of the civil war, there are also many socioeconomic, political, and security similarities. As a result, the lessons Liberia offers – and especially the mistakes to avoid – can be very useful for any undertaking aimed at understanding the security predicament of CAR.
Part 2: Relevant background and prospects for reform

Historical background

14. More than a year after the 2005 presidential and legislative elections that started the process of normalization of the political situation in the country, significant obstacles remain to consolidation of peace and economic development in CAR. While it did not experience the near collapse of the state seen in Liberia and Sierra Leone for example, CAR came very close when General François Bozizé got the upper hand in a rebellion he led against President Ange Felix Patassé in 2003. On March 15, 2003, Bozizé’s troops took control over the capital Bangui, an event marked by looting and violence on an unprecedented scale. This was the conclusion of years of political instability fueled by the mounting tensions between the narrowly based political elite, the military top brass, and the overwhelming majority of the Central African people. The origins of this chronic instability and political and ethnic violence can to a large extent be found in the political development of the CAR since its independence on August 13 1960, and in particular the first military intervention in the political process carried out by Colonel Jean Bedel Bokassa on January 1st 1966.

Initial civilian rule replaced with the Bokassa empire: 1960-1979

15. In 1959, just before the country gained its independence from France, the charismatic national leader Barthélemy Boganda was killed in a plane crash. He was succeeded by his inexperienced nephew David Dacko, whose fragile succession was contested by a violently repressed opposition. The country shared the same institutional weaknesses, a narrow and foresight-deprived educated class, and economic inadequacies like many other former colonies (Decalo 1989). Alongside military coups in most of its neighboring countries, Dacko was ousted by coup in 1966. In the next forty years, the country would live through nearly 20 crises involving the military, with coups, countercoups, mutinies and other disturbance of the political system and normal civil-military relations (Binoua 2005).

16. Before Colonel Jean Bedel Bokassa came to power in 1966, he was a semi-literate petty officer in the French colonial army. Bokassa’s haphazard and checkered rule marked the country profoundly. In an ever-increasing appetite for power, in 1976, Bokassa proclaimed himself emperor and spent for his coronation more than a quarter of the state treasury. Aside from transforming the country in an empire, nothing suggested that Bokassa had a national political, economic, or social project or agenda for his country and its people. There clearly was no discernable attempt to build state institutions or carry out an economic development programs. The state was transformed in an instrument for the personal use of Bokassa and his close aides, largely drawn from his region of origin and ethnic group. To maintain itself in power and impose various self-serving social and political measures, such a political regime had to rely on repression and brutal force. This was enforced by the security apparatus, particularly the army, which Bokassa had packed with men from his ethnic group (the M’Baka) and region (the Southwest).

17. Amid widespread discontent sporadically expressed by civil servants and educated middle classes, the sociopolitical and economic crisis deepened throughout Bokassa’s rule, who responded with further repression. A 1979 massacre of schoolboys and students protesting one of the regime’s many excesses signaled that Bossaka’s rule had reached its limit, although it was only one of many exactions committed by the security forces, the army in particular. When France’s open military intervention deposed him in the “Barracuda Operation” in 1979, hopes were high for the country to finally harness the promises of independence.
Part 2: Relevant Background and Prospects for Reform

Brief return to civilian rule and the Kolingba military regime: 1979-1993

18. France, who had maintained her colonial era military base at Bouar and remained involved in the country, brought back to power the first president David Dacko whom Bokassa had overthrown in 1979. David Dacko proceeded to restore a multiparty system with a new constitution and state institutions. At the end of the process of installing the CAR’s ‘second republic’ in 1981, he was elected president in a contested election. Soon, a political impasse and a looming social and political crisis forced President Dacko to cede power to General André Kolingba.

19. In less than two years of a return to civilian rule and efforts to rebuild a constitutional framework and resolve outstanding social problems, power had reverted back to the military. André Kolingba lost no time in consolidating his power. Instead of searching popular or democratic legitimacy, his main solution to a still looming malaise was to massively recruit his fellow ethnics, the Yacoma (only about 5% of the total population) of the Southeastern CAR in the army and administration and tightening his control over the security apparatus and the state. His regime lasted almost as long as Bokassa’s. While the level of repression did not equal Bokassa’s, it was nevertheless a repressive and heavily ethnically based military regime. General Kolingba, as head of state, was minister of defense and army chief of staff during most of his tenure. He had also thoroughly “Yakomacized” the administration in addition to surrounding himself with officers either belonging to that same ethnic group, or beholden to him.

Democratic reform and military insurgencies 1993-2003

20. As the wave of multiparty democracy swept through the continent in the early 1990s, General Kolingba lifted the ban on political parties and introduced a new, more competitive political framework that would lead to contested elections in 1993. By then the military had become a thoroughly politicized institution which had been in power for 25 years out of 33, not to mention the impact of ethnicity and regionalism. In addition, the short interlude of Mr. Dacko between 1979 and 1981 did a disservice to the principle of civilian control of the military. Because he had to hand over power “voluntarily” to the army chief of staff, his action seemed to prove the inability of civilians to govern the country properly. It also seems to reinforce the sense the army had acquired (and rationalized) of its superior qualifications to govern. This perception and the deliberate ethnicization of the army by General Kolingba, along with the policies and actions of the victor in the 1993 presidential elections, were to complicate even more this political and security equation and lead to the breakdown that spanned a decade between 1996 and 2005.

Box 1. Ethnic Groups in CAR

Politicized ethnicity is nothing new and a word on the ethnic composition of the CAR can be useful. Like most African states, the CAR is made up of many ethnic groups, though it has the rare advantage of having one unifying national lingua franca, the Sangho. As elsewhere ethnicity has been manipulated in power struggles and for access and control of the state and the rent this provides. According to various sources on the ethnic groups in the CAR, the main groups that make up the CAR are the Baya (also spelled Gbaya, President Bozizé’s group) who constitute 33% of the total population and the Banda who make up 27%. Geographically the Baya are located in the North West, whereas the Banda are found throughout the territory. These two groups have intermingled extensively. The Mandjia (13%), Sara (also called Sara-Kaba 10%), Mboum (7%), are the next largest ethnic groups. The Manjia who are affiliated with the Maroro and Peuhl are located in the north, the Sara and Mboum are found in the north along the Chad and Cameroon border, while the Sara (President Patassé’s ethnic group) are also found in the northwest. Finally, distinct minority groups, are the M’Baka (4%, Bokassa and Dacko’s ethnic group) settled in the southwest of the country, and the Yakoma (4%, General Kolingba’s ethnic group) who live mainly in the southeast along the Oubangui river. Other ethnic groups, including the forest dweller Tvides, (so-called pygmies) make up 2% of the population.

4The 2006 CIA fact book, “From conflict analysis to conflict prevention Central African Republic,” a World Bank internal discussion paper, and “fact on record” were used to compile a succinct ‘ethnic card’ of the CAR.
That electoral victor was Ange Felix Patassé, a prominent member of the political class, and a former Prime Minister of Bokassa’s. His election did not fundamentally alter the political, social, or security underpinnings of the country. A fierce competition between elites had led to the emergence of a winner, but did nothing to focus the attention of the elites on radically solving the crisis the country was steeped in. In May 1996 and November 1997 elements of the army, by then dominated by the Yacoma, mutinied and rampaged, articulating corporate and political grievances and making corresponding demands. This contributed to sapping the new political regime, deteriorating further the social climate, and increasing insecurity. The president himself no longer trusted the security apparatus to protect him. All of this led to the intervention of international actors to restore law and order and help implement the ‘Bangui accords’ assiduously arrived at to end the mutinies and the deep social and political crisis they had brought to the surface.

21. While he was almost immediately confronted with social and security crises to attend to urgently, President Patassé appeared to be merely continuing an established tradition of poor governance. This included upholding the tradition to divert national resources toward personal use and non-productive activities. In 2002, unable to fulfill the promise to pay state employees salary arrears on the state treasury, Patassé resorted to paying them from his own personal fortune.

22. Patassé’s reelection in 1999 by a large margin did not ease what was by then a deepening political, social, and economic crisis and a most precarious security environment. These were aptly illustrated by months of salary arrears for state employees, including the armed forces, increasingly out of President Patassé’s control. Feeling besieged, he had weapons distributed to his political supporters, organizing veritable militias to counterweigh the regular armed forces. He also invited in Libyan troops to assure his safety and the continuation of his regime. In May 2001 a military coup attempting to overthrow him failed when Libyan troops stationed in the capital intervened to crush it. André Kolingba, the former military head of state, though no longer commanding troops, admitted to have been its mastermind. Threatened with arrest, he and his supporters, along with follow Yacoma fearing reprisal, fled Bangui and other parts of the country and took refuge in neighboring DRC with the help of the troops of Jean Pierre Bemba, the leader of military and political faction (the Movement for the Liberation of the Congo, MLC), and a protagonist to the conflict of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).

23. Meanwhile, General François Bozizé, until then Army Chief of Staff as a result of a provision of the Bangui accords following the 1996 and 1997 mutinies, was suspected of having either condoned the May 2001 coup or even having hatched a plot of his own. Bozizé launched an open rebellion when President Patassé moved to arrest him, and fled toward Chad in November 2001 accompanied with about half a battalion of troops loyal to him. His first attempt to take power in 2002 failed. This attack on Bangui prompted a desperate President Patassé to call ally states and non-state actors to the rescue. These were mainly Libya and the Community of Sahel and Coast states CEN-SAD, CEMAC (the sub-regional integration grouping) and the troops of rebel leader Jean Pierre Bemba from the DRC. The intervention resulted in widespread looting and atrocities including rapes that still haunt populations in Bangui.

More of the same or new beginnings? 2003-

24. On March 15, 2003, with the help of mostly Chadian hired guns, General Bozizé succeeded in overrunning Bangui and taking over power while President Patassé was out of the country. Days of violence and systematic looting ensued throughout the capital, forcing a vast population movement, all of which contributed to aggravating the socioeconomic crisis and insecurity throughout the country. While the stalemate was broken and hopes started, again, to run high that a new era may be opening, it was clear that the road to a radical turnaround of the country’s situation would be much more arduous.

Current sub-regional security and international context

25. CAR is located in the heart of a particularly volatile region. To its north is Chad where a low
intensity conflict challenging President Idriss Deby Itno’s regime occasionally flares up, with the recent exploitation of oil increasing the stakes. To the east is Sudan where the ongoing Darfur crisis added to decades of north-south civil war. In recent years, simmering tensions in these two countries were markedly heightened by mutual accusations of support for their respective armed oppositions and blatant attempts at destabilization leveled against one another. Since the Ugandan LRA operates mainly from southern Sudan, it too has been said to use the CAR territory for a variety of purposes including poaching and tactical and operational retreat. To the south, incursions from the DRC conflict have plagued the country, specifically through the involvement of Jean Pierre Bemba and the presence of his troops. To the southwest, the Republic of Congo also experienced a bloody civil war only a few years ago. The Brazzaville-Pointe Noire transport route remains hampered by the simmering conflict in the Pool region in the south of the country, forcing Central African timber transport through Cameroon, where it is subject to roadblocks and banditry on the way. Only Cameroon to the Northwest has been spared a civil war or major disturbances in recent years, though it too cannot be considered a haven of peace and democracy.

26. In addition to armed groups and the regular armies protagonist in these various intrastate armed conflicts, the territory of the CAR has been also freely utilized by roaming bands of bandits and poachers engaged in crimes, racketeering, and trafficking of all sorts, in command of weaponry and logistical means far superior to that of the national armed forces of CAR (FACA). It is estimated that some 50,000 small arms and light weapons are in circulation (Berman 2004).

27. The political instability has contributed to poor socioeconomic outcomes. CAR ranked 169th among 177 countries in UNDP’s 2004 Human Development Index. With a GNI per capita of $350 (2005), poverty is widespread: an estimated 67 percent of the population lives under the poverty line, with an even higher incidence of poverty in rural areas. Nearly 11 percent of people between the ages of 15-49 are infected with HIV/AIDS. Access to basic education and health services is minimal. The rate of school attendance at the primary level dropped from 48 percent in 1988, to 41 percent in 2003 as a result of the instability. Similarly, the Country’s GDP collapsed after the 2001-2003 rebellion and only returned to its previous growth level in 2005 with 2.2%. Agriculture, the main activity for the majority of Central Africans, has recorded very poor performance. The main cash crops are coffee and cotton, for which production fell respectively from 11,800 tons in 2000 to 3,800 tons in 2004, and from 21,000 tons in 2000 to 6,800 tons in 2004. In 2003 CAR’s debt stood at 107% of its GDP.5

28. The number of companies registered with the internal revenue administration dropped in 10 years from 400 to just 25. State employees, including members of the security forces go months without being paid. Meanwhile the turmoil and uncertainty of that decade drastically reduced international development aid, compounding the effects of anemic economic growth and tax recovery rates on both the state and populations. Although no statistics are available, one consequence of these dismal socioeconomic data and trends is clearly high unemployment rates in general and among youth in particular. Idle youth are easy targets for recruitment by any of the armed non-state actors.

Policy response and international support

29. The World Bank reengaged with CAR in November 2006, clearing arrears and providing a small budget support. A Strategic Framework for Poverty Reduction has been elaborated and a Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRSP) is expected to be finalized in 2007. The document makes the connection between security and poverty explicit through a pillar on security and another on governance. Arrears to the African Development Bank were cleared in December 2006. On December 22, 2006, the IMF approved a three-year arrangement under the PRGF for a total amount of US$55.4 million. The return of IFIs which enables the CAR’s access to additional bilateral and multilateral aid and (HIPC) debt alleviation mechanisms is expected to improve budgetary prospects and make more resources available for necessary expenditures, including

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5 World Bank (2006)
Relevant Background and Prospects for Reform: Part 2

Beyond Demobilization: Challenges and Opportunities for Security Sector Reform in the Central African Republic

security. Meanwhile, the present dire economic and fiscal situation continues to severely limit the room for maneuver by the government.

Prospects for security sector reform

30. In their study of opportunities and challenges to SSR in West Africa, Bryden, N’Diaye, and Olonisakin (2005) advocate “the need to foster a culture of ‘positive opportunism’ when it comes to pushing ahead the transformation of the security sector in states spared the catastrophe of collapse” (p.223). This simply means capitalizing on major events as a window of opportunity to make hard choices and engage in reforming aspects of the state apparatus, in particular the security sector. Ideally a strategically minded leadership would recognize such a window of opportunity and its brevity, and endeavor to put in place well-planned and bold policies in the security area.

31. Emerging from a civil war following years of political and security turmoil, the concept of positive opportunism is clearly of some relevance to CAR. First, the current President knows the system and its dysfunctions - having been one of its victims - to want to change it in some way. Second, while the decisive victory of the current regime provided broad leeway for its leaders, and no negotiated deal for integration of armed factions, the President needed to make room or create alternatives for the “libérateurs/patriotes” that had helped him to power. Third, pressure from international partners to legitimize and professionalize the new political order remains high. In addition to elections, reforms in public sector management are underway.

32. On the other hand, there are equally strong and compelling motivations for the new regime and its leader not to conceive the end of the Patassé regime as an opportunity for a radical departure from existing policies and practices. General Bozizé was a minister and protagonist of the endless rivalries among the elites in the 1980s. He had been Chief of Staff of the FACA for five years and is steeped in the tradition of security as the preserve and privilege of the head of state; a means to maintain power and keep enemies at bay.

Toward a discourse on human security

33. For too long, in CAR as elsewhere in Africa, security meant security for the head of state, his regime, and people around him. Globally, and as discussed earlier, it has become increasingly accepted that security cannot just mean security for the state and its institutions against external aggression and domestic destabilization if this is done to the detriment of protecting populations. Human security also entails a general situation where there is an absence of undue violence or threat of violence on a human community and its members and where individuals “live in freedom, peace and safety; participate in the process of governance enjoy the protection of fundamental rights, have access to resources and the basic necessities of life; and inhabit an environment which is not detrimental to their health and well-being.” At present, the human security of Central Africans is undermined not only by widespread poverty, but also kidnappings, assassinations, pillage, rapes, rackets, stealing or destruction of property, even committed by the very institutions that are supposed to protect.

34. One key challenge will be to make the broader concept of security sector reform, including human security, understood and accepted by authorities as well as the average official and state employee. Currently, SSR is mostly conceptualized as a technical restructuring of the armed forces and the rebuilding of their material and operational capabilities. Analysis and political will of the political and governance dimensions of the security sector are lacking. The passage of a new constitution and the holding of free and fair election in 2005 constituted crucial steps toward democracy and more accountable government institutions. International partners, keen to support the Government in planned efforts to reform the security sector, have insisted on a global approach to SSR, encompassing governance, oversight, and sound principles of financial management.

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Part 3: Mapping out the Security Sector: Functions and Challenges

Overview of actors

35. As the above discussion suggests, the security sector in CAR goes well beyond the core apparatuses in charge of national defense and state security. In addition, paramilitary bodies, non-state actors, organs of oversight and control as well as international partners must be examined to present a complete picture. (See table 2 for an overview). Similar to other former French colonies, the core of the security sector is comprised of a number of services: the Army: the Forces Armées de la Centrafrique (FACA); the Gendarmerie; a paramilitary force; an Air Force; a small fluvial Navy; the National/Republican/Presidential Guard; the National Police, (recently seconded in policing work by Bangui’s municipal police); and a national security service in charge of State Intelligence. The mission and functioning of most of these forces and services have been stipulated in recent law number 99.017 of October 24, 1999 and decree 00.230 of October 3, 2000.

36. Decree 00.230 of October, 3 2000, taken in application of law No. 99.018 of October 24, 1999 set up a Supreme Council on National Defense (SCND) presided over by the head of state. The SCND is conceived as an advisory body attached to the Presidency and is in charge of national defense issues (broadly construed to include economic, civil, internal, and external defense). Though the term ‘defense’ is used rather than ‘security’, it can be inferred that the Council also has in its attributions broad security concerns. The mission of this important organ is to “evaluate threats and risks, both internal and external, and to design effective responses to counter them.” (article 9) In addition, the Council is tasked with the coordination of different national defense elements through four sub-commissions in which a number of key ministries are represented. It appears that the SCND has not been allocated the necessary resources or opportunity to fully play its role. However, if refocused, the Council has the capacity and potential to contribute immensely to the design and coordination of an SSR initiative. Other security related state services include customs; the water and forest protection services; and the judicial system, including the prison management system.

37. A growing number of private security agencies have yet to be more formally and systematically regulated by the state. In the context of CAR and other countries emerging from civil war, former combatants, remnants of ethnic/political militias, self-defense armed groups (such as the archers), self -proclaimed rebel groups on the border of Sudan and Chad, armed bandits who racket passersby on countryside roads (called Zaraguinas), also constitute components of the security sector. From the onset, it must however be noted that despite its severe security problems, CAR does not seem to have experienced to any large extent the phenomenon of child soldiers that has plagued other war torn countries.

38. A number of international actors support the Central African Republic in realms of security. French cooperation personnel and infrastructures is the most important and visible single actor, alongside the European Union (EU) support to the Multinational Force of the Central African Monetary and Economic Cooperation (FOMUC), and the United Nations Office in CAR (BONUCA).

39. Constitutional, legal, political, or de facto oversight bodies also belong to the security sector and their roles, capabilities, and potential will be reviewed as part of this mapping exercise, including the National Assembly through its National Defense and Security Commission, and civil society organizations monitoring security related issues.
### Table 1. Summary of Security Sector Actors in the CAR

#### A: State controlled actors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Actors</th>
<th>Description/Status</th>
<th>Anticipated Role in SSR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FACA</td>
<td>Very low operational effectiveness, morale, limited facilities and equipment; strained relations with civilians</td>
<td>Become ethnically and regionally balanced, better trained, equipped, apolitical; Build better relations with civilians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gendarmerie</td>
<td>Very low operational effectiveness, morale, limited facilities and equipment; strained relations with civilians</td>
<td>Continue improvement, training more officers, better understanding of role in a democracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican Guard</td>
<td>Made up of “libérateurs” ; more heavily armed and often called in as problem solvers yet no formal role in public order; Problems of impunity</td>
<td>To become a professional corps not a praetorian guard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Police</td>
<td>Undermanned, under-equipped; low morale</td>
<td>Better recruitment, training; professional attitude; accountability, respect for human rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Municipal Police</td>
<td>Recently set up; confusion about mandate and jurisdiction;</td>
<td>Status and mission clarification; better training, supervision; better coordination with National Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Customs</td>
<td>Operate in extremely difficult conditions; undermanned, under-equipped; history of corruption and mismanagement</td>
<td>Participate better in fiscal operations of the state; reduce smuggling and corruption; increase revenue collection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water, Forests, Fisheries, and Environmental protection</td>
<td>Limited coverage of the national territory; need for additional personnel and equipment (logistics, communication, weaponry)</td>
<td>Harmonization of legislation on environmental protection; determination of clear objectives, plans to achieve them to limit devastation of CAR fauna and flora</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intelligence Services</td>
<td>Non uniformed service attached to the President’s office; instrument at the discretion of the Head of State; absence of legal framework for action; absence of oversight, inadequate means</td>
<td>Professionalization; training to stress apolitical nature of mission; democratic oversight; equipment; need of legislation regulating their functioning and attributions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Defense</td>
<td>Portfolio held by Head of State; supervises armed forces, coordinates defense/ security related issues</td>
<td>Review concept of Security, civilian control; Assess threats, opportunities, strategize, revitalize coordinating organs; integrate new actors, transparency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Interior/ Security</td>
<td>In charge of domestic security; Oversees National police</td>
<td>Review, adopt new concept of security; accept role for monitoring organs;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Justice</td>
<td>Outdated legal instruments and equipment; only to a very limited extent executes role as managing judiciary police. Role in SSG underestimated;</td>
<td>Become a bona fide actor in SSR; update skills and practices; Rehabilitation/ Revitalization of judicial administration; better equipment</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table 1. Summary of Security Sector Actors in the CAR

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>B: Democratic Control</strong></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>National Assembly (N.A.)</strong></td>
<td>Holds financial and investigatory power; questioning and powers; Power to initiate legislations</td>
<td>Increase awareness of, capacity, and role in defense and security matters. Create legislative framework for SSR/G</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Commission on National Defense and Security</strong></td>
<td>Specializes in security and defense issues on behalf of N.A. Power to investigate; hold hearings; But has not used any of these powers; no influence over defense/security matters</td>
<td>Take on its full role as an oversight body on behalf of the parliament and people. Increased capacity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Civil Society</strong></td>
<td>Made up of diverse groups with legitimate interests in security, human rights and good governance; Despite expertise and interest in security issues, has been excluded from any substantive role</td>
<td>Participate in formulation and monitoring of security sector governance; Remains engaged in security sector governance matters informally as well as formally</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>C: Non-State Actors</strong></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Private security companies</strong></td>
<td>Have proliferated to meet security needs unfulfilled by the state; unregulated; problematic involvement of other security sector actors (retired or serving officers)</td>
<td>Need regulatory framework and close supervision; has its place in a well regulated security market.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Armed militias and self defense groups (remnants)</strong></td>
<td>Prospered under the former regime; DDR has demobilized most</td>
<td>No role if addressed by DDR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Rebel Groups</strong></td>
<td>Former “Libérateurs” and political opposition affiliated with personalities of Patassé Regime still roam the north and northeast</td>
<td>Lay down weapons, accept political role in improved democratic arena</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Zaraguinas</strong></td>
<td>Gangs of 10 to 150 armed bandits blocking roads and ransoming passengers and commercial operators; May lend rebels support for a price</td>
<td>None; Will have to diminish as security forces gain operational effectiveness and achieve actual presence throughout the territory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Archers</strong></td>
<td>Self defense groups formed by herders to fend off the zaraguinas</td>
<td>None; will diminish in time as Zaraguinas threat disappears, and state asserts its control and provides security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Poachers</strong></td>
<td>Of foreign or domestic origin, bands who illegally hunt and devastate CAR fauna and flora</td>
<td>None; are likely to remain a nuisance and a threat to the environment protection policies;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
D: External partners in Security Sector Reforms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Role and Activities</th>
<th>SSR and Governance Focuses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FRANCE</td>
<td>Principal partner and sustainer of the security apparatus in CAR; Knows main actors and dynamics; Critical role in training, equipment, and restructuring of police, gendarmerie and FACA</td>
<td>Sponsor and finance important aspects of SSR; impress on authorities need for transformation of the security sector</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRAC/MDRP</td>
<td>Critical Program to reduce number of armed individuals and reintegrate former militia members into communities</td>
<td>Necessity to link DDR and SSR and continue demobilization and related reintegration programs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEMAC/FOMUC</td>
<td>Stabilizing military presence, training and operational support to FACA; diplomatic involvement</td>
<td>LAs FOMUC mandate come to an end, more CEMAC engagement, push for SSR and good governance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BONUCA</td>
<td>UN multifaceted aid for political stabilization and capacity building</td>
<td>Continued support to SSR efforts, monitoring, capacity building</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUROPEAN UNION</td>
<td>Important financial and technical partner and backer of reforms</td>
<td>Continue to push for reforms and monitor progress in SSR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IFIS (WB, IMF, AfDB)</td>
<td>Have not included security sector as target of funding, activities/programs; Tends to focus on budgetary aspects</td>
<td>Encourage SSR, integrate it to overall development and poverty reduction strategies alongside partners;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A. State controlled actors

The Central African Armed Forces (FACA)

40. By the end of the first military regime under Bokassa, and further under the Kolingba regime, the Forces Armées de la République Centrafricaine (FACA) had become a thoroughly ethnic and regionally based force, and a key player in the country’s political process. Having more or less ruled the country for 27 years out of 46, the FACA has little experience in being part of a democratically governed security sector. Over the last few years the FACA has deteriorated even further with respect to its capabilities (human and material), its cohesion, and discipline. In the course of various mutinies and rebellion, barracks and archives were destroyed, and weapons stolen. Morale is lacking and desertions are frequent, particularly among troops deployed in the north of the country where the presence of rebel/armed criminals has been signaled and periodic battles take place.

41. Since the change of regime in March 2003, the FACA is now comprised of at least three distinguishable clusters. The first, the “loyalist,” is made up of remnants of the original (pre-mutiny) army; the second of former mutineers (involved in the 1996 - 1997 mutinies) predominantly members of the Yacoma, former President General Kolingba’s ethnic group; and the third cluster of elements is labeled “liberateurs”. The latter are mostly Chadian mercenaries hired by General Bozizé to strengthen core elements of his rebellion in 2001 and later integrated in the FACA and the Presidential Guard. A high-ranking officer reported that members of these clusters tend to salute only “their” own officers, and pay no attention to officers from other clusters. So far three battalions seem to have been trained by French troops. Efforts to reduce the impact of ethnic recruitment and other aspects of FACA management should be made part of any SSR efforts.

42. The legacy of years of repressive acts of violence against the population has turned certain elements of the FACA, as currently set up, into a liability for the population rather than a resource. As candidly admitted by a senior official, “the army [is] utterly rejected by the people.” As recently as December 2006, the Peace...
and Security Council of the African Union (AU) noted that the FACA had committed human rights violations against the population during the most recent fighting in the north and northeast. The UN Secretary General, in his report to the Security Council in December 2006, listed reprisals by the Central African Armed Forces against civilian populations suspected of supporting rebel groups among the “primary causes of human rights violations in the conflict zones.8”

43. The FACA totals 5,108 men and women, including 101 officers, 275 petty officers, and 298 non-commissioned officers. As of 2006, 1,200 members of the FACA were deployed throughout the national territory, up from just 400 after March 2003. This comes nowhere close to the adequate level of coverage of the national territory given the current level of threat and insecurity and the size of the country. Lack of proper equipment, barracks and leadership; irregular or inexistent salaries; and the storage of weapons and ammunitions in living quarters have combined to foster antisocial and criminal behaviors. In Bangui and in the countryside checkpoints are set up for no other purposes than to racket citizens. When deployed in the countryside, members of the FACA have reportedly been forced to prey on the population they are supposed to protect in order to survive, thus contributing to the insecurity, and further widening the gap between them and the population.

44. Meanwhile, the ranks are being decimated by the AIDS pandemic as well as other diseases, a loss in number compounded by the prohibition on recruiting imposed by key development partners. The prevalence rate in the FACA are said to be higher than in the general population, a rate which already stands at nearly 14% in 2004. Similarly to the gendarmerie, soldiers who otherwise would have been discharged because of their age stay on because there are no funds to pay salary arrears and make pensions immediately available. In fact, in many instances, retirees are even called back. In addition, because for years no real training was carried out, the level of fitness and skills are dismal. Over the last several years, only the support of the FOMUC has made possible a minimum of training and professional outlook for the few lucky FACA units that came in contact with them.

45. The defense forces also for some time became the supplier of private protection to a variety of “customers” (private companies, NGOs, etc) who can afford to pay for its services at the cost of 10,000 CFA Francs per soldier and per day. This arrangement is regulated by the Ministry of Defense since 2006. However, on a budget management level, this practice opens the way to budget manipulations and other specious budgetary and managerial practices. This is further discussed in the economic governance section.

46. In these conditions, FACA cannot fulfill its obligations unless major and urgent reforms are carried out. These reforms would have to address a variety of issues such as missions and obligations, troop levels, structure, strategy, effectiveness, accountability, and relations with other actors in the security sector. The breach of confidence that now prevails between the FACA and ordinary civilians must also be remedied and much better civilian-military relations established and nurtured. The FACA must be made into a genuinely national force (not ethnic or regional) that is professional and apolitical, subordinate to the democratic authority, respectful of human rights, and without any claims or ambitions to rule the country. This objective will not be achieved without a radical transformation of the institution and environment in which it operates. It will not be possible without also attending to the material and other legitimate needs of the FACA.

The Gendarmerie

47. As an armed security force with a military status, the Gendarmerie is a legacy of the French colonial system. Its mission combines police and military-like activities throughout the national territory. While under the command of a Director General and the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Defense, the Gendarmerie enjoys a certain autonomy granted to it by decree no. 95.369 passed on January 1st 1996. Although its budgetary needs are not fully met (especially its needs for fuel to enable full mobility and rapid reaction), it seems to be doing fairly well given the overall circumstance of the country. This is nearly entirely thanks to the training, technical and material support the Government of France has provided over the last few years. Without this support, the force would have been in a much worse
situation, with further implications for insecurity in CAR. As of August 2006, the Gendarmerie has 1,728 men and women and an effective presence in over 60% of the national territory, and is fairly well equipped. It seems to have been spared the ransacking the FACA experienced during the last few years. Among its strengths is what appears to be a remarkable sense of planning. Its ambition is to raise the level of the force to 4000 by 2015 and reach a ratio of one gendarme per one thousand persons.

48. The Gendarmerie suffers from some of the same weaknesses as the FACA however. One key weakness is a serious deficit of commanding officers, since there are only 50 officers for the entire force. To overcome this shortage, it needs to train 20 officers annually, and has currently only 7 in training. The second is that there does not seem to be any awareness within the command structure of the concept of democratic oversight of the armed forces in general, and the Gendarmerie in particular. In contrast to the FACA, there appears to be openness to more formal and sustained institutional and personal relations with the National Assembly’s defense and security commission and with civil society elements. There also seem to be an above average awareness of the human rights dimension of the duties of the armed forces, and the gendarmerie in particular. This is encouraging given the critical role a force like the Gendarmerie can be made to play in security sector governance.

The Republican Guard

49. This brigade is estimated to consist of about 800-1000 elements. Members of the Guard can be found in the provinces alongside the FACA. The Guard is traditionally responsible for the personal safety and security of the head of state. While its inclusion is paramount for a genuine reform and security governance, this discussion is likely to be extremely sensitive, with little reception for pushes toward transparency in composition and operation. At least, SSR design would have to impress on CAR authorities the need to progressively and firmly put in place mechanisms to prevent and punish unlawful behavior by members of the force.

50. Given how much rides on the control and loyalty of this guard, heads of state from Bokassa onward have taken a personal interest in their composition, command, and operations. While technically under the command of the army chief of staff with its elements to be drawn from the various units of the army (article 10 of law No. 99. O17 pertaining to the general organization of the army), this brigade actually answers only to the president through the direct supervision of a trusted person/office.

The National Police

51. Of all the main components of the security apparatus, the National Police appears to be in the direst state. Because of their weak technical, human, and material situation, CAR’s National Police has not been able to play that role for a long time. They have also borne the brunt of the destruction that accompanied the most severe episode of the security crisis, as their offices and physical infrastructures were pillaged and sacked in the capital and throughout the country.

52. No new personnel have been recruited since 2002. The employees of the force, 1,648 in total including uniformed (1270), plain-clothed (279), specialists (137), experience several months of arrears. In contrast, in 1983/1984 for example, the CAR police force was 3,500 men strong. This situation has severely impacted its ability to carry out its mission (limited mobility, little or no means of communication, worn out uniforms, rundown physical infrastructure, etc) and its coverage of the national territory (the national police is only present in the 8 subdivisions of Bangui and in a few outside the capital).

53. The integrity and effectiveness of the police are the first casualties of the low morale of its members. It is also aging, severely affected by AIDS and other endemic diseases such as tuberculosis, and lacks the minimum training and skills required for an effective police force. Because of salary arrears, the unavailability of pensions for those eligible for retirement, and the hiring restrictions imposed by the country’s development partners, particularly the IMF, contribute to the aging and understaffing of the force. In its most recent extension of the post conflict emergency assistance, the IMF continues – explicably to some extent – to insist on budgetary restrictions, reduction of inefficiency and
54. Some believe the police to have managed, despite its constraints, to contribute to the relative safety of the city of Bangui. The police and gendarmerie are supported in maintaining public order by specialized units such as the gendarmerie squad, however oftentimes the army or the republican guard intervene in their place. The national police is not present in most of the 16 provinces, however. The extent of this impact is of course difficult to measure or ascertain. With regard to issues of reform, the emphasis should be on the level of manpower and material issues (regularly paid salaries, logistical means, etc). There is also a need to transform the understanding of policing itself, the relationship between the police and citizens, and for enhanced accountability and oversight. While there seems to be some consciousness about human rights issues such as torture and due process, and corruption issues (possibly due to the training efforts conducted by the BONUCA), there clearly is no conscious linkage between these and the reforms hoped for by the highest authorities in the police department and the Ministry of the Interior and Security. Any effort to pull the police out of a very difficult material and morale predicament should include an overall transformation of its entire outlook, including a continuous reeducation on the proper role of the police in a democratic society where the rule of law and respect for human rights are the norm.

The Municipal Police

55. In recent years, municipal police forces attached to the city of Bangui and a few other cities, dependent on and under the control of mayors, were created. The jurisdiction and attributions of this police force and its relationship with the national police are still not very clear. In Bangui, while their mission seems to center around tax collection and related duties, they also appear to have participated in policing work requiring the use of force. There is a clear need to clarify the role of these municipal police forces and determine their role in the overall policing work through appropriate legislations. The municipal police are officially estimated to number 1650 though this number seems extraordinary large for a city with such limited means as Bangui. Observers estimate the real number to be closer to 100.

Customs and Environmental Protection

56. The importance of the customs and the environmental protection administrations is compounded by the fact that the CAR is landlocked, sharing borders with five countries and with important environmental assets to protect. Like all the other components, these services are in a state of decay. There are only 424 active customs officers, including all positions (inspectors, comptrollers, agents, and auxiliaries). Among these employees, 102 are stationed in Bangui and the rest is scattered across the national territory, in 122 bureaus. In terms of logistics, for all these agents and for the entire territory of CAR the customs have five firearms, three vehicles, three motorcycles, a few patrol boats, five transmission radios, and 31 walkie-talkies. These means, both human and material resources, are patently insufficient for customs to fulfill adequately its mission.

57. The environment protection service is similarly inadequate. With 400 personnel, or a ratio of one agent per 6000 square kilometers, against a norm of one per 250, it is clearly understaffed. Plans to recruit 300 additional agents in 2001 were never implemented. The financial means available are poor, considering the superior quality of the poachers’ vehicles and arms. While for both services the material shortcomings are obvious, changes are also necessary with regards to effectiveness, accountability, and respect for property and human rights.

Intelligence Services

58. As in other African states, the “direction de la coordination et de la documentation” is a political instrument, seeing itself not as a professional, apolitical state organ, but rather as direct service to the head of state. It provides the latter with the means to stay in power by supplying information to ward off political enemies, and keep political allies in line. In CAR, this mission is carried out by a unit made up of 20 to 25 persons coming from various security forces, such as the gendarmerie or the police. These are attached to the office of the president and headed by a police commissioner. The unit reports directly to the head of state and has no relationship with any other state institution or person, including the National Assembly. The unit carries out
investigations, listens to telephone communications, and admittedly invades the privacy of citizens on its own authority, sometimes in collaboration with other state security services. As for other state services, it lacks material and financial means. Legislation to ensure professionalization and oversight, as well as training on the role and responsibilities of intelligence agencies in a democratic setting will be critical as part of SSR.

**Ministry of Defense**

59. Traditionally the Ministry of Defense oversees all the armed forces including the Gendarmerie, the Presidential Guard and the regular military, and acts as the main body responsible for the defense of the national territory against foreign threats. Since the threats to national security now stem largely from within CAR, the Ministry of defense has become more and more focused on domestic issues. Its power and influence over domestic politics is illustrated by the fact that now as in the past, the head of state is also the minister of defense. These arrangements are likely prompted by the fact that in most minds, the real struggle for power is not yet over, the new constitution, institutions and elections notwithstanding. As long as there is no real change in this mindset, the incentive to maintain the Ministry of defense under the direct control of the president will remain strong. The ‘de-presidentialization’ of the

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Permanent</td>
<td>Armed forces</td>
<td>Ministry</td>
<td>Magistrates (included)</td>
<td>Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Auxiliary</td>
<td>Gendarmerie</td>
<td>National Police</td>
<td></td>
<td>Technicians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Republican Guard</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Engineers</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>Guards</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Auxiliaries</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2. Personnel of various security related departments and total civil servants figures.

Source: compilation from various governmental sources.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ministries</th>
<th>Available Human Resources Data</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Civil Service: Total</td>
<td>24,310</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Permanent</td>
<td>22,371</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Auxiliary</td>
<td>1,939</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Defense</td>
<td>6,995</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armed forces</td>
<td>1,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gendarmerie</td>
<td>1,729</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican Guard</td>
<td>800-1000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of the Interior and Security</td>
<td>1923</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry</td>
<td>241</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Police</td>
<td>1,682</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Justice (total)</td>
<td>367</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Magistrates (included)</td>
<td>154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Customs</td>
<td>477</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of the Environment (in charge of Water, Forests, and fisheries)</td>
<td>455</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Management</td>
<td>133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technicians</td>
<td>146</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineers</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guards</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Auxiliaries</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Readers will note that the total of defense forces do not add up to 6,995. Numbers vary between sources, perhaps symptomatic of the lack of oversight. The total of 6,995 comes from the Ministry of Finance books and represents the number of people in the security sector that receive their paycheck under the “Ministry of Defense” label. However defense authorities provide lower figures. 1,200 represents the number of troops that are active and does not include “inactive” personnel.*
ministry and the appointment of a respected civilian personality to carry out the reforms would send a strong signal and show sincerity in the government’s efforts.

**Ministry of Interior and Security**

60. The Ministry of Interior and Security is under the command of an army colonel. It is in charge of the administrative management of the country’s 16 prefectures and 72 sub-prefectures, each headed by a prefect or a sub-prefect respectively. In addition to the National Police, the Ministry of Security employs a total 241 men and women.

**Ministry of Justice**

61. The judicial system plays an important role in the security sector. This has led the European Union and other international partners such as BONUCA to try and correct the difficult conditions in which the 154 magistrates, for example, exercise their duties. As in other departments, material and financial means as well as adequate training are sorely lacking. For the security system to function in a satisfactory manner, magistrates and the penal system more generally must function in conditions that do not encourage corruption and sub-standard justice. Currently sentences can be bought and prisons are in dismal conditions, even gowns are in limited numbers and have to be shared. A comprehensive SSR would have to include updating of judicial instruments and methods with training, address perceived impunity, punish mob justice, and more generally restore public trust in institutions of justice.

**B. Democratic Oversight**

**The National Assembly**

62. Constitutionally, the National Assembly plays a central role in the governance of security through its power of the purse, constitutional provisions, and, more directly, through its oversight powers. In reality, historically this institution has been completely severed from any role in the management of the security sector. This marginalization, partly self inflicted, is also a legacy of a long standing practice of the parliament as a rubberstamp institution for a strong executive. Its specialized commission on security, the Commission on National Defense and Security, has not played its institutional role for a number of reasons. As elsewhere on the continent, this body has surrendered to the assumed principle that security issues are the exclusive dominion of the executive, the president in particular. Nearly every facet of security and defense matters is framed in need for confidentiality incompatible with oversight that includes opponents to the regime.

63. Members of the commission admit that they have had only little to no impact on decisions regarding the security sector. The weak institutional capacity of the Assembly and the Commission has rendered the task even more difficult. For any security sector reform to succeed, the National Assembly through its Defense and Security Commission will need to play a crucial role in a national dialogue on SSR and later in the creation of a legislative framework for security governance. Reform would have to empower the Assembly and Commission to shape the security governance regime of the country, execute oversight, and increase the effectiveness of inexperienced members. Experiences from Ghana and Mali for example, illustrate that this is possible, but only as part of a comprehensive SSR.

**Civil Society Groups**

64. As in most other African states, the experience of a particularly repressive state has left CAR’s civil society with the nearly impossible task of bridging the gap between population and state. Civil society in CAR is made up of religious and secular, non-political organizations and groups advocating or serving as watchdogs for a range of issues, including human rights, some specifically oriented toward prisoner rights and women’s rights. These organizations have demonstrated a sustained interest in security sector governance and human security in particular. However civil society organizations were never systematically associated to the management of the security sector, only involved in occasional national forums on defense, for example the 1996 *Etats généraux* (national dialogue), and the monitoring committee of various national dialogues, including following the 2003 change of regime. They also often lack the material and administrative capacity to play a sustained role.
Leaders of civil society groups display competence and knowledge of the issue and their experience and connections to their various constituencies should guarantee them a place at the table. It is important that reform of the security sector makes room for civil society oversight and input, hence ensuring that security does not remain the exclusive purview of the state. In this respect one has to note the encouraging sign a free press and non state owned radio stations represent for the prospect of an active and involved civil society.

C. Non-state Actors of the Security Sector

Private Security Companies

In the context of a weak security sector and the loss by the state of its monopoly over the means of violence, private security companies have emerged in response to a demand for security on the part of businesses and non-profit organizations and other local and international NGOs. In the mining sector for example, the general lack of security and the need to ensure minimum safety for production operations and protection for company assets and management made it necessary to use armed security and surveillance mechanisms.

The state, concerned with its own security and related problems, has not yet caught up with adequate regulations and control of these companies. It appears that many of them belong to former or current high-ranking officers of the security forces, leading to a potential risk for conflict of interest and encroachment on the normal functions of the state.

Remnants of Militias and Self-Defense Groups

In the early 2000s, as security deteriorated in Bangui groups of civilians sympathetic to President Patassé and his party, started to form in the capital. As President Patassé became increasingly threatened by army mutineers, he had weapons distributed to loyalists and militants of his political party. Soon, militias with clear political and ethnic affiliations attached to president Patassé’s party, the Movement de libération du Peuple Centrafricain, emerged and started to carry weapons to counteract regular security forces whose loyalty to the President was questioned. The most notorious among these were the Karakos, the Balawas, and the Sarawis. Although the DDR program that followed the 2003 takeover disbanded most of these militias in the areas where it operated and recovered at least part of their weapons, possible remnants of these politico-ethnic militias may need particular attention. Care should be taken to ensure that the remaining weapons be recovered and the last militia members are properly oriented towards legitimate gainful activities.

Rebel Groups

While the military has, at least since the 1966 coup been involved one way or another in politics, it wasn’t until the rebellion led by the current head of state General Bozizé that non-military armed groups became political actors, with more or less articulated political agendas. The effects of this phenomenon are being felt today (late 2006). It started a cycle whereby armed groups are immediately formed by whatever faction is removed from power in order to regain it or at least prevent the opponent from enjoying it peacefully. Ever since Bozizé came to power, there have been a number of armed groups who have on occasions attacked outposts of the FACA, civilians, or travelers in order to get supplies. These are heteroclite groups made up of supporters of the former president Patassé, groups claiming allegiance to his former commander in charge of security Abdoulaye Miskine, and disgruntled former “liberateurs” unhappy with the compensation or rewards General Bozizé has paid or promised them after they helped him topple Patassé’s regime. Depending on the circumstances, these groups have formed alliances of opportunity or fought one another.

These have made their presence felt by attacking the FACA as recently as October 2006. The different groups operate mainly in the northeast and northwest of the country, more specifically in the Kaga Bandoro/ Kabo/ Batongafo triangle, in Birao, and around the locality of Paoua. They share the northeast with rebel groups coming from Sudan and Chad who take advantage of the absence of security forces in these regions to regroup and plan their activities against...
their enemies in relative security. The rebel groups and their activities undermine the country’s security and, perpetuate fear of renewed fighting among the population.

**Zaraguinas**

71. For years, gangs of 10 to 150 well-armed individuals have roamed the outskirts of the capital and particularly the countryside, attacking vehicles and racketeering passengers. Named in the Sangho language “Zaraguinas,” road blocking bandits, they seem to be well informed about the movements of their targets, well armed and well-equipped in terms of transportation means, and bold enough to attack even well protected convoys. They also engage in cattle wrestling and hostage taking. They typically kidnap children of wealthy Fulani herdsmen (in the northwest of the country), forcing them to sell their cattle to pay the ransom. Although their criminal activities as such are not unique, it is evident that it is the fragility of the state security apparatus, the porosity of the borders, and the availability of weapons that make the “zaraguinas” phenomenon possible on such a large scale, and for so long. The application of the tri-partite accords for the eradication of trans-border criminality signed with Chad and Cameroon could help curtail this phenomenon.

**Archers**

72. In response to the activities of the “Zaraguinas,” Fulani herdsmen have organized themselves into self-defense groups that attempt to prevent or counter raids on their cattle and rescue their kidnapped children. Though the “archers” are known to collaborate with state security forces, this reaction to the “Zaraguinas” has added yet another armed group to be taken into consideration when crafting a comprehensive SSR. The “archers” phenomenon is indicative of the natural inclination of people, whether organized in groups or not, to bypass the state to ensure their own protection. There is always a gap between the period when a state is clearly incapable of carrying out its duty and the time when, because of adjustments, new capabilities, and new policies, the state resumes its basic duties. Groups such as the “archers” could very well complicate the latter period by continuing to exist, even beyond the transitional phase. Hopefully, as the “Zaraguinas” phenomenon recedes, the “archers” will also disappear.

**Poachers**

73. CAR’s inability to protect its formerly abundant wildlife have transformed its territory into an open field for heavily armed and equipped poachers, plundering national resources and devastating the fauna for food and commercial reasons. The relationship between this situation and the inability of the security sector to meet its obligations is obvious.

**D. International Partners**

74. Support from the international community in the security arena has been limited and not well coordinated. Without this support however, CAR would find itself in a situation much worse than currently is the case.

**Regional Actors**

75. With virtually all neighboring countries experiencing more or less acute security crises, security in CAR can only be properly understood by taking the regional context into account. There are security assistance and cooperation agreements between CAR and most of its neighbors in areas such as trans-border crimes. A formal cooperation and good neighborliness agreement with Sudan covers a variety of areas, including economic and even border security, and calls for mixed military border patrols and other confidence building and collective security measures. These agreements have essentially been dormant since they were signed (prior to the Bozizé regime). The current political and security crisis in Darfur has drawn the governments of Chad and CAR even closer. Both continue to accuse the government of Sudan to support their respective armed opposition in an attempt to destabilize them. In addition, they also struggle with their own respective armed opposition groups intermingling and operating from the north of CAR. Although it too needs far-reaching political and security sector reforms, it is unlikely that Chad will engage in either in the immediate future. Tripartite agreements aimed at fighting illegal cross border activities have been signed between Chad, Cameroon and the CAR,
without much follow up. Non-aggression and mutual assistance treaties aimed at improving security, stability and peace in central Africa and Sahelian countries exist between CEMAC and CEN-SAD countries. However these are mostly statements of intention with no serious political will for implementation.

76. The DRC is tied by mutual assistance agreements to the CAR, and will continue to have an impact, as it has in the past, on events marking its neighbor. For now however, the DRC faces arguably even more daunting security challenges and remains focused on solving its own volatile situation. The Republic of Congo has also recently emerged from civil war. While it has seen its security situation improve, the simmering conflict in the Pool region has yet to find a political solution. In sum, the solution to the security crisis in CAR is closely tied with the central African sub-region. Any solution must therefore have a sub-regional dimension, including the reinforcement or creation of a sub-regional security regime and code of conduct in security related matters. The emerging common defense and security regimes favored by the AU and regional organizations seem to confirm this necessity.

France

77. As the former colonial power, France has played a major role in CAR since independence. Regardless of its antecedent, and perhaps because of it, France will constitute a key player in any SSR efforts in CAR. Because of its position, ties and its presence on the ground, France is more informed than possibly any other external partner. French officials are well informed about the political and security dynamics (both domestic and sub-regional), the personalities involved, as well as the state of the relations between the population and their security apparatus. Since at least 2003, France has contributed significantly to preventing a complete collapse of the state and its security system in particular. As already mentioned, it has provided significant support to the Gendarmerie through its expertise, technical assistance, and training. It is also providing technical assistance to the FACA and the National police. Recently, France has played a decisive logistical and operational role in helping the FACA regain control over the localities attacked and occupied in October/November 2006 by the armed opposition. Based on this, France is uniquely situated to act as a benevolent sponsor and supporter of the security sector reform in CAR.

The National Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) Program

78. The circumstance under which power switched from President Patassé to General Bozizé prompted the establishment of a disarmament, demobilization, and reintegartion (DDR) program to deal with the numerous armed groups and weapons in circulation. Funding for the project was enabled by General Bozizé’s commitment to security sector reform in his June 2003 letter to the President of the World Bank. The Projet de Reinsertion des Ex Commbattants et Appui aux Communautés (PRAC) program was launched in September 2004 under the aegis of UNDP and in partnership with the National Commission for DDR. The operation, financed with $9.8 million from the Multi-country Demobilization and Reintegration Program (MDRP) Trust fund and additional funding from the UNDP, targeted 7,565 former combatants and 42,000 dependants. As of late 2006, 5,515 ex-combatants (73%) had been demobilized and 5,176 reintegrated. Nearly 70 micro projects had been started in relevant geographical areas. In addition to alleged operational and management difficulties, the program seems to have suffered from a lack of linkage with security sector reforms. Its operations exclusively targeted former non-state controlled combatants, not the armed forces under state control; even though security and peace were certainly as threatened, if not more, by the latter. As the project closes, and alternatives are explored by the donor/development community to address the still fragile security situation, it will be crucial to better coordinate these two components to secure sound post-conflict security sector governance.

Economic and Monetary Community of central African States (CEMAC) and its Multi-national Force (FOMUC)

79. The Central African Economic and Monetary Community (CEMAC) has played an important role in limiting the consequences of the armed conflict, stabilizing the situation, and pushing for a durable, inclusive solution in CAR. Its contribution, initially
Part 3: Mapping out the Security Sector: Functions and Challenges

diplomatic, evolved into the deployment of a multinational force, FOMUC. FOMUC has played a key role in the stabilization of the country and training of FACA elements.

80. The presence in CAR of a contingent of 380 FOMUC personnel is a good example of the regional solidarity and collective security spirit emerging on the continent and symbolized by the African Union’s 2002 Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council, and in particular its African Standby Force provision. The 2004 African Common Defense mechanism also reinforces this trend. While CEMAC contributes less than 22% of the funds that make that presence possible (the rest is funded by the European Union, and France supplies part of the equipment), the willingness of CEMAC states to contribute troops and partially fund the operation has played a key role in minimizing the crisis. Due to limited resources and other constraints, the presence of FOMUC has been extended for only one year despite calls for a longer presence. When its mandate and funding come to an end in 2007, their withdrawal will leave a vacuum. It is critical that precautions be taken by then to prevent the return of violence, particularly in light of recent developments in the north and the still weak state of the FACA. However, as the present analysis suggests, it is not clear that these security conditions will be in place.

United Nations Bureau in the Central African Republic - BONUCA

81. Since the late 1990s, BONUCA has been another international partner pushing for political and institutional reforms, and the adoption of best practices. It provides training to the Police and Gendarmerie, in addition to its advisory and advocacy work on political and human rights issues. BONUCA also works closely with the ‘Wiseman’s council’ (Comité des Sages) to establish dialogue on politically contested issues. More recently, in connection with the widening Darfur crisis, BONUCA has been advocating for the inclusion of a CAR dimension to any discussion of the international community on possible solutions to the crisis, including the stationing of UN troops on CAR territory along the CAR-Sudan border. The UN system as a whole is also active through its UNDAF and is considering a larger and more sustainable intervention (2007-2011) especially outside Bangui as security permits. However, all these actions are short term and lack a much-needed comprehensive plan from the CAR authorities. Given its experience, in-country connections, and authority, BONUCA can be a critical catalyst and partner in the early stages of the SSR through its relevant activities (Human rights, good policing, protection of vulnerable groups, institutional capacity building, etc).

The European Union

82. Only the MDRP which is funding the DDR operation has given more financial aid to CAR than the European Union. In addition to its critical funding of the FOMUC, the EU contributes directly to SSR by funding an initiative to build capacity in the Ministry of Justice and the judicial system as a whole. The EU is keenly aware of the security situation and has been willing to do its part to alleviate it and will be a valuable partner in ensuring the success of SSR, including by providing funding to relevant activities as consistent with European funding policies. Its knowledge of the dynamics at play and clear idea of what needs to be done will be an invaluable asset for the sustainability of an SSR process.

International Financial Institutions

83. Financial partners such as the IMF and World Bank have recently scaled up their assistance. The extent to which they are sensitive to the needs of the CAR to reform its security sector as part of its overall reconstruction and recovery efforts will influence whether or not SSR succeeds or fails.

84. Typically the International Financial Institutions (IFI) do not address core security functions of the state. However, their insistence on macroeconomic balance has affected the security sector by limiting the means to be used for defense and security, impacting the financial crisis of the FACA and the National Police for example. On the other hand, the recent reengagement with both the World Bank and the IMF making available funding and technical support for reconstruction and strengthened public sector management, also more or less directly affect the security sector. This reengagement will have to take into account the urgency of reforming the security sector and integrate this into
its recovery and development efforts. For example, it already focuses on public sector management including management of public finances. The DDR program in particular, and perhaps also indirectly the HIV/AIDS program, have contributed to improving the security situation. While ensuring that the ownership, initiation and sustainability of the SSR remains the Government’s responsibility and prerogative, the IFIs will have to play the crucial role of insisting that a status quo in the security sector is inconsistent with political stability and sound socioeconomic development strategies.

Other Partners

85. Other partners include a variety of UN agencies and other organizations who work to alleviate poverty, empower various social actors, and more generally help rebuild the country’s socioeconomic capacities. By improving the living conditions of the population and reduce the impact of psychological insecurity, they actively contribute to the transformation of the country’s security sector. In addition, other states such as China are also providing assistance, by for example providing training for a limited number of members of the armed force. While not yet enlisted in the “global war on terror” (GWOT), CARs strategic location could also make it a potentially valuable partner to the United States as the country stabilizes.

86. Exploration and exploitation of natural resources such as oil and uranium may also attract potential investors and increase the country’s geopolitical importance. If threats from armed (and non armed) opponents remain high, any offer by a global power involving financial benefits (financial aid, protection, weapons, etc) will undoubtedly be eagerly embraced. It will be crucial that such military and financial support not come at the detriment of efforts toward enhanced governance of the sector.
87. Given the near collapse of the state and the security sector in recent years, it won’t come as a surprise that, by and large, the management of budgetary and other resources has been rather poor and remains in need of far-reaching reforms. A recent sample study of several African countries concluded that the budgetary processes and management practices of an overwhelming majority of these countries are inadequate and violate or overall score rather low on the seven sound budgetary principles they have identified (Comprehensiveness, contestability, predictability, honesty, discipline, transparency, accountability,

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Budgetary Principles</th>
<th>Level of Adhesion</th>
<th>Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Comprehensiveness</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Not all financial operations are included in the budget. Off-budget accounts exist for the FACA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contestability</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>While all sectors of the state may compete for funding during the budgetary process, budget allocations are made on non-objective bases</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Predictability</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>None. Policy volatility and unpredictability of revenues are the norm; budgeting process driven by haphazard variables</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honesty</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>The budgeting process remains based on flawed data and unrealistic projections; systematic fraud and illegal or unethical practices flourish</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discipline</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>The frequent and larger than predicted deficits indicate a lack of discipline than derives from non adherence to the other principles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transparency/Accountability</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>The widespread belief in the secrecy of defense and security budget, the restricted number of decision makers in the budgetary process, and the non existent (beyond pro-forma) parliamentary oversight, contribute to the low level of transparency and accountability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legitimacy</td>
<td>Likely high</td>
<td>This Principle prescribes that policy change during the implementation of the budget can be made only by those policy makers who participate in the formulation of the original policy. It is likely that this principle is followed given the limited number of budgetary policy makers, though it may be inconsequential given how little the other critical principles are violated</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Since the majority of those sampled had not experienced severe security crises, it should come as no surprise that these principles are also mostly absent in the budget making and resource management process of CAR (See table 3). For example, the Ministry of Defense has, in addition to its regular budget, a separate account in which funds stemming from services rendered by FACA soldiers (such as escorting services offered to NGOs and commercial enterprises) or from special taxes (such as a special tax on airline tickets) are deposited. This violates principle number one which prohibits off-budget accounts and expenditures. These funds are utilized without the benefit of transparency and accountability, two other important principles of budgeting.

88. One of the most striking aspects of how government resources are administered is the opacity and disjunction between its various components, making it almost impossible to identify clear management patterns of budgets, or generate dependable statistics (accounts and others), exact numbers, status of personnel, and accurate forward projections. A key example is the lack of complete budget figures for roughly the entire last decade. In addition, there are clear discrepancies between budgetary and personnel figures provided by various ministries and the budgetary and ministry of finance service. Finally, a close scrutiny of the civil service files revealed the existence of nearly 2,000 fictional civil servants on the payroll. With those caveats in mind, tables 2, 4, and 5 present relevant statistics, figures, and projections regarding these aspects of the security sector.

89. Table 4 summarizes the estimated resource utilization for security related activities in the 2006 national budget. It appears from the available numbers that, as of 2006, human resources in charge of defense and security represent around a 1/3 of the civil service. It also appears that the financial resources used by the ministries of defense and of interior and security for salaries totals an estimated 36% of the total budget, compared to the ministries of Education (7.2%) and health (21.1%) for example. Adding the customs and the ministry in charge of the environment should increase the total by another 2.7 billion. Two important observations can already be made. First, the data are incomplete and permit only partial conclusions on resource use and impact. Second, one can’t help to note the large share of the defense budget that goes to salaries. When combined, the salaries of core security sector actors (FACA, gendarmerie, police and socioeconomic protection forces) consume nearly 76% of total spending of internally generated resources and

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Table 4: **Estimates of Security Sector Spending for 2006 (In Billion CFA Francs)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nature of Spending</th>
<th>Salaries</th>
<th>Material</th>
<th>Capital</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1. Spending on Domestic revenues</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Defense (1)</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td></td>
<td>14.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Min. of Interior/Security</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td></td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-total</td>
<td>14.9</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td></td>
<td>17.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Justice</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environment (Waters/ Forests)</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Customs</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-total</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total: Domestic Resources</strong></td>
<td>17.6</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>21.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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54% of the total budget allocated to them. A much smaller proportion goes to either equipment (37%) or functioning (8%).

90. The under-equipment of all state controlled security services reflects this imbalance. While this tendency is not atypical, it should be noted that there are still up to 30 months of salary arrears (although in recent months salaries have been paid fairly regularly). With regards to other spending, estimates for 2006 goods and services consumption for the two core ministries will amount to nearly 20% of the total state budget allocated to goods and services and 35% of the total amount expected to be disbursed for salaries.

91. Table 5 presents estimates and projections of security related spending for 2006 (figures for previous years are not available) and for the coming four years in volume and as a percentage of both GDP and public spending, respectively 4.3% and 28.0%. These estimates are based on the assumption that the security situation does not deteriorate further, and that the threat presented by the various spoilers remains at a manageable level. The estimates of table 5 also presume that the modest macroeconomic performance forecast will be achieved and there are tangible windfalls of the reengagement of IFIs, with increasing bilateral and multilateral financial aid. While it is projected that the total overall as well as security budgets will increase, no significant changes are likely to appear in the percentage of GDP and public spending devoted to reducing insecurity and more positively, enhancing and spreading the ‘right’ kind of security throughout the territory. The projections for the upcoming years are quite high even compared to the highest spenders in the 2006 SIPRI study of military spenders as a percentage of...
GDP. However, this may take into consideration the fact that in order to carry out SSR there may be a need for increased security related spending (particularly in ways and means that institutionalize security governance and take urgent measures) in both the percentage of GDP and public spending. It is true that when budgeting is done along the principles mentioned above and the rate of tax recovery is improved, the resources made available will undoubtedly be sufficient to meet these needs.

As far as resource consumption is concerned, there is a synergetic relationship between security governance (and ill-governance) and the resources and energy spent. An improvement of the security governance (through thoughtful reforms and judicious resource utilization) will translate in the medium and long terms into a lower cost for security provision (sometime referred to as ‘security dividend’). To illustrate, it will take much more resources to “fix” the FACA (paying arrears, recruiting, training, improving health, etc) over the next two to four years than it will take to maintain them as a reformed, civilian subordinated, law-abiding, efficient, healthy force afterward. This is of course true for other components of the security sector.

Besides projections, so far, the clearest and most predictable budgetary pattern has been that the budget for subsequent years has been merely a repeat of the previous year’s aggregate figures with marginal adjustments. One of the most perverse effects of this situation has been that just about nothing in the budgetary aspects of the security sector is taken seriously by those...
supposed to prepare, administer, control, or handle any of these aspects. In fact, all the other facets of the budgeting process are trumped by endless salary arrears (and daily alimentation allowance for troops), a process which translates into continuous budgetary gymnastics with little regard to basic budgetary practices. In some cases these “gymnastics” degenerate into outright criminal activities, which, if not ended totally will keep alive and store up legitimate grievances on the part of troops which in turn may lead to collective action, mutiny or other. Of course the seemingly impossible task of trying to catch up with the backlog of budgetary work of salaries not paid for as far back as 30 months, not just complicates operations, but imposes a sense of futility in the actions of those managing the budget. As it stands, it would be equally futile for external auditors to draw any sound conclusions by looking at the budgetary process, beyond affirming the need for a thorough reform of the entire process.

94. With regards to the execution of the budget, similar practices can be identified. Sums are disbursed without following the appropriate procedure and typically payments are made without any services being effectively rendered by the supplier. The salaries of civil servants including the armed forces are often paid directly by cash handling accountants (only about half of state employees are paid through a bank transfer), a practice that often perverts the budgetary process. The fact that ways have to be found to get cash to remote places for payment and other necessary accommodations have created conditions for illegal retention of salaries and organized usury and racket, as well as other practices bordering on criminal activities.

95. The painstaking, labor-intensive, yet ineffective and inefficient practice of tracking accounts and reconciling budgetary line items and guidelines are currently the most visible attempts at giving the various budgetary processes an illusion of rigor. The current procedures are clearly antiquated, and need to be overhauled, simplified and made electronic. Budgetary practices such as the Ministry of Defense’s off-budget revenues from its private protection activities need to be rectified. Evidently, this and similar unorthodox practices tend to foster faulty and corrupt budgetary practices and are incompatible with sound security sector governance. A redesign must include ways and means to attain a more robust rate of tax revenue recovery and bring it in line with the African average. The low level of tax revenue collection clearly limits the ability of the state to gather the financial means to meet its obligations, including security.
Part 5: Conclusions and Recommendations

Conclusions

96. Current insecurity, domestic and sub-regional, cannot be adequately addressed by the state’s current security apparatus. Security is a paramount prerequisite to address any of CAR’s urgent needs. This mapping exercise has illustrated the need for comprehensive security sector reform in the Central African Republic. The transformation needs both quick solutions and long-term changes. The country’s leadership should, for example, as a symbol of its commitment, put an immediate end to the impunity of the armed forces, and in particular to the alleged excesses of the presidential guards and so-called “libérateurs” or “patriotes”. Poor oversight of the security sector and lack of civil-military divide have transformed the security forces into a politico-ethnic group at the service of the leader rather than the country. This relates to years of recurring military/political crises, inherent dysfunctions within the state, lack of political will, or the recent rebellion.

98. To date, CAR authorities have focused only on the technical and operational dimensions of SSR leaving out the need for political and policy reforms. The Government’s discourse has so far focused exclusively on restructuring and improving the staffing and material situation of the FACA, rather than taking a global approach to SSR encompassing governance, oversight, and sound principles of financial management. Only the latter can have any serious impact in mobilizing the necessary resources and solving recurrent security problems.

99. Development partners need to explicitly link recovery to genuine security sector reforms. Awareness among partners about this link is gaining currency. In the past the attitude, in particular of the International Financial Institutions, toward the security sector has been ambivalent. Institutional blockages still exist with regards to devoting funds to “hard” security issues critical to a successful SSR such as training or material procurement. Budgetary restrictions suggest that it will make it more difficult to use resources, whether internally generated or from foreign aid, for security related expenditures.

100. The current situation also presents a unique opportunity for the government and its international partners to initiate reform. While the security situation in CAR remains fragile, it is also an opportunity to be seized. Key enabling factors include: the rebellion did not last that long, there was no other ‘complicating factors’ (such as use of child soldiers, large scale atrocities, etc), the economic potential of the country is still enormous, and development partners are coming back and willing to help. The window of opportunity which opened up after the 2003 regime change (clear cut victory, no tenuous peace agreement)
and the 2005 (generally open and fair) elections must be taken advantage of.

101. Despite the government’s stated commitment to carrying out a comprehensive reform expressed in November 2003, little has been done. One of the reasons is persistent confusion over what ‘reform’ fundamentally means and what the inclusion and empowerment of previously excluded stakeholders actually entails. This lack of clarity ranges from the executive branch and top-level members of the armed forces to parliamentarians, members of civil society and other stakeholders. As part of reform efforts, the respective roles and responsibilities of the various actors involved in the country’s security sector must be clarified through legislations that emphasize democratic oversight and transparency. SSR programs must not be seen as an isolated set of activities targeting “men in uniform” and conducted by the executive branch, but as an integral part of a holistic approach to state management.

Specific Recommendations

• Shift from narrow to broad concept of security. Security should be seen not as the privilege of a small elite, but as a much broader concept where other stakeholders, including the parliament, civil society and international partners play a role.

• Bring in civilian stakeholders. It is critical to get the parliament as a whole, and its specialized commission in particular, to reclaim its constitutional, institutional, and legal roles with regards to security sector governance. Throughout the reform process, the parliament will be required to initiate and pass a series of laws to set up a coherent legal framework for SSR and regulate key security issues such as private security companies. This will require training and capacity building of parliamentarians.

• Civil society groups should take initiatives to be part of the oversight mechanism of the security sector. Training and other capacity building efforts will have to be tailored to help key actors (media, NGOs, community groups) ensure that the reforms and corresponding policies reflect the interest of the society as a whole.

• Organize a national workshop on SSR. Given the urgency of the reform, and the lack of conceptual clarity about what SSR really entails, a national forum devoted exclusively to raising awareness on the need for reform and the roles various stakeholders are expected to play should be organized as soon as possible with the assistance of local international development partners such as France, BONUCA, EU, and UNDP. The event should be followed by an educational campaign for the general public. Lessons on how other countries similar to CAR handled SSR may also prove useful and provide guidance.

• Tap into existing institutions. A good entry point for a genuine discussion on the necessity and design of the reform is the Supreme Council of National Defense (SCND). Its attributions, stipulated in its original decree, make it a useful preexisting mechanism to steer the reform, spearhead a review of national security, and ensure the inclusion of a variety of departments with defense or security functions. This could also enhance national ownership of the program.

• Articulate a national defense and security strategy. A systematic and thorough review of CAR’s national security strategy is long overdue and should be carried out in the short to medium run. With the help of experts and practitioners this exercise will help national stakeholders of security and defense matters to identify the strategic objectives of the country. It will also enable them to design appropriate plans, secure the necessary means, and identify the likely threats and hurdles that may jeopardize the process. This exercise could also help determine the real needs of the country in terms of personnel, for example, given existing threats and means to deal with them. This exercise will also enable the emergence of a new broader and more participatory conception of security, beyond purely military threats. Finally, this review will also help to develop an overarching policy framework that will serve as a blueprint for security related government policies.

• Link SSR and DDR in the event of future DDR. SSR and DDR are inherently linked. When designing and implementing DDR programs, efforts must be made to build bridges between the overarching SSR initiatives and specific DDR activities. Any future
Conclusions and Recommendations: Part 5

Beyond Demobilization
Challenges and Opportunities for Security Sector Reform in the Central African Republic

31

DDR activities should respond to needs coming out of SSR and the restructuring of security forces.

- **Restructure the FACA with support from France.** Transforming the FACA to a professional, non-political, strong, and motivated army, present throughout the country is essential for a successful reform. This supposes the construction of barracks in appropriate numbers and the rebuilding of other infrastructure. It also requires reconciliation and confidence building measures between the FACA and the population. A variety of simple steps such as formal apologies, intensified contacts and other low cost initiatives may contribute to such a healing process. To start the process, some basic measures need to be taken however. For example, it is essential to have an accurate account of the armed forces as well as the material and financial resources the state utilizes. Currently, the confusion is such that developing exact, dependable, and actionable statistics about the security sector has become a priority.

- **Restructure the National Police.** Just as for the FACA, reform of the national police would include a renewal of the force and the building of infrastructure as well as enhanced oversight and democratic control. BONUCA is well situated to play a role in the retraining of the police and raising awareness around human rights issues.

- **Strengthen accountability in the Presidential guard.** While recognizing the particular sensitivity of this brigade its particular position has led to strong resentments vis-à-vis the perceived impunity and unaccountability of its members. Calling attention to these problems will serve to encourage the introduction of medium to long term reforms.

- **Promote SSR/SSG at the sub-regional level.** Along with CEMAC and its development partners, CAR should take initiatives to promote common solutions to common security problems based on democratic principles inherent to SSG and good governance in general. Such efforts must involve non-state actors, state actors and sub-regional bodies. Initiatives could include revisiting, strengthening and reactivating the non-aggression and mutual assistance agreements already in existence; and reinforce the relevant African Union instruments (the African Common defense and Security Policy and the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union for example).

- **Consider extending FOMUC.** The end of FOMUC 3 in early 2007 may not bode well for stability in CAR as armed opposition groups may see in it an opportunity to regain power through violence.
Part 6: References


