Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration in Uganda

Mini Case Study

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July 2008

Contribution to the Project:

DDR and Human Security: Post-conflict Security-building in the Interests of the Poor
Acronyms:

COFS: combatants on foreign soil
D, D, R & R: disarmament, demobilisation, reintegration and reinsertion
DDR: disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration
DRT: demobilisation and resettlement team
EU: European Union
GoU: Government of Uganda
ICC: International Criminal Court
IPDs: internally displaced persons
JLOS: Justice, Law and Order Sector
LRA: Lords Resistance Army
MDRP: Multi-Country Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme
MDTF: Multi-Donor Trust Fund
NGO: non-governmental organisation
NRM: National Resistance Movement
NUSAF: Northern Uganda Social Action Fund
PEAP: Poverty Eradication Action Plan
PRDP: Peace, Recovery and Development Plan for Northern Uganda
PRSP: Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
SALW: small arms and light weapons
SSR: security sector reform
UNDP: United Nations Development Programme
UNHCHR: United Nations Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights
UNICEF: United Nations Children’s Fund
UNRF II: Uganda National Rescue Front II
UPDF: Uganda People’s Defence Force
USAID: United States Agency for International Development
Introduction to the Purpose and Scope of this Mini-case Study

This mini-case study on disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) in Uganda has been researched and written by Saferworld. It is one component of the ‘DDR and Human Security: post-conflict security building and the interests of the poor’ project being undertaken by the University of Bradford’s Centre for International Co-operation and Security (CICS) and partners, including Saferworld.

This mini-case study is designed to provide data for thematic papers which are being produced as part of the project. These papers focus on the integration and / or co-ordination of DDR with other areas of post-conflict security building, namely: security sector reform (SSR); small arms and light weapons (SALW) control; transitional assistance; and longer-term development programming. As such, this case study seeks to examine experience in Uganda with regard to the integration and / or co-ordination of DDR activities with these four related areas of programming.

This mini-case study examines disarmament, demobilisation, reinsertion and reintegration (D, D, R & R) activities that have taken place in Uganda since 2000 and that have been implemented by national agencies, primarily the Amnesty Commission, with support from international agencies including the Multi-Country Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme (MDRP) – a multi-agency programme financed by the World Bank and 13 other donors. It focuses on D, D, R & R activities that have taken place in the West Nile and Acholi regions of Northern Uganda since 2000, with a particular focus on activities between January 2005 and September 2007 (during which period MDRP provided financial support).

The mini-case study does not provide a full, substantive analysis of DDR in Uganda, or of the institutions and programmes that have been centrally involved in D, D, R & R activities, such as the Amnesty Commission and MDRP. Neither does it seek to unpack the definitions of integration nor co-ordination, as this is covered elsewhere within the project.

It should be noted from the outset that, while components of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration have taken place during this period in Uganda, they have not done so within a standard or classic model of DDR. The constituent elements of DDR have not been conceived of or implemented as a single programme within which all actors and projects are subsumed. Rather, they have occurred within the context of a broad range of initiatives that have been implemented by various actors within the country, including the Government of Uganda, NGOs and donors agencies, seeking to address past and ongoing conflicts. For these reasons, the term ‘DDR’ will be used sparingly within this case study, which will seek to examine the constituent elements of DDR as they as they relate to each other and to other areas of programming, as opposed to conceiving of DDR as a single ‘box’ or model. Further,

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1 In addition to the World Bank, the 13 other donors contributing to the MDRP are Belgium, Canada, Denmark, the European Commission, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Ireland, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Note that the MDRP provides financial support to demobilisation and reintegration activities, but does not fund disarmament.

2 ‘Acholi’ refers to the region of in the Central North of Uganda which comprises the districts of Amuru, Gulu, Kitgum and Pader. ‘West Nile’ refers to region of North West Uganda which comprises the districts of Koboko, Muyo, Yumbe, Arua and Nebbi.
in addition to looking at disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration, this paper will also include a focus on reinsertion activities, which are aimed at providing short-term assistance to ex-combatants to enable them to (re-)enter a community, as distinct from reintegration projects which seek to enable sustainable (re-) integration into the community. This mini-case study will therefore use the term ‘D, D, R & R’ where it is necessary to refer to the full range of activities that occur within these various types of programming, but in the main shall refer to, and examine, the four components separately.

The mini-case study draws upon a desk review of existing literature and MDRP project documentation, which has been supplemented by field research and interviews conducted in Kampala, in the towns of Arua and Yumbe in the West Nile region, and in the town of Gulu in Acholi.³ 

³ The field work in Uganda took place between 23rd July and 6th August 2007. Please see annex for a list of people interviewed during the course of this research. Information collected through interviews is non-attributed.
1. Context and Background to Disarmament, Demobilisation, Reinsertion and Reintegration (D, D, R & R) Programming in Uganda

This section of the mini-case study provides an overview of the context within which D, D, R & R programming has taken place in Uganda during the period covered by this study. It is intended to provide the reader with relevant background information prior to the analysis in Section 2 of how and whether D, D, R & R has been linked to programming in the areas of SSR, SALW control, transitional assistance programming and long term development programming.

This section thus provides a brief general overview of the conflict and political context in Uganda. It then introduces the Amnesty Act, which has provided the primary basis for D, D, R & R programming, and provides an overview of the project through which MDRP has provided support. Finally in this section, there is an overview of the particular contexts within which D, D, R & R programming has taken place in the Acholi and West Nile regions.

1.1 Overview of Uganda Context

Since independence from Britain in 1962, Uganda has experienced considerable armed conflict. Armed struggles have resulted in violent seizures of power and ushered in new regimes. In 2007, the conflict with the Lords Resistance Army (LRA) remains unresolved, although peace talks are underway in Juba. The precise factors driving these conflicts naturally vary from case to case, and a detailed analysis of conflict causes is well beyond the scope of this case study. Contributing factors however appear to include: perceptions and realities of political exclusion, and social and economic marginalisation; poverty and underdevelopment; and regional and cross-border conflict dynamics. Though not exclusively, these conflicts have in recent decades occurred primarily in the north of the country, including the West Nile and Acholi regions. Conflict in these regions appears to both to be driven by, and to exacerbate, underdevelopment, and there is a stark contrast between levels of development in the north compared with the rest of the country. Thus, while Uganda has experienced overall economic growth in recent years, and has often been hailed as a good example of African growth, this is only part of the story.

Progress towards the entrenching of democracy within Uganda has also been patchy. Multiparty elections were held for the first time in 2006, following which the opposition took the Electoral Commission to court to challenge the results. The court ruled that malpractices had occurred with regard to the election, including interference by the military, but that these did not warrant a rerun of the election. Yoweri Museveni retained the Presidency which he has held since 1986 and may seek a fourth
term at the next elections set for 2011. Uganda meanwhile maintains a large standing army and its politics and society are characterised by entrenched militarism.

1.2 The Amnesty Act

Museveni’s Government has adopted a variety of stances towards the conflicts and insurgencies that have occurred in the north of the country, including repeated military offensives, negotiations, granting of amnesty, and the requesting of international arrest warrants against rebel leaders. Of these, this case study includes a particular focus on the granting of amnesty, since it primarily in the context of the 2000 Amnesty Act that components of D, D, R & R have taken place. It is important to note, however, that the passing of the Amnesty Act did not signal an end to the conflicts in Acholi or the West Nile, or to the Government of Uganda (GoU)’s attempts to end them through other means, including military offensives. Therefore, the D, D, R & R activities resulting from the Amnesty Act have been implemented within a dynamic and ongoing conflict context, in contrast to many other countries where DDR programmes have been established following a formal cessation of conflict.

Under the Amnesty Act of the year 2000, the GoU declared an amnesty ‘in respect of any Ugandan who has at any time since the day of the 26th of January, 1986 engaged in or is engaging in any war or rebellion against the government of the Republic of Uganda’. Engagement in war or rebellion is defined to encompass actual participation in combat, collaboration with the perpetrators of war or armed rebellion, committing any other crime in the furtherance of war or armed rebellion, or assisting or aiding the conduct or prosecution of war or armed rebellion. According to the Act, any person having participated in any such act shall not be prosecuted or subject to any form of punishment. The Act refers to those people seeking amnesty as ‘reporters’, as opposed to ‘ex-combatants’ or ‘insurgents’ in recognition of the fact that many of the people who have participated in the insurgencies, particularly in the case of the LRA conflict, have been forcibly abducted, thus blurring the lines between victims and combatants.

Under the terms of the Amnesty Act, reporters should present themselves to the ‘the nearest Army or Police Unit, a Chief, a member of the Executive Committee of a local government Unit, a magistrate or a religious leader within the locality’ and ‘renounce and abandon involvement of the war or armed rebellion’. They should also surrender any weapons in their possession. Reporters will then be provided with an Amnesty Certificate and entitled to receive reinsertion and reintegration support. Further details of this process are provided within Section 2 of the case study.

The impetus for the Amnesty Act originally came from the Acholi community, civil society and religious leaders, including the Acholi Religious Leaders Peace Initiative (ARLPI). It was envisaged as a legal mechanism to provide amnesty to returning LRA combatants as one part of wider efforts towards resolving the LRA-GoU conflict. Following a nation-wide consultation the GoU decided that a blanket amnesty should be extended to all members of insurgent groups across the country.

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5 Amnesty Act 2000, para. 2 (3).
7 Refugee Legal Project, February 2005, p. 6
The Amnesty Act provides for the establishment of the Amnesty Commission and defines the role of the Amnesty Commission as to:

- monitor programmes of demobilisation, reintegration and resettlement of reporters;
- coordinate a programme of sensitisation of the general public on the amnesty law;
- consider and promote appropriate reconciliation mechanisms in the affected areas;
- promote dialogue and reconciliation; and
- perform any other function that is associated or connected with the execution of the functions stipulated in this Act.8

In addition to the Amnesty Commission, the Act led to the formation of Demobilisation and Resettlement Teams (DRTs).9 According to the Amnesty Act, the DRTs are responsible for drawing up programmes for:

- de-commissioning of arms;
- demobilisation;
- re-settlement; and
- reintegration of reporters (i.e., returning combatants).10

DRTs have been operating in different locations across Uganda including in the towns of Arua, Gulu, Kitgum, Mbale, Kasese and Kampala. In November 2005 the Amnesty Commission also opened an office in Beni, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), with the support of Irish Aid, with the aim of allowing Ugandan Combatants on Foreign Soil (COFS) to go through the amnesty process.

There have been discussions about opening an office of the Amnesty Commission in Juba, to support the return of LRA from assembly zones in Southern Sudan if and when a peace agreement is signed, although at this point it is unclear exactly what role this office would play. The Amnesty Commission is meanwhile participating in the Juba peace talks, including discussions on Agenda Item 3 on Justice, Peace and Reconciliation.

The Amnesty Commission receives some limited funds through the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MoIA), to cover its administrative costs. However, the Commission has depended heavily upon support from international donors and multilateral agencies to finance implementation of its mandate. Between 2000 and 2004, the Amnesty Commission was financed by the GoU and direct bilateral contributions from Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Great Britain, Italy, Ireland, Netherlands, Norway, the United States and the European Union. Between 2002 and 2004 the Amnesty Commission received some support from the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) through its Integrated Project for the Return and Reintegration of Reporters and Dependents funded by USAID, UNICEF and the EU.11 UNDP has also has

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9 Amnesty Act 2000, para. 11,
11 Escola de Pau
provided some support to the Amnesty Commission through its’ Conflict Prevention and Recovery Programme. Between January 2005 and June 2007, the Amnesty Commission received support totalling US$4.2 million from the MDRP through the Multi-Donor Trust Fund (MDTF) – see below.

1.3. **MDRP in Uganda**

1.3.1 **Background to MDRP**

It is through the MDRP that the Amnesty Commission has received the bulk of its funding since 2005. This sub-section provides a brief background to the MDRP project in Uganda.

The MDRP is a ‘multi-agency effort supporting the demobilisation and reintegration of ex-combatants in the Greater Lakes region of Africa’. MDRP works with national partners to finance, plan and implement demobilisation and reintegration activities. MDRP was established to support demobilisation and reintegration processes following the end of conflict in the DRC. The conflict drew in combatants from countries across the Great Lakes region, creating a number of DDR-related challenges of a regional nature, including: COFS; cross-border weapons flows; and the need to prevent the phenomenon of ‘double dipping’ whereby combatants attempt to benefit from more than one DDR process in a region or to pick the process which is most attractive to them. The decision to adopt a regional approach was further informed by experience suggesting that regional insecurity and conflict dynamics can seriously undermine national-level efforts to carry out DDR.

MDRP is funded by the World Bank and 13 other donors (see Introduction), whose contributions are pooled within the MDTF. The World Bank manages the MDRP Secretariat (which has its headquarters in Washington and country offices, including in Uganda) and administers the MDTF. The MDTF component of the MDRP programme is unique in the field of DDR interventions because it provides a central funding mechanism for international donors and multilateral agencies to support demobilisation and reintegration processes in a number of countries in a co-ordinated and integrated manner.

According to the MDRP’s Greater Lakes Regional Strategy for Demobilisation and Reintegration, of March 2002, the programme’s objectives are three-fold:

i) to provide a comprehensive regional framework for DDR efforts for both irregular and government forces,

ii) to establish a single mechanism for donor co-ordination and resource mobilisation, and

iii) to serve as a platform for national consultative processes that lead to the formulation of national demobilisation and reintegration programmes.

The MDRP provides assistance to governments who request support to carry out a national DDR programme. In addition, the MDRP also supports a number of Special Projects. The Special Project option within the MDRP regional strategy creates a framework for funding activities urgently needed in the period prior to the

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12 MDRP website www.mdrp.org
13 MDRP/ World Bank, March 2002, para. 3
development of a national DDR programme, in countries where this is required (for example allowing for the 'early' DDR of special needs groups) and/or DDR in areas beyond the control of the government.\textsuperscript{14}

1.3.2 MDRP Special Project in Uganda: January 2005 to June 2007
Uganda qualifies for support from MDRP on the grounds of its status as a signatory of the 1999 Lusaka Agreement on the conflict in the DRC and its consistent support of regional peace efforts.\textsuperscript{15} Discussions between the MDRP and the GoU began in 2002. In the early phases of discussions, the GoU indicated that it would welcome MDRP support for a national demobilisation and reintegration programme.\textsuperscript{16} However, in 2003 a decision was reached that Uganda would, at least for the time being, be granted support within the status of a Special Project as opposed to a national programme. According to MDRP Joint Supervision Reports and Partner Meeting Reports from this period, the decision to provide support through a Special Project was taken because the GoU failed to meet a number of criteria for a national programme – see Section 2.1.1 for further detail.

The Special Project was entitled ‘Repatriation, Rehabilitation, Resettlement and Reintegration of ‘Reporters' in Uganda’ and its aims were to:

- Assist approximately 15,300 reporters in their reintegration into civilian life, within the context of Uganda's Amnesty Act of 2000; and
- Strengthen the capacity of the Amnesty Commission.

The project included five components:

- Sensitisation and dialogue;
- Demobilisation and process of Amnesty Applications;
- Reininsertion (Resettlement) support;
- Long term social and economic reintegration; and
- Institutional strengthening of the Amnesty Commission.\textsuperscript{17}

The Special Project ended in June 2007. However, the World Bank and the GoU are, at the time of writing in September 2007, drawing up plans for a potential new project. If agreed, this project will entail support to the GoU to plan and implement demobilisation and reintegration activities, including those arising from the Juba peace talks with the LRA. This would include support to the Amnesty Commission, building upon that provided by MDRP. The new project would include support to new reporters seeking amnesty, as well as to those reporters who have already received amnesty but have ongoing reinstertion and reintegration needs. See section 2.3.2 for further details.

1.4. Conflict and DDR contexts in Acholi and West Nile regions

\textsuperscript{14} MDPR website \url{http://www.mdrp.org/programs_proj.htm}

\textsuperscript{15} See MDRP, September / October 2002, p. 94.

\textsuperscript{16} MDPR, April 2003, para. 5.

\textsuperscript{17} MDPR website www.mdrp.org/uganda
This sub-section provides a brief overview of the contexts within which D, D, R & R activities have been implemented within the Acholi and West Nile regions.

1.4.1 Conflict and DDR context in the Acholi region

The LRA insurgency began in 1987 and it has since decimated much of the Acholi region. Whilst the political agenda of the LRA is not well defined, the insurgency appears to have been partly driven by grievances against the Government stemming from feelings of marginalisation that are prevalent across Northern Uganda. The LRA no longer has the support of local people because of the brutality and violence of its campaign against communities. The hallmarks of the LRA campaign have been abduction of an estimated 20,000 children, brutal disfigurement of people, rape and murder. Tens of thousands of people are thought to have died and an estimated 1.5 million people have been displaced and forced into camps for internally displaced persons (IPDs), which are ill-equipped to deal with the most basic subsistence or security needs.

Since 2000, the GoU has pursued various initiatives to bring an end to LRA campaign, including; the Amnesty Act, military operations, referral of the case of Northern Uganda to the International Criminal Court (ICC), and negotiations.

As outlined above, the 2000 Amnesty Act was drafted following an initiative led by community and religious leaders and civil society in Acholi, who saw it as an important component of efforts to end the conflict. It is widely viewed as an important mechanism that has encouraged significant numbers of LRA to return and renounce rebellion.

The passing of the Amnesty Act did not signal the end of a military approach to the LRA conflict however, and in 2002 the Government launched Operation Iron Fist in response to mounting violence and increased pressure from the international community to resolve the conflict and protect civilians. The Ugandan army – the Uganda People’s Defence Force (UPDF) - carried out massive military operations aimed at crushing the capacity of the LRA to launch attacks from its extra-territorial bases in Southern Sudan and eastern DRC. After an initial hiatus in attacks, the LRA responded with an increased campaign of brutality and abduction.

In 2003 the GoU made a formal request to the ICC to initiate investigations against five of the top commanders of the LRA. In October 2005 the ICC unsealed arrest warrants against Joseph Kony, Vincent Otti, Okot Odhiambo, Dominic Ongwen and Raska Lukiya. The impact of the ICC investigations and subsequent indictments has been the subject of wide debate between commentators. Some believe that the threat of legal proceedings has played an important role in bringing the LRA to the negotiating table at Juba, while others view the ICC warrants as a barrier to concluding a peace agreement.

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18 For the purposes of this case-study the paper gives an overview of conflict issues in the Acholi region. It does not include a discussion of the impact of the LRA-Government conflict upon communities living in the Teso, Lango or West Nile regions of Northern Uganda.
20 Raska Lukiya subsequently died on 12th August 2006.
At the time of writing (September 2007), ongoing peace talks in Juba between the 
GoU and the LRA represent the most promising chance of peace to date. In August 
2006 the LRA and the GoU agreed a formal cessation of hostilities and initiated peace 
negotiations. The five items on the agenda for discussion at the talks are; cessation of 
hostilities and LRA assembly at designated points in Sudan; comprehensive solutions 
to the conflict including tackling the root cause of the conflict; accountability and 
reconciliation; ceasefire agreement; and DDR.

Many former LRA members and abductees have already returned from the bush and 
left the insurgency, either through being captured by the UPDF, escaping, or going 
through the Amnesty process. The Amnesty Commission therefore estimates that 
there are up to 3000 remaining LRA who will need to be demobilised if and when a 
DDR process is agreed and implemented as a result of the Juba peace talks.

1.4.2 Conflict and DDR context in the West Nile

The West Nile region was the homeland of the former President Idi Amin. Amin 
filled many key positions within the government and armed forces with people from 
this part of the country. Amin’s regime was marked by brutal violence against 
opposition, both within Amin’s own circle and beyond, and the death of thousands of 
people. Following the overthrow of Amin by Milton Obote in 1979, anger over 
atrocities committed under Amin erupted into violence against some members of the 
former Uganda Army, government officials and the civilian population of the West 
Nile, since many associated the region with the brutalities of his regime.\(^21\)

Many people, including former Uganda Army soldiers, fled the violence in West Nile 
and went into exile in neighbouring DRC and Sudan. Between 1980 and 1985 some 
then began to mobilise under the banners of the Uganda National Rescue Front 
(UNRF I) and the Former Ugandan Army (FUNA) to launch rebellions against the 
regimes of Obote and of Tito Okello Lutwa (who launched a successful coup against 
Obote in 1985). The Okello regime was subsequently overthrown by the National 
Resistance Army/Movement (NRM/A) under the leadership of Museveni in 1986. 
During this period some UNRF I joined the NRM and some, including former leader 
Moses Ali, took up key positions within the newly formed government.\(^22\) However 
not all members of the UNRF or of the NRM supported the building of bridges 
between the two groups and, following the arrest of some key UNRF I officers, some 
insurgents formed two new groups - the West Nile Bank Front (WNBF) and UNRF II. 
Both of these groups then launched attacks against government forces from bases in 
Southern Sudan and DRC.

In December 2002 the UNRF II reached an agreement with the GoU, with the support 
of national and international actors, to end the insurgency. According to the terms of 
the peace agreement signed by the GoU and UNRF II, ex-combatants agreed to hand 
over their arms to the UPDF. The agreement also entitled ex-combatants to the receipt 
of Amnesty Certificates and reinsertion packages, to be processes by the Amnesty 
Commission. Thus the implementation of the demobilisation and reinsertion 
components of the peace agreement took place largely within the framework of the

\(^{21}\) For a detailed analysis of conflict and peace negotiations in the West Nile region see Refugee Legal 
Project, June 2004.

Amnesty Act. In addition, the GoU agreed to provide a sum of 4,200,000,000 Uganda Shillings for the resettlement of former UNRF II and to convene a conference to begin identifying and addressing the development needs of the region (later known as the West Nile Development Conference). With regard to the demobilisation of ex-combatants, the agreement stated that any ex-UNRF II who opted and qualified to join the UPDF would be integrated into the UPDF and that they would be allowed to retain their current ranks, subject to passing UPDF examinations.

2. Integration / Co-ordination of DDR and Related Areas of Programming

This section of the mini-case study analyses the extent to which D, D, R & R activities and processes in Uganda have been integrated or co-ordinated with programming in the following related areas: SSR; SALW control; transitional assistance programmes; and longer-term development programming. This section of the mini-case study is intended to provide data to inform thematic papers on the integration and co-ordination of DDR with these four areas of programming, which are being produced within the University of Bradford’s ‘DDR and Human Security: Post-conflict Security-building and the Interests of the Poor’ project.

As noted in the introduction, a range of D, D, R & R activities have taken place in Uganda, but these do not fit within a classic model or DDR or within a single DDR programme. In analysing the extent to which these activities have been integrated or co-ordinated with related areas of programming, this section therefore focuses on particular components of D, D, R & R, as opposed to trying to analyse these activities as a single, unified DDR programme.

2.1 Integration / Co-ordination of DDR and Security Sector Reform

This sub-section of the mini-case study focuses on the demobilisation component of D, D, R & R and the extent to which the demobilisation of reporters that has occurred under the Amnesty Act, and with support from MDRP, has been integrated or co-ordinated with broader reforms of the security sector. The mini-case study focuses on reform of the military, and does not seek to examine integration or co-ordination with other components of SSR. This sub-section therefore looks for evidence of efforts to integrate the demobilisation of reporters with reform or demobilisation of the UPDF.

Such integration could potentially be beneficial because, as stated in the MDRP Position Paper on the linkages between DDR and SSR,

“...key decisions on the size of the army, the extent of new recruitment and the absorption of rebel reporters, provide DDR planners with information on the numbers of reporters that cannot be taken into the armed forces and thus need to be demobilised. In the same vein, a decision on eligibility criteria for recruitment influences the eligibility criteria for DDR beneficiaries.”24

24 MDRP, October 2003, para. 19.
2.1.1 Demobilisation of Reporters and Integration / Co-ordination with Reform of the Military

MDRP seeks to support linkages between DDR and SSR and ‘in order to be eligible for funding under MDRP, Governments are expected to submit a letter of demobilisation policy which expands on the links with security sector reform, including plans for future military size and budget, military unification and restructuring where relevant’.\(^{25}\) In 2002-3, MDRP undertook discussions with the GoU regarding the potential for a national programme which would include the demobilisation and reintegration of both reporters and UPDF soldiers.\(^{26}\)

At the time, the GoU was undertaking a defence review process, with support from the UK’s Defence Advisory Team (DAT). The review process included,

> “…a threat assessment, analysis of foreign policy and development of a security policy, determination of capability and force requirements, examination of supporting structures and processes, and the publication of a White Paper on policy and agenda for change”.\(^{27}\)

The existence of the review process suggested political will within the GoU to undertake progressive reform of the defence sector, and appeared at the time to provide a potential opportunity for integrating the demobilisation of reporters with reform of the military. As noted by MDRP, it also appeared to offer, “an excellent opportunity to more closely link the DRP (national demobilisation and reintegration programme) with the broader issue of security sector reform”.\(^{28}\) However, in October 2003, MDRP concluded that the GoU still needed to take a number of important steps in order to become eligible for MDRP support under a national programme, including: resolution of the conflict with the LRA; Adoption of a White Paper on Defence that would indicate a significant surplus of soldiers in the UPDF; Development of a national demobilisation and reintegration programme; and further development of suitable implementation arrangements.\(^{29}\) MDRP therefore concluded that a national programme of support to the GoU could not be foreseen in the near future, and an agreement was made for MDP to instead provide support to the GoU within the status of ‘Special Project’, which would deal only with irregular forces.\(^{30}\)

According to MDRP reports from the time, this decision reflected concerns regarding the likelihood that the GoU would meet the necessary conditions for a national MDRP programme. For instance:

- the GoU argued that the size of the UPDF needed to be maintained in order to counter threats from the LRA and potential for instability in neighbouring countries;

- the White Paper (published in 2004) lacked the indication that the UPDF was seen as having a significant surplus of soldiers; and

\(^{25}\) Ibid, para. 16  
\(^{26}\) MDRP, September/October 2002, para. 9  
\(^{27}\) Ibid  
\(^{28}\) MDRP, April 2003, para. 13  
\(^{29}\) MDRP, September / October 2003, para. 14  
\(^{30}\) Ibid, para. 16
• the UPDF was likely recruiting more personnel than it was retiring.31

As noted in Section 1.3.1 above, the ‘Special Project’ option within the MDRP regional strategy provides a framework for funding activities urgently needed in the period prior to the development of a national DDR programme, and consideration of the potential for a future national programme continued. In 2004, MDRP however, decided that further active dialogue with the GoU regarding the potential for a national programme would only be useful if there was a significant change in the situation and the GoU’s approach.32 Subsequently, in November 2006, MDRP concluded that the GoU no longer expected to undertake a demobilisation of regular forces UPDF forces and that MDRP should therefore not anticipate providing support to a national DDR programme.33

It can therefore be seen that discussions took place in Uganda regarding the potential for integrating the demobilisation of reporters with reform and demobilisation of the military, and that MDRP would like to have promoted such linkages if the appropriate conditions had been met. However, the limited progress towards substantive defence reform in Uganda, despite the early promise of the defence review, meant that such integration was not possible and therefore the demobilisation of reporters and ex-combatants has taken place in the absence of a complementary process for reform of the military.

The lack of integration or co-ordination between D, D, R & R and SSR in Uganda is thus primarily a result of the context within the country. D, D, R & R has been taking place in a context of ongoing conflict in Acholi, such that the GoU appears not to have perceived the environment as being conducive to substantive military reform. D, D, R & R is taking place within a country with a strong and powerful army, in contrast to many DDR contexts where the army, and other national institutions, have suffered serious erosions of capacity, strength and / or authority. These factors appear to have reduced the incentives or imperatives for the GoU to undertake substantive defence reform, and as such integration between demobilisation of reporters and reform of the military has not been possible.

### 2.1.2 Absorption of Reporters into the Security Forces

As noted above, links between DDR and the reform of the military could have created parameters for the absorption of reporters into the UPDF. In the absence of a national strategy linking the demobilisation of reporters with reform and restructuring of the military, policy positions on this issue appear to vary among key actors, including the UPDF, Amnesty Commission and MDRP.

MDRP’s position on this issue, as stated in its ‘Position Paper on Linkages between DDR and SSR’, concluded that,

“…in some cases, a growth of the security sector may be vital to absorb

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32 Ibid, para. 16
33 MDRP, November 2006, para. 22
categories of armed personnel that would otherwise constitute a significant threat to security and stability. However, this should not be a long term solution and DDR and SSR programmes should both be designed to result in a leaner, more professional and cost-effective security sector."

The official position of the Amnesty Commission is that reporters should return to the community and enter into civilian life. However, staff members within the Amnesty Commission recognize that in some cases people come out of the bush after spending much of their young and adult lives engaged in combat and find it very difficult to envisage making the transition to civilian life. Amnesty Commission staff reported that such people sometimes choose to join the UPDF because it gives them the option to continue life as a combatant, and they are supported in doing so because they would otherwise find reintegration difficult and could pose a threat to the security of communities within which they were resettled.

According to the UPDF, there is no limit on the number of reporters who can join the UPDF. Reporters who express a desire to join the UPDF apparently go through a vetting process to determine their eligibility for service. All recruits must be 18 years of age or over and of sound mental and physical health. They should also have passed Standard 6 schooling, but are sometimes permitted to join on the basis of being able to read and write, due to the fact that many reporters have not attained that level of schooling. Reporters who do not meet these standards may sometimes be accepted into the auxiliary forces. In practice, the UPDF reported that up to 1,500 reporters from the LRA have at one time served, or are currently serving, with the UPDF.

In the case of West Nile, the 2002 peace agreement between the GoU and the UPDF stipulated that UNRF ex-combatants who opted and qualified to do would be integrated into the UPDF. The agreement also stated that those ex-combatants joining the UPDF would be allowed to retain their current ranks, subject to passing the appropriate examinations set and conducted by the UPDF. However, according to the UPDF, problems arose in this regard. Former UNRF II were obliged to undergo a number of different tests to gauge the level of service and rank that they should be given in their new role within the UPDF. As a result, a large number of ex-UNRF II felt that they were ‘demoted’ to lower positions within the UPDF and this caused much resentment. In addition, many ex-UNRF II did not qualify to join the UPDF because they were too old.

2.2 Integration / Co-ordination of DDR and SALW Control

This sub-section focuses on the disarmament component of DDR and examines the extent to which the disarmament of reporters in Uganda has been linked to broader programming in the field of SALW control.

At the global level, potential links between DDR and SALW control are worthy of consideration for a number of reasons. Firstly, such links could create the potential for addressing the possession and misuse of SALW not only in the possession of ex-combatants, but also other groups including community members and state officials. Secondly, experience has indicated that there is often a rise in armed crime and SALW proliferation following a cessation of conflict, and that preventive action is

34 MDRP, October 2003, para. 23.
needed in this regard, to ensure strong controls over all arms in post-conflict environments. Thirdly, SALW control programming has the potential to support the running of an effective DDR process. For instance, programmes to promote the effective management of SALW stockpiles could improve the capacity of the state to effectively and appropriately manage those arms collected through DDR processes.

The particular context in which disarmament activities have been implemented in Uganda appears however to have impacted upon the extent to which conceptual or practical links have been established with broader programming on SALW control. The key agencies co-ordinating and funding demobilisation and reinsertion / reintegration activities (i.e., the Amnesty Commission and MDRP), have limited mandates and functions with regard to disarmament, and thus limited scope to promote substantive integration or co-ordination between disarmament and SALW control.

MDRP does not fund disarmament activities in any countries, and thus financial support for the implementation of disarmament is not included with MDRP’s ‘Special Project’ in Uganda. Within its regional strategy, MDRP does, however, recognise disarmament as the ‘critical first step’ in DDR processes, and MDRP states that it will only engage in DDR processes if clear agreements and arrangements are in place regarding how weapons will be managed.

Uganda’s Amnesty Act mandates the Amnesty Commission to monitor programmes of demobilisation, reintegration and resettlement, but not disarmament. Disarmament is also excluded from the title of the ‘Demobilisation and Resettlement Teams’ established under the Act. This perhaps suggests that disarmament is not considered to be a primary task of these teams, though they are mandated ‘to draw up programmes for the decommissioning of arms’.

Regarding the process for disarming reporters, the Amnesty Act states that reporters should,

“…report to the nearest Army or Police Unit, Chief, member of the Executive Committee of a local government unit, magistrate or local leader within the locality’ and ‘surrender at any such place and to any such person any weapons in his / her possession”.

The above listed officials should then hand over the reporter and any weapons in his / her possession to the Sub-country chief of the area, who then hands the reporter to the DRT. Although reporters are required to hand in any weapons that are in their possession at the time that they report for amnesty, the handing in of a weapon is not a prerequisite for receiving amnesty, demobilisation or reintegration support. According to staff from the Amnesty Commission and DRTs, reporters are often not in possession of a weapon when they report for amnesty, and there are a variety of reasons why this may be the case: individuals may not have been provided with a

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38 Amnesty Act 2000, para. 4.
39 Ibid., para. 5
weapon by the LRA; they may have given their weapon to other rebels remaining in
the bush; they may have been captured by the UPDF and had their weapon taken from
them at that point; they may have buried or otherwise hidden their weapon before
presenting themselves for amnesty; or they may have given their weapon to a
member of their family or community for safe-keeping, hiding and / or to project their
family and property.

In cases where reporters do present themselves in possession of a weapon, it is
difficult to ascertain with certainty whether, in practice, there is a clear and consistent
process for what happens next. The DRT office in Arua reported that weapons are
sometimes stored temporarily within their office. In such cases, the DRT apparently
records each of these weapons and they are then collected by the UPDF, who take
them to the local armoury. Other sources indicated that reporters who present
themselves to the DRT in possession of a weapon are instructed to take their weapons
directly to the UPDF themselves. This is problematic since some sources indicated
that this can lead to a situation whereby reporters are unwilling to hand over their
arms directly to the UPDF and therefore bury them before returning to the DRT,
creating the danger that they will recover these weapons subsequently.

According to the UPDF, those weapons which are collected as part of the amnesty
process or seized from captured rebels are registered within the UPDF’s records and
then stored securely at the local UPDF armoury and later destroyed. However, a
number of stakeholders interviewed for this case study raised concerns regarding the
lack of transparency surrounding this process and the difficulty in ascertaining
whether all arms are destroyed.

Overall, the disarmament of reporters does not appear to be as integrally linked as the
other components of D, D, R & R. The Amnesty Commission is monitoring and co-
ordinating programmes of demobilisation, reinsertion and reintegration, but its co-
ordination with the UPDF, which is leading the disarmament phase, has so far been
limited. At the time of writing in September 2007, the UPDF was apparently however
in the process of identifying an official within the UPDF to responsible for co-
ordinating DDR and liaising with the Amnesty Commission.

Neither has the disarmament of reporters been substantively integrated with broader
programming on SALW control, even though Uganda is further ahead than many
other countries in terms of progress on SALW control. Uganda has established a
National Focal Point (NFP) to co-ordinate national action on SALW control. The NFP
is an inter-agency body which includes a broad range of representatives from GoU
ministries and agencies, including the UPDF, and civil society. 40 Uganda has also
developed a National Action Plan on SALW (NAP), which sets out a comprehensive
range of measures to be taken to reduce the demand for, and supply of, SALW across
the country. Indeed, Section 7 of the NAP on ‘Strengthening Peaceful Conflict
Resolution Mechanisms’ calls for linkages with DDR programming. The NAP does
not, however, detail what this should look like or make reference to the Amnesty

40 The membership of Uganda’s National Focal Point includes representatives from the following
ministries / departments / civil society organisations: The Office of the Prime Minister, Ministries of
Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Education, Uganda Police Service, Customs, Immigration, Intelligence,
Ugandan People’s Defence Force, Centre for Conflict Resolution, Ugandan Joint Christian Council,
People with Disabilities, Oxfam.
Commission or to specific DDR processes. An attempt was made by UNDP to support the creation of links between the NFP and the Amnesty Commission, including funding a United Nations Volunteer (UNV) Advocacy Officer at the NFP Secretariat who is also mandated to support the Public Relations Office at the Amnesty Commission. UNDP have also initiated some discussions with the Amnesty Commission to identify ways in which to link its activities with those of the NFP, although these discussions have apparently not yet resulted in strategic or practical cooperation between the NFP and the Amnesty Commission.

This lack of progress apparently reflects the difficulty for the Amnesty Commission in prioritising disarmament activities, since they are not explicitly included within its mandate. At the same time, the potential for integrating the work of the Amnesty Commission with that of the NFP appears to be undermined by the limited capacity of both institutions, as acknowledged by officials interviewed for this case study. Delayed implementation of the NAP has also been a factor, since, according to the NFP, linkages with the Amnesty Commission should take place through the Arms Management Committee within the NFP. This Committee is one of a number of committees envisaged to be set up within the NFP and it should include the Amnesty Commission, but it is not yet functioning. The NFP Secretariat has however indicated that it hopes to strengthen links with the Amnesty Commission as implementation of the NAP progresses. This may also create further opportunity for strengthening links between the Amnesty Commission and the UPDF, since the UPDF is represented within the NFP.

To-date, however, there has been little integration between the disarmament of reporters and broader programming on SALW control. Conceptually, the potential benefits of integration appear to have been recognised, though not in a detailed sense, within the NAP. In practice, however, integration would appear to require a greater level of interaction, and clarity of roles, between key actors including the Amnesty Commission, the UPDF and the NFP.

2.3 Integration / Co-ordination between DDR and Transitional Assistance Programmes

This sub-section focuses on the reinsertion and reintegration components of DDR in Uganda and examines the extent to which they have been co-ordinated or integrated with other transitional assistance programmes. ‘Transitional assistance’ programming is understood for the purposes of this project to refer to interventions undertaken in the post-conflict phase which are designed to promote stability and recovery, and which coincide primarily with the reinsertion phase of DDR. Reinsertion has emerged as a distinct phase of DDR programming in many contexts and is intended to encourage ex-combatants to: participate in the DDR process; meet their immediate basic needs; enable them to return to a community; and reduce the likelihood of a return to violence. The reintegration phase, on the other hand, seeks to support ex-combatants to achieve sustainable reintegration into the community, and is more often linked to broader, long-term recovery programming.

41 National Focal Point on Small Arms and Light Weapons, May 2007, p. 69.
In seeking to examine whether reinsertion and reintegration have been linked to broader transitional assistance programming in Uganda, it is important to highlight again the particular context in the country. In the case of Acholi, the conflict with the LRA has been ongoing throughout the period in which the Amnesty Commission has been implementing its activities, and thus reinsertion and reintegration are occurring not in a post-conflict phase, but in a period of ongoing conflict. This naturally limits the opportunities for linking reinsertion and reintegration with other initiatives designed to support post-conflict recovery.

This sub-section of the mini-case study will focus on both the reinsertion and reintegration aspects of D, D, R & R in Uganda. In the Ugandan context, reinsertion and reintegration are occurring somewhat simultaneously due to the extended time period within which such activities are occurring, whereby a steady flow of reporters have passed through the Amnesty process over an eight year period and are thus not all at the same stage within this process. In addition, limited progress has occurred more broadly from relief-to-recovery programming.

2.3.1 Reinsertion

Reinsertion support is provided to reporters through the Amnesty Commission, with support, since 2005, from MDRP. This phase consists primarily of a reinsertion package, consisting of in-kind assistance and cash, plus a health assessment and psycho-social screening. The reinsertion package comprises the following: support fund of $122 USD, medical costs of $10.50 USD, 1 mattress, 1 blanket, 1 jerry can, 1 plastic basin, 2 saucepans, 2 sets of clothing, 2 hand hoes, 1 panga, 5 kilos of bean seeds and 5 kilos of maize seeds. The packages are provided directly to reporters, and thus reinsertion support is targeted at the individual reporters rather than at the community. This is common practice during the reinsertion phase, due to the need to reduce the immediate threat that the ex-combatant may otherwise pose, and to enable their short term subsistence. There are however a number of problems which can result from this approach, including in the case of Uganda.

The provision of targeted, and particularly cash, support directly to reporters as they return to communities appears in some cases to have contributed to resentment within the community. In Acholi, due to the ongoing conflict and insecurity, and the lack of alternatives, the majority of reporters are being ‘reinserted’ into IDP camps. The situation is therefore such that civilians remain trapped within camps due to conflict, insecurity and underdevelopment, for which they are likely to hold the LRA at least partially to blame. Many of them will also have directly experienced or witnessed atrocities at the hands of former combatants. They are further suffering from extreme poverty and lack of access to resources including cash and basic necessities.

According to a range of interviews conducted for this mini-case study, it thus appears that there have been examples whereby other community members have perceived the provision of reinsertion package to reporters as unjust, particularly since reporters have also just been granted legal amnesty regarding their involvement in the conflict. An additional point for consideration is that this ‘amnesty’ has been granted though the Amnesty Commission, rather than as part of a community-wide reconciliation and forgiveness process. Examples were cited, for instance, whereby reporters would be

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the only people in the camp with mattresses or where reporters received in cash an amount greater than other camp inhabitants could earn in a year.

This is not to say that resentment towards reporters has been universal, and indeed the capacity of communities to absorb and accept former combatants has undoubtedly in many cases been extremely impressive. However, it does imply a need to examine carefully the use of reinsertion packages and how they are delivered. Particular problems appear to have emerged, for example, in cases where reinsertion packages have been provided to reporters only after a long delay. Prior to the support of MDRP, which began in 2005, the Amnesty Commission had a significant backlog of cases, whereby people had been granted amnesty and received demobilisation certificates but not yet received their reinsertion packages. MDRP support enabled the Amnesty Commission to clear most of that backlog. However, at the close of MDRP’s ‘Special Project’ in support of the Amnesty Commission, in June 2007, there remained 1,440 reporters who had been demobilised but not received reinsertion support out of a total of 16,256 reporters having been demobilised and 14,816 of those having received reinsertion support.

The delayed provision of reinsertion support to some reporters has been problematic according to many interviewees, because it serves to upset progress that may have already been made by the reporter towards acceptance within the camp or community. Delayed delivery of packages can reinforce the distinction between reporters and other community members and reawaken resentments and perceptions of injustice. Further, the delayed or non-delivery of packages sometimes creates resentment among reporters and ex-combatants themselves. This particular problem was cited frequently in relation to the West Nile, where one interviewee described it as a latent conflict risk.

In terms of links between the reinsertion phase and broader transitional assistance programming, as highlighted above there are limited interventions taking place within the IDP camps and communities of return, to which reinsertion could be linked. In Acholi, those interventions which are occurring are primarily humanitarian in nature and thus not well suited to assist in the reintegration of reporters. Possible options that might exist in a ‘normal’ DDR context would therefore be particularly difficult to achieve within this context. ‘Cash for work’ schemes, whereby reporters participate in projects such as infrastructure development to the benefit of the community and receive their cash payment on this basis, would for example be challenging to implement because of the limited infrastructure projects undertaken within the camps and because of the desperately high unemployment rate among other community members, who could thus resent the reporters being given this opportunity.

Creating links between the reinsertion of reporters and other initiatives is also challenging due to the particular manner in which D, D, R & R activities have taken place. Such activities have been implemented primarily through the Amnesty Commission and within the mandate created by the Amnesty Act, rather than resulting from a formal peace agreement. Such an agreement might have provided a basis for defining the roles of those actors implementing DDR activities and how they should co-ordinate or link with other actors implementing or supporting related recovery processes. In the case of Uganda, however, there does not appear to have been a clear strategy set out for how the Amnesty Commission should relate to other
actors, and this is compounded by the fact that humanitarian and early recovery initiatives are often being implemented by NGOs. These NGOs often play an invaluable role, but they are not always part of a well-defined or co-ordinated framework of interventions, and thus it can likely prove difficult for the Amnesty Commission to establish substantive links with them. Many of the NGOs are supporting the rehabilitation and reintegration of former child soldiers. Such children are initially supported within reception centres, and then assisted to identify and return to their family. This is largely implemented outside the framework of the Amnesty Commission and MDRP, because children under the age of 12 are not eligible for amnesty because they are too young to be criminally responsible for their actions under the terms of the National Criminal Code. Children presenting themselves to the Amnesty Commission are apparently referred to such agencies.

2.3.2 Reintegration

In addition to the reinsertion packages, the Amnesty Commission and MDRP have sought to assist reporters to access opportunities which will enable their reintegration within communities. This reintegration support has comprised of counselling to reporters, and attempts to identify, and refer reporters to, economic and educational opportunities from which they might benefit. Here the role of the Amnesty Commission is intended to entail the linking up of reporters with opportunities within the broader community, and to move beyond the specific targeting of reporters as the recipients of support. Linking reporters with education and income generation opportunities offered by other actors could provide a good example of integration between reinsertion support and broader transitional assistance programming. As with the reinsertion phase, however, there are challenges in terms of the context, particularly in light of the fact that the majority of the population of Acholi has remained in IDP camps during the life of the Amnesty Commission. Northern Uganda has made limited progress towards recovery, as the conflict is ongoing, and this has affected the economic growth and social cohesion of the region as a whole, and thus the scope for the successful reintegration of reporters. Of those reporters who do receive support beyond the reinsertion packages, such as training, they often find that there is limited opportunity for them to utilise their new skills. For instance, a number of organisations are offering skills training to reporters and the wider community, including in the fields of carpentry, tailoring and hair-dressing. However, the majority of people in the region do not have any kind of disposable income to spend on new furniture, clothes or hair-cuts. Thus some people are being trained, but the overall economic climate of the region is not creating an environment in which they are able to make use of their newly acquired skills. In Acholi, opportunities for accessing support and for generating income are particularly limited in those camps which are some distance from Gulu town. Meanwhile, in the West Nile, there are limited opportunities for linking reporters with services and projects because of the limited number of NGOs and international agencies which are based in, and focus upon, that region of the country.

The Amnesty Commission has, however, attempted to support reporters to access transitional assistance programming available within the community by creating links between the Amnesty Commission and the Northern Uganda Social Action Fund (NUSAF). NUSAF receives funding from the World Bank and its overall objective is to increase the capacity of communities to reduce their poverty levels. Communities are encouraged to identify their needs through a Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA)
and then provided with funds to implement relevant projects. Funding is provided to the community as a whole and the projects are intended to promote community empowerment and bonding. In July 2007, NUSAF and the Amnesty Commission finalised an agreement whereby NUSAF committed to funding a certain number of projects (one per sub-district) which included reporters, as well as other members of the community. This agreement was apparently developed following a recommendation to this effect from MDRP. The Amnesty Commission was tasked with mobilising reporters to submit proposals to NUSAF, and NUSAF was tasked to appraise the projects, identify those eligible for funding and then monitor and evaluate the projects. However, by the time the proposal was agreed, the deadline for allocating and distributing funds to selected projects was only weeks away; normally the process of selecting projects takes months. It was therefore, unclear whether the agreement would result in the funding of any projects under the current funding cycle. It was further reported by a range of interviewees that NUSAF suffers from: serious capacity problems; ambiguous support from central government; lack of credibility amongst some community members; and allegations of mismanagement of funds.

The opportunities for, and progress towards, integrating the reininsertion and reintegration activities with broader transitional assistance programming have to-date been limited. However, the Amnesty Commission and World Bank have recognised that they could potentially strengthen the role of the Commission in accessing and creating links with those opportunities which do exist, and which are likely to increase if the peace talks between the GoU and the LRA reach a successful conclusion. The Amnesty Commission and the World Bank have thus included within the new potential project that they are currently discussing, a focus on strengthening the counselling and referral role of the Amnesty Commission. According to officials, the primary motivation for strengthening this aspect of the Amnesty Commission’s role is to guard against creating further divisions between reporters and the wider community. It is planned that the Amnesty Commission will play a key role in providing information and in referring reporters to relevant NGO, civil society and government agencies who are in a position to draw them into their activities with the rest of the community.

2.4 Integration / Co-ordination between DDR and Longer Development Programming

Sustainable recovery in Northern Uganda requires not only the successful reininsertion of ex-combatants, but also significant progress towards development. Chronic levels of underdevelopment in Northern Uganda are an obstacle to the successful reintegration of reporters. Similarly, unsuccessful D, D, R & R may threaten security and undermine development. This sub-section examines how D, D, R & R programming has been integrated with longer term development programming in Uganda. It looks specifically at the inclusion of DDR within key development frameworks and at the potential for integrating DDR within a particular governance sector.

2.4.1 DDR and Development Frameworks

On paper at least, Uganda has a relatively strong set of development frameworks and strategies, a number of which contain specific components on DDR. The Poverty Eradication Action Plan (PEAP) is the key strategic plan guiding development programming in Uganda and is Uganda’s equivalent of a Poverty Reduction Strategy
Paper (PRSP). The PEAP specifically outlines assistance to the Amnesty Commission as a priority action under Pillar 3 on Security, Conflict Resolution and Disaster Management.\textsuperscript{43}

In addition to the PEAP, the GoU has recognised that particular regions of the country require more targeted assistance to support development and improve security. It has therefore drafted the Peace, Recovery and Development Plan for Northern Uganda (PRDP). The PRDP is intended to address the particularly acute development needs of the North, such that the North will become realigned with national development programming following the 3 year duration of the PRDP (2007-10). The PRDP covers the North-West (West Nile), Central North (Acholi and Lango) and North-East (Karamoja, Elgon and Teso) regions of Northern Uganda. The PRDP prioritises the Demobilisation and Reintegration of Ex-Combatants under Strategic Objective 4 on Peacebuilding and Reconciliation. The PRDP states that there are estimated to be a total of 20,588 potential remaining reporters in Uganda – that is people who remain eligible for amnesty – and that 17,251 of these people are in Northern Uganda and therefore relevant in terms of the PRDP.\textsuperscript{44} These figures include those individuals still with the LRA, for whom detailed provisions for DDR are being negotiated at the current Juba peace talks.

The PRDP states that,

“The strategy for demobilization and re-integration will focus on provision of resettlement packages to the ex-combatants, facilitating reunification with their families and the community and providing opportunities to access existing service providers. Mass information dissemination and facilitation of contact with reporters will be promoted.

Other strategies include:

- Issuance of a Demobilisation Certificate and kits (of about $250 USD in value);
- Provision of bursaries for formal education for an estimated 20% of the reporters;
- Skills training/apprenticeships for 50% of the ex-combatants. In some cases, the assistance may be a one off while in other cases, it may be for a specified period depending on the specific needs of individual ex-combatants. For example, a one time support will be given for income generating activities, education may be for an average 2-4 years and skills building may be for 3-6 months; and
- Provision of support to income generating activities for 30% of the ex-combatants.

Activities will include:

- Clearing backlogs;
- Defining the assistance framework;

\textsuperscript{43} Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development, December 2004

\textsuperscript{44} Government of Uganda, September 2007, p. 101
• Establishment of technical standards for programme interventions;
• Establishment of delivery mechanisms and identification of service providers through issuance of a request for proposals from existing organizations;
• Establishment of a system to facilitate the linkage between reporters and reintegration assistance;
• Plan for handling the potential new caseload.  

The new project foreseen within the proposal currently being discussed by the Amnesty Commission and World Bank also situates the future work of the Commission within the implementation of the PRDP. Reinsertion packages will continue to be provided directly to reporters, but a strong emphasis will be placed on supporting the reintegration of reporters through the overall implementation the PRDP. As outlined in section 2.3.2 above, the focus will therefore be on supporting the reintegration of reporters with the broader context of assistance to the recovery of the region as a whole.

The inclusion of DDR within the PEAP and PRDP is positive. However, what is crucial is that these development frameworks are effectively implemented and co-ordinated, such that tangible changes are achieved and co-operation between actors is enhanced. Uganda has many impressive strategies and frameworks, but implementation is sometimes lacking. With regard to the PRDP, many actors are currently voicing concerns about the programme and questioning whether it is intended to function as a new strategy, a co-ordination framework for existing strategies, or a funding mechanism for donors. Question marks also exist regarding the capacity of the Office of the Prime Minister (OPM) to co-ordinate the implementation of the PRDP and regarding the capacity of specific institutions, including the Amnesty Commission, to implement specific components.

Meanwhile, the limited implementation of development initiatives is a source of significant tension in the West Nile region. The 2002 Peace Agreement included a provision for a West Nile Development Conference to create a development strategy for the region. Following a two year delay, the Conference took place and a strategy was developed which, if fully implemented, could have created enhanced opportunities for the reintegration of ex-combatants and sustained development across the region. However, this strategy now seems to have been put aside in favour of the PRDP, which some donors and many people within the West Nile feel is biased towards areas affected by the LRA-GoU conflict. This creates a danger that the particular development needs of the West Nile region, which require targeted programmatic responses, will not be fully addressed.

2.4.2 DDR and Sectors
The particular set-up of the GoU and international donor relations within Uganda should create an environment conducive to establishing linkages between DDR and development planning. The GoU’s governance set-up is arranged according to sectors, such as the ‘Justice, Law and Order Sector’ (JLOS), within which ministries, departments and donors co-operate closely and integrate strategies. Relations between different donors are ‘characterised by high levels of harmonisation of operational

45 Ibid.
46 DED, November 2005
policies, procedures, and practices’. At the same time, UN agencies have adopted a cluster-approach to work in Uganda, whereby UN agencies co-operate closely across the range of interventions that they undertake. This creates the potential for ensuring that DDR processes do not take place in isolation from, or on the margins of, broader processes, and should in theory help to avoid uncoordinated programmes of support from different departments and agencies. Furthermore, the nature of the MDRP Programme is such that a wide range of donors are providing co-ordinated support to DDR and the Amnesty Commission and should thus be able to promote the integration and co-ordination of DDR with other development efforts and initiatives. However, a number of donors contacted for this mini-case study indicated that co-ordination between donors is stronger on paper than in practice.

A particular opportunity for furthering the integration and co-ordination of DDR and related post-conflict programming could be for the Amnesty Commission to be incorporated within the JLOS. This could serve to enhance co-ordination and integration between DDR and the reform and development of the security and justice sector, although JLOS has limited engagement with the UPDF and this could limit such opportunities. Furthermore, if the Amnesty Commission were included within JLOS planning and budgetary processes, it would assist it in the acquisition of funds. However, whilst some donors feel that this would be a positive step, others question the desirability of trying to fit too many institutions within the sector, particularly given the competition for funding within the sector that exists already.

47 Bayne, S, 2007, p. 11.
3. Conclusion

This mini-case study has sought to analyse the extent to which D, D, R & R programming in Uganda has been integrated or co-ordinated with related programming in the areas of SSR, SALW control, transitional assistance, and long-term development programming. This analysis has been undertaken so as to provide empirical data which will contribute to a global project on ‘DDR and Human Security: post-conflict security building and the interests of the poor’. As such, this study has not sought to provide a full analysis of D, D, R & R programming in Uganda. Neither has it sought to examine in-depth the conceptual or practical details and implications of such integration or co-ordination, as this is covered elsewhere within the project.

As noted elsewhere in the study, D, D, R & R activities in Uganda have not taken place within a single, coherent DDR programme. Therefore, this study has focused primarily on the distinct components of D, D, R, & R and how they relate to other areas of programming, as opposed to examining a DDR programme as a whole.

For each of the components of D, D, R & R, there is some evidence to suggest that efforts have been made to establish links with the related areas of programming examined by this study. Regarding possible links between demobilisation and SSR programming, MDRP had discussions with the GoU regarding the potential for linking demobilisation of reporters with restructuring of the army. Some steps have also been taken to try to promote integration of disarmament with SALW control through the inclusion of DDR within a component of the NAP and through attempts to strengthen links between the Amnesty Commission and the UPDF, and between the Amnesty Commission and the NFP. Meanwhile, in relation to reinsertion and reintegration, the World Bank and the Amnesty Commission are discussing a new proposal which will seek to enhance the capacity of the Amnesty Commission to support reporters to access other transitional assistance and recovery programmes within the wider community. DDR has also been included as a priority on paper within development frameworks in Uganda, including the PEAP and the PRDP.

These initiatives primarily represent attempts to bolster co-ordination and integration with existing D, D, R & R processes, as opposed to reflecting the creation of strong conceptual linkages at the design or planning phase. Further, they do not yet appear to have achieved substantive results in terms of integration or co-ordination at the practical, field level.

There are a number of reasons for this, particularly relating to the context in which D, D, R & R activities have been implemented in Uganda. The D, D, R & R activities that have taken place in Uganda during the period covered by this study have done so primarily under the rubric of the 2000 Amnesty Act. This Act was passed in the context of ongoing conflict in both the West Nile and Acholi regions, with the central objective to encourage combatants to renounce rebellion through offering them a legal amnesty. D, D, R & R activities have thus been implemented in Acholi (and initially in West Nile, prior to the peace agreement of 2002) in a situation of ongoing conflict, and this has determined not only the nature of these activities, but also the prospects for integration. For example, the ongoing conflict between the GoU and LRA, and the
limited progress towards substantive defence reform, contributed to the suspension of
talks regarding the prospect of linking the demobilisation of reporters with reform of
the military. Meanwhile, ongoing conflict in the Acholi region has, at least until
recently, limited the extent of transitional assistance and development programming
in the region and thus, the scope for creating links with the reintegration of reporters.
Such opportunities have also been limited in the West Nile, due to the lack of targeted
development and recovery programming that has taken place in the region since the
peace agreement of 2002.

The mandate of the Amnesty Commission, which was established through Amnesty
Act, has also been significant in terms of prospects for integration. With regard to
SALW control, the Amnesty Act mandates the Amnesty Commission to monitor
programmes of demobilisation and reintegration, but its role with regard to
disarmament is somewhat unclear and this component is in practice led by the UPDF.
Different components of D, D, R & R will naturally involve a range of agencies, but
in Uganda the detailed roles of specific agencies and how they should interact - within
and across components - have not been elaborately detailed, reflecting the fact that
this is not a classic DDR programme. This seems to have impacted upon the scope for
integrating D, D, R & R activities with related areas of programming. For instance,
the potential for integrating disarmament activities with SALW control might have
been greater if the detailed process for disarmament had been elaborated within a
peace agreement or related DDR strategy. With regard to reintegration, meanwhile,
the role of the Amnesty Commission is to monitor programmes and to refer reporters
to initiatives which are led by other actors. This creates the potential for linking
reintegration of reporters with broader development programming. To-date, however,
there appear to have been few formal structures or strategies in place for this, other
than the recent NUSAF proposal - though, as noted above, development programming
in Northern Uganda has anyway been limited.

Issues of timing and capacity have also been significant in terms of prospects for
conceptual or practical integration. For instance, the Amnesty Act was passed in 2000
and preceded the establishment of the MDRP programme, thus precluding the
potential for detailed discussions between the GoU and MDRP at the time, at which
D, D, R & R activities were being legislated. Meanwhile, the capacity of the Amnesty
Commission, like that of many other Ugandan institutions, is limited. For example,
the Amnesty Commission and DRT officials reported shortfalls and gaps in terms of:
funding, which has for example contributed to backlogs in the provision of reinsertion
packages and delayed payment of staff salaries; human capacity and expertise; and
physical infrastructure required for the processing of reporters. These factors have
reportedly affected the ability of the Amnesty Commission to fulfil its current
mandate and also the prospects for enhancing co-ordination with related areas of
programming.

Overall, therefore, it can be seen that some attempts have been made to link D, D, R
& R programming in Uganda to the four areas of related programming examined
within this project, and that efforts in this regard are ongoing. However, several
factors, including the context in which D, D, R & R activities have been implemented
within the country, and the fact that they have not taken place within a classic model
of DDR, have to-date limited the extent to which substantive integration or co-
ordination has occurred.
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Annex: List of Interviewees

Jtoya Abdalatif Chairman, United Reporters Association and Founder, Peace, Reconciliation and Development Organisation (PRADO)

Juruga Abdul-Rahim Ibrahim Technical Assistant, Project Officer, African Pact

Jeannie Annan, PhDc Founder and Co-Director, Survey of War Affected Youth (SWAY)

Professor Ron Atkinson University of South Carolina

Mark Avola Programme Manager, Gulu – Uganda Children of War Rehabilitation Programme, World Vision

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Donal Cronin Development Attache, Irish Aid

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Lt. Col. Obitre Gama DRT, Amnesty Commission Arua Office

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Major Kagoro  
UPDF and Deputy Co-ordinator of the National Focal Point on Small Arms, Ministry of Internal Affairs

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Senior Protection Officer, UNHCR

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Senior Demobilisation and Reintegration Specialist, MDRP Secretariat, Kampala

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Moses Chrispus Okello  
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Betty Akweromuk  
Expert Conflict Management, Food and Nutrition Security Promotion Project, GTz Arua

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Chairman, Amnesty Commission

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Father Carlos Rodriguez  
Former Justice and Peace Committee Chairman in Gulu Archidiocese
Judith Ruko  
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Rose Ssebatindira  
Assistant Resident Representative, UNDP Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery

Flavia Waduwa  
Under Secretary Pacification and Development, Office of the Prime Minister

Ejoyi M.C. Xavier  
Programme Coordinator, Peace and Conflict Resolution, Danida

Name Withheld  
Elder, Yumbe

Group Interview  
17 former Uganda Army servicemen – PRADO