REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL FINANCING ARRANGEMENTS FOR
DISARMAMENT, DEMOBILIZATION AND REINTEGRATION

Phase 1 Report to Working Group 2 of the

Stockholm Initiative on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (SIDDR)

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May 16, 2005
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**Acronyms**

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>ACABQ</td>
<td>UN Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions</td>
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<td>BCPRA</td>
<td>Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery, UNDP</td>
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<td>CPRTTF</td>
<td>Crisis Prevention and Recovery Thematic Trust Fund, UNDP</td>
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<td>DAC</td>
<td>OECD Development Assistance Committee</td>
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<td>DDR</td>
<td>Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration</td>
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<td>ESF</td>
<td>Economic Support Fund, United States</td>
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<tr>
<td>FMPU</td>
<td>Financial Management and Procurement Unit</td>
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<td>IRS</td>
<td>Information and Referral System/Mozambique</td>
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<td>MDRP</td>
<td>Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program for the Greater Great Lakes Region</td>
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<td>MDTF</td>
<td>Multi-donor trust fund</td>
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<td>NCDDDR</td>
<td>National Committee on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration, Sierra Leone</td>
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<td>NCRRRR</td>
<td>National Commission on Resettlement, Rehabilitation and Reconstruction, Sierra Leone</td>
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<td>ODA</td>
<td>Official Development Assistance</td>
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<td>PCPI</td>
<td>World Bank Post-Conflict Progress Indicators</td>
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<td>PF</td>
<td>Provincial Fund/Mozambique</td>
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<td>PSO</td>
<td>Peace Support Operation</td>
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<td>RUF</td>
<td>Revolutionary United Front, Sierra Leone</td>
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<td>SIDDR</td>
<td>Swedish Initiative on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration</td>
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<td>SSR</td>
<td>Security-sector reform</td>
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I. INTRODUCTION

1. This paper constitutes the first part of a review, commissioned by the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, of the experience of international actors in financing disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) processes. It is intended to inform the financing-related discussions of Working Group 2 of the Swedish Initiative on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (SIDDR). The purpose of Phase 1 was to collect background information and conduct a mapping of issues that will provide a basis for Working Group 2 to determine the focus of Phase 2 work.

2. This paper discusses how we conducted the mapping exercise and presents the findings. In section II, we provide background information on the costs of DDR programs (by component to the extent possible). In section III, we discuss the sources of DDR funding and the types of funding instruments employed. In section IV, we examine a number of issues that influence the effectiveness of the different forms of financing available for DDR. This will help the SIDDR partners understand the most effective forms of financing, the pros and cons of different instruments, and some of the policy implications and trade-offs of different approaches. In section V we identify key issues that have emerged from phase 1 of this work that may warrant further consideration during phase 2.

3. The analysis includes two tables, which are found in Annexes 2 and 3. The first lists the 36 DDR processes we were able to identify between 1992-2005. The second contains more detailed information on 21 of these processes, including costs and funding sources.

4. This review was primarily conducted as a desk study. Documentation from donors, including the United Nations and the World Bank, was consulted, as were evaluations and summaries of DDR processes. This written material was supplemented by interviews (in person in New York and Washington, DC, and by phone and email) with individuals who have managed or evaluated a selection of the DDR processes listed in Annex 2. Annex 3 contains a detailed listing of sources.

II. MAPPING DDR PROCESSES

5. The following information was collected on DDR processes in 29 countries, beginning with the 1992 – 1996 DDR process in Mozambique:

- The country where the DDR process occurred,
- The dates/duration of the DDR process/processes (as some countries have undergone more than one DDR process),
- Whether the DDR process occurred under the auspices of a UN peace support operation (PSO), under the auspices of a non-UN peace support operation, or without the assistance of a peace support operation.

\[1\] The authors would like to thank the members of Working Group 2 and colleagues at the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC), the United Nations and the World Bank who provided input into this report.
The sources of funding and where possible information about the specific funding instruments used,

The number of beneficiaries (to calculate per beneficiary costs), and

The amount of money spent on each DDR process, disaggregated according expenditures on disarmament, demobilization, reinsertion, and reintegration.

6. Thirty-six DDR processes were identified in 29 countries during the relevant time period. Seven countries – Angola, Cambodia, Eritrea, Haiti, Liberia, Rwanda, and Uganda – each undertook two DDR processes during this period. Two-thirds of the DDR processes identified occurred in African countries. Most of these countries experienced internal conflicts, although many of these “internal” conflicts had significant regional aspects. More than half (55.6%) of the DDR processes did not take place under the auspices of a UN-mandated peace agreement. Annex 2 lists the 36 DDR processes and specifies which ones were associated with UN-mandated peace support operations.

7. Collecting this information proved challenging. None of the major multilateral or bilateral sources of DDR resources consulted appears to maintain a centralized DDR database. It was therefore necessary to identify individuals in each organization who had been involved in the DDR process in question and could provide access to relevant documentation. A good deal of the information obtained refers to planned, rather than actual, expenditure. Much of the information cannot be disaggregated according to DDR component. Information on funding instruments employed is also highly incomplete. Nonetheless, a reasonable amount of information was collected for 21 DDR processes. Seventeen of these (81%) occurred or are underway in Africa. The available information for these 21 DDR processes is summarized in Annex 3.

8. It is difficult to draw hard and fast conclusions based on the information collected thus far. Some patterns are, however, discernible from the information in Annex 3:

- While DDR processes tend to have a wide variety of funding sources and to rely heavily on international support (financial, technical, and material), in 12 countries (57%) the national government also contributed financial resources.
- Multi-donor trust funds (MDTFs), managed either by the World Bank or UNDP, have been employed with increasing frequency. Thirteen of the DDR processes in Annex 3 (62%) involved an MDTF. Over half of those involved the Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program (MDRP) for the Greater Great Lakes

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2 The number of countries with multiple DDR processes would be higher if the starting date had been a year or two earlier.

3 The data search was conducted over a period of a few weeks in March-April 2005. If the data search had been extended both in time and in scope (that is, if it had been possible to identify staff members of all major external actors that have supported DDR over the past 10-15 years, to interview them and to obtain program documents and evaluations), more information of the type provided in Annex 3 could have been collected. It is unlikely, however, that amassing more of this sort of data would appreciably change the broad trends identified in this paper. Nor would collecting more of these data lead to a significantly deeper understanding of how and why funding decisions are made and how these funding decisions affect the course of DDR processes.
region.

- The World Bank has emerged as a major supporter of DDR processes independent of its management of trust funds. At least 11 (52%) of the 21 DDR processes in Annex 3 received either World Bank credits or grants. Several of these agreements have involved substantial sums of money. Ethiopia (2000-2005) and Eritrea (2001-2006) lead the list with US $170.6m and US $60m in IDA credits respectively. Angola (2002-2006) has an IDA grant agreement for US$33m and Cambodia (1999-2005) has signed an IDA credit agreement for US$18.4m.

- There is virtually no information available on expenditures for disarmament. It is therefore impossible to determine the full cost of DDR processes or to calculate accurate per-beneficiary costs.

- The calculation of per-beneficiary costs is further complicated by the incompleteness of the data for other DDR components, by the lack of actual versus budget expenditures, and by the sometimes-significant differential in numbers of beneficiaries by stage of the DDR process. In consequence, this report does not attempt to develop per-beneficiary costs.

- What is more, Table 1 sounds a note of caution on per-beneficiary costs. It demonstrates that per-beneficiary costs of programs can vary significantly, even in the same geographic region with the same executing agency over time.4

- Annex 3 demonstrates the paucity of information on administrative or program management costs. Most often, the available information on these costs refers solely to World Bank IDA credits or grants and/or World Bank- or UNDP-managed multi-donor trust funds. Recent evaluation experience reinforces the conclusion that an in-depth understanding of administrative costs, which is essential to an assessment of

### Table 1. Per-Beneficiary Costs of Projects Financed through the Mozambique Provincial Fund, Selected Provinces, US $

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cabo del Gado</td>
<td>$78.98</td>
<td>$188.73</td>
<td>$205.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manica</td>
<td>$290.33</td>
<td>$207.70</td>
<td>$269.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maputo</td>
<td>$227.49</td>
<td>$265.71</td>
<td>$175.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niassa</td>
<td>$142.49</td>
<td>$187.85</td>
<td>$177.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambezia</td>
<td>$62.97</td>
<td>$149.94</td>
<td>$138.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td>$160.45</td>
<td>$199.99</td>
<td>$193.20</td>
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IOM implemented programs in Cabo del Gado, Maputo, Niassa, and Zambezia; GTZ implemented programs in Manica.

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4 There is also a suggestion that setting the allowable per-beneficiary cost at too low a rate may cause problems in program delivery by requiring implementing partners to include too many beneficiaries in each program in order to keep per capital costs down. Creative Associates International Inc., “The Information and Referral Service/Provincial Fund Final Evaluation,” Final Report, prepared for International Organization for Migration, Washington, DC: March 1997, pp. 42-43.
financial efficiency, is a research project of its own.\(^5\)

III. SOURCES OF DDR RESOURCES AND MAJOR FINANCING INSTRUMENTS

9. As the mapping exercise demonstrated, there are many different ways in which DDR processes can be resourced. This section identifies both the major sources of DDR resources and the major financing instruments that have been used since late 1992.

II.1 Sources of DDR Resources

10. There are three major sources of DDR resources: national, multilateral and bilateral. Each of these sources has multiple windows from which these resources can be drawn. Boxes 1-3 summarize the main windows for each of these sources.

11. **National windows.** Although the focus of this report is on international financing of DDR processes, it is important to include national resources in the discussion as well. National financial resources generally make a modest contribution to the post-conflict DDR processes listed in Annexes 1 and 2. National resources broadly defined, however, are crucial to the success of DDR processes. While international actors provide financial (as well as technical and in-kind) resources for DDR projects and programs, it is the national stakeholders who inevitably bear the responsibility for the success or failure of DDR programs. When DDR programs fail, as all too many have in the last 15 years, it is an indication that the necessary political will to make peace (and not simply to implement DDR) does not exist.

5 In Sierra Leone, the World Bank’s administrative charges for managing the MDTF were 1.9%. However, when technical assistance was added in, the figure rose to 5.2% and when operating costs were included, it rose to 15.8%. [Gebreselassie Tesfamichael, Nicole Ball and Julie Nenon, *Peace in Sierra Leone: Evaluating the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Process*, prepared for the Government of Sierra Leone and the World Bank, Washington, DC: Creative Associates International, Inc, October 2004 draft, p. 71.] The data in Annex 3 for DDR processes such as Ethiopia (2000-2005) and Rwanda (2002-2005) produce a “program management” ratio of about 5% for Bank-managed trust funds, although when technical assistance is factored in (Rwanda (2002-2005), that figure rises to about 10%.

Information provided by UNDP on the UNDP-executed trust fund for Liberia (2000-?) provides a project management ratio of about 16.3% if one includes “support to Joint Implementation Unit” and “Other Project costs”. The project management costs of parallel DDR programs in Liberia is unknown, but UNDP charges on average 3 – 5% of project costs, depending on the amount of money administered.

In contrast, IOM reported US $3.1m in “Staff and Office” costs to implement a demobilization and reintegration program in Haiti in the mid-1990s with a total budget of US $8.7m, or 35.6% of total project costs. Jonathan Dworken, Jonathan Moore and Adam Siegel, *Haiti Demobilization and Reintegration Program*, evaluation conducted for USAID, Alexandria, VA: The CAN Corporation/Institute for Public Research, (IPR) 96-0104, March 1997, p. 21. [Information on Haiti is not included in Annex 3 due to the highly incomplete nature of the data collected.]
exist among key local stakeholders. Even when the necessary political will to make peace does exist among local stakeholders, successful DDR processes require a variety of local inputs. Some of these are financial but as Box 1 demonstrates, most are in-kind.

12. Three issues are worth highlighting here. The first is that for those DDR processes that occur outside the framework of a UN-mandated peace support operation, national security forces and ministries will have an important role to play in disarming and demobilizing combatants (from both the state security forces and the armed opposition) and in providing security for the DDR process. Even when UN-mandated peace support operations are involved in DDR processes, providing security in communities where former combatants settle is generally the responsibility of local security bodies. Maintaining these forces costs money.

13. Second, in all peace processes, the tasks of reconciliation between combatants and non-combatants and of reintegration of former combatants into civilian society fall largely to local actors. The value of these activities is difficult if not impossible to quantify. Neither of these “costs” is taken into account when assessing the level of expenditure on DDR processes. Without access to these resources, however, DDR processes would not succeed. Third, while comparatively speaking the share of total DDR costs assumed by national budgets tends to be modest, two of the DDR processes listed in Annex 3 relied heavily on domestic resources: Eritrea (1993-1997) and Djibouti (Phase 1, 1993-1996). While the use of national resources is not sufficient for determining whether adequate political will exists, it can be an important indicator.

14. **Multilateral windows.** Box 2 summarizes the most frequently used multilateral windows: UN, World Bank, and regional organization. The UN assessed budget is an important component of DDR resourcing. However, it is available for use only when UN peace support operations are fielded. It is further restricted in that it has been used

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**Box 2. Multilateral Windows**

**United Nations Windows**
- UN assessed budget (mission budgets, pre-mission commitments, Peacekeeping Reserve Fund)
- UN agency core budgets
- UN trust funds (uneamed or earmarked for DDR or for specific country)

**World Bank Windows**
- World Bank IDA grants and credits
- World Bank Post-Conflict Fund
- World Bank Learning and Innovation Loans
- Grants from IBRD surplus
- Donor trust funds within World Bank

**Regional Organization Windows**
- Member troop contributions
- Political support/confidence building efforts
- In-kind contributions [ECOMOG troops feed encamped RUF/AFRC at Lungi, Sierra Leone]

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6 Given the regional nature of many conflicts, the lack of political will may also extend to regional political actors.
primarily to finance “military-related” aspects of DDR, that is disarmament and some
demobilization costs. The assessed budget has traditionally not covered reinsertion or
reintegration activities, although small amounts have been used to assist in
reintegration planning and the possibility of using the assessed budget to support
reinsertion is currently under study. Additionally, the assessed budget has generally not
been available for DDR planning prior to the establishment of a PSO.

15. The other major UN windows – agency core funding (including in-kind
contributions) and UN-managed trust funds – are available irrespective of whether a
DDR process takes place under the auspices of a UN-mandated PSO and are routinely
used in all circumstances. UNDP has been able to provide resources for DDR planning,
through core funds, unearmarked trust funds, or country-specific trust funds. UNDP,
however, does not support individuals in the military and as such is not in a position to
manage financing for disarmament activities.

16. As indicated in section II, the World Bank has emerged over the last decade as
a major source of DDR financing. This is a reflection of the Bank’s growing involvement
in post-conflict rebuilding activities, an involvement that has, for the most part, been
strongly supported by its major shareholders. In part to meet the needs of conflict-
affected countries, the Bank has developed new windows for supporting post-conflict
activities, notably IDA grants (including grants to countries that have yet to clear their
arrears to the Bretton Woods institutions), enhanced IDA funding for good performing
post-arrears conflict-affected countries measured against a set of Post-Conflict
Progress Indicators (PCPI), Post-Conflict Fund grants (which are relatively small),
Learning and Innovation Loans, and the LICUS trust fund. The most frequently used
Bank window for DDR is IDA, both credits and grants. DDR has also at times been
financed from the Post-Conflict Fund and using the Learning and Innovation Loans.
Some DDR financing has also come from the World Bank surplus. However, the Bank
does not provide support (bilateral or through Bank-managed trust funds) to individuals
who have not yet been demobilized and disarmed. In common with UNDP, therefore, it
is unable to manage financing for disarmament activities.

17. Regional organizations have also played a role in DDR processes. Their

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7 Countries that perform well on the PCPI are eligible for exceptional levels of IDA resources for between
three and five years and as much as 40 percent of these resources can be grants. An additional flexible
funding mechanism, the LICUS Trust Fund, does not appear to have been used to support DDR
processes to date.

8 With regard to donor trust funds in the World Bank, it is important to note that while the Bank
administers them, decisions on how to use the funds involve a broader set of actors.

9 Bank staff are told that the Bank’s mandate precludes engagement with security forces. This appears to
be an interpretation of Article 1, section 10 on the prohibition of political activity: “The Bank and its
officers shall not interfere in the political affairs of any member; nor shall they be influenced in their
decisions by the political character of the member or members concerned. Only economic considerations
shall be relevant to their decisions, and these considerations shall be weighed impartially in order to
achieve the purposes stated in Article I.” The Bank’s articles of agreement contain no reference to
“military,” security forces,” or “armed forces.” IBRD Articles of Agreement (as amended effective
contributions tend to be in-kind. Some UN-mandated peace support operations, such as those in Afghanistan, Kosovo and Timor Leste, are based on regional peace operations. Others, such as ECOMOG in Sierra Leone or RAMSI in the Solomon Islands, have played an important support role for DDR operations. As with national stakeholders, regional political actors can play an important part in getting DDR processes under way and in helping to keep them on track.

18. **Bilateral windows.** Bilateral actors also dispose of a large number of windows through which resources can be made available to DDR processes. The five main windows are: development assistance, humanitarian assistance, foreign affairs, defense, and pooled resources (Box 3). To date, bilateral actors have primarily provided support to DDR processes through the development and humanitarian assistance windows.\(^\text{10}\) Along with multilateral development and humanitarian assistance, bilateral humanitarian and development assistance have provided the bulk of reinsertion and reintegration support and a significant share of demobilization support. Foreign affairs and defense resources have at times provided important financial and material contributions to regional peace support operations, some of which may be used to assist DDR processes.

19. It is extremely difficult to generalize about the way in which bilateral resources are used for DDR because the regulations governing the use of different types of resources vary considerably from country to country. Additionally, the ways in which those regulations are interpreted can differ over time within the same country or organization. This plethora of windows places a premium on staff experience in navigating the funding bureaucracy, both within one agency and government-wide.

20. A common restriction on development and humanitarian assistance funds relates to their use for activities that may be seen to benefit a country’s security forces. This restriction can be interpreted narrowly or broadly. When interpreted broadly, it can

<table>
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<th>Box 3. Bilateral Windows</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Development assistance windows</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>• Quick disbursing funds</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Development grants/loans/credits</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Humanitarian assistance</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Foreign affairs windows</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Security-related funds [i.e. US Economic Support Fund]</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Peace support funds</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Embassy funds</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Defense windows</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Troop and other personnel contributions to multilateral PSOs or to support national governments</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Commanders’ field funds[?]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Pooled resources</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Funds drawing on two or more ministries [UK Conflict Prevention Pools; Netherlands Stability Fund]</td>
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\(^{10}\) This is, of course, in addition to support provided through the UN assessed budget for peacekeeping forces.
prevent development and humanitarian assistance actors from providing support to former combatants until after they have been demobilized. This has in some cases resulted in inadequate support for combatants (and their dependents) in cantonment areas awaiting demobilization.

21. Donors facing such restrictions have at times found ways around such problems. For example, soldiers awaiting demobilization may be administratively demobilized or placed under the supervision of a non-military entity. In Mozambique, for example, USAID/Maputo was able to tap into Economic Support Fund (ESF) resources (which are not intended to be used to support “military” activities) for pre-demobilization support by convincing USAID/Washington that soldiers in assembly areas were, effectively, no longer members of a “military force.” Some donors will simply finance necessary activities out of development assistance windows, as the UK did in Sierra Leone in 1998 when the need arose to establish demobilization centers for surrendered soldiers and members of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF). Additionally, resources may be provided from non-development/non-humanitarian assistance windows, such as the UK’s Conflict Prevention Funds or the Netherland’s Stability Fund (see section III.2 below). Nonetheless, these restrictions remain a complicating factor.

III.2 Major Financing Instruments

22. In addition to having multiple windows through which resources can be channeled to DDR processes, the international community disposes of a variety of ways in which those resources can be applied. Box 4 lists the financing instruments most commonly used to support DDR processes. Some funding sources are structured so that they can use only certain instruments. Additionally, organizational mandate, national legislation, or long-standing organizational practice may limit the use of certain instruments.

23. For example, the UN assessed budget is generally managed by DPKO and executed by the UN mission in a country. Although funds provided through the assessed budget could in principle be executed by NGOs or by national government entities (such as national DDR commissions), in practice, it would not be easy for such

<table>
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<th>Box 4. Major Financing Instruments</th>
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<tr>
<td>• Direct execution [national actors, international actors]</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Financial transfers to national executing or implementing bodies: national commissions, national ministries, local governments, local NGOs, community-based organizations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Financial transfers to international executing or implementing bodies: NGOs, UN or other multilateral agencies, commercial contractors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Financial or in-kind support to regional bodies, including regional peace support operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Contributions to trust funds (multilateral/single donor; earmarked by country or theme/unearmarked)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Co-financing/cost-sharing of projects executed by another agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Technical assistance</td>
</tr>
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11 To the best of our knowledge, the UK is the only bilateral donor willing to use non-pooled development assistance resources for such purposes on a regular basis.
arrangements to be made. Some bilateral donors have a preference for channeling resources through international non-governmental organizations; others prefer using commercial firms or consulting groups; still others favor multilateral channels. Some bilateral donors have windows that can be used only to purchase technical assistance through direct execution by selected bodies (generally of the same nationality as the donor) or windows that provide only financial assistance. The combinations and permutations can seem endless.

As the mapping exercise demonstrated, trust funds are becoming an increasingly widely used mechanism for channeling resources to DDR. They also come in various formats. There are single-donor trust funds, multi-country trust funds, thematic trust funds, and with the advent of the Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program for the Greater Great Lakes Region (MDRP), regional trust funds. These trust funds may consist of unearmarked funds or the funds may have to be used for a particular purpose or in a particular country. Unearmarked funds are, of course, the most flexible, and flexibility is an extremely important characteristic in post-conflict environments.

World Bank trust funds are unearmarked, although ways of accommodating donors that want their funds to be used for specific purposes have been found. UNDP, in contrast, has in the past allowed multiple earmarking. However, since the early 2000s, UNDP has sought to simplify its trust fund system and the Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (BCPR) is seeking to increase its unearmarked trust fund contributions significantly.

Technical assistance, particularly short-term technical assistance, is frequently employed in DDR programs. Technical assistance has, however, had a checkered history. One significant criticism of technical assistance in the development field has been that process receives insufficient attention. Rather, technical solutions are offered to problems that are essentially political or systemic in nature. Because of the sensitivity of security-related issues, process is likely to be even more important in the security sector. Another major criticism is that insufficient attention is given to developing capacity; foreign experts tend to carry out the tasks at hand themselves.

This is not to say that technical knowledge and skills are not in need of improvement in countries undergoing DDR processes. They clearly are and technical assistance does have a role to play. However, a major objective of technical assistance should be to capacitate local actors who have the political and cultural knowledge that are necessary to develop and implement effective DDR processes. To maximize its usefulness, technical assistance offered through DDR processes should aim to empower local stakeholders by improving their skill levels and responding to needs defined by the local stakeholders.

12 Authors’ interviews, April 2005. With regard to NGOs, the problem is that the peace support forces do not guarantee their security in the same way they guarantee the security of UN staff members.

13 In 2003, the year that the Crisis Prevention and Recovery Thematic Trust Fund was created, approximately 1% of its funds were unearmarked. By 2005, approximately 10% were unearmarked and the expectation was that the amount of unearmarked contributions would at least double or possibly triple in the coming year. Authors’ interviews, April 2005.
28. The existence of multiple funding sources and instruments is, in and of itself, not necessarily undesirable. Each DDR process demands somewhat different inputs from the international community. The flexibility that the current menu of funding sources and instruments offers has advantages, in that virtually every funding requirement should, in theory, be able to be met. In practice, however, it can often be difficult to access the right type of financing, to deliver it in the amounts needed and on time, and for those resources to be used effectively, efficiently and in an accountable manner. The following section will examine the extent to which an appropriate use of financing instruments and sources can help overcome some of the most common difficulties faced in financing post-conflict DDR.

IV. CRITICAL ISSUES IN RESOURCING DDR

29. If the ultimate objective of the SIDDR effort with regard to DDR financing is to “identify the most effective forms of financing, understand the pros and cons of different instruments, and suggest some of the policy implications and trade-offs of different approaches,” it is important to place both DDR and DDR financing in their proper context. This section will accordingly begin by briefly describing the role of DDR in the peace process. It will then examine five factors that influence the success of international financial assistance to DDR in conflict-affected countries.

IV.1 DDR and the Peace Process

30. Conflict-affected countries confront enormous economic, political, and social problems. Many of these problems pre-date the outbreak of conflict and may in fact be at the heart of the conflict. Resolving them is thus essential to the long-term well-being of people in war-affected countries. Resources – both national and international – are typically limited and choices need to be made about how to allocate those resources in ways that will most effectively and efficiently promote long-term recovery.

31. Experience has shown that a safe and secure environment is an essential condition for successfully addressing the myriad problems confronting conflict-affected societies. A post-conflict DDR process is an important component of providing that security. DDR processes thus help to create an environment in which the overall peace process, political and social reconciliation, social and economic rehabilitation, and longer-term development can take root. They do this by contributing to a level of security that is sufficient for the peace process to go forward and by helping to build confidence between former warring parties and among the warring parties and the population.

32. As Figure 1 demonstrates, initiatives such as DDR, which address the legacies of past conflicts, are only one element of creating a well-functioning security sector. Creating a safe and secure environment is necessary to build a prosperous, equitable, and well-functioning society that operates within the rule of law. This also requires strengthening the democratic governance of the security sector and creating security

forces that can discharge their constitutionally mandated tasks effectively and efficiently within the parameters of the rule of law. Thus, in a post-conflict setting, DDR may be a necessary component of improving security but it is by no means a sufficient condition.

33. DDR programs can provide an incentive to former combatants to return to civilian life when the correct political conditions exist. DDR programs cannot by themselves create those political conditions. A DDR process cannot substitute for inadequate will on the part of the parties to the conflict to engage in a political process that will enable them to lay down their weapons and resolve their differences peacefully. Nor can it substitute for peace enforcement activities when those are necessary. Although a DDR process can help mitigate conflict; it cannot, by itself, prevent conflict from recurring. Similarly, DDR processes cannot produce development. They cannot even guarantee that ex-combatants will successfully reintegrate into civilian society.

34. Realistically speaking, DDR processes can provide the mechanism to separate combatants from at least some of their weapons and to begin to break up command structures. They can offer the armed opposition a way of laying down arms without being seen as having surrendered. They can also begin to build trust and confidence among and between former combatants and non-combatants that is necessary for other elements of the peace process such as elections, security sector reform (SSR), reconciliation, and economic recovery to go forward. DDR processes also provide ex-combatants with a much-needed transition period and an opportunity to reintegrate into civilian life, offer a short-term safety net for ex-combatants and their dependents, and start the process of changing the habits and identity of ex-combatants.

35. It is within this context that DDR financing must be viewed. DDR must be financed in a way that supports the peace process. The choice of which resources to use and the instruments with which to deliver those resources must reinforce the efforts of the local (and regional) stakeholders to resolve their differences peacefully, by political means, rather than by the force of weapons. Other instruments should be used to achieve other objectives, such as building effective and accountable security services or providing communities with the means to recover from conflict.

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IV.2 Financing for Success

36. In interviews conducted for this report and in discussions held by SIDDR Working Groups 1 and 2, a number of issues have consistently been raised.

- How to ensure that funding maximizes national ownership of DDR processes;
- How to obtain the right kind of money in the right amounts on time;
- How to link DDR with upstream (peace negotiation, pre-disarmament) and downstream (SSR, community rehabilitation and development) activities;
- How to promote coordination among the members of the international community supporting DDR efforts; and
- How to match resource needs with available funding sources and instruments.

37. Many of these are essentially the same issues that arise when considering how best to finance any aspect of post-conflict recovery. International actors have progressively been adjusting the financial instruments at their disposal to better respond to the needs of post-conflict environments since the mid-1990s. That these issues continue to arise lies partly in the need for additional adjustments in funding instruments and the regulations governing the various funding windows at the disposal of the international community.

38. Even more important, the persistence of these issues underscores the need for adjustments in the behavior and expectations of international actors, as will be discussed below. Many lessons concerning the design and delivery of both development assistance and support for DDR processes have been observed time and again over the last fifteen years in post-conflict processes. They have, however not yet been fully incorporated into DDR programming.

IV.2.1 National ownership

39. Full national ownership of a DDR process requires the participation of national governments, the former armed opposition, and members of civil society. In practice, DDR processes have often focused on the involvement of government or of government and the armed opposition. Full national ownership also implies that local actors have the responsibility for decisions about objectives, policies, strategies, program design, and implementation modalities. Simply creating a “national DDR commission,” however constituted, is insufficient to ensure national ownership. National actors must be in the famous “driving seat.” Most DDR processes are, however, externally driven. There are multiple reasons for this. Some actors are not well-versed in the need for national ownership. Some are led by weak local capacity to take control. Some cite the absence of adequate political will on the part of local actors to participate fully in the peace process as a reason why international actors need to be in the lead. Tight timetables for peace operations can exacerbate the conditions that militate against national ownership. Some international actors find it difficult to work with all relevant DDR stakeholders, particularly national militaries or armed groups.

40. Diplomatic and security actors. In principle, the importance of national ownership is well recognized by development actors who play an important role in the
design and implementation of DDR programs. Nonetheless, the international community frequently does not take full advantage of the opportunities to promote national ownership of DDR processes. In part this is because diplomatic and security actors have often been less cognizant of the significance of national ownership and therefore have been more likely to seek to design and execute peace-related activities themselves, including retaining control over funding. Additionally, UN peace support operation mandates frequently give the mission the responsibility of ensuring that the peace process – including DDR – is implemented. This leads to a sense that UN agencies need to be involved in execution, and that the mission in particular must retain control over its budget. UN members states therefore have the responsibility of ensuring that UN mandates are not interpreted in a way that undermines local ownership of the peace process or key elements of that process.

41. **Development actors.** However, even development actors have problems with national ownership. First, some humanitarian and development actors find it difficult to work with some of the local actors. For both the World Bank and UNDP, the government is the main partner – the civilian components of government, that is. Both are expanding their capacity to work with civil society. Some donors are restricted from financing programs for combatants until the former fighters have been disarmed or demobilized. Non-governmental organizations, both international and local, which implement many DDR-related programs or projects have in some instances been reluctant to work with the perpetrators of violence, including women associated with the fighting forces.

42. Additionally, it is all too often assumed that a lack of local capacity to carry out all aspects of developing and implementing DDR programs means that the capacity for local ownership is also lacking, including the capacity for managing financial resources. This is not necessarily the case. Local actors do not need the capacity to plan or execute all aspects of a DDR process to have ownership over it. Where capacity is weak, as it almost always is in conflict-affected countries, it can and should be built, including the capacity to manage finances.\(^\text{16}\) In the short term, capacity can be supplemented. Weak capacity should never become an excuse for members of the international community to exert control over activities that they support.

43. The mid-term evaluation of the MDRP noted, for example: “…experience in Sierra Leone (positive) and Liberia (negative) seemed to indicate that national ownership was the most viable way forward, especially given the limited international presence on the ground at the MDRP’s inception. But there is a price: building national capacity takes time; the implicit assumption was thus that time was not considered of immediate essence.”\(^\text{17}\) This suggests a clearer trade-off between “national ownership” and “national capacity” than exists in practice. At the same time, this comment does

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\(^\text{16}\) The opportunities for capacity-building in the course of DDR activities are enhanced to the extent that technical assistance is provided in the form of mentors. For example, in Sierra Leone, several employees of the Financial Management and Procurement Unit (FMPU) that serviced both the National Commission on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (NCDDR) and the National Commission on Resettlement, Rehabilitation and Reconstruction (NCRRR) subsequently qualified as chartered accountants. Nicole Ball, Julie Nenon and Gebreselassie Tesfamichael interview, Freetown, May 2004.

point out one important constraint on internationally supported DDR processes – the desire for rapid implementation.

44. Rapid implementation of peace processes. The relatively tight timetables that govern peace processes – at least those overseen by UN peace support operations – tend to encourage external actors to play the dominant role. International actors have a variety of reasons why they seek to avoid extended peace support operations. Chief among these is the cost, which is borne almost entirely by the members of the international community. The fact that the international community provides the bulk of the financing can lead international actors to undervalue the importance of national ownership and the need to build that ownership. International actors often feel that they have a right to determine how the resources they provide are used, to influence the shape of national programs, and to finance DDR-related activities outside national programs. Preference is often given to international non-governmental organizations or consulting firms to carry out DDR-related activities. In addition to undermining national ownership, this is not necessarily the most cost-effective way of implementing DDR programs.18

45. What is more, tight timetables can make it difficult for international actors to foster local political will. This seems to be particularly true when an international peace support operation is mandated. The conditions that led to the creation of the PSO are often taken as an indication of the existence of adequate local political will to proceed to implement a peace process. In fact, they are often only the bare minimum of what is necessary to develop sustainable peace, and in some cases not even that. It seems advisable to at least question the desirability of moving forward with a DDR process under such conditions.

46. Lack of government legitimacy and weak political will. Related to this, there also appears to be a concern on the part of at least some members of the international community that very weak or transitional governments may not have the legitimacy to develop and implement truly national programs. For example, the UN inter-agency process on DDR is promoting a more operational role for international actors, particularly members of the UN family, in the design and implementation of DDR programs in the context of peacekeeping operations in order to create a truly national program.19

47. There can be no doubt that real or perceived questions of legitimacy, even-handedness or political will can compromise DDR programs, but overcoming these problems does not necessarily require international execution of DDR programs or

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18 See footnote 5 above.

19 “Interagency Workshop Report: Towards a United National Approach to Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration in a Peacekeeping Environment. An Interagency Workshop, 28-30 October 2004,” para. 7. b notes: “Another key finding of the workshop was the need for institutional change in the way the United Nations organizes itself to plan, implement and evaluate DDR operations. Participants acknowledged the need for a more coordinated and integrated approach, especially greater participation of United Nations Country Team and national partners....” Para 7. e continues: “There was consensus that this interagency process must be complemented thorough consultations with local actors, including national DDR institutions, civil society organizations and implementing partners....”
control of financial resources. Rather, skilful use of external mediation, mentoring, and oversight should be the preferred method in cases where difficulties in producing truly national DDR processes arise. This assumes, however, that the international community is willing to allow the peace process to continue until an adequate level of trust exists among the parties to the conflict so that a DDR process that involves all relevant stakeholders can be implemented. It also assumes that the international community is willing to exert pressure on the local parties to implement peace agreements, using both its diplomatic and its security instruments as necessary. In some cases the international community has shown itself to be willing to use all instruments at its disposal and to match the pace of the peace process to local conditions. In many other cases, however, it has not.

48. Multi-donor trust funds: the funding modality of choice? The funding instrument that shows the most promise in terms of promoting national ownership is the multi-donor trust fund, particularly MDTFs that support agreed nationally owned DDR processes.

49. Well-functioning multi-donor trust funds can support national ownership in a number of ways. First, they can enhance national ownership, when, as in the case of Sierra Leone, execution is split between the government and the international body overseeing the trust fund. Second, trust funds are a good way of supporting national programs and disciplining individual donors, particular when no earmarking is allowed. Third, trust funds provide an opportunity to maximize oversight of resources allocated to DDR, as opposed to individual donors contributing to national programs or attempting to monitor a plethora of implementing agencies (international or national). This also lessens the problem of national capacity by reducing reporting requirements for the national DDR entity. Fourth, trust funds support sustainability and continuity in that they are not linked to the operational presence of any one organization and the national actors do not have to develop or approve a DDR process that is unreasonably time-constrained.

50. Donors can choose between UNDP and the World Bank as trust fund managers. Donors have increasingly opted for World Bank management of post-conflict trust funds, including those for DDR, for four main reasons. First, the World Bank is perceived by at least some of the major donors to provide stronger fiduciary controls than the United Nations system. Second, there is a perception that as a major donor, the World Bank can exert political influence over the parties to the conflict. Third, the World Bank has the capacity to mobilize significantly larger quantities of resources, including its own resources. Fourth, there is the perception that donors can exert greater policy influence over the World Bank than over the UN system. From the perspective of national ownership, the ability of the World Bank to allow some degree of national execution of MDTFs is also a plus. At the same time, there are shortcomings to World Bank trust funds that reduce Bank-managed MDTF’s ability to operate effectively in the early part of the post-conflict period. Chief among these are the long start-up period and, according to some, onerous regulations once the MDTFs are operational (see section IV.2.2 below).

51. What is more, if trust funds are to succeed in producing the benefits outlined here, they need to be taken more seriously by the bilateral donors, irrespective of the
organization that manages them. Bilateral donors need to submit to the discipline of trust funds. Some, like the United States, have a history of not contributing to trust funds and do not take particular notice of national efforts to define the DDR process. Others contribute to trust funds but simultaneously fund programs outside the trust fund, some of which may be at odds, to a greater or lesser extent, with the objectives of the program supported by the trust fund. In Sierra Leone, where a clear national program was in place, one donor engaged in reintegration activities that were not part of the formal DDR program but were undertaken in areas prior to disarmament, leading to the concern that combatants would see no need to disarm once the formal DDR program got under way. Other donors offered better benefits than the formal program. One donor reported consciously choosing to provide some DDR financing through the MDTF and some through donor-executed programs because they did not want the Sierra Leone government to have control over all of the funds that this government was donating to DDR. National ownership of DDR processes will clearly benefit to the extent that bilateral donors are able to maximize the amount of funds that can be contributed to unearmarked multi-donor trust funds.

IV.2.2 Obtaining the right kind of money in the right amounts on time

52. **New funding mechanisms.** The experience of supporting peace processes during the first half of the 1990s led most development donors to establish quick-disbursing mechanisms to provide early and flexible resources to peace processes. For some agencies, such as the United States Office of Transition Initiatives, this early money has been restricted to the post-demobilization phase of DDR programming. Other bilateral donors, such as the UK and the Netherlands, do not appear to have significant problems in accessing early money to support DDR. Through its Crisis Prevention and Recovery Thematic Trust Fund (CPRTTF), UNDP can rapidly access unearmarked funds or funds earmarked for DDR or specific countries. The effort that BCPR is putting into obtaining unearmarked funds is important in this respect. UNDP also has “Trac 1.1.3” funds, which can be accessed rapidly and used flexibly, as well as local mission budgets and the technical support of BCPR. For example, UNDP began supporting DDR planning in Sudan in 2003, financed partly through the budget of the

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20 The United States has begun to contribute to DDR trust funds. In the case of the MDTF for Sierra Leone, however, it insisted on earmarking its contribution for support of the transitional safety net allowance, requiring the Bank to open a second trust fund. This requirement probably related to prohibitions on the use of US economic assistance. The Foreign Assistance Act divides foreign assistance into economic assistance and military assistance (U.S. Congress, Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as Amended). USAID regulations prevent economic assistance from being used to finance goods or services where the primary purpose is to meet military requirements of the cooperating country. Exceptions to this rule are not allowed. To determine whether economic assistance is being diverted to military purposes, USAID asks whether the aid primarily benefits the military and, if not, if it subsidizes or substantially enhances military capability. USAID’s legal advisers make determinations on a case-by-case basis. US officials are also constrained by legislation prohibiting contact with “terrorist” groups.

local UNDP office and partly through the CRPTTF.\(^{22}\)

53. **UN assessed budget.** For countries where DDR processes occur with the support of UN-mandated peace operation, the UN mission’s budget can provide a source of relatively early, although not very flexible, and, perhaps most important, **guaranteed** financing.\(^{23}\) As noted earlier, assessed budget funds are unavailable for planning DDR processes until the mission budget is approved, but planning generally needs to begin well before the mission budget is developed. Additionally, financing through the UN assessed budget has been restricted to a fairly narrow interpretation of the “military” aspects of DDR – for example disarmament, some parts of demobilization such as providing security in cantonment areas, and information gathering by military observers. Discussions are currently underway within the UN on expanding the scope of the assessed budget so that UN PSOs could support a broader range of DDR needs, including payment of reinsertion benefits.\(^{24}\)

54. From a financing point of view, expanding the scope of the UN assessed budget would provide assured funding at a relatively early stage in the DDR process for at least portions of DDR needs. However, it would only reduce, but not eliminate, the need to raise voluntary funds to cover aspects of demobilization and reinsertion (Box 5).\(^{25}\) It would also shift some of the burden for financing DDR within the donor community, as countries with higher peacekeeping assessments would pick up a larger share of the DDR bill than they have in the past. From a national ownership perspective, expanding the scope of UN assessed budget financing is problematic, since the opportunities for national execution of the DDR process

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**Box 5. Child Soldier Programs and the UN Assessed Budget**

Good practice relating to child soldiers dictates that children do not go through the demobilization process with adults. Rather they are separated from adults and placed under the responsibility of child protection agencies and, to the extent possible, reunited with families as soon as possible or found other suitable living arrangements.

According to DPKO, however, even mission budgets under the expanded role in DDR will not have a line for “child soldier programs.” While military observers and members of peacekeeping forces could help identify child soldiers, the PSO would never have the capacity to provide the sort of support required by child soldiers. Such programs would thus have a continued need for voluntary contributions.

A similar situation would probably obtain with physically and psychologically disabled fighters and with females associated with the fighting forces.

Source: Authors’ interview.

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\(^{22}\) UNDP has also supported early planning in Haiti and Liberia. In Sudan, Annex 3 shows that some of the early money accessible to UNDP came from the UK.

\(^{23}\) Authors’ interviews, April 2005.

\(^{24}\) Haiti and Sudan are currently considered test cases for this broader approach. With regard to Haiti, however, DDR was mistakenly omitted from the mission budget. In consequence, voluntary funding is currently being sought for the DDR program in Haiti and DPKO are also seeking ways to resource the Haiti DDR Unit. Robert Muggah, personal communications, April 19, 2005 and April 20, 2005.

\(^{25}\) United Nations Department for Peacekeeping Operations, author’s interview, April 2005. In principle, the DDR portion of the mission budget can include financial contributions to set up a national institution and provide capacity-building for the national entity (provision of training or necessary equipment). This type of expenditure has to be clearly included in the mission budget and approved by the UN’s intergovernmental body, the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ).
would be reduced.

55. **World Bank.** In common with many other development agencies, the World Bank’s capacity to operate in immediate post-conflict environments was highly circumscribed in the early 1990s when it started to become engaged in post-conflict activities. As explained in section III.1, the Bank has created several more flexible funding mechanisms for post-conflict environments which have been applied to DDR programming. Additionally, together with the IMF, the Bank has prioritized assisting conflict-affected countries to clear arrears as rapidly as possible. In at least two cases (Sierra Leone in 1998 and Republic of Congo in 2001), the Bank has been able to provide early funding for the national DDR commission through IDA grants, while the Bank-managed MDRP trust fund has also provided resources for institutional development early on in DDR processes.

56. Despite these new instruments, World Bank funding (both bilateral and through trust funds) has been less nimble when it comes to financing early operational activities as compared with UNDP and some bilateral donors. This is partly due to procedures governing World Bank trust funds. It has been suggested that the Bank’s capacity to deliver early money would be increased if MDTFs managed by the Bank had a window that was governed by the more flexible rules guiding the LICUS Trust Fund and the Post-Conflict Fund. Alternatively, the Bank could formalize partnership arrangements with other international actors, such as UNDP, that are capable of moving more rapidly. The international community could also think in terms of sequencing trust funds, with a start-up trust fund being managed by UNDP and a larger, World Bank-managed trust fund coming on line at a later stage in the process. Sequencing should not, however, lead to two DDR trust funds operating simultaneously. That would undermine the objective of disciplining the bilateral donors and reducing the burden on national actors, since inevitably differences would occur in the way in which each trust fund was managed.

57. **Streamlining DDR financing.** In view of the multiplicity of potential funding sources and instruments, efforts need to be made to streamline the DDR financing process. However, a single, simple mechanism for obtaining early DDR financing that will be delivered on time is unlikely to be created, and certainly not in the near term. The multidisciplinary nature of DDR processes militates strongly against any one type of organization (development, peace support, diplomatic) being able to manage all the necessary functions. Problematic as it has traditionally been, coordination of donor support for DDR processes needs to be improved. Better coordination of efforts is discussed in section IV.2.4 below.

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IDA grants were approved under the IDA-13 replenishment in 2002.

27 The mid-term evaluation of the MDRP suggested, for example, that the Special Programs window of the MDRP should operate on LICUS trust fund terms. Development Alternatives, Inc., “MDRP Midterm Review.”
58. **Early donor engagement.** One means of developing early access to financing that has long been recognized is to encourage the involvement of those who will ultimately help foot the DDR bill as early in the DDR planning process as possible (including at the peace negotiations stage). An additional means of obtaining early and appropriate financing is to assist national actors to develop a DDR program that donors will agree to support. While these mechanisms have been applied in the past, the fact remains that when development donors are responsible for providing financing through voluntary contributions they may delay making pledges or fulfilling those pledges because of uncertainties in the peace process. This argues in favor of the use of UN assessed budget funds where possible and/or early money from UNDP or the World Bank. It also argues in favor of seriously questioning whether the political environment is appropriate to attempt to undertake a full DDR process.

59. **ODA eligibility.** An additional constraint on bilateral donor financing relates to the eligibility of funds allocated for DDR to be counted as Official Development Assistance (ODA). As Table 2 demonstrates, the problem does not lie with reintegration, but with demobilization and, particularly, disarmament. What is more, ODA-eligibility is not a problem for some donors, such as the US (which is more constrained by national legislation) or the UK and to some extent the Netherlands (where decisions of which countries or DDR processes to support are based on other considerations).

60. There has been a discussion within the OECD DAC about clarifying and expanding the definition of ODA for a number of security-related purposes. In one group of DAC member countries, development assistance agencies are concerned that the ministries of defense in their countries want access to resources currently allocated to development budgets. This group therefore wants to stay close to the original definition of ODA – expenditures on economic development and welfare. A second group of DAC member countries takes the position that the reality of development has

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DDR Component</th>
<th>ODA Eligible</th>
<th>Non-ODA Eligible</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Disarmament</td>
<td>Some aspects of controlling, preventing and reduction proliferation of small arms and light weapons.</td>
<td>Most DDR-associated disarmament.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demobilization</td>
<td>Activities for non-government fighting forces where DDR occurs in the post-conflict peacebuilding phase of a UN-mandated peace support operation.</td>
<td>Activities involving government fighting forces in any context. Activities involving non-government fighting forces in the absence of a UN-mandated peace support operation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reintegration</td>
<td>All activities in all phases of reintegration.</td>
<td>None.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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changed. In their view, conflict is undermining development and until security is guaranteed in conflict-affected countries, there can be no development. Therefore, the definition of ODA should be broadened to include a range of security-related activities. However, no further discussions on ODA eligibility will occur until 2007, and the situation portrayed in Table 2 will remain as it is until at least that time.

61. The question of ODA-eligibility gets to the heart of the priorities of DAC member governments. If they value helping to create a safe and secure environment in which development can, eventually, take root, they should allocate resources according to those priorities. This could mean finding ways to use some development assistance for non-ODA purposes, finding resources in non-development, non-humanitarian windows, or raising additional resources. It could also mean working to broaden the issues that the World Bank can address and to strengthen nascent efforts at cooperation between the World Bank and UN agencies.

IV.2.3 Upstream and downstream linkages

62. One of the challenges of designing and implementing DDR processes is the linkage between DDR and other parts of the peace process. These may occur prior to or after DDR, but their success is often closely linked to the success of the DDR process itself. This section examines linkages between DDR and elements of security-service restructuring (upstream), early planning (upstream), security-sector reform (downstream), and community-based assistance to war-affected communities (downstream).

63. **Upstream: Security service restructuring and early planning.** The question of how to support former armed opposition members during cantonment when the peace agreement calls for all fighters to be integrated into the national armed forces prior to demobilization has brought the question of the ODA-eligibility of DDR financing into sharp relief over the last year or two. This has at least two implications from the perspective of DDR financing. First, those donors (including the World Bank) that are unable to finance activities involving the national armed forces of a country are unable to provide support during cantonment. Second, those countries that are concerned about ODA-eligibility of their DDR financing may be reluctant to provide support under these circumstances out of development windows.

64. In the case of the DRC, soldiers were administratively demobilized and placed under the authority of a civil body pending their acceptance into the armed forces or

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29 It should be said that those favoring a more traditional definition of ODA do not necessarily disagree that security and development are closely linked. Rather, they believe that security-related issues should be addressed using other financial windows. At least some of these DAC members are also concerned that broadening the definition of ODA eligible expenditures will open the door for the United States to declare some portion of its defense budget as ODA.

The Dutch government has been the strongest proponent of expanding ODA-eligibility to include “activities that can contribute to stability as a prerequisite for sustainable development.” Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, personal communication, April 11, 2005.

their demobilization. This enabled MDRP money to be used to maintain them prior to
demobilization. In the case of Burundi, the EC, France, Belgium and the UK have
provided support in the absence of a similar compromise involving MDRP funding.
While the easiest solution to problems such as these would be to have a fully flexible
funding instrument that could meet all contingencies, it will continue to be necessary
into the foreseeable future to identify the most appropriate source of financing or to
determine how to tweak the situation so that existing funding sources can be applied.

65. Another upstream issue that has been raised is how to support the preparatory
phase of a DDR process prior to the signing of a peace agreement. The Sudan
example cited earlier explains how UNDP (with financial support from DFID) has been
able to support early planning, which involves working together with local actors to
develop progressively more detailed DDR plans. In the case of Sierra Leone, the World
Bank’s IDA-funded support to the National Committee on Disarmament, Demobilization
and Reintegration began shortly after the elected government was restored to power in
early 1998. This enabled the NCDDR to obtain technical support to begin to develop
the DDR program. In principle, the DDR process was still operating under the Abidjan
peace agreement of 1996 in 1998. However, the subsequent breakdown of the peace
process in early 1999 required additional negotiations, resulting in the Lomé Agreement
in July 1999. A further breakdown in the peace process in 2000 meant that the DDR
process did not get underway in its final form until mid-2001. At that point, the MDTF
had been established and was financing limited DDR activities. Equally important, the
NCDDR and its international partners used the period between May 2000 and April
2001 to review progress to date, revise operating procedures, and refine the DDR
program. Once again, it seems that if the correct sources of financing are identified,
resources do exist for pre-peace agreement planning.

66. Downstream: SSR and community-based recovery. Both SSR and
community-based recovery and rehabilitation efforts need to be linked to DDR. They
are not, however, are not an integral part of DDR processes. DDR is most appropriately
seen as a means of helping to create a stable and secure environment following wars
that is conducive to political and economic development. It is not a mechanism for
achieving these longer-term objectives. Yet there is indication of increasing
pressure to expand the scope of DDR programs to encompass both
community rehabilitation and
development as the main mechanism
for reintegrating ex-combatants, and
security-sector reform. This raises a
number of questions in regard to how
DDR is defined and the results it can be
expected to yield.

67. DDR has typically been viewed
as a five-stage process: weapon
surrender, assembly, discharge, short-
to medium-term reinsertion, and longer-term reintegration (Figure 2).\textsuperscript{31} In the past, reintegration has been the stepchild of the DDR process. Ex-combatants have tended to receive short-term “resettlement” or “reinsertion” assistance, while support for longer-term reintegration has frequently not been forthcoming due to factors such as a lack of funding, a lack of long-term perspective, or a conscious decision to limit targeted assistance to ex-combatants.

68. Interest is now growing among donors in promoting community-based reintegration of ex-combatants and other vulnerable groups. The objective is to provide assistance to all war-affected populations in a given area and to emphasize sustainability. In some cases, this assistance is described as supplementing short-term reinsertion assistance. In other cases, it is described as substituting for reinsertion assistance. [Reinsertion assistance can include food, clothing and personal items, housing material, medical care and education, basic household goods, land, basic agricultural supplies, severance pay, counseling for ex-combatants and, in some cases, their dependents. Reinsertion assistance can also include basic education, vocational training and job placement services for ex-combatants.]

69. A more fundamental question that has yet to be addressed is whether longer-term reintegration should actually be part of the DDR process.\textsuperscript{32} Given the political and security objectives of DDR, it might make more sense to redefine the “R” portion of DDR as “reinsertion,” as portrayed in Figure 2, and to identify ways in which longer-term assistance can be used to support the reintegration of former combatants and their dependents into civilian life without overly privileging them compared to other war-affected populations.\textsuperscript{33}

\textsuperscript{31} Questions are being raised about the appropriate sequencing of DDR processes. In particular, there may be a need to provide reintegration support before disarmament occurs. And it is clear that full disarmament is a lengthy process that needs continued attention even after the completion of formal DDR processes. This issue is beyond the scope of this particular report. However, it does have implications for financing.

\textsuperscript{32} The SIDDR process does not include longer-term reintegration. Its concern is to identify what types of assistance are absolute necessary from a security perspective.

\textsuperscript{33} The issues of targeting and benefits are beyond the immediate terms of reference of this particular report. However, it is interesting to note that the Activity Report of the UNDP Trust Fund supporting the Liberia DDRR Program covering the period September 2004 to March 2005 identified as a key reintegration policy challenge the following:

“The policy to address reintegration and rehabilitation of ex-combatants through community-based recovery activities. Disarmed and demobilized ex-combatants in Liberia, due to sustained conflict over a period of 14 years, neither have marketable skills that enable them to independently earn their living nor own capital to engage in self-employment income generation activities so as to have a transactional relationship in the final preferred area of settlement. Such a group, unless provided with targeted opportunities that prepare them to enter into civilian life could be a potential danger for national security and the overall peace process in Liberia. Due to the slow but promising pace of community based development programmes and the inadequacy of synchronized injections of capital into multi-sectoral community based interventions to create livelihood opportunities for all citizens, including the disarmed and demobilised, it is difficult to conclude that such initiatives would address the reintegration and rehabilitation needs of ex-combatants – a vulnerable group that could be remobilized into armed robbery and gang related activities. Hence, a significant policy consideration should be directed towards sustaining the current momentum of targeted assistance for ex-combatants rather than shifting the entire
70. It is important to stress, however, that defining DDR in this way should not be taken as a sign that disarmament and demobilization are a unit and that reinsertion and longer term reintegration should be planned and implemented separately. One of the major lessons of previous DDR processes is that organizationally de-linking the process of disarming and demobilizing combatants from that of planning and delivering reinsertion and reintegration support creates institutional rivalries that undermine the effective and efficient delivery of DDR programs. Creating these linkages is not, however, easy in view of the large number of actors typically involved in designing and delivering DDR activities. Figure 3 illustrates one way in which disarmament, demobilization and reinsertion could be linked to longer-term reintegration within the context of a nationally-led DDR process. Precise institutional relationships depend heavily, of course, on local circumstances. However, the point should be to find ways of both developing and implementing an integrated strategy while allowing the most appropriate implementing agencies to take on specific tasks.

71. Security sector reform is also a long-term process that is, in principle, rooted in democratic governance and influenced by DDR.\textsuperscript{34} The main objectives of SSR are to develop:

- a legal framework that is consistent with international law and good democratic practice and that is implemented;
- effective civil management and oversight mechanisms and that function as intended;
- viable security bodies that are professionally and technically capable of providing security for individuals, communities and the state and are affordable and accountable;
- an institutional culture of the security services, particularly the attitudes of the leadership, that is supportive of the legal framework, international law, good democratic practice, and the functions and supremacy of civil management and oversight bodies.

This is clearly a complex agenda that even under optimal conditions requires many years to implement. In conflict-affected countries, progress will be considerably slower. However in most conflict-affected countries where some form of security-sector reform has been attempted, the process has been reduced to restructuring and reforming the security services, particularly the military and the police. In part, of course, this reflects the need to restore the monopoly over the use of force to the elected government. More importantly, however, it reflects the failure of all external actors, including development actors, to ensure that reformed security bodies are matched by civil authorities, parliaments and civil society that are capable of monitoring and overseeing the development and implementation (including financing) of the security sector.

Efforts to link “SSR” and DDR appear to have arisen out of recognition on the part of some members of the international community that without fundamental reforms in the security sector, countries would be locked into a perpetual cycle of conflict, DDR, return to conflict, another round of DDR, and so on. Thus, a major innovation of the MDRP partnership was to require governments hoping to receive MDRP assistance to submit a letter of demobilization policy that identified linkages with SSR. However, as the MDRP position paper on this subject demonstrates, the direct linkages are rather tenuous. What the MDRP does offer is some leverage over governments to promote SSR.

Regrettably, there appears to have been very little follow-up to the letters of demobilization policy. Rather, “SSR” is currently being defined in the MDRP context as a means of supporting former combatants in the DRC and Burundi who have all become members of the national armed forces prior to the demobilization of some of them. The “linkage between SSR and DDR” is thus reduced to using MDRP funds to feed and house these soldiers prior to demobilization rather than as a catalyst for a strategic review of force requirements and structures which could lead to more appropriately sized, affordable and better-managed armies.

IV.2.4 Promoting coordination among the members of the international community supporting DDR efforts

Coordination is the perennial problem facing all humanitarian, post-conflict, and development work. Coordination of DDR activities and financing is somewhat more complex than coordination of some other forms of assistance in that it requires collaboration among actors with different institutional agendas and cultures. There is some evidence that the international community, or at least parts of it, are attempting to improve DDR-related coordination.

The growing use of multi-donor trust funds to support DDR activities in conflict-affected countries documented in Annex 3 is in part a reflection of the recognition of the need to coordinate donor financing of DDR processes. The same is true of the creation of pooled resource funds in the UK and the Netherlands, as well as the “whole of

---

government approach” discussions that DAC members are having on a range of security-related issues. Similarly, the UN-wide effort to develop an integrated DDR strategy, which contains a module on financing and budgeting of DDR programs, focuses both on bringing DDR funding mechanisms under an integrated DDR fund management facility to support an integrated DDR plan to the extent possible and on linking parallel funding mechanisms to this integrated plan.

77. Linking all financing into a unified DDR plan is undoubtedly the most effective means of coordination. The key questions are, whose plan will it be, how will that plan be developed, and how will the financing be managed? As stressed throughout this report, the central tool for raising and coordinating international financing for DDR processes should be a national DDR plan. One of the dangers of international coordination is that even when it does not work very well, it often manages to exclude national actors.

78. There is no doubt that the UN system needs to coordinate its financing of DDR processes better and that the process of UN coordination needs to be linked more effectively to DDR funding from the World Bank, other multilateral development banks and bilateral donors. There is also no doubt that bilateral donors need to develop a coordinated approach to supporting DDR processes within their own governments. In the UN context, the proposal of the High-level Panel to create a Peacebuilding Commission is a reflection of the need for senior policy-level coordination on a whole range of issues in conflict-affected and fragile states.36 Discussions on creating a Peacebuilding Fund in the UN Secretariat as suggested by the High-Level Panel are also going forward.37 This would not, however, be the locus of all resources necessary for DDR, even if the UN assessed budget covers more DDR-related costs. Additionally, one has to wonder what effect the entry of a new player in an already crowded international funding “system” (and one situated in a non-operational part of the UN system), would actually have.

79. All of these efforts need to take as their starting point a national DDR strategy. Once that strategy is agreed among national actors — a process that itself will frequently benefit from appropriate international support — the international community needs to approach supporting this strategy in a collaborative manner. Developing a product line for DDR may be part of an institutional survival strategy for at least some members of the international community. Developing and implementing an effective DDR process is essential to the long-term sustainability of peace processes in conflict-affected countries. The international community has to be clear about where its own priorities lie.

IV.2.5 Matching resource needs with available funding sources and instruments

80. Annex 3 demonstrates that most DDR processes since late 1992 have been financed by a variety of sources. These funding sources have in turn often used a variety of funding instruments to deliver the resources. Table 3 shows the different funding sources and instruments used in two DDR processes. While having multiple options can be helpful in putting together a funding package for a DDR program, it can also create significant problems in terms of effectiveness, efficiency and accountability. Inexperienced international staff may not know which sources of funding or instruments can be used; they may not understand how to work the system and thus miss available resources or instruments by failing to think outside the box or lacking understanding of how programs were financed in the past.

81. For their part, national actors cannot be expected to understand what funding windows exist in each donor, how best to tap each window, and what funding

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country/Date</th>
<th>Funding sources</th>
<th>Funding modalities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
2. UN assessed budget  
3. Bilateral development assistance grants (US, Germany, Italy)  
4. Bilateral security-related funds  
5. Bilateral market food aid  
6. UN agency financing [ILO/own $$?]  
7. World Bank | 1. Multilateral trust fund [RSS managed by UNDP, executed by BDP]  
2. Financial transfers to international executing agencies [PF, executed by GTZ and IOM; IRS, executed by IOM]  
3. Direct execution [Government budget/6 months salary payments]  
4. Funding specific programs (training) [executed by local training bodies plus international NGOs?]  
5. Co-financing [WB co-financed PF/GTZ] |
2. World Bank IDA credit  
3. UN assessed budget  
4. UN agencies (UNDP, WFP, UNICEF) [own $$?]  
5. Bilateral development assistance (Canada, Denmark, the European Commission, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, the United States, Japan) | 1. Direct execution [National entity: NCDDR/NCDDR-ES]  
2. Direct execution [UN Mission - UNAMSIL (D1, D2 and R2)]  
3. Contributions to multilateral trust fund (managed by WB, co-executed by WB and NCDDR-ES, in support of national program]  
4. In-kind contributions [WFP]  
5. Contributions to UN agency [UNICEF - MOU w/NCDDR for child soldier programs]  
6. Financial transfers to International implementing bodies [consulting firms, international NGOs (some with MOUs w/NCDDR)]  
7. Financial transfers to local implementing agencies [NGOs, CBOs, firms – hired by NCDDR or through bilateral programs] |
instruments will best meet their needs. Additionally, they will be hard pressed to oversee the activities of a diverse group of DDR funding instruments.

82. Simplifying this process by maximizing the amount of resources that are provided through multilateral/multi-donor instruments such as multi-donor trust funds and peace support operations (UN or regional) in support of national programs appears to make good sense. The first question is what impediments exist to this approach. In some cases there may be national policies and legislation that require funds to be used in certain ways. In other cases, it may be more an issue of allocating more funds to particular financing windows or changing long-standing practice on the approach to DDR (or assistance to conflict-affected countries in general).

V. LOOKING FORWARD TO PHASE 2

83. Both the information collected in the course of the phase 1 desk study and the process of collecting that information lead us to three main conclusions:

- First, while a good deal of information about the level and nature of funding, funding windows, and funding instruments for DDR has been collected, there are considerable gaps in the readily accessible information. This limits the ability to make comparisons among different DDR processes or even to understand fully issues such as efficiency of resource use in individual DDR processes.

- Second, this variability in the available data reflects not only the wide range of international approaches to financing DDR, but also the lack of common agreement on what DDR processes include. This seems to arise primarily from different institutional priorities and constraints that influence the way in which the members of the international community supporting DDR define and approach DDR.

- Third, even if it is possible to collect additional data of the sort summarized in Annex 3, the key issues involved in financing DDR processes that support the peace process and create the environment needed for sustainable recovery are themselves process issues.

Phase 1 work thus confirms the expectation contained in the draft terms of reference that phase 2 of the review and analysis of experience of financing DDR should focus on issues such as “fiduciary requirements and procedures, governance structure, speed of disbursement, management, oversight and accountability, and donor coordination impact,”\(^{38}\) and that field visits may allow for a deeper analysis of specific problems.

84. Interviews conducted for phase 1 work also underscore the degree to which members of the international community, particularly those with main responsibility for supporting DDR – the UN system and the World Bank – are already seeking ways to improve the functioning of their own systems and are discussing ways of improving coordination between themselves. Additionally, the information that has been most helpful in understanding the progress that has been made to date and the remaining

\(^{38}\) “Review and Analysis of the Experience of Financing Demilitarization Programs,” Draft Terms of Reference, p. 3.
challenges has come from a detailed understanding of specific cases, some of it gathered previously by the authors of this report in the course of previous field work.

85. A major theme of this report has been the importance of maximizing the amount of resources that are provided through multilateral/multi-donor channels in support of nationally owned DDR strategies, to the extent possible. This is because a multilateral financing framework offers the best opportunity for aligning the different approaches to financing DDR with national priorities. It promotes a more coherent DDR process, and reduces the burden on national actors of managing multiple sources of financing.

86. It therefore seems to make good sense for phase 2 of Working Group 2’s consideration of DDR financing to focus on:

- outcomes of different DDR financing governance structures, including financial execution by national actors;
- fiduciary requirements and what is needed on the part of both international and national actors to meet them;
- effective and accountable methods of ensuring timely disbursement of international financing for DDR;
- resource management, oversight and accountability; and
- impact of donor coordination (or lack thereof) on DDR outcomes.

87. This portion of the work should be based on in-depth examination of a small number of carefully chosen case studies which include DDR processes with the following characteristics:

- The members of the international community supporting DDR have come together primarily through a WB-managed MDTF, and
- The members of the international community supporting DDR have come together primarily through the UN system.

88. The DDR processes chosen for phase 2 work should have been underway for an adequate amount of time for all portions of the DDR process to have been started. Ideally one of the DDR cases examined will be occurring in the context of a peacekeeping mission. A combination of field study and in-depth interviews with individuals involved in designing, implementing and evaluating the chosen DDR processes is deemed most likely to provide the most useful information.
Annex 1. Draft Terms of Reference – Phase 2

Working Group 2 of the Stockholm Initiative on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (SIDDR)

PHASE TWO

Draft Terms of Reference

Background

The Swedish Government launched the Stockholm Initiative at the end of 2004 by inviting a number of key partners and agencies to examine the policy issues around DDR programmes. Working Group 2 is intended to inform the financing-related discussions.

The purpose of Phase 1 work was to collect background information on the costs of DDR processes and conduct a mapping of issues that would provide a basis for WG2 to determine the focus of subsequent work. The conclusions of Phase 1 confirmed the expectation that there are large gaps in the available information and differences in how donors classify data, making comparisons between different DDR processes or analysis of how resources are disbursed difficult. Phase 1 also highlighted the need for a better understanding of the process by which international financing for DDR processes is managed.

The purpose of Phase 2 is to carry out a deeper analysis of specific problems that the international community faces in financing DDR processes. This work will focus on fiduciary requirements and procedures, governance structures, mechanisms for management, oversight and accountability, donor coordination, and the factors that affect the speed of disbursement, and the national ownership of DDR processes.

Methodology

Two case studies of DDR processes being supported by the international community will be used to examine these issues. The case chosen will have been underway for an adequate amount of time for all portions of the DDR process to have been started.

One of the case studies will be of a DDR process where international support is being provided through a World Bank-managed MDTF, and one will be a case where the UN is leading. Ideally, one of the processes examined will be occurring in the context of a peace support operation.

Information will be collected through a combination of field study, documentation review, and in-depth interviews with individuals involved in designing, implementing and evaluating the chosen DDR processes.
Issues to be addressed

The following issues should be examined:

- outcomes of different DDR financing governance structures, including financial execution by national actors, and how their performance might be improved;
- assessment of the content and relative “weight” of national contributions to DDR programmes;
- methods of maximizing financial support for an agreed national DDR strategy;
- fiduciary requirements and what is needed on the part of both international and national actors to meet them;
- effective and accountable methods of ensuring timely disbursement of international financing for DDR;
- resource management, oversight and accountability;
- impact of donor coordination (or lack thereof) on DDR outcomes,
- how the limited availability of information affects efforts to evaluate DDR processes and strengthen cost-effectiveness

Management and reporting

The study is being funded by the Swedish Government. The consultants will report to Ambassador Jan Cedergren, Chair of Working Group 2, and the Swedish MOFA.

Timeframe and outputs

Phase 2 work will be carried out between May and July 2005. A draft final report will be submitted for comments by…. Comments will be provided to the consultants within ten days by WG 2 members. A final draft will be submitted on 19 August 2005.

The final report will combine the main findings of Phase 1 and Phase 2 work, and policy recommendations. It will include an Executive Summary and List of Acronyms, with relevant supporting data and material included in Annexes. The length of the report, excluding Executive Summary and Annexes, will be a maximum of 50 pages.

The consultants will attend any additional WG 2 technical meetings, as required, and the final meeting of the SIDDR in Stockholm in October 2005.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country/dates</th>
<th>UN-mandated peace support operation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Djibouti: 12/1993 – 2002</td>
<td>No</td>
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<tr>
<td>Eritrea: 1993 –1997</td>
<td>No</td>
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<tr>
<td>Somaliland: 1993 - ?</td>
<td>No</td>
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<td>Mali: 1995 - ?</td>
<td>No</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rwanda: 1997 – early 2001</td>
<td>No</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tajikistan: 1997 -</td>
<td>No</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kosovo: 1999 -</td>
<td>United Nations Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), 10/06/1999 -</td>
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<tr>
<td>Guinea-Bissau: 2000 - ?</td>
<td>No</td>
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<tr>
<td>Uganda: 2000- ?</td>
<td>No</td>
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<td>Cambodia: 1999 – 2005</td>
<td>No</td>
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<td>Somalia: 2000 -</td>
<td>No</td>
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<tr>
<td>Eritrea: 2001 – 2006</td>
<td>No [UNMEE has no mandate for DDR]</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ethiopia: 2000 – 2005</td>
<td>No [UNMEE has no mandate for DDR]</td>
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<tr>
<td>Congo, Republic: 2000 -</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
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<td>Angola: 2002 – 2006</td>
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<td>Solomon Islands: 2002-2003</td>
<td>No</td>
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<td>Rwanda: 2002 – 2005</td>
<td>No</td>
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<tr>
<td>Papua New Guinea: 2003</td>
<td>No</td>
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<tr>
<td>Country/dates</td>
<td>UN-mandated peace support operation</td>
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<td>-------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>Haiti: 2004 -</td>
<td>UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), June 1, 2004 — This entry seems to be in the wrong place — not about Haiti</td>
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<td>Congo, Democratic Republic: 1999 -</td>
<td>United Nations Observer Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC), 30/11/1999 -</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sudan: 2004 -</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) 24/30/2005 -</td>
</tr>
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</table>
## Annex 3. Mapping DDR Processes, Selected Countries (in chronological order)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country/Dates</th>
<th>Peace Support Operation</th>
<th>Funding Sources</th>
<th>Total Cost and Number of Beneficiaries</th>
<th>Additional Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Djibouti</strong> Phase 1 Dec 1993 - 1996 Phase 2 1996 - 2002</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>1. Government of Djibouti (Phase 1) 2. Multilateral development banks (World Bank, African Development</td>
<td>Disarmament (Phase 1): unknown  Demobilization (Phase 1): unknown  Demobilization (Phase 2): unknown</td>
<td>Phase 1 included police as well as army. Ex-combatant unrest led to increased in departure allowance to US $ 1,000 non-frontline service and US $ 2,000 frontline service. Phase 2 approved May 1997 at Round Table.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country/Dates</td>
<td>Peace Support Operation</td>
<td>Funding Sources¹</td>
<td>Total Cost and Number of Beneficiaries</td>
<td>Additional Comments²</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Djibouti</strong></td>
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<td>Reinsertion (Phase 1): unknown</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>Reinsertion (Phase 2): US $17.9¹⁸</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Reintegration: US $2.5 m¹⁹</td>
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<td>Project management: US $0.5²⁰</td>
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<td>(14% reintegration only)</td>
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<td>Total Phase 1: US $9.0m²¹</td>
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<td>Total Phase 2: US $20.9</td>
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<td>Total: US $29.9</td>
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<td>Beneficiaries:</td>
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<td>Phase 1: 4,096</td>
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<td>Phase 2: 8,224</td>
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<td>Total: 15,000</td>
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<td>WB project for disabled ongoing 2004?⁴³</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Eritrea</strong>²⁷</td>
<td>1993-1997</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Disarmament: unknown</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Demobilization: unknown</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Reinsertion (cash payments only):</td>
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<td>320-340 m. Birr (US $ 51.2 – 54.4 m)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Reinsertion (cash to Ethiopian soldiers fighting with Eritrea): 4 m Birr (US $ 0.64 m)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Reinsertion (in-kind): unknown</td>
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<td>Reintegration: unknown</td>
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<td>Total: US $ 68.8</td>
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<td>Beneficiaries: ~54,000</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Donor community declined to finance reinsertion programs, and government borrowed 430 m Birrs (US $68.8 m).</td>
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<tr>
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<td></td>
<td>“Donors” provided under US $ 12 m, including pledges (for reintegration schemes that benefited ex-comb?)</td>
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<td>Exchange rate $1 = 6.25 Birrs</td>
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<td>Disarmament: MOD</td>
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<td>Demobilization/reinsertion: Mitias [Dept for Demob and Reint of Ex-Fighters/Eritrean Relief and Rehabilitation Agency]</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Germany allocated US $3.3 m to support Mitias, including financing for reintegration projects²⁵</td>
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<td>Italy (1995-1996): US $0.1 m</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Australia (1995): US $0.2 m²⁶</td>
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<td>Reinsertion: US $</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Reintegration (Dayton): US $8.0m</td>
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<td>Program management (Dayton):</td>
<td></td>
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<td>In Madrid Agreement 1998, Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Republika Srpska agreed to cut forces an additional 30% 1999-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country/Dates</td>
<td>Peace Support Operation</td>
<td>Funding Sources¹</td>
<td>Total Cost and Number of Beneficiaries</td>
<td>Additional Comments²</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Bosnia and Herzegovina</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>US $0.8m</td>
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<td>Total:</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Dayton: US $8.8m²⁸</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>Madrid: US $</td>
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<td>Beneficiaries:</td>
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<td>Dayton: 23,000+³⁹</td>
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<td>Madrid: ~8,000⁰³⁰</td>
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<td><strong>Rwanda</strong></td>
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| Stage 1 1997 – early 2001 | None                  | 1. Government of Rwanda  
2. Contributions to trust fund  
3. UN agency financing  
4. Bilateral development assistance (UK, Austria) | Disarmament: unknown  
Demobilization: US $0.97m  
Reinsertion: US $ 13.2m  
Reintegration: US $4.1m  
Project management: US $1.1m  
Total: US $19.4m  
Beneficiaries: 18,692 | Phase 1 implemented by Rwanda Demobilization and Reintegration Commission formed 01/1997; external financing limited due to political environment. It is unclear if the contributions from Austria and the UK were for the UNDP trust fund or went directly to the government of Rwanda. Austria provided US $0.8 m and the UK provided US $1.7 m. Netherlands: US $2 m to UNDP-executed trust fund |
| **Uganda**   |                         |                |                                      |                   |
2. Contributions to MDTF (MDRP)  
3. Bilateral development assistance (Norway, Belgium, Netherlands, Ireland, Denmark, United States)  
4. UN agency financing (UNDP) | Total: US $7.4 m  
Beneficiaries: 15,300 | DDR in the context of Amnesty Act |
| **Cambodia** |                         |                |                                      |                   |
2. World Bank  
3. Bilateral development assistance (Japan, Canada, Sweden, Germany)  
4. UN agency financing (WFP) | Disarmament: unknown  
Demobilization: US $14.0  
Reinsertion: US $24.0  
Project implementation, TA and studies: US $4.0 m  
Total: US $44.25  
Beneficiaries: Pilot: unknown  
Pilot 2001: 30,000 | Announcement of intention to downsize army by ~55,000 over 5 years (1999). Then 31,500 over 3 years (2000)  
Donor meeting Paris 2000 agreed focus on long-term reintegration. Initial WB severance package worth $1200 reduced to $240 plus in-kind support (goods and housing) due to lack of funds. Donors also stress DDR needs to be part of broader military reform process. Pilot: US $2.25 m pilot carried out under World Bank trust fund supported by governments of Canada, Sweden and Netherlands). World Bank IDA credit (2001): US $18.4 |
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<td><strong>Cambodia</strong></td>
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<td>Netherlands (2001): US $2.0 m&lt;sup&gt;29&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
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<td>Japan: US $10.0&lt;sup&gt;30&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
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<td>Government of Cambodia: US $7.2 m.&lt;sup&gt;61&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
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<td>Sweden: US $2.4 m&lt;sup&gt;62&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
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<td><strong>Eritrea</strong></td>
<td>None</td>
<td>1. World Bank</td>
<td>Disarmament: Unknown Demobilization: US $9.5m Reinsertion: US $120.0m Reintegration: US $52.0m Project management: US $6.6m&lt;sup&gt;63&lt;/sup&gt; Contingencies: US $9.3m Total US $197.0m&lt;sup&gt;64&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>National Commission for Demobilization and Reintegration (NCDR) leads on DDR process. The UN PKO, UNMEE, is not mandated to address DDR. Netherlands (2001): US $20,000&lt;sup&gt;65&lt;/sup&gt; and ~US $5.6m co-financing World Bank program.&lt;sup&gt;66&lt;/sup&gt; World Bank IDA (2002): US $ 60m&lt;sup&gt;67&lt;/sup&gt; EC (2002): US $6.5m&lt;sup&gt;68&lt;/sup&gt; World Food Program: US $15m&lt;sup&gt;69&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
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<td>2001 - 2006</td>
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<td>2. Bilateral development assistance (EC, Netherlands)</td>
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<td><strong>Ethiopia</strong></td>
<td>None</td>
<td>1. Government of Ethiopia</td>
<td>Disarmament: Unknown Demobilization: US $26.8m&lt;sup&gt;70&lt;/sup&gt; Reinsertion: US $53.2m Reintegration: US $80.0m Project management: US $9.0m Contingencies: US $5.1m Total: US $174.1</td>
<td>An earlier Ethiopian DDR process following creation of Eritrea is not included as it began before the Mozambique DDR process. However, Ethiopia did demobilize 22,200 Oromo Liberation Front fighters and released 20,000 from ENDF (mostly Tigrayans) in mid-1990s.&lt;sup&gt;72&lt;/sup&gt; In 1996, Austria provided US $0.2m for reintegration of ex-combatants.&lt;sup&gt;73&lt;/sup&gt; The UN PKO, UNMEE, is not mandated to address DDR. Ethiopia developed DDR strategy with assistance of 3 year WB Emergency Demobilization and Reintegration Project. Of the 174.1m total cost of this program, IDA credits provided US $170.6m and the Government of Ethiopia contributed US $3.5m&lt;sup&gt;74&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
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<td>2000 – 2005</td>
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<td>2. World Bank</td>
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<td>Pilot was completed in July 2001</td>
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<td>The main DDR process began at the end of 2001</td>
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<td>Country/Dates</td>
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<td><strong>Congo, Republic</strong>&lt;br&gt;Phase 1: Jan 2000-end 2002&lt;br&gt;Phase 2: 2003</td>
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<td>1. Government of Republic of Congo (Phase 1) 2. UN agency financing (UNDP) (Phases 1 and 2) 3. World Bank (Phase 1) 4. Bilateral development assistance (Sweden/Phase 1; EU/Phases 1 &amp; 2; Norway/Phase 1) 5. Contributions to MDTF (MDRP) (Phase 2)</td>
<td>Disarmament (Phase 1): unknown Disarmament (Phase 2): US $90,000? Demobilization (Phase 1): US $0.65 (IDA) Reinsertion: unknown Reintegration (Phase 1): US $4.73m (UNDP) + US $2.2 m Reintegration (Phase 2): US $ under preparation Project management (Phase 1): US $ Total: US $7.7m Beneficiaries: Reintegration Phase 1 UNDP/IOM: 7,249 Reintegration Phase 1: HC/WB: 3,732 Disarmament: Phase 2: UNDP program has target of 15,000 weapons</td>
<td>Phase 1:&lt;br&gt;Disarmament: various uncoordinated efforts since 1999²⁷ Demobilization: no formal process (implicit due to signing of 1999 agreement) Reintegration: IOM (micro-credit) and Haut Commissariat pour le Démobilisation et Réintégration des ex-Combattants (HC), with IDA credit IOM implemented UNDP-executed program financed by Government, UNDP, Sweden, EU, Norway²⁸ World Bank IDA credit (2001): US $5.0m.²⁹</td>
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<td>Country/Dates</td>
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<td><strong>Solomon Islands</strong></td>
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| 2002/03            |                         | 1. Bilateral development assistance (Australia, New Zealand, European Union)³⁷ | Disarmament: US $0  
Demobilization: US $382,536  
Reinsertion: US $0  
Reintegration: US $732,000  
Project management: US $100,000 (8.3%)  
Total US $1.2 m³⁸  
Beneficiaries: 864³⁹  
Cost/beneficiary: US $1,389 | Program to demobilize Special Constables and provide microenterprise projects for their reintegration  
UNDP executed (Direct Execution)  
Phase 1 was funded by AusAID with support for small business training from NZAID.  
Phase 2 was funded by the EU.  
The Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI) arrived in the Solomon Islands only after the DDR project was underway. While the completion of the project was not dependent on RAMSI, it has been reported that “The arrival of RAMSI … has had a direct and positive impact on project activities and, ultimately on its results…Overall, the presence of RAMSI gave the project further and well-needed leverage in its collaboration and interaction with SCs to insure maximum impact of the project activities.”³⁹⁰ |
| **Rwanda**         |                         |                  |                                        |                      |
2. World Bank  
3. Bilateral development assistance (Germany, UK)  
4. Contributions to MDTF (MDRP) | Disarmament: unknown  
Demobilization: US $3.3 m  
Reinsertion: US $17.2 m  
Reintegration: US $24.0 m³⁹   
Project management: US $6.3 m³⁹  
Contingency: US $2.5 m  
Total: US $53.3  
Beneficiaries: 60,000³⁹⁴  
Of which as of 12/2004:  
Demobilization: 33,945³⁹⁵  
Reinsertion: ~29,000³⁹⁵  
Reintegration: 30,3801(9,282 + 11,098 from stage 1)³⁹⁷ | Security situation in Eastern DRC has caused slowdown in repatriation of ex-combatants to Rwanda.  
IDA credit: US $25m allocated; US $10.4m disbursed as of 12/2004³⁹⁶  
UK: US $7.95m allocated; US $8.8 m disbursed as of 12/2004  
Germany/GTZ: US $3.25m allocated; US $0.3m disbursed as of 12/2004  
MDRP: US $14.4m allocated, US $4.95m disbursed as of 12/2004  
Govt of Rwanda: US $2.7m allocated, US $2.3m disbursed as of 12/2000 |
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<th>Additional Comments&lt;sup&gt;2&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Afghanistan</strong> 2002-2006</td>
<td>United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)</td>
<td>1. Bilateral development assistance (Japan, Canada, UK, USA, Netherlands) 2. Contributions to MDTF (UNDP executed)</td>
<td>(as of April 10 2005)&lt;sup&gt;99&lt;/sup&gt; Disarmament: US $6.6m Reinsertion: US $ Demobilization and Reintegration: US $68.6m Construction: US$1.0m ICT: US $2.7m Support to government: US $5.9m Public information: US $1.2m Ammunition Survey Project: US $294,182 Planning of Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups: US $584,307 UNDP Admin fee: US $6,105,458 Project management: US $11,601,611</td>
<td>Canadian contribution to ANBP 2004: US $7.6m&lt;sup&gt;100&lt;/sup&gt; US Dept of Labor Child Soldiers reintegration (2003): US $3.0m&lt;sup&gt;101&lt;/sup&gt; Disarmed additional 755 XCs not from the Afghan Military Forces (AMF); cantoned 8,926 heavy weapons; deployed 5 Ammunition Survey Teams throughout the country to survey munitions stockpile and destroy the most dangerous stockpiles; compile database of Illegal Armed Groups (over 120 groups with estimated strength of 130,000). Donor contributions in 2005 temporarily addressed the funding crisis, which most negatively impacted the reintegration contracts with Implementing Partners. An additional $17m is needed to complete the DDR mandate for 60,000 AMF; however, recent estimations suggest the AMF strength may be greater. Netherlands contribution to ANBP/UNDP (2004): ~US $2.4m&lt;sup&gt;102&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
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<td><strong>Burundi</strong>&lt;sup&gt;TM&lt;/sup&gt; 2004-2006?</td>
<td>United Nations Operation in Burundi (ONUB) 21/05/2004</td>
<td>1. Contributions to MDTF (MDRP) 2. World Bank 3. Bilateral development assistance (Germany)</td>
<td>Disarmament: unknown Demobilization: US $4.8 m Reinsertion: US $31.5 m Reintegration: US $36.8&lt;sup&gt;104&lt;/sup&gt; Project management: US $10.8&lt;sup&gt;105&lt;/sup&gt; Unallocated: US $4.0 m Total: US $87.9m&lt;sup&gt;106&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>UNICEF implements Special Projects for Children Is the food for assembly areas purchased with EU grant included in demobilization figure? Pre-disarmament assistance has been financed by EC, France, Belgium and UK: ~ US $3.1m [of which, UK ~$245,000]&lt;sup&gt;108&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
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<td>Country/Dates</td>
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<td>Liberia 2002 -</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) 19/09/2004-</td>
<td>1. Contributions to MDTF (UNDP executed)&lt;sup&gt;108&lt;/sup&gt; 2. Bilateral development assistance (USAID, EU) 3. Other bilateral assistance (US/DOS) 4. UN agency financing (UNDP, UNMIL, UN Office of Humanitarian Affairs, UNICEF, UN High Commissioner for Refugees, World Food Programme and World Health Organization)&lt;sup&gt;110&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>Disarmament: unknown  Demobilization: US $12.3m&lt;sup&gt;111&lt;/sup&gt;  Reinsertion: US $ (TSA?)  Reintegration: US $15.5m&lt;sup&gt;112&lt;/sup&gt;  Project management: US $3.7m&lt;sup&gt;113&lt;/sup&gt;  Total: US $31.5m&lt;sup&gt;114&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>Abuja Agenda set terms for DDR  US Department of State small arms destruction: US $0.2 m&lt;sup&gt;116&lt;/sup&gt;  UK reports $1.8m for UNICEF&lt;sup&gt;117&lt;/sup&gt;  UNDP DDRR Trust Fund pledges:  EC: US $11.2m  UK: US $5.4m (of which US $1.7 m disbursed by 2004)&lt;sup&gt;118&lt;/sup&gt;  Denmark: US $3.4m  Sweden: US $3.2m  UNDP: US $3.m  US: US $2.9m  Norway: US $1.2m  Switzerland: US $0.8m  Ireland: US $0.6m  Iceland: US $ 13,933&lt;sup&gt;119&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
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<td>Central African Republic July 2004 – June 2006</td>
<td>UN Political Mission - BONUCA</td>
<td>1. Contributions to MDTF (MDRP) 2. Bilateral development assistance (France, EU)</td>
<td>Total: $40.7 m  Beneficiaries: no more than 7,566 $1,718/beneficiary (maximum)</td>
<td>UNDP is executing an MDRP Special Project in lieu of a national DDR program. It has four inter-related components: 1) disarmament; 2) demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants; 3) community strengthening to ensure sustainable reintegration of ex-combatants; 4) security for development.&lt;sup&gt;120&lt;/sup&gt;  Of the US $13.0 m special project: US $9.8 m from MDRP (of which US $1.0 m for community support); US $1.2 m from UNDP (for disarmament and security and development); US $1.2 m from France (for community support); and US $1 m from the EU (for community support).&lt;sup&gt;121&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
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<td><strong>Congo, DR</strong>&lt;br&gt;1999 - ?&lt;br&gt;2004 [formal start of national program]</td>
<td>UN Observer Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC), 30/11/1999</td>
<td>1. UN agency financing (UNDP) 2. World Bank 3. Contributions to MDTF (MDRP) 4. Bilateral development assistance (Canada, Norway, Germany, Belgium, UK)</td>
<td>Disarmament: unknown&lt;br&gt;Demobilization: US $34.4 m&lt;sup&gt;122&lt;/sup&gt;&lt;br&gt;Reinsertion: US $66.1 m&lt;br&gt;Reintegration: US $82.3 m&lt;sup&gt;123&lt;/sup&gt;&lt;br&gt;Program management: US $35.8 m&lt;br&gt;Unallocated: US $2.9 m&lt;br&gt;Total: US $230.5 m&lt;br&gt;Beneficiaries: approx 150,000&lt;sup&gt;124&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>MONUC mandate includes comprehensive DDRR, in collaboration with the Joint Military Command&lt;br&gt;The DDR program will be implemented by the National Commission for DDR (CONADER) under supervision of Interministerial Committee for DDR (CIDDR).&lt;br&gt;UK reported providing US $9.7m. to the MDRP&lt;sup&gt;125&lt;/sup&gt;&lt;br&gt;NGO execution of child soldier programs: Save the Children, IRC, IFESH, Care Int’l&lt;br&gt;National Program declared effective Nov 9, 2004 and first tranche IDA grant US $5.4 m disbursed.&lt;br&gt;Bilateral contributions prior to 2004:&lt;br&gt;Canada (1999-2000): US $0.8m&lt;br&gt;Germany /GTZ (2001, 2003): US $4.8m&lt;br&gt;Belgium (2002-2003): US $0.9m&lt;br&gt;Norway: US $55,600&lt;br&gt;Canada, Belgium, Norway, UK contributions for child soldiers. UK provided ~US $1.3m to UNICEF.&lt;sup&gt;127&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
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<td><strong>Sudan</strong>&lt;br&gt;2004 -</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) 24/30/2005-</td>
<td>1. UN agency financing (UNDP) 2. Bilateral development assistance (UK&lt;sup&gt;128&lt;/sup&gt;) 3. Other bilateral assistance (Canada/DFAIT)</td>
<td>Total cost pilot DDR program: US $3.4m&lt;sup&gt;129&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>Netherlands: US $0.3m for UNDP pilot program&lt;sup&gt;130&lt;/sup&gt;&lt;br&gt;UK: ~US $0.9m. to UNICEF’s child soldier DDR program; ~US $0.6m. to UNDP for 3 field advisers to support preparatory planning for DDR; and ~US $0.3m. for a DDR adviser to IGAD and office of the UN Resident Coordinator.&lt;sup&gt;131&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
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Notes

1 In terms of “funding sources” it is also important to consider the role of local communities, which is generally ignored in studies of DDR. Communities provide reconciliation, psychosocial, reinsertion and reintegration support in non-monetized ways. See Lundin et al in Kees Kingma, ed., *Demobilization in Sub-Saharan Africa: the Development and Security Impacts*, New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000, p. 191.

2 This report has taken as its starting the DDR process in Mozambique. Where earlier DDR processes in the same country have been excluded from this survey, it is noted in this column.

3 MDTF = Multi-donor trust fund

4 Own funding or solely voluntary funding?

5 Contributions to the Provincial Fund and the Information and Referral Service were: USAID, US $11m; Italy, US $1.5m; World Bank, US $0.7m; and Canada, US $0.5m. Creative Associates International Inc., *The Information and Referral Service/Provincial Fund. Final Report*, Prepared for the International Organization for Migration, March 1997, p. 33.


8 Includes contribution of €4.6m. Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, April 13, 2005.

9 Kees Kingma, ed., *Demobilization in Sub-Saharan Africa*.; p. 86.

10 Some reintegration activities continued after the formal end of demobilization.


12 Kostner, and Ingo Wiederhofer, *Cases in War-to-Peace Transition*, p. 317, gives US $42.3 m as total expenditures at the time their report was prepared, but noted that Phase III ongoing at time of writing and exact costs could not be calculated at that time. Pp. 313, 317. Their table shows a balance of US$1.4m.

13 It is unclear how this mechanism differed from a normal Bank trust fund.

The contributors to the Uganda Veterans Assistance Program pledged the following amounts: Denmark (US $6.9m); EU (US $2.9m); Germany (US $0.001m); Netherlands (US $5.7m); UK (US $7.1m); Sweden (US $5.8m), US (US $7.0m), UNDP (US $0.9m), IDA (US$3.4m), and Government of Uganda (US$0.4m). Actual receipts were slightly below pledges but information on actual outlays is not available for most donors. Nat J. Colletta, Markus Kostner, and Ingo Wiederhofer, *Cases in War-to-Peace Transition: The Demobilization and Reintegration of Ex-Combatants in Ethiopia, Namibia and Uganda*, Washington, DC: World Bank/Africa Technical Department, 1996, p. 317.

Information for UNDP and UNICEF from: Nat J Colletta, Markus Kostner, and Ingo Wiederhofer, *Cases in War-to-Peace Transition*, p. 317. UNICEF funds never passed through the UVAP.


World Bank, “Project Appraisal Document on a Proposed Credit in the Amount of SDR 2.0 Million (US$ 2.7 Million) for an Ex-Combatant Reintegration Project,” Report no. 17777-DJI, November 30, 1998, p. 12. The ADB contribution was tied to approval of an IMF ESAF. The ESAF had been delayed from 1998 to 1999 and there was some concern that it might not be approved at all, in which case the Government of Djibouti would be facing a short-fall of some US $5.0 m for its reinsertion payments. *Ibid.*, p. 17.

Together France, the EC and the ADB pledged $15.9 primarily for departure allowances which are classified here at reinsertion payments. It is unclear where the additional US $2.0 million came from, possibly the Government budget. World Bank, “Project Appraisal Document on a Proposed Credit in the Amount of SDR 2.0 Million (US$ 2.7 Million) for an Ex-Combatant Reintegration Project,” Report no. 17777-DJI, November 30, 1998, pp. 3, 12.


This cost was borne entirely by the Government of Djibouti. It did not include any reintegration support. World Bank, “Project Appraisal Document on a Proposed Credit in the Amount of SDR 2.0 Million (US$ 2.7 Million) for an Ex-Combatant Reintegration Project,” Report no. 17777-DJI, November 30, 1998, p. 12.

The total number of beneficiaries includes some 3,000 Front pour la Restauration de l’Unité et de la Démocratie (FRUD) that were not integrated either into the new armed forces or into the civil service. It is unclear whether these former FRUD combatants had been eligible for the reinsertion payments. Of the potential 15,000 target group, the World Bank reintegration project anticipated supporting 3,800. In the end, only 2,926 actually received assistance. Due to continued conflict and economic deterioration, the Bank reported that “The operation did not achieve its objective of facilitating to any significant degree integration of ex-combatants into the economic and social life of Djibouti…. A certain number of veterans were trained but there is no evidence they actually were employed (anecdotally, it appears they were not) and a small number of disabled were assisted. The micro grant component had to be cancelled after the violence [recurred] in light of the small amount of funds set aside for it and charges of bias in its allocation to individuals, who tended to view it as a cash entitlement rather than a program to establish a means of livelihood. There is little evidence that few, if any, of the former rebels benefited at all and it is reported therein resentment that such benefits as there were accrued largely to former government troops.” World Bank, “Implementation Completion Report (IDA-31540) on a Credit in the Amount of US$ 2.7 Million to the Republic of Djibouti for an Ex-Combatant Reintegration Project,” Report no. 26251, June 27, 2003, pp. 4-5.


Multiple numbers are given in the World Bank Implementation Completion Report on a Credit in the Amount of US $9.175 Million to Bosnia and Herzegovina for a Pilot Emergency Labor Redeployment Project: US $9.175 (p. 11), US $8.9m (p. 35), US$8.8m (p. 36-37), and US $8.4m (p. 37). The difference between the US$ 8.9 (which represents donor commitments) and the US $8.8m may be the ongoing work financed through a Dutch contribution that was due to be completed after the IRC was written.

World Bank, Implementation Completion Report , on a Credit in the Amount of US $9.175 Million to Bosnia and Herzegovina for a Pilot Emergency Labor Redeployment Project.


According to OECD statistics, 79.29% of this IDA credit was a grant. The loan portion carried 0% interest, had a grace period to January 2009 and a final repayment date of 2031. OECD, International Development Statistics (IDS) database, www.oecd.org/dac/stats/idsonline, 1996. According to the World Bank, Implementation Completion Report on a Credit in the Amount of US $9.175 Million to Bosnia and Herzegovina for a Pilot Emergency Labor Redeployment Project, p. 2, not all beneficiaries were ex-combatants.


Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs reports it provided the World Bank trust fund with US $20 m for DDR and other activities. Personal communication, April 13, 2005. The World Bank Implementation Completion Report, p. 34, states that the Dutch government provided an additional $375,000 “toward the end of the project, i.e. around 1999. However the OECD International Development Statistics database shows a commitment in 1996.

EDRP co-financing figures from World Bank, Implementation Completion Report on a Credit in the Amount of US $9.175 Million to Bosnia and Herzegovina for a Pilot Emergency Labor Redeployment Project, p. 35.


Own funding or solely voluntary funding?

Contributors to the MDTF include Canada, Denmark, the European Commission, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and the United States.

It has not been possible to develop a breakdown of expenditure. In 2004, a senior UN official estimated that the total cost of the DDR process in Sierra Leone was around US $100m. In fact, it is clearly more than US $100m since the known contributions add up to US $100m and there is, at a minimum, additional UK expenditure plus an unknown about of UNAMSIL expenditure.
Information on MDTF, Government of Sierra Leone, IDA and WFP provided by the World Bank. Information on UNICEF provided by UNICEF. All are reported in Gebreselassie Tesfamichael, Nicole Ball and Julie Nenon, *The Final Evaluation of Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Program and the Multi-Donor Trust Fund Supporting DDR*, October 2004 Draft, p. 67

This figure covers only the UK contract with AgriSystems and the UK contribution to GTZ's DDR program. It therefore understates the total UK contribution. *Africa Conflict Prevention Pool expenditure*. Data provided by DFID, May 2005.

The bulk of this assistance is described as “Security Council General Support” in the DAC IDS database.


Includes TA


From Estimates based on World Bank, *Technical Annex for a Proposed Credit, T7498-RW, March 25, 2002*, p. 4. From another source (which??), have a figure of 16,125 for Stage 1. Also, there are some 12,000 ex-FAR and ex-RPA who did not get adequate assistance during Stage 1 and are included in Stage 2, as well as 15,000 ex-FAR who returned before Stage 2 began. *See World Bank, Technical Annex for a Proposed Credit, T7498-RW, March 25, 2002*, p. 6, para 20.


According to OECD, *International Development Statistics (IDS) database*, [www.oecd.org/dac/stats/idsonline](http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/idsonline), 2003, the Netherlands provided this sum to UNDP TF 97. However, the UNDP trust fund closed in 2001.

MDRP donor partners are: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, EC, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and the UK.

Includes a Grant Agreement valued at US $4,204,000, of which US $0.45 m has been disbursed. MDRP, *Uganda Special Projects*, MDRP Website March 24, 2005. The MDRP grant became effective in January 2005 and will run until January 2007.

This figure also includes US $1.7 m from Norway (2000-2003), US $0.2m from the Netherlands, US $0.8 from Belgium and US $106,000 from Ireland. *OECD, International Development Statistics (IDS) database*, [www.oecd.org/dac/stats/idsonline](http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/idsonline) 2000-2003.

This total is an underestimate since financing provided by UNDP, USAID (implemented by IOM), and Denmark is not available.

15,300 is the figure that the MDRP program intends to assist. The MDRP Secretariat states that it would be very difficult to determine the per beneficiary cost. Personal communication, April 8, 2005. According to the spokesperson for the Amnesty Commission, some 14,700 former fighters had applied for amnesty since 2000. Of these, 11,324 had not received their resettlement packages due to a lack of funding. Isabirye Musoke, “Amnesty Commission to Pay Ex-Combatants,” *The Monitor* [Kampala], March 21, 2005, [http://allafrica.com/stories/printable/200503210063.html](http://allafrica.com/stories/printable/200503210063.html).

According to the World Bank Project Appraisal Document, “GTZ is providing assistance to be managed in parallel with the above funds [the World Bank credit, Japanese, Swedish and Dutch contributions], including provision of technical assistance…” *World Bank, Project Appraisal Document on a Proposed Credit in the Amount of SDR 14.7 Million (US$18.4 Million Equivalent) to the Kingdom of Cambodia for a Demobilization and Reintegration Project*, Report no. 22601 KH, August 2, 2001, p. 11.

Includes US $0.2 m for data management and MIS. *World Bank, Project Appraisal Document on a Proposed Credit in the Amount of SDR 14.7 Million (US$18.4 Million Equivalent) to the Kingdom of Cambodia for a Demobilization and Reintegration Project*, Report no. 22601 KH, August 2, 2001, p. 10.

All breakdowns are for the 2001-2005 main project and come from the World Bank Project Appraisal Document, p. 10.
Includes US $2.25 m for the pilot project. World Bank, Project Appraisal Document on a Proposed Credit in the Amount of SDR 14.7 Million (US$18.4 Million Equivalent) to the Kingdom of Cambodia for a Demobilization and Reintegration Project, Report no. 22601 KH, August 2, 2001, p. 3.

World Bank, Project Appraisal Document on a Proposed Credit in the Amount of SDR 14.7 Million (US$18.4 Million Equivalent) to the Kingdom of Cambodia for a Demobilization and Reintegration Project, Report no. 22601 KH, August 2, 2001, p. 31.


World Bank, Project Appraisal Document on a Proposed Credit in the Amount of SDR 14.7 Million (US$18.4 Million Equivalent) to the Kingdom of Cambodia for a Demobilization and Reintegration Project, Report no. 22601 KH, August 2, 2001, p. 1.


World Bank, Project Appraisal Document on a Proposed Credit in the Amount of SDR 14.7 Million (US$18.4 Million Equivalent) to the Kingdom of Cambodia for a Demobilization and Reintegration Project, Report no. 22601 KH, August 2, 2001, p. 1.

World Bank, Project Appraisal Document on a Proposed Credit in the Amount of SDR 14.7 Million (US$18.4 Million Equivalent) to the Kingdom of Cambodia for a Demobilization and Reintegration Project, Report no. 22601 KH, August 2, 2001, p. 1.

Includes institutional strengthening and operating and capital costs of the Executive Secretariat. This does not appear to include the World Bank’s administrative fee.


The Netherlands Foreign Ministry reports it provided €4.65m to the World Bank. Personal communication, April 13, 2005.

IDA and EC from: OECD, International Development Statistics (IDS) database, www.oecd.org/dac/stats/idsonline, 2002. 80.68% of IDA loan is a grant; 0% interest rate on loan portion; 10-year grace period; final repayment 2042.


All cost figures from, World Bank, Technical Annex for a Proposed Credit of SDR 133.7 Million (USD170.6 Million Equivalent) to Ethiopia for an Emergency Demobilization and Reintegration Project, Report no. T7405-ET, November 9, 2000, p. 15.

Personal communication from Ingo Wiederhofer, World Bank, April 8, 2005.

Kingma, p. 85


World Bank, Technical Annex for a Proposed Credit of SDR 133.7 Million (USD170.6 Million Equivalent) to Ethiopia for an Emergency Demobilization and Reintegration Project, Report no. T7405-ET, November 9, 2000, p. 9. OECD, International Development Statistics (IDS) database,
OECD, International Development Statistics (IDS) database, www.oecd.org/dac/stats/idsonline, 2000, reports that of the 170.6m IDA credit, 80.66% is a grant. The loan portion carries 0% interest and has ~ 3 year grace period and the final repayment is due 2040.


Of this, 80.72% is a grant. The loan portion carries 0% interest rate and has a 10-year grace period with a final repayment date of 2041. OECD, International Development Statistics (IDS) database, www.oecd.org/dac/stats/idsonline, 2001.


Contributions for feeding demobilized and their dependents.

Includes US $4.3 m in Special Projects executed by UNDP/FAO

At end of March 2005, US $12.1m had been disbursed under IDA grant and MDRP Trust Fund for National Program. Sean Bradley, World Bank, personal communication, April 15, 2005.

A €13.5m grant from the EU for vulnerable groups will be used 50/50 for ex-combatants and other community members. It was originally estimated in the budget for support to ex-combatants only and is included in the estimated costs of reintegration above. Sean Bradley, personal communication, April 15, 2005.

With the exception of one grant in 2003 from the State Department, all US contributions are from USAID. Two USAID grants are financed out of ESF. OECD, International Development Statistics (IDS) database, www.oecd.org/dac/stats/idsonline, 2002-2003.

Africa Conflict Prevention Pool funding, DFID contribution. Data provided by DFID, May 2005.

Luc Lafrenière, “Support to Demobilization of Special Constables in the Solomon Islands,” UNDP Project SOI/02/01, 2003, p. 7, and personal communication, Nick Hartmann, Regional Conflict & Development Advisor, United Nations Development Programme, UNDP Pacific Center, Fiji, April 8, 2005.


Lafrenière, p. 2.
Lafrenière, pp. 6-7.


Includes US $5.6 m for “special groups” which may not all be reintegration activities.

Includes TA

World Bank, Technical Annex for a Proposed Credit, T7498-RW, March 25, 2002, p. 6, para 20 states: “Target groups. For the second stage of the RDRP, the Government envisages the demobilization and reintegration of 20,000 RPA soldiers and 25,000 members of armed groups returning from outside the country (including the 1,735 recently demobilized from Mudende and Nkumba). In addition, the Program would provide reinsertion assistance to 15,000 ex-FAR who returned before stage II as well as economic reintegration assistance to an estimated 12,000 RPA and FAR ex-combatants who did not receive adequate assistance during stage I of the Program and who remain economically vulnerable.” This comes to 60,000 for demobilization in stage 2. Attachment 3, however, on p. 52 gives the number of stage 2 beneficiaries as 66,650.

MDRP Quarterly Report Oct-Dec 2004 p. 5 notes that the demobilization target is 60,000: 20,000 ex RDF adults, 22,500 ex-armed group adults, 2,500 ex-armed group children, and 15,000 ex-FAR. Of these 16,592 ex RDF adults, 4,509 ex armed group adults, 554 ex-armed group children, and 12,290 ex-FAR have been processed for a total of 33,945 or 57% of anticipated 60,000.

MDRP Quarterly Report Oct-Dec 2004 p. 5 notes that 20,578 received basic needs kit; 27,079 received “recognition of service allowance 1, and 27,463 received “recognition of service allowance 2”.


All donor expenditure data from: World Bank, “Rwanda Demobilization and Reintegration Program (Project ID: 075129; Credit No. IDA-36340, MDF No. 075129), Mid-Term Review,” December 2004, p. 40.

All information provided by ANBP, April 10, 2005.


Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, April 13, 2005.


Includes US $12.4 for “special groups” which may not be solely reintegration costs and US $3.5 for demobilization and reintegration of child soldiers plus some non-recruitment activities.

Includes TA

According to Ingo Wiederhofer, World Bank, the total budget amount for the Burundi DDRP is ~US $82m (including the UNICEF Special Project). Personal communication, April 8, 2005.

Of which some 5,000 adults will be demobilized in phase 1 prior to April 2005 elections. All registered child soldiers have been removed from assembly areas, and additional screening is underway to ensure none remain. MDRP Quarterly Report Oct-Dec 2004, p. 2.

UK contribution from Africa Conflict Prevention Pool, program implemented by GTZ. Data provided by DFID, May 2005.

These UN bodies sit on the Joint Implementation Unit of the DDRR Program, along with US, EU, World Bank and other donors.


Initially anticipated a total budget of US $75m for a DDR program benefiting 53,000 former combatants. Some 100,000 have been demobilized.


The total beneficiary pool is estimated at ~98,000. Some 2,000 individuals were expected to self-reintegrated. The 55,200 figure covers all of those for which funding has been secured, including some 2,500 children associated with the fighting forces. According to UNDP, this leaves approximately 43,000 potential beneficiaries without reintegretion support, unless additional funding is secured. UNDP, “Liberia Disarmament, Demobilisation, Reintegration and Rehabilitation Programme. Draft Trust Fund Activity Report,” Vol. II, September 2004 – March 2005, p. 65.


Data provided by DFID, May 2005.

First tranche of the MDRP grant disbursed October 2004; total amount of Grant Agreement between UNDP and World Bank: US $9,777,343.00. MDRP Special projects, www.mdrp.org.


Includes US $30.5 m Special Projects which may include some non-reintegration activities. Value calculated from MDRP Quarterly Report Oct – Dec 2004, p. 11.


Resources from both DFID and the Africa Conflict Prevention Pool. Data provided by DFID, May 2005.

Data provided by DFID, May 2005.

Most of the UK contribution was provided by the African Conflict Prevention Pool and therefore strictly speaking is not bilateral development assistance.

Information from Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, April 13, 2005.

Information from Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, April 13, 2005.

Data provided by DFID, May 2005.