Case Studies in War-to-Peace Transition
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The Demobilization and Reintegration of Ex–Combatants in Ethiopia, Namibia, and Uganda

Nat J. Colletta
Markus Kostner
Ingo Wiederhofer

with the assistance of Emilio Mondo,
Taimi Sitari, and Tadesse A. Woldu

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FOREWORD

Africa contains more than half of the world's countries undergoing or just coming out of conflict. Over 10 million households have had their entire livelihoods wiped out by war. About 25 million refugees and internally displaced persons, most of whom are women and children, live in border camps or urban squatter settlements. Children have been especially victimized by the ravages of war. There are an estimated 5 to 10 million war orphans and numerous child soldiers traumatized by observing or directly participating in mass violence. Approximately 20 million landmines render vast proportions of fertile agricultural lands unproductive and prohibit the free movement of persons, goods, and services.

Although world military spending has declined since 1987, falling precipitously in Africa from US$3.2 billion in 1987 to US$297 million in 1994, poverty, inequality and ethnic discrimination continue to fuel civil unrest and undermine the authority of the state in several African countries.

Prolonged civil conflicts, up to thirty years in some African countries, have not only left massive physical destruction, death, and displacement in its wake but has also destroyed much of the human and social capital (organization, trust and affiliation) in existing communities. Institutions in general and governments in particular have, to varying degrees, been weakened or incapacitated through the demise or exile of civil servants, the breakdown in the rule of law, and absence of resources. Some states are on the brink of collapse, functioning largely through criminalized economies and by warlord rule.

The transition from war to peace is a complex process marked by the need to stabilize the economy, demilitarize the country (demobilization and demining being paramount), reintegrate dislocated populations, protect the most vulnerable war victims (children, disabled, and widows), and reestablish civil society and good governance. Where natural disaster and famine were traditionally at the root of human suffering and displacement, civil conflict now has become the leading cause of tragic human emergencies for many countries.

The end of the Cold War and a decade of economic deterioration in many Sub-Saharan countries has, ironically, created a climate in which a growing number of governments, whether emerging from internal conflict or at peace, are exploring ways to reduce their military expenditure to shift scarce resources to redressing persistent poverty and growing inequality. In this changing climate, demobilization and reintegration programs (DRPs) for military downsizing and economic revitalization constitute a vital dimension of the continent's transition.

In response to client requests for World Bank leadership and financing in this area, the Africa Region first established a working group in 1992 to examine the worldwide experience in DRPs and assess the Bank's potential role. This was done in parallel with direct on-the-ground assistance to government requests for DRP programs in Uganda, Rwanda, and Mozambique.
These efforts culminated in the publication of a synthesis Discussion Paper *Demobilization and Reintegration of Military Personnel in Africa: The Evidence from Seven Country Case Studies* (October 1992), and in the development and implementation of a model program in Uganda. The planned Rwanda DRP was not implemented due to the sudden turn of internal political events and continuing change in government. However, the Rwandan government has recently requested assistance to prepare for a demobilization, reintegration, and reconciliation program. The recent Mozambique assistance program primarily focuses on the reintegration stage, in particular training and employment generation.

Since the above Bank initiatives, a growing number of African (and non–African) countries have become candidates for such program assistance, among which are Angola, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Djibouti, South Africa, and Togo, and, outside Africa, Cambodia, Bosnia, and Sri Lanka. Namibia and Eritrea have also requested further assistance in their long–term reintegration programs. To meet the growing demand for assistance, the Africa Region has recently established a Post–Conflict Rapid Response Team. This complements the discussions on a Post–Conflict Reconstruction Fund to provide emergency financing filling the gap between relief and development actions.

In an effort to address the above issues and assist client governments, international partners (multilateral and bilateral agencies and NGOs), and Bank staff to improve the design and implementation of such operations, the Africa Region has undertaken preparation of a publication entitled *The Transition from War to Peace in Sub–Saharan Africa* (Directions in Development, World Bank, May 1996). This overview publication was based on three in–depth country studies and a synthesis of reports on DRPs in several other countries.

The present publication pulls together these in–depth country studies into one easily assessable volume for comparative review. The countries selected for intensive field study are Ethiopia, Namibia, and Uganda. These countries offer a unique range of conditions and program models as well as a variety of successes and failures from which to learn. The Uganda case is that of peace–time DRP driven by macro–economic constraints and a strong political consensus. The Ethiopia experience was born and implemented under emergency conditions, when the current government achieved a sudden military victory and faced the challenge of demobilizing and reintegrating over 450,000 soldiers from the defeated Derg army. The Namibian case was a negotiated settlement convened by the UN and other outside parties, followed by a period of UN occupation and management of the repatriation and demobilization processes, leaving reintegration to the new government.

The country studies provide a detailed analysis of the intricate nature of political, economic and sociocultural war–to–peace transition under varying conditions. We hope that our Bank colleagues working in war–torn countries both in Africa and other regions of the world, our donor and NGO partners, and our client countries benefit from this report as they design, implement, and evaluate DRPs.

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**KEVIN CLEAVER**

DIRECTOR

TECHNICAL DEPARTMENT

AFRICA REGION

**FOREWORD**
ABSTRACT

A successful demobilization and reintegration program (DRP) for ex-combatants is the key to an effective transition from war to peace. The success of this first step following the signing of a peace accord signals the end to organized conflict and thereby provides the security necessary for people affected by war to reinvest in their lives and their country. Undertaken in a peacetime context, a DRP enables a government to restructure its public expenditure in favor of poverty-oriented programs and to consolidate peace efforts.

Reinsertion and reintegration are not distinct phases independent of demobilization. Rather, they are part of a seamless web in the transition from military to civilian life, without a clear beginning or end. As reinsertion and reintegration proceed, the needs of ex-combatants change and call for different support activities. To rebuild community social fabric and engender the understanding necessary to rebuild trust, measures of national reconciliation should form part and parcel of a DRP.

A successful DRP requires several integrated actions: (a) classifying ex-combatants according to need, skill level, and their desired mode of subsistence, (b) offering a basic transitional assistance package (safety net), (c) finding a way to deliver assistance simply, minimizing transition costs while maximizing benefits to ex-combatants, (d) sensitizing communities and building on existing social capital, (e) coordinating centrally yet decentralizing implementation authority to districts, and (f) connecting the DRP to ongoing development efforts by retargeting and restructuring existing portfolios.

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The Ethiopia case study was undertaken in cooperation with the Commission for the Rehabilitation of the Members of the Former Army and Disabled War Veterans, guided by Alemayehu Haile Mariam, Deputy Commissioner. Field work on the impact of the program as well as further desk analysis was carried out by a team led by Tadesse A. Woldu (Addis Ababa University). Ashton Douglas (U.S. Agency for International Development) provided support for the field study which was cofinanced by USAID. We are also grateful to Dawit Eshetu (Catholic Relief Services) and Kerstin Wilde (German Agency for Technical Cooperation) for their extensive assistance as well as to OXFAM United Kingdom and Ireland and the International Resource Group on Disarmament and Security in the Horn of Africa for helpful comments.

The Namibia case study draws on extended discussions with authorities, development agencies, and beneficiaries, in particular Zedekia Ngavirue (National Planning Commission), Joseph S. Iita and Mukwaita N. Shanyengana (Ministry of Lands, Resettlement, and Rehabilitation), Erastus I. Negonga (Ministry of Defense), and Simeon Shikangalah (Development Brigades Corporation). Additional field work on the program's economic and social impact was undertaken by a team led by Taimi Sitari (Evangelical Lutheran Church in Namibia). We are indebted to Steven Adei, Ester Hoveka, and Bruce Schimming (United Nations Development Program) for their vital support and assistance. Albert Lefleur (Council of Churches in Namibia) provided valuable insights into the early stages of the program.

The Uganda case study is based on documentation and experiences from the appraisal and implementation of the Uganda Veterans Assistance Program, as well as data from the established program monitoring and evaluation system under the direction of Maj. Gen. (Rtd.) Emilio Mondo (Uganda Veterans Assistance Board). The Danish International Development Agency, the German Agency for Technical Cooperation, the Dutch Government, the British Overseas Development Administration, the Swedish International Development Agency, and the U.S.
Agency for International Development participated in the Bank's appraisal missions and contributed significantly to the findings of this publication.

This study also benefited considerably from inputs of colleagues within the Bank. Special thanks for comments and suggestions are due to the Africa Regional Working Group on Demobilization. This group comprises Nicolas Gorjestani, Elisabeth Morris-Hughes, Luiz Pereira da Silva, Laura Frigenti, Philippe Benoit, Bension Varon, Sanjay Pradhan, and Sarah Keener.

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### ABBREVIATIONS

#### Section I: Ethiopia

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<th>Acronym</th>
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<tr>
<td>ACS</td>
<td>Archdiocesan Catholic Secretariat</td>
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<tr>
<td>AIDB</td>
<td>Agricultural and Industrial Development Bank</td>
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<td>BMZ</td>
<td>German Ministry for Economic Cooperation</td>
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<td>CRS</td>
<td>Catholic Relief Services</td>
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<td>DRP</td>
<td>Demobilization and Reintegration Program</td>
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<tr>
<td>DTC</td>
<td>Demobilization Technical Committee</td>
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<td>ENDF</td>
<td>Ethiopian National Defense Force</td>
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<td>EPLF</td>
<td>Eritrean Popular Liberation Front</td>
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<tr>
<td>EPRDF</td>
<td>Ethiopian Popular Revolutionary Democratic Front</td>
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<tr>
<td>ERCS</td>
<td>Ethiopian Red Cross Society</td>
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<td>ERRP</td>
<td>Ethiopian Rehabilitation and Recovery Program</td>
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<td>ESRF</td>
<td>Ethiopian Social Rehabilitation Fund</td>
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<td>ETB</td>
<td>Ethiopian Birr</td>
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<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
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<td>GTZ</td>
<td>German Agency for Technical Cooperation</td>
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<td>GTZ–RP</td>
<td>GTZ Reintegration Program</td>
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<td>IDA</td>
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<td>ILO</td>
<td>International Labor Organization</td>
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ICRC
International Committee of the Red Cross
MRE
Meal–Ready–to–Eat
NGO
Nongovernmental Organization
ODA
Overseas Development Association
OLF
Oromo Liberation Front
Oxfam UK/I
Oxfam United Kingdom and Ireland
RCF
Revolving Credit Fund
RRC
Relief and Rehabilitation Commission
SIDA
Swedish International Development Agency
STD
Sexually Transmitted Diseases
TGE
Transitional Government of Ethiopia
TPLF
Tigrayan Peoples' Liberation Front
USAID
United States Agency for International Development
USDOD
United States Department of Defense
UNDP
United Nations Development Program
UNHCR
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
WFP
World Food Program

Section II: Namibia

CIVPOL
Civilian police of UNTAG
CCN
Council of Churches in Namibia
CRIAA
Development Center for Research–Information–Action in Africa
DB
Development Brigade
DBC
Development Brigade Corporation
DRP
Demobilization and Reintegration Program
DTA
Democratic Turnhalle Alliance
ELCIN
Evangelical Lutheran Church in Namibia
ERC
ELCIN Rehabilitation Center
IDA
International Development Association (World Bank)
GDP
Gross Domestic Product
LWF
Lutheran World Federation
MEC
Ministry of Education and Culture
MHSS
Ministry of Health and Social Services
**MLRR** Ministry of Lands, Resettlement, and Rehabilitation  
**NAMPOL** Namibian Police Force  
**NDF** Namibian Defense Force  
**NGO** Nongovernmental Organization  
**N$** Namibian Dollar  
**NVRC** Nakayale Vocational Rehabilitation Center  
**PLAN** People's Liberation Army of Namibia  
**RRR** Repatriation, Resettlement and Reconstruction Committee of CCN  
**SADF** South African Defense Force  
**SIDA** Swedish International Development Agency  
**SWAPO** South West African People's Organization  
**SWAPOL** South West African Police Force  
**SWATF** South West African Territorial Force  
**UNHCR** Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees  
**UNITA** National Union for the Total Independence of Angola  
**UNTAG** United Nations Transitory Assistance Group  
**VDC** Village Development Committee  
**VTC** Vocational Training Center  
**WFP** World Food Program  
**ZAR** South African Rand  

**Section III: Uganda**  
**CAP** Community Action Program  
**CTB** Central Tender Board  
**DANIDA** Danish International Development Agency  
**DEO** District Education Officer  
**DES** District Executive Secretary  
**DMO** District Medical Officer  
**DRP** Demobilization and Reintegration Program  
**DVAC** District Veterans Advisory Committee  
**DVPO** District Veterans Program Officer  
**DVR** District Veterans Representative  
**EDF** European Development Fund  

**ABBREVIATIONS**
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Prologue

Ethiopia

Following twenty-nine years of civil strife and prolonged guerrilla warfare that ravaged Ethiopia's economy and society, the Ethiopian Popular Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) seized power and established the Transitional Government of Ethiopia (TGE) in May 1991.
The TGE created the Commission for the Rehabilitation of Members of the Former Army and Disabled War Veterans (the 'Commission') to design and implement a demobilization and reintegration program (DRP) for the defeated Derg army. The immediate objective of the Commission was to contribute to the restoration of security and stability by restricting the movement of the soldiers to transit centers. The long-term goal was to resettle ex-combatants and to facilitate their peaceful, productive, and self-sustained social and economic reintegration into society.

In addition to Derg ex-soldiers, the Commission has also been charged with the demobilization, reinsertion, and reintegration of the fighters of the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) captured by the EPRDF in 1992.

**Namibia**

The demobilization of opposing forces in Namibia took place in the context of a United Nations supervised war-to-peace transition prior to the country's independence in March 1990. The subsequent repatriation and reintegration process coincided with the creation of a new nation after seventy-three years of South African rule.

Neither the United Nations nor the new government planned any reinsertion or reintegration assistance to ex-combatants. After independence, many former soldiers of both sides failed to reintegrate economically. In response to protests from disaffected veterans, the government hastily designed a number of ad hoc activities. Consequently, the Namibian demobilization and reintegration program resembles a patchwork of well-intended program responses rather than strategic government policy and a planned program response. In early 1996 the government embarked on a redesign of the reintegration component.

**Uganda**

After fifteen years of civil strife and prolonged guerrilla warfare that left Uganda with a war-torn economy and society, the National Resistance Movement came to power in 1986. Rebellion and banditry afflicted different parts of the country until 1991. During this period, recurrent and capital expenditures on defense increased. Once military opposition was defeated in 1991, the government decided to shift the burden of its public expenditure away from defense and security to the promotion of social and economic development. This shift in government expenditures entailed the phased demobilization and subsequent reintegration into productive civilian life between 1992 and 1995 of 36,400 of the estimated 90,000 soldiers in the National Resistance Army (NRA).

The three objectives of the Uganda Veterans Assistance Program (UVAP) were the (a) demobilization and resettlement of veterans and their families, (b) facilitation of their social and economic reintegration into a peaceful, productive, and sustainable civilian life, and (c) restructuring of public expenditure with a view to increasing the funds available for priority programs, especially those allocated for economic and social infrastructure and services.

**Target Groups and Targeting Mechanisms**

**Ethiopia**

With the help of socioeconomic data collected in the transit centers, the 455,000 Derg soldiers were categorized into four groups: rural, urban, those who had served for fewer than eighteen months, and disabled ex-soldiers. This categorization enabled the Commission to differentiate assistance to ex-combatants in accordance with their needs. The number of female Derg veterans is unknown but is not thought to exceed 5 percent of Derg force strength. Women comprised up to 20 percent of the 21,200 strong OLF.
A significant percentage of Derg and OLF ex–combatants was below the age of twenty–five at the time of demobilization. Most came from poor families, and only a few had the resources necessary to start a civilian life. A great majority of ex–soldiers were illiterate or functionally illiterate, and most were unskilled or had low skill levels.

Prior to completing the demobilization phase, each ex–combatant received a nontransferable identification card, which included a photograph and a seal of the Commission. The identification card was the principal mechanism for ex–combatants to apply for benefits. Each disabled ex–soldier was also provided with a disability card.

Several leakages occurred during the process, the most significant being that approximately 15 percent of Derg ex–soldiers declined to report to the Commission for demobilization. An unknown number received assistance twice, first as Derg ex–soldiers, then as OLF ex–fighters. Rigorous application of the identification system as well as transparent monitoring procedures, however, seem to have minimized leakages.

Namibia

An estimated 32,000 combatants from the People's Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN) and approximately 25,000 combatants from the South West African Territorial Force (SWATF), including the paramilitary units of the SWATF, were demobilized in 1989. Of these, approximately 7,500 were absorbed into the Namibian defense and police forces. The remaining 49,500 ex–combatants constitute the target group of the Namibian DRP. For program purposes, this group was further differentiated into the unemployed, the disabled, and the San (Bushmen) fighters.

PLAN ex–combatants are predominantly of Ovambo ethnic origin, whereas the SWATF ex–combatants are ethnically more diverse, containing significant numbers of Ovambo, Herero, Sancontinue Bushmen, and Caucasians. The number of female ex–combatants is not known. There was no systematic collection of socioeconomic data of PLAN or SWATF combatants at the time of demobilization; however, recent ex–combatant survey evidence suggests that most ex–combatants joined the army in their twenties and stayed in the military for over ten years. The majority seem to be married and have an average of four children. Their health condition does not appear significantly different to that of the general civilian population. Their overall educational attainment is low, but PLAN ex–combatants are particularly disadvantaged.

Different targeting mechanisms were applied to PLAN and SWATF ex–combatants. The PLAN ex–combatants who reported to UNHCR in Angola for repatriation were registered and issued identification cards. As some were left out during this process, the government later established a committee of former officers to verify an ex–combatant's claim to benefits. As South Africans had complete computerized records of all SWATF members, no additional target mechanism was necessary.

With no coherent targeting mechanism in place and uneven registration to link ex–combatants to the benefits safety net, targeting leakages were numerous and substantial at all stages of the process. The Ministry of Defense estimates that as many as 40 percent of eligible PLAN ex–combatants have not benefited from severance pay. The leakages of the registration and verification processes also affect the access of ex–combatants to training and resettlement programs.

Uganda

The Ugandan demobilization is the outcome of rational and professional personnel management by the army. Of the 36,358 soldiers demobilized, 38 percent were discharged because their services were no longer required, 25 percent of soldiers left the army voluntarily, and 26 percent were discharged on medical grounds. Recognizing
that UVAP would also impact the veterans' families and the host communities, the program provided some support to their spouses and children.

A crucial step in the design and preparation of the program was the completion of three studies. These included (a) a socioeconomic profile of soldiers to identify the capabilities, needs, and expectations of the target group, (b) an analysis of the opportunities for veterans in product and factor markets to design the settling–in kit and long–term reintegration program, and (c) the examination of institutional requirements to determine the program implementation structure.

At discharge, over one third of veterans were younger than thirty. Indeed, an estimated 30 percent of phase II veterans were under the age of eighteen when they enlisted. The vast majority of veterans are married (90 percent) and, on average, have approximately three children. The health condition of veterans is a matter of serious concern. Over 5 percent have already died. One third of those who died were confirmed AIDS victims. The veterans' education level is low: three–quarters have not gone beyond a primary education. Further, only few possess marketable skills.

UVAB, in collaboration with the Army, developed the discharge certificate as the principal nontransferable, noncorruptible identification mechanism. It includes general information about the bearer, an entitlements section, and a statement of the rights of inheritance vis–à–vis the next–of–kin, should the veteran pass away before the six–month program of entitlements has ended. Its major security features are a photograph, its bound format, and the unambiguous identification of the bearer. Due to these features, the discharge certificate has proved to be a highly effective tool preventing leakages, facilitating administrative procedures, and reducing costs.

**Demobilization Segment**

**Ethiopia**

Demobilization consisted of three phases: assembly, predischarge orientation, and transportation. Derg ex–soldiers were called on to report to one of the seven discharge centers located mainly in the north of the country. In two groups of 365,000 and 90,000 respectively, ex–soldiers heeded this call. Of the former, 52,000 who had fled to the Sudan were repatriated to Ethiopia by UNHCR. The latter group had initially distrusted the TGE's intentions. Of those, 80,000 ex–soldier refugees in Kenya were repatriated directly to their communities. OLF ex–fighters were treated in a similar fashion as the Derg ex–soldiers.

During the demobilization phase, donors provided crucial humanitarian assistance to the centers, which were administered by the TGE as well as by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the Ethiopian Red Cross Society (ERCS). The U.S. Department of Defense (USDOD) airlifted a large number of relief supplies (surplus ready–to–eat meals, tents, and blankets) that had been earmarked for the Gulf War but were not used. The OLF centers were managed by the Commission, with financial support from the German Agency for Technical Cooperation (GTZ).

A lack of food, potable water, and shelter combined with overcrowding and the poor physical condition of the ex–soldiers initially posed a serious health risk; however, there was a constant movement of ex–soldiers in and out of the centers, thus preventing the outbreak of major diseases or epidemics. The demobilization was implemented between July 1991 and January 1992; however, individual ex–soldiers were retained in the centers for much shorter periods, ranging from a few weeks to a couple of months.
The Commission organized orientation sessions for the first batch of Derg ex−soldiers in the centers. The purpose of these sessions was to help ease the ex−soldiers' feelings of hopelessness and militarism and mitigate their antisocial behavior. Similar exercises were undertaken for the OLF captives and the officers repatriated from abroad. The remaining ex−soldiers received some civic education based on group discussions in their localities. These orientation sessions complicated the relations between the Commission and donors.

In close cooperation with the Commission, the ICRC/ERCS organized the transportation of ex−soldiers to locations closest to their community of origin or destination of choice. Thereafter, ex−combatants received a travel allowance to finance their way home independently. The ERCS contracted private transport companies and also used vehicles provided by the Ministry of Transport and Communication. The Commission and GTZ shared responsibilities for the transportation of the OLF ex−fighters to their preferred destination.

Namibia

UNTAG military officers were deployed in southern Angola to monitor the confinement of PLAN forces to bases prior to their repatriation. The ex−combatants then joined civilian members of the SWAPO exile community in UNHCR assembly camps. After discharge, PLAN ex−combatants were entitled to the same benefits (demobilization) package as the civilian refugees.

During the registration process in Angola, UNHCR collected some socioeconomic and demographic data. Most of these data, however, were of a highly sensitive nature and were not made available to design reintegration initiatives. On arrival in Namibia, the returnees were initially transferred to reception centers that were operated by the Council of Churches in Namibia (CCN). They were allocated a tent, issued a food ration card, and provided with a basic kit (transition allowance).

Secondary centers were set up by CCN constituent churches for special groups of destitute, handicapped, and homeless returnees, especially the children and the old. These centers also became a mechanism for alleviating the congestion at the reception centers. The Lutheran World Federation (LWF) carried out the transportation of returnees to their final destination without serious problems.

An unknown number of PLAN combatants ('PLAN reserve') remained hidden in camps in southern Angola at the time of UNHCR's registration and repatriation program. Members of this army−reserve returned to Namibia independently later in 1989. CCN provided a one−month food ration and the basic kit to each of these ex−combatants, but was not mandated to register them. They were also not transported to their communities.

As part of the peace agreement, the South African Defense Force (SADF) withdrew all its forces to South Africa within one week after the elections. SWATF was demobilized by June 1, 1989; however, paramilitary police units known as Koevoet were violent, disruptive, and repressive until their disbandment in October 1989. Fearing retaliation, many Koevoet members departed for South Africa after independence in 1990. SWATF and Koevoet ex−combatants did not receive any of the demobilization benefits accruing to PLAN ex−combatants. They may, however, have received severance pay from the SADF.

Uganda

The Army decided to discharge the identified soldiers as quickly as possible to avoid potential disruptions, difficulties, and costs in sustaining large numbers of soldiers and their dependents at the assembly points for any prolonged period; therefore, soldiers were often given no more than one to two days prior notice of demobilization. Many veterans resented the shortness of the demobilization notice. Good collaboration between Army and UVAB in most instances facilitated early troubleshooting.
To facilitate the veterans' return to civilian life, a predischarge orientation program was offered to veterans and their dependents assembled in the discharge centers. 

Transport was provided to every veteran and his/her family and belongings from the discharge center to the district of destination. From district headquarters to their final destination, veterans had to arrange transport individually and pay for it with part of their transition allowance. UVAB entered into contractual arrangements with private and public transport providers at rates that were fixed during each phase.

In the final phase of the program, post-discharge orientation meetings for information and counseling were organized in district capitals and were attended by veterans and their spouses. District administration representatives, especially those for agriculture, health, and education, were also present at these sessions.

Reinsertion Segment

Ethiopia

The Commission designed a transitional safety net package as a form of reinsertion assistance. Its objective was to address the immediate basic needs of the demobilized ex-combatants. This package provided ex-combatants with financial and in-kind assistance starting immediately after the ex-combatants reported to their communities and the local Commission office. OLF ex-fighters received the same assistance as ex-Derg, as far as cash payments and food rations were concerned.

The nature of assistance (financial or in-kind) differed, primarily according to (a) location of settlement (rural/urban) and (b) duration of service (less/more than eighteen months). All ex-combatants who participated in the orientation phase have been eligible for free health care since repatriation. Rural ex-combatants were provided access to land for residential and agricultural use.

Namibia

Reinsertion support consisted of one-time severance pay to each unemployed ex-combatant. The objective of this policy was to address the basic needs of the neediest of ex-combatants. It is estimated that 24,650 ex-combatants received this severance pay; however, there were many complaints from PLAN ex-combatants that non-ex-combatants received payments, while some legitimate claimants were excluded.

At the reception centers, all SWAPO returnees (including PLAN ex-combatants) were issued food distribution cards, which entitled them to receive food rations for a total of twelve months. SWATF ex-combatants continued to receive their monthly salaries for a period of nine months and ex-SWATF officers are entitled to pension payments. Pensions are now also paid to PLAN ex-combatants (veterans) over the age of forty-five. All returnees received free basic health care in the CCN-implemented UNHCR reception centers. Demobilized SWATF could satisfy their health care needs at the remaining SADF bases until the elections. Returnees also received initial rehabilitation assistance for their short-term needs, including agricultural production packages, shelter construction, and supplementary family support.

Uganda

UVAP's Transitional Safety Net Package included (a) cash payments to assist veterans for a period of six months, (b) health care support in cases of severe need, (c) financial contributions to veterans children's primary education, and (d) shelter for families to meet the most pressing short-term survival needs as they sought to secure a sustainable future.
The *cash benefits* were calculated to finance a package of basic needs and were designed to cover the veterans’ expenses for clothing, food, medical care and drugs, agricultural tools, and the mate—soft

...rial necessary for the construction of a simple building. All were designed to cover the needs of the veterans families, with the exception of expenses for clothes. The payments were effected in installments, partly in cash and partly through bank transfers.

As the health status of veterans is generally poor, UVAP envisaged *health care support* from the outset. A pilot health care fund was established to cover a limited number of disabled and chronically ill veterans; however, it soon became clear that the number of veterans in need of health support had been severely underestimated. Phase III extended funding for health care support to 15 percent of all demobilized soldiers.

Since children of soldiers are entitled to free education, all three phases included a one–year *children’s education support* component to increase school attendance rates among veterans’ children. Female children suffered from discrimination in phases I and II, but the broader coverage of phase III countered gender discrimination.

Soldiers primarily required *housing support* after demobilization; hence, the following assistance was envisaged to enable each veteran to erect a simple house: twenty iron sheets and five ridges in kind as well as cash contributions for the purchase of other necessary goods. The inefficiency in the delivery of the iron sheets in phases I and II became the single most important deficiency in the implementation of the program. Phase III sought a more flexible approach by monetizing the iron sheets so that veterans may buy them from local dealers.

**Reintegration Segment**

**Ethiopia**

The Commission adopted one general strategy and four category–specific strategies. The *general strategy* contained several related elements. First, the minimum necessary assistance that each category required was identified to enable ex–soldiers to achieve the same social and economic status as average civilians. Second, the reintegration programs were prioritized according to their implementation complexity. Third, an integrated and simple institutional structure with decentralized decisionmaking was adopted.

On the basis of socioeconomic information gathered during the demobilization phase, the Commission designed four *category–specific strategies*. The objective of this approach was to provide need–based economic reintegration programs for different ex–combatant categories. Separate programs were designed for the reintegration of (a) rural settlers, (b) urban settlers, (c) disabled ex–combatants, and (d) war veterans (pension scheme). These programs were almost identical for Derg and OLF ex–combatants.

The *rural reintegration program* was classified by the mode of subsistence into (a) sedentary agriculture (upland coffee farming and lowland maize farming) and (b) cattle herding. All beneficiaries received technical and material support necessary to engage in small–scale agriculture production. Many also received an ox or heifer and access to collective lands of former Derg political groupings (e.g., youth league). The Ministry of Agriculture, assisted by the Commission, the ICRC, and the Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (RRC), managed the distribution of inputs.

The *urban reintegration program* initially comprised three components: employment, education, and training. Two years after demobilization, the Commission also established a *Revolving Credit Fund (RCF)* to advance concessional loans to cooperatives of urban ex–combatants. Its design is based on socioeconomic accounting, which takes the opportunity costs of not providing subsidized credit, such as ex–combatant dissatisfaction and
crime, into consideration.

By the end of 1994, almost 99,000 ex-combatants had received reintegration assistance. The Commission referred almost 62,000 ex-combatants to public or private sector employment, issued civilian certificates to 7,908 ex-combatants, and facilitated application and entrance formalities for over 16,000 continuing with formal education. A further 6,130 ex-combatants received skills upgrading in different trades. The RCF financed 295 microprojects designed for the reintegration of 6,826 ex-combatants.

The Commission designed several measures to support the reintegration of disabled ex-combatants. According to the classification of the disabled, the Commission's strategy was threefold. The approximately 20,000 less severely disabled ex-combatants did not require any long-term medical care and were absorbed into the urban and rural reintegration programs after receiving necessary treatment.

After completion of the medical treatment and/or special training programs, 15,208 moderately impaired ex-combatants were provided the necessary materials to start a productive life. The injuries of 2,328 more severely disabled ex-combatants receiving institutional care at the Adigrat and Debre Zeit centers preclude them from engaging in training or productive activities. The Commission encourages them to join their families as soon as they have received the necessary treatment.

Derg ex-soldiers and OLF ex-fighters are covered under the same pension scheme. Those who are forty-five years or older and have served in an army for at least twenty years are eligible for a government pension. The Commission ensured that 7,405 Derg ex-soldiers receive a pension. The exact number of OLF pensioners is not known but is estimated at roughly 2,000. Furthermore, the moderately impaired ex-combatants received pensions since their release from the rehabilitation centers.

The TGE has recently commenced the demobilization of up to 30,000 ENDF soldiers as part of its ongoing restructuring of the Ethiopian National Defense Force (ENDF). A significant proportion of these demobilized soldiers have been encouraged to participate in the Humeria Resettlement Scheme for cotton growing. Its main rationale is that the communities of origin of these soldiers are situated in an overpopulated, drought-prone region that offers few reintegration opportunities. According to the Commission, 7,000 have already been demobilized and voluntarily participate in the scheme.

In close collaboration with the Commission, the GTZ provided assistance through the establishment of a special Reintegration Program (RP) in early 1992. The GTZ-assisted RP provides similar support to ex-combatants as the Commission's rural and urban reintegration programs. Projects include community development, small-scale business promotion, provision of farming implements, vocational training, employment subsidies, and community-based projects providing food or cash for work. Moreover, the GTZ has funded part of the demobilization, reinsertion, and reintegration of the OLF ex-fighters; however, while being part and parcel of the Commission's DRP, the GTZRP is managed separately.

Following consultations with the Commission, a pilot small-scale credit scheme for microenterprise activities was provided by Catholic Relief Services (CRS). The program was completed in mid-1994. The aim of the program was to provide credit on soft terms to ex-combatants to facilitate their urban reintegration. CRS concentrated its efforts on the two urban centers of Addis Ababa and Debre Zeit.

In collaboration with the TGE, the World Bank initiated the pilot phase of a social fund, the Ethiopian Social Rehabilitation Fund (ESRF), in December 1992. The ESRF is primarily a funding agency. One of the main project promoters is the Commission, which identifies proposals and forwards them to the ESRF on behalf of the beneficiaries. By March 1995, 5,566 ex-combatants were participating in diverse income-generating projects.
In sum, the four institutions cited above implemented seven types of program interventions and provided support to an estimated 336,233 ex–combatants or 70.7 percent of all demobilized ex–combatants of the Derg and OLF armies.

Namibia

Reintegration assistance included employment support, rehabilitation and resettlement programs, and vocational training. Immediately after independence, the government of Namibia employed an estimated 7,500 ex–combatants (13.2 percent of all ex–combatants) in the new army and the reformed police. Many of these were permitted to join under a pro–PLAN affirmative action program. The private sector, which is dominated by whites, has employed few ex–combatants, pointing to their lack of work experience and education. Since the demonstrations of 1995, around 3,000 ex–combatants are being placed in the armed forces as well as in the private sector.

As many as 10 percent of ex–combatants are disabled. They have access to the rehabilitation program of the Ministry of Lands, Resettlement, and Rehabilitation (MLRR). The objective of this program is to create employment opportunities for disabled people through income–generating activities. To date, six income–generating projects have been established by the MLRR. An unknown number of ex–combatants participate in the projects. The MLRR provides extended assistance for four or more years and places considerable emphasis on resettlement, thereby creating communities around the disabled.

The rehabilitation projects suffer from several shortcomings. Sites seem to have been chosen without preparatory research and the skills training provided to disabled ex–combatants seems inappropriate. The economic prospects of the disabled on completion of the training are limited, and the beneficiaries consequently suffer from lack of motivation.

The Evangelical Lutheran Church in Namibia (ELCIN) has targeted physically disabled Namibians at the Nakayale Vocational Rehabilitation Center since 1991. An unknown number of ex–combatants are among the roughly 140 beneficiaries. ELCIN's support is for only one year and attempts to empower disabled people to become fully accepted and independent members of their community.

The Development Brigade (DB) was established in 1991 to address the needs after repatriation of the many ex–combatants who had been unable to secure employment. The DB was purposefully restricted to the lower end of the vocational training market with emphasis being placed on practical training and employment. Training courses run for twelve to eighteen months, thereby fulfilling government standards.

The DB was originally a department of the MLRR. Its administration and implementation were strongly centralized and directed by a cabinet–level steering committee. In 1993 the DB was converted into a parastatal organization and renamed the Development Brigade Corporation (DBC). The reorganization left the basic DB design unchanged but broadened its mandate and activities ultimately to cover skills training, income–generating activities, placement, and resettlement schemes for graduates. The DBC was again restructured in late 1995 with the establishment of four Brigade Corporations as independent commercial enterprises.

Conspicuously few of the trainees are ex–SWATF. Trainers are not necessarily qualified or motivated, and training itself suffers from poor quality and is almost entirely classroom–based. Almost 2,500 ex–combatants have graduated thus far. The implementation of income–generating projects was added as the second cornerstone to the newly formed parastatal in 1993. These are now undertaken by approximately 850 workers, most of whom are DBC graduates. The newly established Brigade Corporations took over these activities as specialized firms.
To combat the high rate of unemployment of graduates, the DBC has recently started to acquire land for its own *Brigade resettlement scheme*. By offering such assistance, the DBC tries to enable graduates from agricultural courses to become commercial farmers. Some 640 ex–combatants of the last batch of graduates have been placed on the DBC resettlement scheme. While providing employment, the Brigade resettlement scheme continues to mask the real deficiencies of the DBC training approach. Moreover, it negatively reflects on the inadequacies of the placement unit, which is severely understaffed.

The primary objective of the *Resettlement Program* of the Ministry of Lands, Resettlement, and Rehabilitation (MLRR) is to create homes for landless Namibians by allocating arable land to them. Land is acquired either by government purchase of commercial farms from white settlers or as a gift from tribal leaders. MLRR provides the settlers with all necessary tools to start a new living and with the means to cover their basic needs. This support is normally planned for three years but can be extended if external circumstances inhibit the achievement of self–sufficiency.

The decisionmaking process of the resettlement program is highly centralized. Even day–to–day management decisions are made in Windhoek. Perceiving their impotence and being caught between settlers’ grievances and a slow bureaucracy, regional staff often respond passively to requests from settlers. Although settlers are encouraged to establish committees, they are essentially excluded from the important decisionmaking process at every level.

The government of Namibia has adopted a phased approach to wean settlers off assistance and encourage them to take their lives into their own hands; however, in practice, none of the resettlement projects have become self–sufficient to date. Several sites suffer from remoteness from markets, infrastructural deficiencies, and inadequate soil fertility. Furthermore, a drought has undermined agricultural production in many parts of the country; therefore, settlers have been receiving 100 percent of their food and other basic needs for up to five years and have developed a marked *dependency syndrome*.

Excluding the two San resettlement projects (see below), eight resettlement projects have been established thus far, catering to an estimated 6,000 people. The exact number of ex–combatants beneficiaries is unknown, but it is thought to be significant.

With the end of the war, the fate of San ex–combatants and their families, who had become very dependent on SADF, seemed unclear. In response to the plight of the San, LWF (phase I) and ELCIN (phase II) designed and implemented a two–phased *San resettlement and rehabilitation program*. During the initial relief phase, the San received food aid, shelter, tools for agricultural production, and legal aid. The program also included infrastructure development, community development, and logistics. The second resettlement phase was started in early 1990. By the end of 1993, almost 10,000 San had been resettled at two project sites. The support program for the San settlers is comprehensive and includes agricultural support, education, health support, community development, and spiritual care. Beneficiary participation has been limited, which has impeded program effectiveness at times.

Lack of beneficiary consultation, soil quality, and technology have frequently impeded the achievement of sustainable agricultural production. Adequate infrastructure for primary education has been provided; however, for children in remote communities, distance and travel time are a constraint to attendance. The resettlement program includes a health and nutrition component, which aims to provide health facilities and improve health and hygiene through a program of health education and training.
Uganda

UVAP was not initially designed as a reintegration program. Nevertheless, it was clear from the beginning that UVAP’s real measure of success would be the successful reintegration of veterans into a civilian environment. In response to this challenge, UVAP has progressively instituted measures in support of the economic reintegration of veterans (for instance, education, training, counseling, employment support, and self-employment).

A pilot education and training support component was introduced in phase II. The fund enabled veterans to continue with formal education, attend a vocational training institution, or participate in a scheme that provided on-the-job training and advice by master craftsmen. Overall, demand for this component far exceeded the funds made available for phase II. The final phase, therefore, allocated more financial resources to this component and covered 15 percent of all veterans.

During phase II, UVAB set up a directory of NGOs to advise veterans on non-UVAP financial reintegration support. To counter various incidences of discrimination, UVAB sensitized project promoters as well as local and central authorities to allow veterans to apply for loans on an equal basis with civilians. Counseling mainly addressed issues of health, program procedures, and local administration.

Despite its extension to several reintegration initiatives, direct employment support to veterans and their spouses was beyond the scope of UVAP; hence, several parallel activities, financed by government, multilateral, and bilateral donors alike were initiated or extended to cater to the veterans’ income-earning needs.

Program managers have designed and implemented several measures to facilitate social reintegration. While the envisaged activities have been carried out more efficiently over time, it is evident that complete reintegration is a long and trying process, especially for female veterans and wives. Prior to the end of phase II, UVAP had paid limited attention to problems faced by female veterans and spouses of veterans. Although limited by funding constraints, phase III extended program health and education benefits to wives of chronically ill and severely disabled veterans. Female veterans also received priority for project counseling.

With social capital progressively weakened over years of civil strife, the Ugandan government clearly understood the potential problems of mistrust and fear that could derail even a well-planned demobilization exercise. Consequently, government officials and UVAB staff undertook community sensitization tours at program inception. Community awareness toward reintegration was also a central focus in phase III through a mass media campaign, which reinforced the radio program and will use social drama or puppet theater as alternatives to classical teaching methods.

Reintegration Experience

Ethiopia

Economic reintegration into a population as impoverished as Ethiopia’s has been a formidable challenge. By and large, rural reintegration has been comparatively successful. Since the first harvest, most ex-combatants have felt that they are in the same or even better economic position than civilians; however, the resource-constrained environment of many host communities means that overall living standards are low. Urban reintegration has been hampered by two factors: lack of skills and a depressed labor market.

Most ex-combatants participate in informal social networks. They meet their former comrades and opponents at least occasionally to discuss their present life, work opportunities, income-generating projects, and the general economic and political situation. Such informal contacts have proved helpful in facilitating their transition to civilian life. In fact, over one third of ex-combatants cooperate in economic ventures. Informal contacts also help
them to cope with the challenges of civilian life better.

Almost three quarters of ex–combatants seem to have returned to their previous communities; thus, their social capital was probably still intact. Moreover, it was perceived that the shorter the duration of service and the younger an ex–combatant on demobilization, the less difficult the process of social reintegration was. Anecdotal evidence suggests that female ex–combatants had greater difficulties. Having lived an army life for some time, many were no longer willing to accept traditional family roles. There does not appear to be a relationship between the presence of ex–combatants and the occurrence of crime in the host communities.

In instances where the political affiliations of ex–combatants and host community have differed, tensions have been unavoidable. Moreover, some communities and social strata perceive themselves as equally disadvantaged and resent the fact that ex–combatants receive special assistance. In general, however, with the possible exception of former officers, ex–combatants have been well received by the communities. Ex–combatant conduct determined community reception to a large extent. When they were disciplined and participated in community social functions, they found acceptance much more easily.

Namibia

Economic reintegration has proved difficult. Given the low level of skills, ex–combatants are ill-equipped to find gainful employment in the formal sector. SWATF ex–combatants seem to have fared better, as significant numbers have been hired as security guards by private companies. Overall, however, formal sector unemployment among ex–combatants is still estimated at a disconcerting 50 percent and is possibly as high as 70 percent among ex–PLAN combatants.

Ex–combatants from both sides seem to have greater difficulty than returnees or stayers (those who remained in the country) in coping with civilian life in an independent Namibia. Possibly the greatest contributor to ex–combatant dissatisfaction with government assistance is the discrepancy between their expectations (often influenced by government promises) and the reality of an opportunity–constrained environment.

A majority of ex–combatants felt welcomed by their host communities; however, many ex–combatants have found access to land a serious problem. Indeed, most see their transition to civilian life as a difficult process. The key factors for successful social reintegration are good relations with family, friends, church, and community, which in effect, constitute the ex–combatants' social capital.

Despite its shortcomings, the San resettlement program has assisted the target group reasonably well in its difficult dual transition to civilian and sedentary agriculture–based life. It appears that the San who stayed behind in Namibia and participated in the program from the outset have fared better than their 4,000 brethren who migrated to South Africa at independence.

Psychological reintegration remains a major problem. Notwithstanding the fact that PLAN ex–combatants know that they helped bring about independence, many have little knowledge of how to give themselves a purpose in life or how to take initiatives toward self–sufficiency. SWATF ex–combatants bear the guilt of having fought for the vanquished foreign oppressor. Often they are ashamed and shy and are ostracized in many communities.

An unknown number of female combatants and staff served in both armies. Their male comrades–in–arms perceive no differences in their own reintegration experiences to female ex–combatants, at least regarding economic reintegration. Anecdotal evidence suggests that female ex–combatants might find it more difficult to reintege into civilian society or accept the traditional roles assigned to them socially and psychologically.
Although a formal mechanism for exchanging or coordinating views among ex-combatants does not exist, they have evidently created their own informal networks. At the local level, interaction with former comrades in arms seems to flourish. Many work together, for example, on resettlement projects, in the same business, or in agricultural activities.

During the repatriation process, many communities set up a repatriation committee through the local church or the Council of Churches in Namibia (CCN). While not explicitly targeted toward returning ex-combatants, the more than fifty committees nationwide also served the purpose of sensitizing the communities and easing tensions. Such committees commonly consisted of headmen, pastors, social and health workers, businessmen, other respected community members, as well as ex-combatants.

The majority of ex-combatants seem to have returned to their families and communities. In most cases, this is likely to have eased social reintegration; however, ex-combatants faced cold to hostile community reactions when they had fought for the 'wrong' side. Their relations with community members seem to get better the more they participate in community activities. The presence of ex-combatants does not seem to be related to the incidence of crime but rather to the general phenomenon of unemployment. An important element of community acceptance was the label attached to a person. As long as an ex-combatant was considered and addressed as a 'returnee,' he/she felt stigmatized.

Uganda

The capacity of veterans to reintegrate socially and economically is determined by several factors. Among the characteristics that have eased reintegration are the following: having been stationed in settled military units rather than mobile combat units, having joined the army as a mature person with access to land, and having a family to which to return. Many veterans lost their entire family, had their houses burned down and/or their economic base destroyed during the civil war, and thus had no home to which they could return. For these effectively displaced veterans, as well as for the child soldiers, reintegration has been a formidable challenge.

Veterans, male and female alike, have shown immense self-reliance, resourcefulness, and initiative. By June 1995, more than 1,400 income-generating project activities have been started by phase II veterans; however, many veterans lack marketable skills and experience, reducing their competitiveness in the labor market. In some cases, hostile local politicians successfully hindered veterans from embarking on lucrative business ventures.

Access to land is a major factor facilitating economic reintegration. Overall, as few as 3 percent of phase I and phase II veterans combined seem to have been unable to secure access to land. Those and many others have had to scale down their ambitions, settling for jobs as agricultural day laborers or unpaid family workers. The incidence of crime has been negligible: up to mid-July 1995, only 159 veterans have been found guilty of some criminal act, that is, 0.5 percent of all veterans discharged under phases I and II.

Veterans display a strong sense of camaraderie, spontaneously informing, helping, and counseling each other on an ad hoc basis. In many districts, veterans have formed groups to tackle the challenge of reintegration more effectively. Sharing experiences among themselves has been a major factor facilitating reintegration for phase II and III veterans: they have been able to learn from the mistakes, lessons, and advice of phase I veterans.

Wives have faced particular problems when they do not belong to the same ethnic group as the husband but have followed him to his home after discharge. They have frequently been rejected by the community and/or abandoned by their husbands bowing to community or family pressures. All too often, wives have found themselves in dependent relationships with husbands and family members. Many have decided to leave (divorce or separate from) their husbands and have returned to their own homes at their own initiative. An inordinately
high divorce rate among returning veteran families (over 50 percent in phase I) bears testimony to this high level of social stress.

Veterans, male and female alike, often returned to their families. This facilitated re-entry into the traditional safety net and provided veterans with easier access to land; however, with memories of a marauding army still fresh in the minds of many Ugandans, communities often erected visible and invisible barriers to veteran reintegration, especially in the early stages of the process. Both political leaders and community members had misconceptions regarding the returning veterans. As only very few veterans actually committed a crime or behaved unsocially, mistrust slowly receded and often turned into advice and assistance. Veteran participation in local volunteer defense units has been highly appreciated by communities in several districts and has enhanced local security.

**Institutional Structure**

**Ethiopia**

The TGE mandated the Commission to design and implement the DRP. The Commission is under the direction of the Office of the Prime Minister and is supervised by a Board or Advisory Committee. It is comprised of three departments (under the Deputy Commissioner) and four units (under the Commissioner). The departments are responsible for (a) administration and finance, (b) logistics and general services, and (c) social services. The service units are (a) planning and programming, (b) legal, (c) public relations, and (d) audit and inspection. Despite the shift from emergency (reinsertion) to development (reintegration), the institutional structure of the Commission has essentially remained the same.

A national field presence was judged to be one the crucial elements of successful program implementation. To this end, the Commission established seven regional executive offices and thirty-six branch offices on the basis of the regional distribution of ex-soldiers. The field-based staff are mostly EPRDF ex-combatants who, in many cases, are familiar with the problems and opportunities of the various localities. They also understand the particular problems of the target group. The use of these ex-combatants seems to have been a major factor in the successful implementation of the program. The Commission also relies on local committees, which consist of representatives from the development sub-committees, the Commission, and ex-combatants themselves.

The GTZ decided to support the Ethiopian program in late 1991, at which point in time the Commission did not have the capacity to implement its contribution; therefore, GTZ created its own implementation unit to respond to the ex-combatants' needs. The GTZ Reintegration Program's headquarters are in Addis Ababa, has three branch offices, and is virtually independent of the Commission. The program was based on the assumption that a comparatively small staff could administer a broad range of projects using a variety of interventions; however, the differing professional quality of counterparts in project design and implementation has required greater levels of monitoring and technical support from GTZ staff at all stages of the project cycle than had been expected.

As CRS is nonoperational, it identified the Archdiocesan Catholic Secretariat (ACS) as implementing counterpart organization. The ACS had limited capabilities to manage independently a development project and adopted a financially unsustainable charity-oriented approach. In each of the project areas, CRS established several local committees. Despite their involvement, however, the communities lacked commitment and perceived the program as a church-driven rather than community-oriented program.

The ESRF is implemented by a small management unit in Addis Ababa that enjoys a certain level of autonomy from the government in regard to accounting, contractual and procurement procedures, staff selection, and management systems.
Namibia

Without a specially designed program, an office with sole responsibility for the assistance to ex-combatants does not exist. Resettlement and rehabilitation have been the responsibility of the MLRR as well as ELCIN. Training and income-generating activities, including placement, have been offered through the Development Brigade Corporation (DBC). The DBC was originally a government office but has since become a parastatal. Recently, some DBC activities were transferred to newly formed commercial enterprises. The support activities of MLRR and DBC have been rather uncoordinated.

Uganda

The National Resistance Council created UVAB in October 1992 to implement the Uganda Veterans Assistance Program. The formal institutional structure of this civilian entity consisted of the Uganda Veterans Assistance Board proper, the Executive Secretariat of the Board, District Veterans Program Offices, and District Veterans Advisory Committees. These formal bodies were complemented by three quasi-formal and informal beneficiary groups: District Veterans Representatives, Sub-County Veterans Representatives, and Veterans Associations. The Board is the policymaking organ for UVAP.

The Executive Secretariat is headed by an Executive Secretary and consists of three departments: finance, administration, and operations. In late 1993 and early 1994, respectively, UVAB added a monitoring and evaluation unit and a reintegration unit. Despite the application of sophisticated management tools, UVAB management suffered from two major weaknesses: (a) unsatisfactory outreach activities and (b) inadequate monitoring and reporting. For example, regular supervision of district staff by Regional Officers was not undertaken due to transport shortages.

District Veterans Program Offices have been established in all districts of the country. To tie the district offices more closely to the existing administrative structure, UVAB decided to hire regular district administration staff in a part-time capacity. By and large, the system has worked well. The district office is headed by a District Veterans Program Officer (DVPO) and includes several support staff. DVPO offices in districts with more than 1,000 veterans receive Assistant DVPOs. Where the number of veterans exceeds 1,500, a second Assistant DVPO has been provided by UVAB.

The effectiveness of district officers has depended to large degree on their personality, experience, and commitment. Some have a high opinion of their veterans and consider the workload within tolerable limits, while others have complained about the multitude of responsibilities, have lacked task orientation, and have appeared to be disinterested nonperformers. Notwithstanding these many weaknesses, the system designed for UVAP has proved the most appropriate means for reaching out to the target group.

As part of the government's preparations at the local level, District Veterans Advisory Committees were set up in all districts prior to phase I discharge. The committee is a cross-sectoral community advisory and coordinating mechanism of high-level district officials whose task it is to assist the district officer as and when required. Its main role is to oversee the implementation of the program at the district level and to contribute to the resolution of local implementation-related problems as they arise. Many veterans are often more comfortable working with the committee than with NGOs. In their eyes, committee members are more familiar with their problems and can, therefore, respond more effectively.

UVAB has encouraged the formation of loose veterans associations under elected veterans representatives at the district and sub-county levels as a means of enhancing economic and social support networks at the local level. The representatives perform their tasks on a voluntary basis in addition to their normal economic activities.

Namibia
veterans representatives' major handicap is their nonformalized and unpaid status. Due to lack of financial and institutional support, much of the initial enthusiasm has waned.

The overall objective of UVAP's staff training activities was to improve the skills and knowledge of staff and other concerned officials to enable them to contribute to the program's implementation, and to identify and respond to the economic and social needs of veterans and their spouses effectively. Most central training activities took place over short periods of one to three days. District-level training sessions extended for up to one week.

The seminars and workshops often lacked adequate preparation and proper orientation. Nevertheless, training was an invaluable component of the program, greatly assisting UVAB and district staff in their duties and enabling them to provide more comprehensive information to veterans and their spouses.

An information system that would continuously monitor the ongoing operations was one of UVAP's major components from the outset. Notwithstanding the heavy emphasis in the design of this component in phase I, monitoring, reporting, and evaluation got off to a slow start. Reporting by district staff was infrequent and incomplete, and the component was subsequently redesigned. Monitoring and reporting improved substantially in phase II, and the first genuine field evaluation provided many helpful insights on the program's impact on the ground. To increase overall management decisionmaking efficiency, phase III developed a more comprehensive management information system.

As a prerequisite for the release of donor funds, the Board employed the services of an internationally certified external auditing firm to ensure that financial management and accounting were in accordance with established procedures. The external auditor audited UVAB's monthly accounts for the first two phases and certified the final statements of accounts on completion of each phase. Financial management systems and controls have been meticulously followed by UVAB throughout the demobilization exercise. All funds received by UVAB have been properly accounted for. This impressive performance encouraged donors to continue funding of later phases at considerable levels.

UVAP has woven an intricate web of major and minor responsibilities at the district level. Although not always successful, this endeavor proved helpful in turning many communities and community leaders into active players, thereby securing community support and strengthening the program's foundations.

**Donor and NGO Involvement**

**Ethiopia**

While external support was crucial for success, donor involvement more often than not complicated the planning and execution of the Ethiopian DRP. Notwithstanding the emergency context, donors were initially not prepared to respond to the challenges of demobilization as rapidly and effectively as required. By September 1991, the donor group agreed to pledge funds to the amount of US$154 million to a two-phase, training-oriented program. When the Commission called on donors to honor their pledges in November 1991, the donors decided that the proposal was unrealistic. This decision led to further delays in donor support and forced the TGE to scale down DRP assistance.

The Commission's demobilization activities proceeded independently, and the TGE had to revise the content, scope and timetable of the program and to divert resources from other programs to keep the process going.

The USDOD provided key relief support at a crucial stage of demobilization. The other major donor during this phase was Italy. The provision by USAID of bilateral assistance to the reintegration phase of the DRP in the amount of US$5 million was marred by difficulties. USAID suffered from protracted disbursement and
procurement delays and as a result, US$2 million of the grant remained uncommitted by mid-1995.

The International Labor Organization (ILO) has been involved in the Ethiopian DRP from a very early stage; however, the Commission appears highly critical of the ILO's role, claiming that it has placed its own interests above the needs of the Ethiopian people.

The quality of the relationship between the Commission and NGOs has ranged widely. The Commission claims that some NGOs have discriminated on the basis of ethnic and religious affiliation. Furthermore, the Commission feels that some NGOs have provided inappropriate services at high administrative costs. On the other hand, some NGOs accuse the Commission of political bias and favoritism. NGOs also attribute the lack of coordination to the Commission's institutional weakness, particularly in the early days of the DRP. Nevertheless, the Commission has repeatedly requested NGOs to support small projects, especially for its urban reintegration program.

**Namibia**

Demobilization and reinsertion took place as part of the transition to independence. These activities were implemented effectively by UNTAG, UNHCR, CCN, and LWF without much government involvement. During the reintegration phase, bilateral donors played important roles. The governments of Sweden and Cuba provided technical assistance during the design phase of the DBC.

Neither, however, provided much detail about the financial implications of their suggestions. Eventually, SIDA played a substantially reduced role whereas Cuba implemented its technical assistance program and is the only donor that has consistently supported the DB (and later the DBC) since its inception. Other donors, notably the European Union, provided financial assistance to the DBC as well as the resettlement and rehabilitation schemes. Part of the projects thus funded were implemented by international NGOs.

In the absence of an overall DRP, many ex-combatants received assistance from a wide range of government offices and NGOs. With one notable exception, it cannot be established to what extent these organizations were actually involved in DRP activities, as ex-combatants were not considered a special target group. The most prominent NGO in the reintegration phase was ELCIN. Its focus on a specially disadvantaged target group (San ex-combatants) proved valuable and complemented the government's more general approach. ELCIN and the MLRR also coordinated their activities whenever required.

Until recently, international organizations played a negligible role in the DRP. By early 1996, however, the government requested ILO to assist in redesigning some reintegration components. These activities will receive bilateral funding from the European Union and the Netherlands. With more donors now explicitly involved in the DRP, UNDP has initiated much needed coordination activities.

**Uganda**

Substantial donor support was necessary at both financial and human levels to design and fund the program. In all, three multilateral and seven bilateral donors contributed to UVAP in one way or another. Donors were encouraged to participate in appraisal evaluation missions. Consequently, they perceived themselves to be stakeholders of the program and were informed and responsive regarding funding. The major donor weakness was the delayed disbursement of funds. On several occasions, the unfavorable level and timing of releases of funds had a disruptive impact on UVAP's implementation schedule.

With so many parties involved in the program, coordination between UVAB and donors became a key factor. This coordination took on various forms, such as meetings, joint field visits, and reports. Within the donor group, the Bank coordinated activities and support, administered the funds provided by donors, and held regular
meetings on the progress of operations. Government and donors have commented favorably on the extent and nature of the Bank’s involvement. In the view of donors, cooperation with the Bank was an efficient means to ensure that the program was implemented in a transparent and accountable fashion.

**Program Costs and Financing**

**Ethiopia**

The total costs of the Ethiopian Demobilization and Reintegration Program between mid–1991 and early 1995 are estimated at ETB 518 million (approximately US$195 million), of which ETB 474 million (91.5 percent) has been for program interventions. The demobilization phase required approximately ETB 170 million, while the reintegration program amounted to ETB 132 million. Administration expenses account for 11.5 percent and 10.8 percent of the program costs of the Commission and the ESRF, respectively. GTZ, on the other hand, is implementing its reintegration program with higher administrative outlays of 19.5 percent. The most expensive implementor has been CRS, which allocated 36.3 percent of program funds for administrative costs.

The per capita costs of the three program phases are similar, ranging from ETB 360 to ETB 398. For Derg and OLF ex–combatants combined, per capita support amounted to ETB 1,089. Government expenses over all phases are estimated at ETB 227 million. Reinsertion and reintegration have largely been the responsibility of the TGE, both in terms of funding and implementation. Overall, the financial share of donors in the DRP is roughly equal to the government’s at 44.0 percent and 43.8 percent, respectively.

**Namibia**

Although the government did not design a comprehensive program, the costs for the major interventions are considerable, amounting to an estimated N$123.8 million (approximately US$41.3 million). More than half of these funds (51.2 percent) were provided by donors. Administrative costs are estimated at 73.8 percent for the MLRR rehabilitation program and 53.6 percent and 42.1 percent for the MLRR and ELCIN resettlement programs respectively. Assuming an absence of overlaps in targeting, only 24,650 ex–combatants (49.8 percent of all demobilized) benefited from the DRP.

Although the government endorsed large–scale program support, the impact on the ground has been limited. The major reason for this failure seems to the highly unequal distribution of benefits. In fact, only 7.1 percent of demobilized ex–combatants (DBC trainees and workers) received 71.6 percent of the government’s assistance. Nevertheless, many of the DBC graduates remain unemployed and dependent on government support.

**Uganda**

The total budget is estimated at USh 43.2 billion (approximately US$43.2 million). Bilateral donors provided an estimated USh 34.1 billion (79.0 percent), multilateral donors contributed another USh 4.2 billion (9.7 percent). The government's financial support amounted to USh 4.9 billion (or 11.3 percent), reflecting its commitment to the program.

Of the total program budget, demobilization, reinsertion, and reintegration benefits account for USh 3.3 billion, USh 30.3 billion, and USh 2.3 billion, respectively. Total administration costs have been kept at USh 3.9 billion and account for only 9.6 percent of the total. On average, over all three phases, each veteran received USh 90,200 in demobilization assistance and USh 832,600 and USh 63,100 in reinsertion and reintegration support, respectively. Total per capita support reached USh 985,800.
Returns to Demobilization

Ethiopia

The fiscal returns to the Ethiopian demobilization are highly significant as they coincide with the general transition from a war–based to a peace–oriented economy. Real current defense spending, peaking in 198990 at ETB 1,339 million, fell to an average of ETB 321 million in the three years after demobilization. In the three years prior to demobilization, the Ethiopian government on average spent 46.6 percent of total current government expenditures on defense. In the three years following demobilization, defense's share decreased to 16.4 percent. Government's social expenditure--soft

tures confirm this dramatic change. In the three years up to 199091 they accounted for 17.0 percent, whereas after peace they rose on average to more than 23.5 percent.

The microeconomic returns are less impressive. The approximately 476,000 combatants represented 2.2 percent of the country's labor force at the time of demobilization. The per capita income of each veteran is estimated at ETB 640 per year, only 55.4 percent of the national average for economically active Ethiopians. Annual per capita income figures reflect the relatively poor socioeconomic status of ex–combatants in their new civilian environment; therefore, the per capita assistance of ETB 1,089 over three years seems well justified.

Namibia

Prior to the transition to independence, defense spending remained at relatively low levels for a country at war. Its share in government expenditures hovered between 11.7 percent and 13.3 percent between 198586 and 198889. Since independence, it has not surpassed 7.0 percent. The country's overall resources devoted to the military were, however, substantial. During the three years prior to peace, defense accounted for 5.1 percent of GDP. After independence, its share leveled out at 3.4 percent. It should, however, be borne in mind that the calculation of these financial returns is based on the budget of South West Africa/Namibia. The capital and recurrent expenses for SADF troops were covered under the South African budget, while PLAN was financed from abroad.

The fiscal savings for the government from the transition to peace (including demobilization) are not overwhelming. Comparing the three–year averages before and after demobilization in 198990, government saved N$117.4 million per year (6.2 percent of government expenditures). Social expenditures have consistently exceeded defense expenditures. Overall, during the three years before and after demobilization, social expenditures increased from 2.8 percent to 7.2 percent of government budget; however, as with the overall distribution of income in the country, social expenditures are skewed toward the better–off segments of the population.

With an economically active population as small as 420,000 in 1990, the return of 49,500 ex–combatants into civilian life (11.7 percent of the labor force) had a significant economic impact. It is estimated that the economically active ex–combatants have a per capita income of N$4,582, which represents only 44.9 percent of the income of the average Namibian worker.

Uganda

The scale of the defense budget was considerable prior to demobilization; it peaked at 39.3 percent of recurrent expenditures in 198990. With demobilization, its share declined to 26.1 percent in 199394. In real terms, defense spending rose by 11.9 percent from 199293 to 199494. This increase is mainly due to wage increases for the remaining soldiers, as well as limited enlistment of local defense units in the northern part of the country to contain recurrent insurgency. It should also be noted that the UVAP has been budgeted under the Ministry of
Defense and that additional segments of security expenditures have been added to the ministry's budget.

The budgetary returns to demobilization have been impressive. Compared to the three years prior to demobilization (198990 to 199192), government's defense spending was USh 28,976 million lower after demobilization (199293 to 199495), amounting to average yearly budget savings of continue

10 percent of recurrent expenditure. Before demobilization, defense has been allocated more financial support than the social sectors (including education, health, and other social services). The ratio of social to defense spending reached its lowest level in 198990 with 0.6 at the height of rebellion but improved to 1.1 with demobilization in 199293. The short–term economic returns to demobilization are impressive but show that the average income of veterans is only about half that of the average Ugandan.

Key Lessons—Ethiopia, Namibia, and Uganda

• Strong political commitment, realism, and pragmatism is the most important factor determining successful program implementation.

• It is counterproductive for a government to promote more than it can deliver. Disillusionment as well as an unequal distribution of benefits create discontent within the target group and may lead to public protest and violence.

• Inefficiently coordinated program interventions are likely to lead to duplication and an unnecessary waste of resources. The initiation of new components or the extension of existing program components should be preceded by strategic planning.

• During the design and implementation of a DRP, a number of trade–offs need to be made (e.g., coverage vs. sustainability, expediency vs. relevance, and control vs. initiative). These tradeoffs should be recognized and addressed with cost–benefit analyses.

• Elements of a successful implementation strategy are (a) provision of a minimum assistance package, (b) simplicity in delivery, (c) decentralized decisionmaking, and (d) building on existing social capital and reorienting local institutions.

• Prioritization of program components by implementation simplicity and implementing the simple components first facilitates optimal use of scarce resources and timely delivery of assistance.

• The medium– to long–term reintegration of combatants should not be neglected in favor of short–term pacification and repatriation.

• By not following its own guidelines, the program can create a serious dependency syndrome among beneficiaries.

• The classification into several target groups and subgroups should be based on the ex–combatants' mode of subsistence and, hence, on their different needs, requirements, and aspirations. This allows for the development of a differentiated, relevant, and cost–effective menu style approach. Good socioeconomic data, which can be collected during encampment, are essential for such classifications.

• The transition from combatant to civilian can be divided into three phases: demobilization, reinsertion, and reintegration. During each of these phases, the needs of ex–combatants are different and different support measures are required.
• A transitory safety net has to be provided to bridge the gap between demobilization and reintegration.

• Good data are essential for designing programs. Surveys and studies should be conducted during program preparation and should seek socioeconomic information about ex–combatants continue and information about the opportunities (land, credit, and employment) that ex–combatants are likely to encounter in rural and urban areas.

• Nontransferable, durable identification cards with a photograph can serve as a useful targeting mechanism to minimize leakages. Comrade committees can be a valuable element in the identification process.

• The particular problems of female and child soldiers as well as of disabled combatants justify development of targeted interventions.

• A short period of encampment reduces health and security threats and costs.

• Urban reintegration is more complex and requires a more diversified approach with more detailed planning. Essential components are counseling, placement and referral, vocational and apprenticeship training, and employment subsidy schemes.

• Demand–driven training approaches and job placement schemes should be linked.

• The provision of information to beneficiaries about opportunities, constraints, and procedures can significantly enhance economic and social reintegration.

• It is the interplay of a community's physical and social capital and a veteran's financial and human capital that determines the ease and success of reintegration.

• The support of nonpolitical informal networks among ex–combatants, in the form of either loose discussion groups or economic ventures is desirable, because they can be key elements for both economic and social reintegration.

• Government and donors alike should avoid using labels that contribute to ex–combatant stigmatization.

• Coordination within government and between government and other relevant actors is important in maximizing the effectiveness of program interventions. The establishment of one civilian agency with overall design and implementation responsibility serves this purpose best. Central coordination balanced by decentralized implementation authority to the districts constitutes an effective institutional structure.

• The establishment of a temporary bureaucracy saves resources in the long–run. Once the major objectives have been fulfilled, any remaining activities should be integrated into the government's mainstream development efforts.

• Minimizing administrative (transaction) costs maximizes beneficiary benefits.

• A management information system has to be installed to monitor, if necessary, redirect program interventions, and provide public accountability.

• Through field offices, beneficiaries have easier access to program benefits and staff. Field offices also enable the government to make the program more responsive to local needs. The use of qualified ex–combatant
representatives in field offices and as outreach staff amplifies these positive effects.

• Local communities should be involved directly in decisionmaking, especially as pertains to local issues. Participation encourages community acceptance of and support for the program.

• Communities can serve an important role as intermediaries for problem solving through such vehicles as community advisory committees. They can also provide guidance to ex-combatants in their reintegration efforts. Community support should be utilized fully.

• Ex-combatant representatives who are elected by their constituency to represent voluntarily the interests of the target group fill a useful function. They are a valuable contact point for program implementors and communities.

• The coordination of donor support by a lead donor has proved effective.

• The donors' budget cycles and funding releases have to be matched with the program's implementation schedule.

• Because of a lack of clear policies on DRPs, donors can fail to develop an effective and timely response mechanism. Conflicting interests and failure to honor pledges can further derail a program. Conversely, a rapid donor response can substantially facilitate operations.

• The peace dividend needs to be understood in social and economic terms as well as financial terms.

• Unless social expenditures are allocated effectively, a high ratio of social to defense expenditure does not necessarily translate into benefits for the poor.

SECTION I—ETHIOPIA: FROM EMERGENCY TO DEVELOPMENT

"Many ex-combatants were in shock when they came to the discharge centers. They were happy that the war was over."
(Official of the Ethiopian Red Cross Society; June 1995)

"The communities were involved in mobilizing soldiers for the Derg. It is now their responsibility to take their sons back."
(Tehadisso Commission official; June 1995)

"We advised ex-combatants to start small and then grow big. Otherwise, they would have started at the top and fallen deep."
(Tehadisso Commission official; June 1995)
The collapse of the Derg regime in May 1991 signified the end of twenty-nine years of civil warfare in Ethiopia. The Ethiopian Popular Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), an alliance of victorious opposition parties and guerrilla groups led by the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), established the Transitional Government of Ethiopia (TGE). The TGE immediately introduced measures to consolidate peace and stability.

The major threats to internal security and stability were the soldiers of the Derg army, the largest military force in Africa. On the collapse of the Derg system, the army disintegrated. An estimated 455,000 Derg soldiers were either captured by the EPRDF, made their way back to their villages or cities, or fled to remote regions or neighboring counties (Djibouti, Kenya, Saudi Arabia, the Sudan, and Yemen). Many had retained their weapons, which they subsequently sold for as little as ETB 25 (US$1 = 2.07 ETB at that time) to buy food.

Although military activity had centered on the north of Ethiopia during the civil war, serious conflagrations between the EPRDF and internal and external forces had occurred in the eastern part of the country on various occasions. Moreover, anti-TGE peasant uprisings occurred in the south and northeastern parts of the country during this period.

The plight of the large number of widely dispersed Derg soldiers, therefore, represented a grave security and
humanitarian concern for the new government; therefore, the TGE established an autonomous government office known as the Commission for the Rehabilitation of Members of the Former Army and Disabled War Veterans on June 14, 1991, only three weeks after its accession to power.1 The Commission was charged with the design and implementation of a program to demobilize and facilitate the social and economic reintegration of Derg ex–soldiers.

The directives for the establishment of the Commission clearly defined what comprises the members of the former army and disabled war ex–combatants and stipulated the objectives, powers and duties of the Commission. For the Commission to carry out its responsibilities effectively, an advisory council, chaired by the Commissioner, was formed. Members of the council included the Commissioner for Relief and Rehabilitation and Vice Ministers of nine relevant ministries as well as representatives of appropriate agencies to be designated by the government as was found necessary.

In the summer of 1992, political differences about the procedures for declaring Oromia a free nation precipitated the withdrawal of the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) from the TGE, and the conflict soon escalated into violent confrontation. The EPRDF defeated the OLF and captured 21,200 OLF fighters. The TGE, thus, extended program coverage to OLF ex–fighters.

1 The Commission for the Rehabilitation of Former Soldiers and Disabled War Ex–Combatants is widely known as the Tehadisso ("Reintegration") Commission in Ethiopia. It will be referred to as the "Commission" throughout this document.

Late in 1994, the TGE has announced that the new Ethiopian National Defense Force (ENDF), composed predominantly of EPRDF units was to be restructured to create a smaller but more efficient army that would be under civilian control and would reflect the ethnic and regional diversity of Ethiopia. Between 20,000 and 30,000 EPRDF soldiers serving in the ENDF, most of them Tigrayans, would be demobilized to make way for recruits from ethnic groups and regions underrepresented in the ENDF.

The TGE had thus embarked on the most ambitious Demobilization and Reintegration Program (DRP) in the history of independent Africa, designing and implementing programs that ultimately benefited approximately 475,000 ex–combatants.

**Political and Economic Context**

The Ethiopian DRP has been taking place in the context of a country emerging from a protracted internal conflict. Following the defeat of the Derg, the TGE rejected the possibility of political powersharing with the Derg. Former TPLF forces were given the responsibility of ensuring national security, as the armed forces of the other factions were not significantly large. All other armed forces, including EPRDF units that were not assigned the role of maintaining peace in the country were ordered to return to their barracks.

Although the EPRDF was the clear military victor in the civil war outside of Eritrea, from the outset it espoused a policy of political powersharing by the different factions involved in the conflict.2 While their role in the armed struggle may have been secondary to that of the TPLF, the OLF, the Islamic Front for the Liberation of Oromia, and the Afar National Front were asked to join the TGE.

The different factions signed a charter and founded the Transitional Government of Ethiopia in July 1991. The signatories promised to hold free and fair national elections within three years (these were later postponed by a year) and agreed that the country would be a federal state consisting of fourteen autonomous regions.3 Each region has its own elected regional assembly and elects its representatives to the federal parliament. In a controversial move, the country's new constitution grants the regional governments legal right to secession from
the Ethiopian state. Recent elections have given the EPRDF a clear political mandate to govern Ethiopia for the next five years (1995 to 2000), although several opposition parties boycotted the polls.

The TGE's economic policy is designed to reverse the downward trend during the final years of the Derg's socialist economic policies. To this end, the TGE has promoted private and public investment, mobilized external resources for reconstruction and promulgated laws to enhance the role of private capital. Nonetheless, the Ethiopian economy has failed to grow significantly since 1991. Both unemployment and internal migration are at high levels and increasing, with evident implications for reintegration initiatives. Furthermore, the TGE has not addressed the question of continue

2 In Eritrea, the Eritrean Popular Liberation Front (EPLF) was the uncontested victor in its quest for national liberation. Eritrea has subsequently seceded from Ethiopia and become an independent state.

3 Five of the smaller southern regions (the former Regions 7, 8, 9, 10, and 11) later merged to form the Southern Ethiopian Peoples Region. Following this consolidation, Ethiopia now consists of nine regions.

land tenure effectively. While land can be leased for a ninety—nine—year period, it cannot be acquired outright. The consequent insecurity in regard to land ownership has contributed to depressing agricultural production.

Demobilization of EPRDF forces was postponed until the TGE felt that the security situation in the country had stabilized. Many parts of the country now appear to be stable; however, donor and NGO sources report that conflict among certain ethnic, religious, and political groups has persisted in some regions and has, in several instances, complicated social and economic reintegration efforts for ex–combatants.4

**Rationale**

Given this political and economic context, the TGE's rationale for its DRP was threefold. First, the TGE felt that soldiers of the disintegrated army posed a threat to the macro— and micro—security of the country. Accounts of Derg soldiers involvement in banditry were common. Furthermore, there was a feeling that the large numbers of Derg soldiers who had fled the country, especially the 51,000 in the Sudan, could potentially destabilize Ethiopia and indeed the Horn of Africa region.

Second, the option of temporarily integrating the vanquished Derg soldiers into an expanded new Ethiopian army was dismissed. The TGE concluded that Ethiopia's torn social and economic fabric could not afford a large army and that its policy focus would be on the economic rehabilitation and development of the country. Furthermore, the TGE felt that there was no external or internal security threat to justify the maintenance of such a large army. Lastly, most of the soldiers of the Derg army had been conscripted, often forcibly, to join the Derg military; hence, many of the Derg soldiers were keen to return to civilian life.

**Objectives**

The objectives of the TGE's DRP correspond to these government concerns on four levels: security, political, economic, and fiscal. By and large, all objectives have been attained. A systematic and effective DRP contributed significantly to the realization of several security objectives in a post—conflict environment. It enabled the TGE to disarm the Derg soldiers, disperse ex—soldiers to their home communities in a transparent manner (and enable the TGE to monitor them), reduced the possibility of former combatants resorting to criminal or political violence, and facilitated a restructuring and professionalization of the military.

The political goals of the Ethiopian DRP included the strengthening of the democratic government, the consolidation of national unity and the reduction of fractional strife. On the fiscal level, the DRP led to the
reduction of public expenditures on unproductive (military) activities and enabled the transferal of resources to productive sectors. Furthermore, it helped to reduce the public sector wage bill that had aggravated fiscal deficits.

Lastly, the economic motivation of the DRP was fourfold to: (a) encourage the resumption of normal economic activities free of security concerns (e.g., banditry), (b) enhance economic stability, (c) facilitate the return of ex–soldiers to productive activities, thereby minimizing the possibility of aggravating already serious unemployment levels, and (d) improve the skills of ex–soldiers so that they could market themselves in civil society. The employment of ex–soldiers in the private sector or their engagement in self–employment would help them to become self–supporting and contribute to the economic revitalization of the country.

Issues

The unprecedented conceptual, logistical, and management challenge of demobilizing and reintegrating 475,000 ex–soldiers in the context of national post–conflict reconstruction has to be borne in mind when analyzing the Ethiopian DRP. The scale and context of the task imposed targeting constraints and limited the amount of support that could be provided to individual ex–soldiers.

The TPLF already had experience with the demobilization of Derg soldiers. During the final years of the war, the rebel forces took large numbers of prisoners who had been disarmed and demobilized. This experience helped the Commission to design and implement a program within a short period of time. The efforts of the Commission are, in a sense, the logical continuation of these activities.

Program Classifications

The Ethiopian DRP can be classified according to three different criteria: (a) target groups, (b) design phases, and (c) implementation phases. The DRP has an advanced breakdown of beneficiaries (target group). It distinguishes between occupation (agriculture/rural as compared to employment/urban), health status (disabled), and period of service (fewer or more than eighteen months). Evidently, support can thereby be more accurately targeted.

Furthermore, the program shows three clearly distinguishable design phases: (a) demobilization (discharge), including orientation and transport, (b) reinsertion (short–term assistance), and (c) reintegration, whereby the TGE supports the ex–combatants in finding gainful economic activities. Each of these phases targets needs of ex–combatants that are different depending on the stage of the transition from combatant to civilian.

While initially targeted at the defeated Derg army, the target group classification and design phases have been extended to the OLF ex–fighters as well; thus, the DRP had three distinguishable implementation phases: (a) the first batch of Derg soldiers, (b) the second batch of Derg soldiers, and (c) OLF fighters. A fourth phase targets EPRDF soldiers; however, the assistance this target group receives is clearly different from the other phases.

Broad as against Narrow Targeting

Half a million ex–combatants represented no more than a fraction of the estimated eight million war–displaced people in the country. Particularly vulnerable were the children who lost their
5 The Commission itself refers to these phases as "emergency" (encampment) and "rehabilitation." It does not distinguish between the short term and the long term.

parents or were abandoned during the war as well as the civilians who became disabled as a result of the war. While their numbers are not known, it is clear that they would compete with ex-combatants for scarce government (and donor) resources. In this environment of widespread poverty and social dislocation, the strategy of targeting ex-combatants for economic support has been questioned on moral and technical grounds by both local and international critics.

Donors repeatedly claimed that ex-combatants should not be treated as a privileged group, even more so as they had been responsible for the dismal situation in the first place. They felt that the welfare of the ex-soldiers could only be secured as an integral part of the welfare of the Ethiopian people in general through reconstruction and development programs distinct from a hastily designed and politically motivated DRP (USAID 1994b, p. 12ff.).

The TGE, however, clearly understood that without internal stability, national development efforts are not sustainable. It also deemed general efforts towards helping needy communities ineffective, rather than a distinct target group. The only option for the TGE to diffuse possible resistance was the direct support to ex-combatants, although it was aware that this could create resentment at the community (and donor) level.

External concerns about the specific targeting of such a special group may have been overly skeptical. It seems that the communities did not perceive narrowly targeted assistance as 'privileges.' In fact, many communities took over the responsibility of actively assisting ex-combatants in their reintegration efforts.

The Commission had designed a program for those "who wanted to help themselves." Not surprisingly, despite the comprehensive support extended by the Commission to ex-combatants, many have complained about the short-term nature of the program; however, the ex-combatants have by now become an integral part of the civilian society. In the future, support will reach them for being members of the overall target group of needy Ethiopians.

**Donor Involvement**

The Commission's reintegration efforts have received extensive financial assistance from bilateral and multilateral donors and international NGOs. In close collaboration with the Commission, the German Agency for Technical Cooperation (GTZ) has even established its own reintegration program. Furthermore, a number of NGOs, most notably the Catholic Relief Services (CRS) and OXFAM United Kingdom and Ireland (UK/I), have targeted ex-combatants in their programs, usually through credit schemes and public works programs.

Although such support was indispensable for ensuring the program's success, donor involvement seems to have at times contributed to the problems rather than solving them. In fact, the TGE has repeatedly claimed that the assistance of a number of donors has been driven by self-interest and characterized by a lack of relevance to Ethiopian needs.

Many donors and agencies were unable to provide rapid and effective financial and/or technical assistance to the demobilization and reinsertion program. Initially, for example, many multilateral and bilateral donors felt unable to provide support to the encampment phase due to the TGE's insistence on the need for political 'rehabilitation' exercises in the transit centers. Later, donors found that bureaucratic institutional constraints hampered their ability to provide assistance within...
agreed time frames. The delays in pledged and expected donor funding repeatedly forced the TGE to modify its assistance schedules, divert funds from other government agencies, and reduce the scope of its assistance.

A Successful Venture

Clearly, the Ethiopian DRP has been a highly complex and demanding operation. Moreover, the TGE and donors alike were hampered by the lack of information on other countries’ experiences with DRPs, which complicated the quest for a joint course of action. Despite the constraints and complexities, however, and without much external design or implementation assistance, the TGE through the Commission initiated and carried out an exceptional program with remarkable success.

2—
Target Groups and Targeting Mechanisms

Target Groups

It has been estimated that the Derg's war efforts involved over 1.2 million armed men and women between 1974 and 1991. At the time of the defeat, almost half a million Ethiopians served in the army. These consequently formed the initial target group of the DRP. In later years, over 21,000 OLF fighters (and up to 30,000 ENDF soldiers) were added to this group. Derg ex-soldiers reported to the Commission's discharge centers in two phases of 365,000 and 90,000 respectively (Table 2.1).

On the basis of data collected in the centers, the target group was further categorized according to several indicators, the most important of which was occupation/location of settlement. The actual classification for accessing benefits was undertaken when the ex-combatants reported to the Commission's branch office nearest to their community of settlement. Almost equal numbers of Derg ex-soldiers returned to rural and urban areas. The OLF was more rural based: almost two of ex-fighters were reintegrated into agricultural areas. All rural settlers received the same type of support. So did the urban settlers, with only minor modifications between Derg and OLF ex-combatants.

Those Derg ex-soldiers who expressed their desire to live in urban areas include those with urban upbringing as well as those who, although of rural background, were in the army for long periods of time and, hence, were exposed and used to urban life. This group also includes the majority of the elite of the Derg and OLF armies. Those who were willing to return to rural areas were further classified into (a) crop farmers (114,594), (b) coffee farmers (42,447), and (c) pastoralists (12,587). Each of these subgroups received specific assistance.

In January/February of 1991, the Derg regime appealed to university students to join the military. Several thousand volunteered and registered for training at the Belate Military Training Center; however, the Derg collapsed before they were dispatched to the front and most of the trainees and regular soldiers in the area fled to Kenya. Almost 51,000 Derg soldiers (with about 3,000 dependents) had fled to the Sudan. These were repatriated by UNHCR to Ethiopia. There are still apparently an unknown number of ex-soldiers staying as refugees in neighboring countries, for example, Saudi Arabia and Yemen. Some have been repatriated in recent years but they do not receive any reinsertion or reintegration assistance.

The 70,162 Derg ex-combatants and 15,900 OLF ex-fighters who had served fewer than eighteen months only received some reinsertion assistance (with the exception of the disabled). The rationale for not including them in the encampment process and reintegration support was that they would not have been indoctrinated by army life and would, therefore, be able to reintegrate on their own.
In this report, the term 'ex–soldier' refers to any former soldier of the Derg army and 'ex–fighter' to any former OLF soldier; the term 'ex–combatant' refers to any of these.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 2.1</th>
<th>Target Group Size and Characteristics at Time of Demobilization</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army (year of demobilization)</td>
<td>Classification</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Derg (1991)</td>
<td>Total (approximately)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>phase I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>o/w less than 18 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>more than 18 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>repatriated from the Sudan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>disabled</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>phase II (approx.) a/</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Classification by target group b/</td>
<td>rural settlers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>o/w crop farmers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>coffee farmers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>pastoralists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>urban settlers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>disabled c/</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>o/w less severely</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>moderately impaired</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>more severely</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OLF (1992)</td>
<td>Total (approximately) d/</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>service less than 18 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>rural settlers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>urban settlers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Derg and OLF</td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENDF (1995)</td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a/ At the time of defeat, 80,162 Derg soldiers fled to Kenya. Among these, 7,500 were university students who did not require further assistance. The other 72,662

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A Successful Venture
are included in the phase II figure.

b/ The discrepancy between those who were demobilized and transported to their respective communities and those who reported in the communities for support is accounted for by the following factors: (a) Six thousand ex-Derg were integrated into the ENDF, (b) those who had been called back by the Derg from their retirement were allowed to resume their retirement with pension and were not required to report to their respective communities, and (c) those who had been mobilized by force and who did not require government support other than freedom to lead their own life. (For this reason, only 170,000 ex-combatants have been included in the rural reintegration program against an initial planning figure of 210,000).

c/ Including OLF and EPRDF, the war left some 45,000 ex-combatants disabled. The less severely disabled are also included in the figures for rural and urban settlers.

d/ Of these, 3,330 had fought for the Derg.

Source: Tehadisso Commission.

A distinct subgroup of ex-combatants are the approximately 37,500 disabled Derg. It is estimated that many of the ex-soldiers with less severe disabilities were not able to reach the discharge centers. (Consequently, the data base for this subgroup was limited.) Those who reported later nonetheless received the same benefits. In the centers, a board of medical personnel from the Ministry of Health classified disabled ex-combatants according to type and severity of injury. These three categories comprise (a) the less severely disabled, (b) the moderately impaired, and (c) the more severely disabled.

An ex-combatant was considered 'less severely disabled' if he/she did not require further medical care. These persons were directed into the mainstream of rural and urban settlers. The moderately impaired required medical treatment and special training before they could be reintegrated into their communities. The more severely disabled include those whose condition precludes any training or placement in productive activities.

Subgroup-specific support differed according to the severity of the disability. Disabled ex-combatants were either (a) treated and integrated into the urban/rural programs, (b) given pensions and repatriated to their communities of origin, or (c) transferred to appropriate medical facilities according to the severity of their injuries; thus, support ranged from job placement to the provision of agricultural tools to home care services.

Although no definitive data on the percentage and distribution of female ex-soldiers are available, the participation of women in Commission, GTZ, and CRS reintegration projects suggests that approximately 5 percent of Derg ex-soldiers are female. The OLF may have comprised up to 20 percent of female fighters, most of whom had joined voluntarily. Because of their small numbers, no specific support program was designed for women.

Between 20,000 and 30,000 soldiers are currently being demobilized from the approximately 90,000 strong ENDF. The soldiers leave the ENDF voluntarily and some of them have left without government assistance. Among the soldiers to be demobilized from the ENDF are mainly women with insufficient qualifications. In fact, it is estimated that 30 percent of ENDF soldiers are female. All ENDF ex-soldiers receive a reinsertion package similar to the Derg/OLF but are provided with a distinctly different reintegration package that focuses on resettlement.
Although the TGE recognized that ex–combatants were embedded in numerous social relationships, financial constraints prevented the extension of most benefits to spouses, dependents, and communities; however, spouses and children form a minor target group of the DRP: they receive free health services, and some children received support for school fees and materials. Moreover, dependents were eligible for general assistance provided to displaced persons and civilian returnees by the Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (RRC) and the Ethiopian Red Cross Society (ERCS) in the wake of the war.8

7 It is estimated that there are 560 ex–OLF disabled.

8 The Commission also took the responsibility to reunite the ex–combatants with their families.

A Profile of Ex–Combatants

Socioeconomic data on ex–combatants were collected in the discharge centers, comprising, among other things, information on education, skills, and work experience; however, no comprehensive profile has been developed. Nevertheless, available information allows for some inductive analysis of the background of Derg ex–soldiers.

• Many ex–soldiers had stayed in the war front and not visited their families for a prolonged period of time; thus, many did not know the whereabouts of their families.

• With the exception of high–ranking officers, the majority of ex–soldiers were undernourished although their health status was generally good, irrespective of their duration of service.

• A third of ex–soldiers was below the age of twenty–five when joining the army.

• About half of ex–combatants were married; the rate was higher in rural areas. Just over half of ex–combatants had children to support.

• Over 50 percent had not gone beyond primary school, and close to 10 percent were illiterate. Most were also unskilled or had low skill levels.

• Most came from poor families, and none but a few had the resources necessary to start a civilian life.

Many of the OLF ex–fighters of urban origin had low levels of education and skills. For instance, 38.0 percent were illiterate and at least seventy–five percent did not possess marketable skills. Most of the OLF ex–fighters of rural background were crop producers while the urban group consisted of students, laborers, merchants, and unemployed. At Dedessa camp,11 317 (2.6 percent) of the 12,016 captives were disabled, the other 11,699 were deemed of good health. In the camp there were also 1,541 (12.8 percent) female ex–fighters.

Targeting Mechanisms

Tehadisso Commission

Given the TGE's scarce resources, every effort had to be made to ensure that only the intended target group actually received the benefits. Several methods were, thus, employed to identify the beneficiaries. In a first step, the verification that those who presented themselves in the discharge centers were in fact Derg soldiers was accomplished through comrade committees. These used the...continue

9 It is claimed that many Derg were child soldiers, some as young as thirteen years when joining the army. According to the Commission, however, the Derg regime did not enlist child soldiers.
As the war was unpopular among many Ethiopians, the Derg could not find enough voluntary recruits; hence, it introduced a proclamation that made it a requirement for every citizen above the age of eighteen to register for military service at the war front. To avoid service, many fled the country. Others were wealthy enough or had the necessary connections to 'persuade' the officials responsible for the draft. Clearly, many if not most of the young conscripts were children from poor families.

One of the camps where they were held captive; the other one was Hurso.

On termination of the predischarge orientation program, each ex–combatant received an identification card (discharge certificate), which included a photograph and a seal of the Commission. The identification card became the principal mechanism for ex–combatants to apply for benefits. Each disabled ex–combatant was also provided with a disability card.

The Commission also issued ration cards with coupons at the end of the demobilization phase, which entitled urban ex–combatants to receive food and money and rural ex–combatants to receive food, seeds, tools, and livestock. The coupons were retained by the government officials (Ministry of Agriculture, RRC) in exchange for the items provided.

Furthermore, the Commission used community–based advisory committees to identify especially needy ex–combatants (e.g., for the distribution of oxen and heifers). Finally, eligible spouses and children were issued verification letters to access health services and the pension scheme. (Table 2.2 provides a summary of target groups, targeting mechanisms, and program components.)

Other Promoters

While GTZ relies on the Commission's identification system and excludes, for example, those who receive a pension, it occasionally provides support to persons who can prove (for example, with salary statements,) that they fought with the Derg, even though they have not participated in the Commission's demobilization program. Participation in the vocational training is needs–based. Overall, however, the GTZ does not seem to make much effort in targeting. Rather, it relies on its counterparts.

The eligibility criteria for financial assistance from the grant scheme of CRS were (a) the identification card, (b) more than eighteen months of military service, (c) unemployment, (d) no alternative source of income (e.g., pension and family income), (e) resident of the targeted kebele (lowest administration level), (f) credibility, and (g) feasibility of the proposed projects. CRS also used community committees in which representatives of the target group were included to insure that the allocation of assistance was needs–based. Another community–based mechanism for reaching ex–combatants are peasant associations. This mechanism was extensively used by OXFAM UK/I to identify the needs of and requirements for ex–combatants.

In fact, the discharge certificate was, thus, also proof that the ex–combatant had undergone 'psychological and social rehabilitation.'

Presumably, the Commission's branch offices issued the verification letters on the basis of the ex–combatants' discharge certificate.
## Table 2.2
**Target Groups, Targeting Mechanisms, and Program Components**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Components</th>
<th>Rural Settlers</th>
<th>Urban Shattlers</th>
<th>Pensioners a/</th>
<th>Disabled b/</th>
<th>Spouses</th>
<th>Children</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food rations, cash</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>1, 3, 5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formal education</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counseling</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skills certification</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Employment</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Credit support</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pension scheme</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Discharge certificate.
2. Disability card.
3. Ration card with coupon.
4. Verification letter.
5. Identification by community.

a/ Pensioners are those ex-combatants with over 45 years of age and more than 20 years of military service.
b/ Moderately impaired and more severely disabled only. The less severely disabled are part of the rural and urban settlers.

*Source*: Tehadisso Commission.

### Targeting Leakages

Overall, the authentic identification system as well as transparent procedures seem to have kept leakages to a minimum. Nevertheless, some occurred, the most significant being the estimated 15 percent of *Derg ex-soldiers* who did not respond to the Commission's call for encampment (Commission 1994b, p. 15). These persons refused to heed the call for assembly for fear of retribution, because they were in remote areas of the country or because they had committed war crimes. They have subsequently not been eligible for any Commission assistance. While it is reported that some of these ex-soldiers have joined forces opposed to the TGE and others may be responsible for acts of banditry, the majority are found destitute in cities and villages across the country.

A number of *non-ex-soldiers* (petty thieves from Eritrea) infiltrated the discharge centers where they subsequently undermined security. It is not known whether (or how many) non-ex-soldiers gained access to...
reinsertion and reintegration benefits by participating in the demobilization and rehabilitation program. Because of the involvement of the comrade committees, however, it is likely that such leakages were small.

Although not on a large scale, ex-combatants seem to have beaten the system by selling their ration cards to civilians and moving to other communities (branch offices) to collect more ration cards. As these cards were limited in number, some ex-combatants may, thus, not have received the full entitlement package. In other cases, ex-combatants have forged coupons and/or ration cards to collect more benefits. The extent of these leakages cannot be determined.

The less severely disabled ex-soldiers are a greater problem. While most of the moderately and severely disabled were interned in the various camps and shelters, a significant number of the less severely disabled did not present themselves at the discharge centers either because of lack of mobility or due to residence in remote regions of the country. Consequently, they were not registered and were not eligible for DRP support. Furthermore, some of the rural ex-combatants seem not to have received their assistance due to problems in coupon distribution (Commission 1994c, p.53ff.; no further details are available).

Exploiting ex-soldier dissatisfaction, the OLF enlisted an unknown number of ex-soldiers in their confrontations with the TGE/EPRDF. After their defeat, these ex-combatant fighters were eligible for the same kind of support as regular OLF troops; thus, evidence suggests that some were demobilized twice and received reinsertion assistance as Derg and OLF ex-combatants. Their number, however, cannot be established.

Because of the small number of beneficiaries in the CRS program, CRS claims to not have experienced any leakage. In its credit and training projects, GTZ has not experienced any leakages either. The cash– and food–for–work program of both implementors, however, has been open for non-ex-combatants as well. Without a benchmark (as designed by CRS), by definition, no leakage can arise.

The policy of GTZ is that at least 60 percent of the beneficiaries of each project intervention have to be ex-combatants. Overall, a level of 69 percent has been reached, and in cash–for–work programs a ratio of up to 80 percent has been achieved; however, in food–for–work programs, the coverage has been lower. One the one hand, not all of the targeted needy ex-combatants were willing to participate in the projects at a given time. On the other, local administrations in two cases prohibited the participation of ex-combatants from neighboring communities in road rehabilitation projects.14

14 Mainly because of the additional indirect effects of the project on the reintegration efforts of ex-combatants in the communities concerned (e.g., higher farm-gate prices for agricultural products due to improved accessibility), the projects were finalized in spite of a ratio of only 25 percent of ex-combatant beneficiaries.

3— Demobilization Segment

Rationale

At the time the Derg regime collapsed, most Derg soldiers returned to their home areas or fled from the EPRDF to remote regions or neighboring countries; hence, they were not formally demobilized and continued to possess their weapons. Consequently, the Commission set up a demobilization program that would include (a) assembly at discharge centers, (b) predischarge orientation, and (c) transportation.
All *Derg soldiers* and those who eventually reported to the discharge centers went through these three phases although the duration and contents of these subphases varied by target subgroup. After completing the demobilization program for the remnants of the Derg army in 1991, the 21,200 captured *OLF fighters* followed a similar process in 1992.

The TGE's rationale for a demobilization program in centers prior to repatriation was based on several arguments. First, a comprehensive skills and needs survey of all ex–soldiers could be undertaken that would facilitate planning of appropriate reintegration measures. This surveying of ex–soldiers could be accomplished more easily in the centers than after dispersal. Second, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) would need information on the community of origin of each ex–soldier for planning their transportation. Third, the Commission screened and registered ex–soldiers to identify wanted criminals and to develop targeting mechanisms.

Most important, the TGE feared that ex–soldiers would not be able to reintegrate economically or socially without assistance. They were likely to pose a threat to stability if they did not have immediate access to food and the prospect of receiving reintegration support after returning home; thus, the TGE was adamant that ex–soldiers should not be allowed to leave the centers without material and moral support (USAID 1994b, p.9).

**Phases of Assembly**

In July 1991, Derg ex–soldiers were ordered through television, radio, and newspaper to present themselves for demobilization at nine discharge (or transit) centers. Former Derg military training centers as well as RRC camps located in Addis Ababa, Adigrat, Bahir Dar, Botar Tole, Dedessa, Haik, Hurso, Kombolcha, and Tatek were chosen to serve as such centers; however, many of them were left without any facilities because they had been looted by ex–Derg soldiers and residents of the surrounding communities. One of the first tasks of the Commission, thus, was the repair and maintenance of these camps and centers to make them ready for service.

15 In the context of this study, 'repatriation' refers to the transportation of ex–combatants from discharge centers (and camps abroad) to the destinations of their choice.

16 About 800 ex–soldiers who presented themselves at the transit centers were indeed detained for allegedly having committed war crimes. The trials of many members of this group are currently taking place.

The call for assembly became an element of contention in the relations between the TGE and donors. While donors acknowledged the TGE's humanitarian and security concerns, most felt unable to support what could be viewed as 'detention' centers. Donors and the ICRC were especially concerned that the centers could be associated with political rescreening and reeducation. Repeatedly, the TGE stressed the fact that the discharge centers were not political detention camps but existed to facilitate the orderly demobilization and reintegration of the former army. They seemed the only alternative to complete chaos.

**Disarmament Process**

The Derg soldiers captured by the EPRDF or EPLF had already been disarmed before demobilization (many even before the fall of Addis Ababa). Those Derg ex–soldiers still possessing weapons were advised by the TGE through mass media to report to the nearest village to surrender their arms. Civilians were also asked to report when they saw ex–Derg with weapons. When the ex–soldiers surrendered their weapons, they were issued receipts by the peace and stability committee. The weapons handed over to the EPRDF are now in the possession of the ENDF.
The First Batch of Derg Ex–Soldiers

The ex–soldiers were promised food aid and reintegration support in return for their cooperation. Initially, approximately 365,000 Derg soldiers reported to the closest discharge centers, where they were provided with minimal shelter, subsistence, and health services. Approximately 85,000 had been forced to walk from the border of Eritrea to Adigrat and Mekele, after being expelled by the EPLF. Most of them were in terrible physical condition. Another 51,000 ex–Derg were interned in refugee camps in the Sudan.

The TGE did not call female ex–soldiers to the discharge centers. They were only required to report to their communities and register. Through this registration, they were entitled to the same benefits as their male comrades.

The Second Batch of Ex–Soldiers

Once it became apparent that soldiers in the centers were not being maltreated and that in fact they would receive food and become eligible for benefits, many of the Derg ex–soldiers who had not heeded the TGE's initial call asked to be included in the demobilization program. The TGE responded to these requests by organizing a short–term program in several parts of the country. A second batch of 90,000 Derg ex–soldiers participated in these programs, thereby securing their eligibility for reintegration support. This batch included 80,162 ex–soldiers and trainees who had sought refuge in Kenya.

17 Although they had to surrender their weapons, Derg ex–soldiers kept uniforms and other personal belongings received while in the Derg army.

18 Only in rare circumstances would an ex–soldier arrive in a discharge center with dependents.

Disabled Ex–Soldiers

By the time the TGE called on all Derg ex–soldiers to assemble in discharge centers, the more severely disabled and moderately impaired were already mostly in hospitals; however, most of the less severely disabled ex–soldiers had already returned to their localities. Apparently, the Commission attempted to identify those who could not report through the EPRDF, communities, hospitals, and the ERCS. Many of them were then transported to the centers; however, not all of them could be reached and, thus, be covered under the program. Those who did were admitted into hospitals, rehabilitation centers, and makeshift camps organized by the EPRDF and ICRC.

Assembly of Derg Ex–Soldiers Repatriated from Neighboring Countries

A specific subgroup represented the ex–soldiers who had fled to neighboring countries, especially those who had fled to the Sudan. In accordance with a tripartite agreement between UNHCR, the Government of Sudan and the TGE, UNHCR repatriated from Kassala, Sudan, a total of 50,888 ex–soldiers. During their encampment in Kassala, the ex–soldiers were provided with food from the World Food Program (WFP) and registered by the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) and its implementing partners, among them ICRC. ERCS officials visited Kassala to coordinate operations with UNHCR.

The ex–soldiers were repatriated by air using the Sudanese and Ethiopian national airlines. The repatriation from the Sudan, began on September 24, 1991. There were many delays and complications in the negotiations between the TGE, the Government of Sudan, UNHCR, and the two airlines. Furthermore, problems with registration of and shelter for prospective returnees emerged in the Sudanese camps (several people died of dehydration). Nevertheless, the operation was considered a success and was completed ahead of schedule on November 21, 1991.
UNHCR's responsibility ended at the Ethiopian airports, where the repatriated ex-soldiers were received by ICRC/ERCS staff and Youth Volunteers. The Commission registered them at the airports and issued identification cards, entitling them to reinsertion and reintegration assistance. Sick and wounded ex-soldiers were flown by ICRC planes from the receiving airports to the main reception center at Bole Airport in Addis Ababa, where ICRC had established a field hospital.

A similar operation was undertaken for 1,375 ex-soldiers who were repatriated by air from Djibouti. On the other hand, the 80,000 soldiers and students who had fled to Kenya were repatriated by road directly to their respective communities and families. Once repatriated, the returning ex-soldiers from abroad were treated much like those who had stayed in Ethiopia. Most of them were only registered at their port of disembarkation and then transported to the destination of choice; however, the high-ranking Derg officers among this group were first transported to the discharge center at Botar Tole to join other ex-soldiers and receive predischarge orientation as had the first batch of Derg ex-soldiers.

OLF Ex-Fighters

In June 1992, 21,200 OLF fighters who were captured by the EPRDF were interned in two military camps for a six-month period. Twelve thousand and sixteen OLF captives were held at Dedessa Camp (Welega Region) and 9,184 were interned in Dedessa (Harerge Region). The same socioeconomic data were collected on these soldiers, and they were required to participate in orientation exercises similar to those of the Derg ex-soldiers.

Management of the Discharge Centers

At the time of the EPRDF takeover, ERCS was practically the only countrywide organization that could implement a large-scale demobilization operation. Early in the process, therefore, the TGE requested the ICRC and the ERCS to assist in the demobilization program and to improve the conditions in the centers. A number of the centers were administered directly by the ERCS and others by the TGE. It seems that at various times, the TGE and EPRDF (who guarded the discharge centers throughout the process) interfered with ICRC/ERCS, especially regarding the screening and registration of ex-soldiers.

The ICRC/ERCS was responsible for providing water and medical support as well as food. To implement this food distribution, ERCS had set up twenty-eight centers nationwide where food was stored before being transported to the centers. The ERCS's own vehicles were largely used for this transport of food and supplies. The ERCS also provided the ex-soldiers with civilian clothing. On request by the TGE, OXFAM UK/I provided support during the demobilization process in the form of tents. Moreover, it set up water tanks and camp infrastructure in some of the centers.

At about the same time, the RRC started operations to assist displaced Ethiopians. The Tehadisso Commission and the RRC cooperated throughout the demobilization and reinsertion phases. In fact, the RRC acted as the Commission's implementing agency on various occasions.

During the demobilization phase, donors provided crucial humanitarian assistance to ex-soldiers in the centers. The U.S. Department of Defense (USDOD) airlifted a large number of relief supplies such as tents, blankets, cots, and excess food rations from Saudi Arabia and Europe to assist encamped ex-soldiers and displaced civilians. This support was worth an estimated US$20 million.

The TGE lacked the funds to finance independently the encampment and repatriation of the OLF ex-fighters. It, thus, appealed to the donor community for assistance. The GTZ was the first to respond to this request favorably.
and signed an agreement with the TGE to cover expenses for a major part of DRP assistance. The OLF centers were, thus, managed by the Commission with support from the GTZ. The RRC provided humanitarian assistance to the two camps.

Data Collection and Classification of Ex–Combatants

Immediately after reporting to the centers, the Derg ex–soldiers were registered by the Commission and EPRDF ex–soldiers to unambiguously identify the target group. In addition, socioeconomic data were collected through questionnaires for the purposes of reinsertion and reintegration programs.

Food aid seems to have been provided in sufficient quantities; however, it was often shipped to the closest port. From there, it was ERCS's responsibility (at ICRC's expenses) to transport the food to its storage centers.

Support was extended to medicines, blankets, and other supplies as well as discharge and transport payments.

On the basis of the preliminary information, ex–soldiers were classified (a) according to rank, health condition, and physical fitness (including disabilities) and (b) into urban or rural settlers, according to their preferred destinations. A similar data collection and classification exercise was undertaken for OLF ex–fighters when they arrived in August 1992. The Commission shared pertinent preliminary, but not detailed, data with other project promoters to enable them to design targeted interventions.

Conditions in the Centers

The ERCS made a health check on every ex–soldier entering the centers. It found that many soldiers had been wounded but had not received treatment before arriving in the discharge centers. Moreover, most centers were located in the northern part of the country whereas the soldiers were predominantly from the south. Often living under makeshift conditions, they suffered from the differences in climate.

A lack of food, potable water, and shelter combined with overcrowding and the poor physical condition of the ex–soldiers posed a serious health risk. This was compounded by the arrival of the main rains in mid–June. Several soldiers died from outbreaks of relapsing fever and chronic upper respiratory tract infections. Also, sexually transmitted diseases (STDs) were rampant, at least in some centers. There was, however, a constant movement of ex–soldiers in and out of the centers, thus preventing the outbreak of major diseases or epidemics.

A protracted period of encampment, low morale, overcrowding and minimal policing in some of the centers contributed to unsatisfactory security conditions in some instances. In Bahir Dar, for example, inmates resorted to the enforcement of a vigilante justice system. In July 1991, Camp 603 inmates committed seven murders (three by hanging). The security situation was compounded by the fact that about 2,000 petty criminals who had been incarcerated in Asmara prior to the EPLF victory were mixed with ex–soldiers in several centers.

Overall, however, the ex–soldiers in the centers were disciplined, and crime did not occur on a systematic or serious level. Many ex–soldiers were in fact in a state of shock and were generally happy that the war was over.

Duration of Encampment

Donors argued that the rapid release and repatriation of the ex–soldiers would enhance the TGE's reputation for reconciliation and reduce the threat of instability. They also felt that the unsatisfactory conditions in the centers were not a major concern, given the short duration of the encampment. However, the Commission recognized that the centers were far from ideal and that more resources were needed to improve living conditions and provide adequate support to the ex–soldiers.
21 No information is available about the conditions in the two centers for OLF ex–fighters.

22 For example, in Camp 603 in Bahir Dar, the ICRC eventually refused to treat inmates with sexually transmitted diseases (STDs), as the men would become reinfected almost immediately after treatment. The problem of widespread STDs and AIDS/HIV infection had serious implications, given the ex–soldiers' eventual dispersal throughout Ethiopia. While anecdotal evidence suggests that the impact was significant in several areas, no hard data is available to confirm this.

Tory health conditions in the centers justified rapid repatriation on humanitarian grounds. Donors especially criticized the Commission for what they saw as deliberate detention.

The TGE had intended to keep the ex–soldiers in the discharge centers for a period of six months. This time was judged necessary for the registration of ex–soldiers, the screening of criminals, and subsequent orientation. Moreover, the Commission had to establish a detailed list of the destinations of all ex–soldiers to enable ERCS to draw up a transportation plan.

Eventually, the total demobilization phase lasted for more than six months and followed a repatriation plan that the ICRC/ERCS had drawn up shortly after the establishment of the Commission. The ICRC/ERCS had initially planned a three– to four–months exercise; however, the scale of the operation and funding delays led to the inevitable extensions of operations. Ultimately, the demobilization lasted from July 1991 to January 1992. Ex–soldiers were, however, kept in the centers for much shorter periods, ranging from a few weeks to a couple of months. OLF ex–fighters were kept in the camps for a six–month period.

By and large, the duration of individual encampment did not appear unreasonable. Nonetheless, donors were proved correct in their worry about protracted encampment by the impatience developed by ex–soldiers who had to stay in the centers for a longer period.

The Predischarge Program

According to the TGE, many of the Derg ex–soldiers had been subjected to intense ethnic and antisocial indoctrination over long periods of time and required social and political counseling; therefore, the first batch of ex–soldiers who had served longer than eighteen months had to remain in the centers. There they were "encouraged to participate in group discussions organized to make former soldiers understand the causes of the war and help them part with some undesirable habits they might have developed while in service with the army and at the same time prepare them for a postwar civilian life" (Commission 1994b, p.6).

The purpose of these orientation sessions was, thus, to help ease their feelings of hopelessness and militarism and to address their antisocial behavior. Moreover, thorough and prolonged discussions on the causes of the war and the need to establish a civil and democratic society were held. The ex–soldiers needed to be prepared to make the transition to leading peaceful civilian lives. The 51,000 who had fled to the Sudan received orientation at the refugee camp in Kassala. Similar exercises were undertaken for the 21,200 OLF captives and the officers repatriated from Kenya.

It does not appear that ex–combatants were subjected to coercion, indoctrination, or intimidation in this political reeducation program, as feared by many donors at the time. The Commission claims that they voluntarily participated in the sessions and decided themselves on what to discuss. Contrary to the Derg ex–combatants, however, OLF ex–fighters seem to have complained about this treatment.

The orientation in the centers included some general information, for example, on deforestation and AIDS. By and large, however, the orientation in the centers focused on political topics at the expense of socioeconomic
issues that would have prepared ex–combatants better for the challenges of civilian life. In fact, these sessions may have even contributed to the ex–combatants' unrealistic expectations about their reintegration. The assembly was, thus, a chance nearly lost for ex–combatants to cope with reintegration.

The TGE assumed that the 70,162 Derg ex–soldiers who had served for fewer than eighteen months as well as the students who had fled to Kenya had not been as indoctrinated. Moreover, they would have retained their civilian knowledge and economic skills. Consequently, the TGE felt that they required less reintegration orientation and support and were transported to their communities immediately after registration without participating in predischarge orientation group discussions. Most of the 90,000 second batch Derg ex–soldiers were not encamped either, but received some civic education based on group discussions in their localities for ten to fifteen days.

**Transportation**

The final element of the Ethiopian demobilization segment was the transportation of ex–combatants from the centers and camps to their community of origin or destination of choice. The major method used was transportation by road organized by ICRC/ERCS in close cooperation with the Commission. By all accounts, the ICRC/ERCS component was managed speedily and effectively and was greatly appreciated by donors and the Commission alike.

The ICRC, in collaboration with their ERCS counterparts, used the time gained during the assembly and orientation phase to develop schedules and mobilize transportation. On termination of the predischarge orientation sessions, the majority of ex–soldiers were transported first to the transit center in Nazret and subsequently to the zonal centers closest to their community of origin or destination of choice. For this portion of transport, the ERCS contracted private transport companies and also used vehicles provided by the Ministry of Transport and Communication.

Thereafter, ex–soldiers received a travel allowance (differing depending on the distance to their final destination) to find their way home independently. They also received Meals–Ready–to–Eat (MREs) to sustain themselves during this trip. Transportation was a continuous process that started in July 1991. By January 1992, virtually all of the encamped ex–soldiers had been transported to their destination of choice.

A similar method was applied to ex–soldiers having been repatriated from the Sudan. On arrival at airports in Ethiopia, tea and bread were distributed, then the returnees were transported by trucks and buses to their areas of origin by the ERCS. According to donors and the Commission, the ICRC/ERCS did an outstanding job of organizing the logistics at each airport, ensuring that returnees began their journeys home within only a few days of arriving in country.

23 The minimum conscription period in the Derg army was two years.

24 It appears that ex–soldiers were able to leave the centers once they were thought of as having stabilized psychologically; however, no information is available on (a) when one was considered 'psychologically stable' or (b) what an ex–soldier had to do if found 'unstable.' Ex–combatants were instructed to report to the respective branch office on arrival.

25 Because of fuel shortages countrywide, the ICRC also had to procure fuel for the transport operation.
The ex-soldiers and students having been repatriated from Kenya did not receive further transport as their localities were close by. GTZ covered demobilization expenditures for 15,061 OLF ex-fighters, including transportation to their destination of choice. Lastly, the Commission was charged with transporting ENDF ex-combatants to their places of destination.

4—

Reinsertion Segment

The Commission designed a program in two distinct phases: 'rehabilitation' as short-term (emergency) assistance and 'reintegration' as medium-term assistance. A more distinct classification, which is followed here, is the division into three phases: demobilization, reinsertion, and reintegration, covering the entire transition from combatant to civilian. These lie on a continuum rather than being exactly identifiable stages and their meanings are distinctly different.

Reinsertion pertains to the short-term period of approximately six to twelve months after demobilization. During this phase, ex-combatants face the challenge of establishing a civilian household. Reintegration refers to a long-term period of approximately two years during which ex-combatants gradually become 'normal' community members, both in social and economic terms; thus, the Commission's rehabilitation phase encompassed both demobilization and reinsertion.

The Commission designed a transitional safety net package as a form of reinsertion assistance. Its objective was to address the immediate needs of the demobilized ex-combatants on their return to their communities. Under this package, the Commission provided the ex-combatants with financial and in-kind assistance starting immediately on the ex-combatants reporting to their kebeles and the local Commission office in their respective communities.

The financial (cash) and in-kind (food) assistance differed primarily according to (a) location of settlement (rural/urban), and (b) duration of service (fewer/more than eighteen months). Moreover, ex-soldiers who received other benefits, for example, pensions or placement in public offices, were not eligible for cash payments; thus, the support package was targeted to the environment and needs of specifically vulnerable subgroups.

OLF ex-fighters received the same assistance as ex-Derg, especially regarding cash payments and food rations. The ENDF ex-soldiers are said to have access to a similar reinsertion package as well.

Cash Payments

Financial assistance was provided both by the Commission and by CRS. The Commission developed the following entitlement system for Derg and OLF ex-combatants:

• Each Derg ex-soldier, including those having served fewer than eighteen months and those repatriated from Kenya, received a transition allowance ETB 137 at the time of discharge.

• The 158,710 Derg ex-soldiers and 2,120 OLF ex-fighters who returned to urban areas each received a monthly stipend of ETB 50 for a seven-month period (six months for OLF ex-fighters).

CRS felt that the assistance from the Commission was insufficient to meet the basic needs of the ex-combatants and their families. Moreover, the political and security situations were still tense.

26 Other sources refer to the reinsertion phase as 'resettlement'; however, the term 'reinsertion' is preferred here to distinguish this transition from military to civilian life from the physical movement from camp to community.
CRS consequently initiated a welfare scheme that targeted 150 ex–combatants in Addis Ababa and Debre Zeit, respectively, for additional short–term financial assistance. The 300 beneficiaries received ETB 100 per month for a three–month period. Of this amount, ETB 5 were deducted ex ante and put into a community fund. The total budget amounted to ETB 90,000.

This cash support program was designed as a welfare pilot scheme. CRS undertook a preliminary needs assessment to determine the amount required by needy ex–combatants. According to a CRS follow–up survey, beneficiaries utilized most of this assistance, as envisaged, on food purchases, clothing, and inputs for income–generating activities. During the three months of implementation, CRS designed its resettlement grant scheme.

**Subsistence Rations**

Before leaving the discharge centers, ex–combatants were provided with coupons for a subsistence food ration for a period immediately following demobilization. The objective of the food aid was to ensure the ex–combatants' food security for a transitional period until the ex–combatants were able to sustain themselves. The major providers of food aid were WFP and several bilateral donors.

The ERCS managed the distribution of this assistance for the first three months. Thereafter, the TGE's Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (RRC) assumed this function as it was also providing food aid to displaced and other persons (including eligible families of ex–combatants) in the same areas. The RRC had food stores across the country. It covered the administrative costs with no charge to the Tehadisso Commission.

The monthly basket consisted of 18 kilograms per ex–soldier (15 kilograms of cereals, 2 kilograms of pulses, 1 kilogram of edible oil). Again, the rations differed by location and duration of service.

- **Rural settlers** received food ration cards valid for ten months (equivalent to one agricultural cycle). After this period, rural ex–combatants were expected to collect their first harvest and be able to sustain themselves and their dependents. Those in need received food support for a second season.

- **Urban settlers** received subsistence ration cards that would ensure their food security for seven months (six months for OLF captives).

- The group of ex–combatants who had served fewer than eighteen months each received a food ration card valid for six months.

- **Moderately impaired ex–combatants** received a one–year food allowance after completing their training program.

While food aid for ex–combatants was not extended to their families, the TGE sought to link the distribution of ex–combatant food aid to RRC programs for food aid for displaced persons and civilian returnees. Apparently, the RRC also made food aid conditional on participation in food–for-work programs in later stages of the rural program. The rationale for this was that ex–combatants should contribute to the reconstruction of the country and the objective was to encourage ex–combatants to overcome the "dependency syndrome" (Commission 1994b, p.6).

**Other Assistance**

According to the Commission, all ex–combatants who participated in the orientation phase and their families have been eligible for free health care since repatriation. This benefit is to continue until the ex–combatants are
deemed fully reintegrated. It seems, however, that many ex–combatants are not aware of this, especially the extension to the family. Moreover, apparently the cost of acquiring medicines is not covered.

Rural ex–combatants were provided with land for residential construction and cultivation. Furthermore, the Commission strove to ensure that those whose houses had been destroyed during the war would receive reconstruction assistance from their respective communities (Commission 1994b, p.8). Moderately impaired ex–combatants received a six–months rent allowance for housing on completion of the training program. A small–scale intervention by OXFAM UK/I targeted ex–combatant children. At the request of local communities, OXFAM UK/I provided 800 schoolgoing children with school fees and materials.27

Summary of Reinsertion Assistance

The reinsertion assistance to Derg ex–soldiers is summarized in Table 4.1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Target Sub group</th>
<th>Number of Ex–Combatants</th>
<th>Type of Assistance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rural settlers a/</td>
<td>Derg: 169,628 OLF: 3,180</td>
<td>Transition allowance of ETB 137; food ration for ten months (extended for the needy); free health care until full reintegration; provision of land and housing reconstruction assistance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban settlers a/</td>
<td>Derg: 158,710 OLF: 2,120</td>
<td>Transition allowance of ETB 137; monthly stipend of ETB 50 for seven months (OLF six months); food ration for seven months; free health care until full reintegration.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fewer than 18 months service</td>
<td>Derg: 70,162 OLF: 15,900</td>
<td>Transition allowance of ETB 137; food ration for six months.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disabled (moderately)</td>
<td>15,208</td>
<td>One–year food allowance; six–month rent allowance.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a/ Includes the less severely disabled who were integrated into the rural or urban program after initial treatment.

Source: Tehadisso Commission; staff estimates.

27 It is not known how many other children had access to free education through NGOs and for how long.

5—
Reintegration Segment

Rationale

The TGE decided that the ex–combatants required targeted social and economic reintegration assistance for two reasons: First, they were deemed to be a special needs population. Many of the Derg ex–soldiers had been recruited at a young age from poor families and had not been employed prior to their entry into the army. Many,
therefore, lacked marketable skills. Moreover, some of those ex-soldiers who did possess marketable skills lacked information and job-search skills.

Second, reintegration of ex-combatants into civil society was important because they potentially posed a threat to security. The combination of their access to arms, their training, and the desperate economic condition of the state immediately following the war convinced the TGE that they merited a targeted support program. To achieve this end, the Commission adopted general and category-specific strategies.

General and Category-Specific Strategies

General Reintegration Strategy

The general strategy contained several interlinked elements. First, the minimum necessary assistance that each category required to be able to achieve the same social and economic status as average civilian Ethiopians had to be identified. This ‘minimalist’ approach ensured that, given limited resources, the maximum possible number of ex-combatants could be supported. Additionally, it reduced the risk of antagonizing civilian communities by creating a privileged subgroup.

Second, the reintegration schemes had to be prioritized according to their implementation complexity. This approach was deemed the most feasible in the absence of demobilization experience and a lack of qualified manpower in the country. Furthermore, it was found to be useful in the Ethiopian context because it facilitated a rapid response to the most pressing needs of most ex-combatants. It also enabled the Commission to buy time and free resources to tackle the more complicated problems at a later stage.

The next element of the general strategy was adoption of an integrated and simple institutional structure and management with decentralized decisionmaking. The Commission maintained thirty-six branch offices that organized and coordinated field implementation. To minimize potential conflicts of interest at the community level, the involvement of beneficiaries, local administrations, and communities in the decisionmaking process was enhanced.

The Commission further realized that the efficient utilization of existing government and NGO manpower, technical resources, and infrastructure could substantially improve the coverage and success of the program. Nevertheless, the country's meager financial resources made external financial support imperative. In its general strategy, therefore, the TGE through the Commission mobilized foreign resources to finance program implementation.

Category-Specific Strategies

On the basis of socioeconomic information gathered during the demobilization phase, the Commission designed category-specific strategies. The objective of this approach was to provide needs-based economic reintegration programs for different ex-combatant categories. In the short-term, the strategies would enable the demobilized ex-combatants to take up productive activities in their communities. In the long term, the Commission intended to alleviate human suffering and facilitate social justice and economic development in the country (Commission 1992b, p. 15ff.).

The outcome of this menu approach of multiple strategies was essentially four programs for the reintegration of (a) rural settlers, (b) urban settlers, (c) disabled ex-combatants, and (d) war veterans (pension scheme). These programs were almost identical for Derg and OLF ex-combatants. For the rural and urban categories, the reintegration assistance complemented the short-term reinsertion assistance for those who had served more than eighteen months. A final strategy for ENDF ex-combatants differs substantially from either and is presented
separately at the end of this chapter.

The rationale for the wide discrepancy between rural programs (mostly packages) and urban programs (mainly referral and credit) is explained by the fact that the Commission attempted to fit the programs into the respective environments. In rural areas, the standard of living is lower and oriented toward subsistence agriculture; therefore, the support was provided free of charge. In urban areas, opportunities are more varied and markets more developed. Urban settlers could, therefore, afford to receive and repay a loan.

External Assistance

Apart from direct and indirect funding of the Commission's reintegration activities, the DRP has been enhanced by two distinct external interventions: the Reintegration Program of the GTZ and the Rehabilitation Grant of the Catholic Relief Services (CRS). Both programs were not only similar in nature to the Commission's strategy but were also undertaken in more or less close coordination with the Commission. In fact, the reintegration of the OLF ex−fighters has largely been the responsibility of the GTZ. The GTZ and CRS programs are, thus, part and parcel of the Ethiopian DRP.

OLF Reintegration Strategy

The support for OLF ex−fighters followed developments that were different from those of Derg ex−soldiers, because the OLF had initially been a member of the TGE. The objectives of OLF reinte−soft

28 While there are no specifically targeted Commission programs for female ex−combatants, they are included in a number of 'mixed' microprojects in the urban areas. There are also few projects in which women are the exclusive beneficiaries. Moreover, the Commission acknowledges that child soldiers are a particularly vulnerable group that requires special support, especially psychological counseling; however, there are no specific programs for child ex−combatants either.

29 Given the recruitment policy of the Derg during the last years in power, many young ex−combatants, a particularly vulnerable group, were probably among those who served for fewer than eighteen months. Consequently, they were eligible only for short−term transitional assistance.

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The TGE lacked funds and was, thus, depending on donor support to reintegrate the OLF ex−fighters. GTZ was the first agency to respond favorably to the TGE's funding appeal and agreed to partially finance and administer the repatriation and the reintegration of 7,076 OLF ex−fighters. Support was later extended to an additional 14,133 OLF ex−fighters through financial support, administered by GTZ, the Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA), and the Overseas Development Administration (ODA). In the case of this group, the Commission covered the costs and managed the process of repatriation.

Rural Reintegration Program

The Commission determined that 169,628 rural ex−soldiers were eligible for rural economic reinsertion and reintegration assistance. According to their own specifications in the discharge centers, rural settlers were further classified into crop (mainly maize) producers (114,594), permanent crop (mainly coffee) producers (42,447), and pastoralists (12,587). Accordingly, the rural program was classified by the mode of subsistence into (a ) sedentary
agriculture (upland coffee farming and lowland maize farming) and (b) pastoralism.

The objective of the rural reintegration program was to enable ex-combatants returning to rural areas to become productive and self-supporting citizens. They would receive the necessary technical and material support to engage in small-scale agricultural production. This would reduce their dependence on food aid after the ten-month transition period and facilitate the participation of ex-combatants and their families in general community development activities; thus, a specific longterm goal of the rural program was to contribute to the recovery of the agricultural sector, which had suffered from many years of ill-conceived government policies and natural disasters.

Simultaneously, the TGE supported ex-combatants in establishing stable family lives by extending necessary assistance to dependents until the family became self-sufficient. This was achieved by providing dependents with food aid through the RRC's general emergency food aid program and by encouraging spouses to participate in community-based, income-generating activities.

Once the ex-combatants arrived in their communities, they reported to the Commission's branch office. This office assigned each ex-combatant to the respective category. The implementation of the rural reintegration program, which began early in 1992, was speeded up to enable beneficiaries to plant seeds in time for the crop season of summer 1992. It was hoped that the expected period of food dependency of ex-combatants would thereby be shortened (Commission 1994b, p.6).

Access to Land

Access to arable land is clearly the key economic factor to successful rural reintegration in Ethiopia. "Land allocation was a problem at the beginning of the reintegration process in Ethiopia. Where in theory conscripts had the right to return to land which their neighbors had been tending in their absence, in reality only a small number were able to do so. The TGE eventually pushed through a proclamation to the local level which allocated land previously held by the community to the ex-soldiers" (Interafrica Group 1994, p.9).

The Commission claims that communities did not have to give up land and that "nearly all of the ex-soldiers who returned to the rural areas received land for cultivation, except in the highlands where some difficulties had been experienced because of the scarcity of land in this part of the country" (Commission 1994b, p.7). The Commission had in fact undertaken a study in conjunction with the Ministry of Agriculture on access to land in late 1993, covering each community in the country. The results reveal that land holdings in the south are larger than in the north; however, in none of the regions was land tenure seen as a constraint.

In cases where there was a problem with access to land (i.e. mainly in areas with high population density), the Commission allocated unused public land or land that the former regime had reserved for farmers' cooperatives and women and youth groups after their dissolution of these groups. An ex-combatant who did not have access to land was eligible to receive one hectare of state land; however, it was the communities responsibility to decide on the distribution of land among ex-combatants.

Nevertheless, evidence suggests that land redistribution did not occur in those parts of the country (Tigray, Gonder, and Gojam) occupied for a longer period of time by the TPLF prior to the fall of the Derg regime. In other regions, where conflicts still prevailed (e.g., Eastern Harerge), land redistribution has not taken place due to security complications. Furthermore, ex-combatants frequently complained that the land given to them was of low quality. In all such instances the rural reintegration has generally been less successful.
Provision of Inputs

Seeds, Implements, and Extension Services

Rural ex–combatants received basic agricultural tools and implements, seeds, and fertilizers. In fact, many of the ex–combatants received these inputs from ICRC/ERCS when leaving the discharge centers; others were assisted by the Ministry of Agriculture. Rural settlers who failed to attain a sustainable standard of living during the first crop year (1992) received seeds and inputs for a second crop year (1993).

The rural reintegration program itself did not contain extension services targeted explicitly at ex–combatants. Rather, the Ministry of Agriculture covered them under its regular program. Any further technical assistance is provided by the community, which has the responsibility to assist those who may need it. Indeed, many rural communities supported the ex–combatants in their reintegration efforts. For instance, communities assisted them in constructing houses with materials and labor and helped in working the fields.

In fact, the Derg regime had previously undertaken a land reform whereby it expropriated feudal landlords and the church and redistributed the land to such political groups.

Oxen/Heifers

The Commission originally planned to acquire one plow ox for each of the 129,360 identified crop producers and one heifer for each of the 12,587 pastoralists; however, some members of the donor community felt that the provision of these animals was too generous, when compared with the possessions of the average Ethiopian peasant. Moreover, donors were concerned about the economic impact (ox–plowing may not necessarily increase the yield) and environmental effects of possible overgrazing. Consequently, donors withdrew their funding support for this program component.

The Commission, however, remained convinced that this type of support was essential for successful rural reintegration. The withdrawal of donor support, thus, compelled the TGE to divert resources from other sectors to provide the animals to the most vulnerable among the target group, as identified by their respective communities. The TGE was able to meet the needs of a significant percentage of the crop producers. Of the pastoralists, however, only about one third received heifers from the Commission. NGOs also secured animals for an unspecified additional number of beneficiaries.

Achievements

The Ministry of Agriculture, assisted by the Commission, the ICRC, and the RRC, managed the distribution of inputs for both sedentary agriculturists and pastoralists. The distribution of inputs seems to have been constrained by the workload of the regional government offices as well as funding delays; however, the process for the distribution of seeds and fertilizers seems to have gone well. Despite some implementation delays, the achievements under the rural program are, thus, impressive (Table 5.1)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Types of Assistance</th>
<th>Beneficiaries (actual)</th>
<th>Amount (ETB)</th>
<th>Cost per Capita (ETB)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Plow oxen</td>
<td>38,189</td>
<td>22,918,400</td>
<td>600.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heifers</td>
<td>4,192</td>
<td>1,677,400</td>
<td>400.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.1 Rural Reintegration Program
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Crop Type</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
<th>Cost (in ETB)</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Seed crop</td>
<td>137,603</td>
<td>5,362,440</td>
<td>39.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fertilizer</td>
<td>114,594</td>
<td>4,045,395</td>
<td>35.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coffee seedlings</td>
<td>27,661</td>
<td>5,859,086</td>
<td>211.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vegetable seeds</td>
<td>77,777</td>
<td>2,158,425</td>
<td>27.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farm tools and equipment</td>
<td>169,628</td>
<td>9,979,880</td>
<td>58.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>169,628</td>
<td>52,001,026</td>
<td>91.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Tehadisso Commission.*

All rural settlers received farm tools and equipment and all agriculturalists received fertilizer and seeds. In addition, close to half of rural settlers received vegetable seeds. The total rural reintegration budget amounted to ETB 52 million or ETB 91.3 per capita.31 Per capita costs for animals continue

31 The GTZ financed expenses for 12,524 ex-combatants for seeds and planting materials and farm tools as well as some chickens in the amount of ETB 1.4 million, or ETB 112.1 per capita. Of the 3,463

(footnote continued on next page)

were substantial; thus, only some 42,400 ex-combatants benefited. On the other hand, the per capita costs for agricultural implements, fertilizer, and seeds (excluding coffee seedlings) amounted to ETB 43.1 over the one–to two–year support period.

The rural program for Derg ex–soldiers was essentially completed by the summer of 1993 although the implementation of some activities, especially for OLF ex–fighters, continued in 1994. Since then, rural returnees have no longer been eligible for targeted assistance.

**Urban Reintegration Program**

The immediate *objective* of the urban reintegration program was to resettle and reintegrate demobilized ex–soldiers who expressed a desire to live in urban areas into productive activities in their communities. The reintegration of the 158,710 ex–combatants in the urban target group was more complex and difficult than that of the rural ex–combatants because of the *diverse social and economic backgrounds* of the ex–combatants, the *tightness of the urban labor market* and the different measures required to assist this group.32

Consequently, the Commission devised several different urban economic reintegration measures, implementing the least difficult ones first. Initially, support included employment creation and referral and formal education. At a later stage, the Commission added a vocational training program and a revolving fund. Based on the principle of prioritization, the urban reintegration program started later than the rural reintegration program. With the exception of the revolving credit fund, which is scheduled for completion by mid–1996, the urban reintegration was completed in the course of 1994.

**Employment, Education, and Training**33
Public Sector Employment Creation

The Ethiopian National Defense Force (ENDF) absorbed 6,000 ex–combatants whose special technical skills were needed in the military. A further 1,400 ex–combatants were employed by the Ministry of Health as health practitioners. Another 39,330 have been referred to contractual employment, for instance, as guards and drivers but more often in short–term public works programs, for example, from the Ministry of Agriculture (especially state farms) in agricultural and construction activities.

(excerpt continued from previous page)

ex–OLF fighters receiving seeds and tools, 2,233 received seeds for a second year after harvest failure due to drought or pest infection.

32 On the contrary, rural settlers possess, by and large, the skills necessary for reaching self–sufficiency in the short–term.

33 This section is limited to Derg ex–soldiers as little is known about the breakdown of these support activities for OLF ex–fighters.

Employment Referral and Skills Verification

The Commission assisted 15,150 Derg ex–soldiers who had worked in different government offices until 1988 and who had been forcibly conscripted by the Derg regime return to their former jobs in both public and private sectors at the behest of the TGE.34 These as well as those who received pensions were not eligible for any other reinsertion or reintegration support.

To facilitate the employment of soldiers who had acquired marketable skills in the military, the Commission issued civilian certificates to 7,908 ex–combatants. Among others, certificates were issued for technical, electrical, driving, and construction professions. In those cases in which ex–combatants had lost their certificates, the Commission arranged testing and verification through the Ministry of Labor.

It is not clear to what extent the Commission was able to assist all potential beneficiaries in this target group. Several ex–combatants whose certificates had been confiscated by the EPRDF in 1991 did not seem aware of this service and were under the impression that they could not pursue these professions for lack of certification.

Formal Education

The Commission encouraged ex–combatants who had not completed their studies (secondary and post–secondary) to resume them. It facilitated application and entrance formalities (e.g., by overriding application deadlines) for 7,500 Derg ex–soldiers from Belate camp and 8,522 OLF ex–fighters who sought to resume their formal education.

Vocational Training Programs

The provision of training in marketable skills in collaboration with existing vocational training institutions became a central component of the Commission's urban reintegration strategy. The objective of this training was to enhance the (self–)employment potential of ex–combatants in the labor market by imparting or upgrading skills. While in training, ex–combatants receive some accommodation and a transport allowance when training takes place outside their place of residence, as well as some cash. The pay depends on the rates in the particular location and is commonly between ETB 810.
In addition to the Commission, training was sponsored by other government bodies, NGOs, and international donors and organizations. By the end of 1994, 6,130 ex–combatants had received skill upgrading in different trades, such as masonry and brick making. Some of the ex–combatant trainees also received tools after course completion. Unfortunately, data on course duration and costs as well as subsequent employment rates are not available, inhibiting an analysis of the cost–effectiveness of this component.

34 In fact, the Derg regime required the employers to pay the salaries to the families of the ex–combatants while in service.

**Revolving Credit Fund**

**Description**

In July 1993, the Commission established a Revolving Credit Fund (RCF) to advance concessional loans to cooperatives of urban ex–combatants.35 The *objective* of the fund is to assist ex–combatants in urban areas who have received training but do not possess the capital or collateral to secure loans from commercial banks. Ex–combatants who either received a pension or had been offered a permanent job or have been recruited by the ENDF were not eligible for support under the RCF.

The Commission is aware that the design does not follow the strict rules of a *revolving* credit fund. In particular, it knows that the fund is not self–financing but will eventually be depleted. But rather than following the economic rationale as espoused by USAID, the Commission also took into consideration the *socioeconomic opportunity costs* of not providing subsidized credit, such as ex–combatant dissatisfaction and crime, leading to increased expenses on internal security forces.

The maximum amount disbursed per beneficiary is ETB 2,000;36 the Commission charges a low rate of interest of 10 percent (equivalent to the deposit rate as against a market lending rate of 14 percent) on the principal of the loan. The Agricultural and Industrial Development Bank (AIDB) keeps 3 percent for handling charges as well as 6 percent as an additional incentive to recover interest (which is its responsibility). The Commission also covers expenses incurred by the AIDB for hiring experts for project appraisals.

Beneficiaries are not required to produce collateral, but the Commission has established guidelines to ensure repayment of the principal; thus, a personal guarantor or property acquired under the loan agreement serves as an alternative to collateral under the RCF. In addition, funds are released in tranches following periodic progress reviews. Lastly, the AIDB is to ensure that the repayment schedule, which is part and parcel of the loan agreement, is adhered to.

**Project Criteria and Selection Procedures**

The Commission initially identified prototype projects that resembled those envisaged under the RCF and outlined a number of criteria.37 For instance, ex–combatants participating in the scheme are expected to fully cooperate. All cooperatives have to encompass at least ten members who have decided to cooperate voluntarily. A higher number is always welcome as it increases coverage while reducing per capita costs. The skills of the members should be complementary and sufficient to enable them to manage the project successfully. Similar projects are encouraged to merge or at least form some kind of association.

35 Because ex–combatants in rural areas had all received a package enabling them to take up agriculture or cattle keeping, the RCF is exclusively targeted at urban settlers.

36 AIDB officials fear this is too small an amount to serve as effective start–up capital.
37 The Commission based its criteria and cost estimates on studies by the Handicraft and Small-Scale Industry Development Agency in various fields of intervention.

The identification and appraisal of projects follows established procedures. In a first step, ex-combatants submit an application letter to the Commission's branch office, which is responsible for designing a project. This project is then submitted to the project appraisal subcommittee of the branch office committee, which evaluates the proposal according to its technical, financial, and economic feasibility and approves it (or otherwise).

As the AIDB is represented on this subcommittee, a project approval by the branch office committee practically ensures funding support from the AIDB. Subsequently, ex-combatants are given letters of recommendation by the Commission, thereby granting them recognition. With the project proposal and letter, ex-combatants then approach the regional AIDB branch office or other promoters.

When approaching a Commission branch office with interest in starting a project, ex-combatants receive an OXFAM UK/I booklet that was translated and adapted to the local circumstances by the Commission. This booklet contains information (a) about different kinds of income-generating activities, (b) about what ex-combatants have to do to receive a loan, and (c) on some basic accounting. It also warns about moneylenders and their practice of providing loans at high interest rates. Groups containing illiterate ex-combatants read the booklet together. Through its use, ex-combatants seem to have become conscious of the fact that they are indeed required to repay the loans.

Donor Involvement

USAID had been requested by the TGE to support the RCF, but the agency declined because it questioned the financial sustainability for the following reasons: (a) the Commission was charging below-market interest rates, (b) the projected default rates were high, and (c) the effects of inflation on buying power would not be adequately offset. Furthermore, it concluded that local NGOs did not have the capability to administer effectively a proposed USAID contribution of US$1 million to the RCF.

USAID was also concerned about the management of the RCF. While they felt that AIDB branch managers were willing and able to conduct professional financial feasibility appraisals for projects presented to them for funding by the Commission's local technical committees, they found that the quality of the prefeasibility studies of the technical committees was inadequate in several cases.

Moreover, AIDB branch managers apparently perceived external 'political' pressure from the Commission to suspend their professional financial appraisal standards in order to disburse money for the ex-soldiers rapidly to fulfill social and political objectives. Lastly, the consultants hired by USAID to evaluate the Commission's funding proposal contended that project management skills needed to be upgraded if sustainability was to be improved.

Achievements

Until September 1994, the RCF approved ETB 14.4 million to finance 295 microprojects designed for the reintegration of 6,826 ex-combatants. This amounts to 62.6 percent of the total amount deposited with AIDB by the Commission. The averages are ETB 2,110 per beneficiary and ETB 48,812 per project, with just approximately twenty–three beneficiaries per project. Many of these projects involve mixed groups, both civilian/ex-combatant and male/female. In addition, a substantial number of projects have been submitted but have not yet been approved for, or approved but have not yet received, funding from the RCF, donors, or NGOs.
As analyzed by USAID, the credit scheme is not economically viable but self-depleting. Despite these financial problems, however, the Commission considers the RCF a success because of its socioeconomic approach. Many projects are considered sustainable, especially small-scale production activities, because these always find a market. Only trading projects seem to suffer from severe problems of competition and competence.

Although ex-combatants are organized in cooperatives out of their free will and determination to work together, it appears as if many former officers design projects and then use privates as laborers. This development is not welcomed by the Commission. Moreover, some groups suffer from mistrust among participating ex-combatants. Other groups lack sufficient funds and encounter various problems, such as the acquisition of land and trade licenses, that delayed implementation. Consequently, the default rate is estimated at between 30 percent and 40 percent. Even so, AIDB staff seems to lack interest in collecting outstanding payments.

**Achievements**

The urban reintegration program has been complex and diverse. It started off slowly mainly due to funding problems. Consequently, it was not able to provide support to all urban settlers. Nevertheless, the short-term achievements of the urban reintegration program are impressive: it supported almost 99,000 Derg ex-soldiers until late 1994 to early 1995 (Table 5.2).

At least two-thirds of all urban ex-combatant settlers have been aided in pursuing employment or training activities. This type of assistance, however, gives reason for caution because two thirds of these ex-combatants only received short-term support. It is not known to what extent they were able to make use of their certificates or newly acquired skills.

38 The TGE's contribution to the RCF is effected through the ESRF. It, thus, cannot be established with certainty whether there is an overlap between these projects and those directly funded by the ESRF.

39 The Commission has at times expressed its frustration at the AIDB's low rate of disbursement.

40 The RCF has also set an example for several NGOs and communities, which have advanced another ETB 7.2 million for seventy-eight income-generating microprojects to 2,913 ex-soldiers. The majority of these funds, however, seem to originate in the GTZ's Open Fund. To avoid double counting, these projects are not further included in the RCF calculations.

41 The current number of beneficiaries is likely to be higher but more recent data are not available.

42 Contrary to the rural program, an ex-combatant was generally eligible for only one type of support. There is, thus, no overlap.

Nevertheless, the Commission enabled them to earn their own income, thereby becoming less dependent on government assistance and improving their chances mostly in the low-skill segment of the urban labor market. With limited means at its disposal, the coverage and extent of urban assistance can, therefore, be considered optimal.
### Table 5.2
**Urban Reintegration Program**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Assistance</th>
<th>Beneficiaries (actual)</th>
<th>Amount (ETB)</th>
<th>Cost per Capita(ETB)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Remobilization (ENDF)</td>
<td>6,000</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health workers</td>
<td>1,400</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public works</td>
<td>39,330</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment referral</td>
<td>15,150</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skills certification</td>
<td>7,908</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formal education</td>
<td>16,022</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vocational training</td>
<td>6,130</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revolving Credit Fund</td>
<td>6,826</td>
<td>14,399,566</td>
<td>2,110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>98,766</td>
<td>46,399,566</td>
<td>470</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

n/a Not available.

*Source: Tehadisso Commission.*

### Reintegration Program for Disabled Ex–Combatants

The Commission realized from the outset that the 37,536 disabled from the Derg and OLF represented a vulnerable special needs group among ex–combatants and consequently designed several measures to support their reintegration. According to the classification of the disabled, the Commission's strategy was threefold:

First, the approximately 20,000 *less severely disabled* ex–combatants who did not require any long–term medical care were absorbed into the mainstream of the urban and rural reintegration programs after receiving the necessary treatment.

The 15,208 *moderately impaired* ex–combatants with treatable disabilities required medium–term medical and paramedical services; several also needed prosthetic or orthopedic devices. The Commission has provided 3,257 moderately impaired ex–combatants with artificial appliances. They were also eligible for vocational training or for support from specialized vocational rehabilitation services at the Adigrat and Debre Zeit43 centers for disabled war ex–combatants.

After completion of the medical treatment and/or the training programs, they were provided with the necessary materials to start a productive life, such as machinery, tools, raw materials, and continue

43 The Debre Zeit center for the disabled had been established by the Eastern Bloc. It had been equipped with high technology instruments and equipment for treatment and had been managed by expatriate staff. With the demise of the Derg regime, the limitations of this technology transfer became apparent. Most of the equipment was nonoperational because of lack of spare parts. Moreover, the operating costs were prohibitively high.
household utensils. Subsequently, they were provided with transport to their communities and received a six–month housing allowance.

The injuries of the 2,328 more severely disabled ex–combatants receiving institutional care at the Adigrat and Debre Zeit centers currently preclude them from engaging in any training or productive activities. These two centers have been renovated for this purpose. The Commission encourages the more severely disabled ex–combatants to join their families as soon as they have received the necessary treatment. Some eighty–six disabled have already left the centers with a small subsidy. Only those who do not have families who can take care of them will be allowed to receive permanent institutional care. Their number is estimated at 300.

Of those in institutional care, 640 have been receiving vocational training in courses lasting for six to eight months. These persons will eventually be reintegrated into society with financial assistance that will enable them to launch sustainable income–generating activities; however, evidence suggests that the conditions in these facilities are inadequate and that they lack staff, resources, and equipment necessary for meaningful physical rehabilitation activities.

The Commission is currently planning to expand the network of vocational training centers and also to strengthen the vocational training capacity of the Adigrat and Debre Zeit centers with equipment, experts, and financial resources. USAID has pledged assistance for this endeavor. For example, the Commission has planned the construction of a workshop for artificial appliances that will produce 600 prostheses per year for disabled ex–combatants. The Commission also developed a project proposal that would link vocational training for about 630 disabled ex–combatants (in areas such as metalworking, woodworking, weaving, tailoring, and knitting) with their self–management of the project.

Approximately 37,500 disabled have been receiving targeted support from the Commission (unfortunately, no financial information and tracer data are available). The three–pronged strategy has proved valuable in providing disabled ex–combatants with the support they actually need. From this perspective, despite inefficiencies in implementation, the disabled program has achieved its objective.

**Pension Scheme**

Derg ex–soldiers and OLF ex–fighters are covered under the same pension scheme: Those who are forty–five years or older and have served in an army for at least twenty years are eligible for government pension. All disabled ex–combatants are eligible for pension benefits as well, irrespective of their disability. In addition, those who had been called back by the Derg from retirement were allowed to resume their retirement with pension. Like all retired civil servants, ex–combatants receive monthly cash pay that depends on rank and years in service.

44 Contradictory information suggests that the Commission plans to close the Adigrat center soon.

45 The GTZ has supported disabled ex–combatants mainly in the form of mud house construction. In close cooperation with the Commission, forty houses were completed by June 1995 while seventy additional structures were under construction. Furthermore, the GTZ financed the training of fifty disabled war veterans in leather works.

The Commission ensured that 7,405 Derg ex–soldiers received a pension; however, an unknown number, although entitled, are not eligible because they had lost their documents during the war or were unable to report to the discharge centers due to lack of funds. The exact number of OLF pensioners is not known but is estimated at around 2,000.46 Furthermore, the 15,208 moderately impaired ex–combatants receive pensions since they left the disabled centers (Commission 1994b, 14);47 thus, the TGE (through the Pension Authority) pays pensions to at least 24,600 ex–combatants.48 Additionally, an unknown number of dependents of deceased soldiers who were in
military service for at least ten years are paid a pension.

The Humera Resettlement Scheme

The TGE has started the demobilization of up to 30,000 soldiers (mainly former TPLF fighters) as part of its ongoing restructuring of the ENDF. A significant proportion of these demobilized ENDF soldiers are encouraged to participate in the Humera Resettlement scheme for cotton growing. This scheme represents a major departure from traditional reintegration approaches. Instead of returning ex–combatants to their original communities, the TGE plans to settle a large proportion of the demobilized soldiers in new communities on sparsely populated land in western Tigray.

According to the Commission, 7,000 have already been demobilized and voluntarily participate in the scheme. They are currently clearing the land and constructing residences and education and health facilities with assistance from regular soldiers. In addition to manpower, the Ministry of Defense is providing equipment. The Commission and Ministry of Defense are jointly managing the program, and the TGE has recently approached donors for providing capital inputs.

The TGE's official rationale for this concentrated resettlement approach is based on several arguments. First, the communities of origin of the former TPLF fighters are situated in an overpopulated, drought–prone region that offers them few reintegration opportunities. In contrast, far fewer people reside in Humera, which, although potentially fertile, is lowland historically plagued by malaria and snakes.

The majority of former TPLF fighters wish to return to Tigray, so they need to be accommodated there without increasing population pressure. The program will, therefore, provide effective and rapid support for the ex–soldiers while developing the economic activities in the region. Moreover, the communal living experience of the ex–fighters in the field means they would be able to form closely knit communities themselves. Lastly, the TGE claims that the resources required to support the demobilized soldiers in informal sector activities (e.g., credit) would be enormous.

Critics have been somewhat skeptical of the program for both technical and political reasons. For example, questions have been raised about the sustainability of a single project of this scale. On a

46 In Dedessa, which housed 56.7 percent of the captives, 1,221 OLF ex–fighters fulfilled the pension requirements. Unfortunately, no data are available for Hurso or for ENDF ex–combatants.

47 It seems that the less severely disabled do not receive a pension as they have been covered under the rural and urban reintegration programs. The more severely disabled are still in institutional care and may, therefore, not be eligible for pensions.

48 Pensioners receive coupons from the regional offices' Pension Authority against which they receive their payment at a bank in their location.

In the political level, the designated land has only recently been annexed by Tigray at the expense of Gonder. The political complexities of this transfer are not apparent. The ex–soldiers would also be concentrated in one group, conveniently close to the Sudanese border. Moreover, the extension of the Derg/OLF reintegration program to the ENDF soldiers (a mere 3.9 to 5.9 percent of all Derg and OLF ex–combatants) is unlikely to add substantially to the overall DRP costs.

Nevertheless, it seems that some donors feel that, in its own terms, the program may succeed due to the high degree of organization and motivation of TPLF ex–fighters. While it is too early to evaluate the program's
implementation, the Commission claims that the second successful cotton crop has recently been harvested in the area and that the proceeds from this will contribute to funding the program. However, recent reports from the field suggest that the program is now moving toward a smallholder approach with the allocation of communal land to individual families.

Special Reintegration Support Programs

Open Fund and Employment Subsidy Program

In close collaboration with the Commission, the GTZ established a separate Reintegration Program (GTZ−RP) in February 1992. The project is currently planned for completion in mid−1996. Initially, the objective was the improvement of the security situation in the country through targeted quick impact measures in support of the reintegration of ex−soldiers. Later, the scope of the program was expanded to encompass the economic reintegration of OLF ex−fighters, refugees, and internally displaced persons through the promotion of employment and income−generating opportunities; thus, ex−combatants are only one of the GTZ−RP's target groups.

The GTZ−RP provides support to ex−combatants in a similar manner as the Commission's rural and urban reintegration programs. For instance, project proposals by ex−combatants that have been submitted to the Commission for approval are then submitted by the Commission for funding to the AIDB, GTZ, or other funding sources. Moreover, the GTZ has funded part of the demobilization, reinsertion, and reintegration of the OLF ex−fighters; however, while being part and parcel of the Commission's DRP, the GTZ−RP is separately managed.

Description

The GTZ−RP assists beneficiaries in all parts of the country with the following services: (a) project identification and formulation, (b) funding or cofinancing of projects, (c) administrative/logistical support, and (d) monitoring and evaluation. Projects can include community development, smallscale business promotion, provision of farming implements, vocational training, and community−based food− or cash−for−work projects.

49 The GTZ also refers to its program as the 'Open Fund' as it attempts to "minimize the involvement of the project into actual implementation, but instead to maximize the efforts to induce or initiate and assist the implementation of small projects through NGOs, government agencies, local administrative bodies, self−help groups, or whoever has the ability to do something with the target groups and possibly contribute something in terms of resources" (GTZ 1994e, p. 1).

Training programs last between one and six months, depending on the trade. The GTZ placed particular emphasis on imparting skills in mud block technology for the construction of houses, beehives and stoves. The use of mud is expected to reduce the demand for wood. The GTZ encourages communities to contribute to the funding in cash or in kind of cash−for−work (infrastructure) projects. This voluntary contribution ranges from 3 percent to up to 20 percent.

In 1994 GTZ−RP introduced the employment subsidy program. This scheme helps ex−combatants to obtain employment in private and public sectors by paying a one−time subsidy of 50 percent of the salary for one year to a maximum of ETB 200 per month. If the employer takes on the beneficiary on a long−term contract on termination of the program, he/she is eligible for a payment of 50 percent of the GTZ subsidy paid during the first year. It encourages employers to offer ex−combatants appropriate jobs and may also include funds to complement basic inputs.
The various types of projects are usually not linked, for example, community development projects cater to different beneficiaries than training activities; however, in individual cases, the GTZ allows an ex–combatant to have access to both training and credit programs. In particular, since 1995, the GTZ is offering short courses on business administration for its credit beneficiaries. To this end, the GTZ first had to train trainers because there were not enough local and qualified individuals to undertake these training activities.

While projects are open to ex–combatants and civilians, each project must contain a minimum of 60 percent ex–combatants. The maximum assistance per beneficiary is limited to ETB 3,000 (in credit or training projects). Implementation is often through NGOs, local administrative bodies (kebeles, woredas, and awrajas) or self-help groups. Cooperation with the latter has been extended in recent years, but the Commission remains the major promoter of projects. More than a third of GTZ–RP projects have been submitted by the Commission on behalf of ex–combatants.

The criteria for assistance from the Open Fund are similar to the Commission's credit fund. In particular:

- A considerable proportion of the beneficiaries should be ex–combatants.
- Project activities should serve the community as well as facilitate self–employment.
- Public works projects should provide employment and income with a focus on addressing community needs (e.g., feeder road construction, afforestation, and so on).
- Priority sectors are natural resource protection, the promotion of appropriate technologies, and rural infrastructure.
- Projects should be broadly based and implemented rapidly.
- Beneficiaries should play a major role in project proposal design.

The GTZ–RP offers grants and loans, depending on the nature of a project and its feasibility. While the first two loans extended under the scheme did not bear interest, a rate of 10 percent was adopted in early 1993 and raised to 15 percent two years later. Grants are provided for subsistence production and where the applicants live in remote areas. The GTZ normally does not extend credit to individuals because of the implicit high per capita administration costs.

The average duration of finalized projects was relatively short, lasting on average fewer than seven months. Especially at the beginning, the GTZ was aware that its quick response procedure was likely to lead to high default rates. Credit rescheduling is offered when loans cannot be repaid due to natural calamities or when equipment has not been procured in time. In the three instances where leaders or members of credit–financed cooperatives misused project money they were taken to court.

Projects are demand–driven as they are designed by beneficiary groups or communities in knowledge of local needs; however, the GTZ–RP does not have a gender focus. First, the number and whereabouts of female ex–combatants is not known to the GTZ although it frequently had requested such information from the Commission. Moreover, the GTZ–RP has not received any proposals by women groups. Female ex–combatants are, however, involved in various mixed projects.

The GTZ implemented projects specifically targeted at OLF ex–combatants, although at times they participated in projects with Derg ex–soldiers. In eastern Ethiopia, five German–funded projects were implemented in favor of...
ex–OLF–fighters. Swedish and British funds were used for the implementation of eleven additional projects with ex–OLF–involvement in western Ethiopia. For political reasons, the Commission seems to have paid closer supervision attention to ex–OLF projects. As the political and social situation was more tense in the western part of the country, the GTZ had to terminate implementation of credit projects for ex–OLF–members. In the eastern part, cooperation with ex–combatants, communities, and the Commission is working well.

**Achievements**

The implementation of GTZ–RP measures began in April 1992. By June 1995, almost 100 *reintegration projects* benefiting ex–combatants were completed or ongoing; in 81 of these, the number of ex–combatant beneficiaries is known (Table 5.3). Overall, at least 20,639 ex–combatants have benefited from 81 project intervention worth approximately ETB 8.1 million.

Over 12,500 ex–combatants beneficiaries received *farm implements* (seeds and tools) at no cost, which enabled them to start farming activities. The vast majority of beneficiaries (90 percent) seem to have used this assistance well. The Commission often assisted these beneficiaries in obtaining arable land. *Vocational training* in marketable skills was completed by 2,238 ex–combatant beneficiaries. Some of the graduates have been provided with tools and equipment.

GTZ–RP has also provided *credit* to facilitate self–employment ventures for 1,038 ex–combatant beneficiaries. Cooperatives in different sectors (e.g., horticulture, fishing, and cinema) have been established with these funds. In addition, a larger number of individuals have received credit. According to GTZ monitoring data, only two projects have failed thus far.

Over 3,800 ex–combatants have participated in three *food–for work projects*. Despite the temporary nature of these activities, they have given beneficiaries somewhere to turn when they are most vulnerable, i.e. in the first months after their return. Furthermore, they have often provided some training and have facilitated improvements in ex–combatant–community relations. Lastly, communities have benefited from the construction of infrastructure (such as dams, terraces, continue

50 It should be borne in mind that the immediate concern at program inception for all parties involved was the security situation. By nature, this implied that support had to be focused on male ex–combatants.

feeder roads, and health clinics). A total of 1,007 ex–combatants have participated in these cash–for–work projects for an average of six ETB per day.

By mid–1995, twenty–nine ex–combatants were benefiting from the employment subsidy scheme by working as guards, mechanics, or bookkeepers at a cost of ETB 1,404 per capita. The major problem with this subsidy program seems to be the scarcity of serious applications from entrepreneurs, reflecting a tight labor market situation. There seems to be no large–scale prejudice among entrepreneurs toward ex–combatants.

By mid–1995, 69 percent of all beneficiaries were ex–combatants; thus, the GTZ–RP reached its target of at least 60 percent ex–combatant beneficiaries on an aggregate level. Agriculture, employment, and training projects were almost exclusively targeted toward ex–combatants. The coverage in food–for–work programs was substantially lower.

In its early phase, the GTZ placed major emphasis on training and cash–for–work (infrastructure) projects. Later in the implementation process, GTZ concentrated on credit projects while keeping a focus on infrastructure projects. When averaging completed and ongoing activities, credit projects are the most expensive with almost ETB 1,750 per capita. Employment subsidy, cash–for–work, and vocational training programs each cost over
ETB 1,000 per beneficiary. Food–for–work programs and the distribution of agricultural implements, on the other hand, amount to only ETB 294 and ETB 117, respectively. On average, the 81 reintegration projects provided support of ETB 393 to each participating ex–combatant. (Table 5.3 provides an overview of the GTZ–RP achievements until June 30 1995.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project Type</th>
<th>Number of Projects</th>
<th>Ex–Combatant Beneficiaries</th>
<th>Approved Project Costs (ETB)</th>
<th>Costs per Capita (ETB)</th>
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<tr>
<td>Agricultural implements</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>12,524</td>
<td>1,467,691</td>
<td>117</td>
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<tr>
<td>Credit</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>1,038</td>
<td>1,816,000</td>
<td>1,750</td>
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<td>Employment subsidies</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>40,716</td>
<td>1,404</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food–for–work</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3,803</td>
<td>1,118,888</td>
<td>294</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cash–for–work</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1,007</td>
<td>1,286,383</td>
<td>1,277</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vocational Training b/</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>2,238</td>
<td>2,391,735</td>
<td>1,069</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total c/</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>20,639</td>
<td>8,121,413</td>
<td>393</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a/ Only those projects where the number of ex–combatant beneficiaries is known.

b/ Including on–the–job mud house construction training.

c/ Excluding double–counting.

Source: GTZ Reintegration Program monitoring reports.

Rehabilitation Grant Program

A number of NGOs have been extending support in their regular programs to ex–combatants; however, coordination between the Commission and these NGOs is often wanting; therefore, no comprehensive information is available on most of these interventions. An exception is the CRS–hard sponsored Rehabilitation Grant that not only directly targets a limited number of ex–combatants but is also implemented in closer coordination with the Commission.51

CRS initiated its pilot small–scale credit scheme for microenterprise activities in 1991. In 1993, the project finally started and by mid–1994 the disbursement of funds was completed. The aim of the program is to provide credit at soft terms to ex–combatants to facilitate their urban reintegration. Because support in rural areas was deemed too complex for CRS to administer, the two urban locations of Addis Ababa and Debre Zeit were chosen. The major reasons for this decision were (a) the high concentration of ex–combatants and (b) the already
existing but limited implementation capacities of the parishes as the implementing partners.

CRS received some initial data from the Commission about the target group. It then asked ex–combatants to register and collected further data during this process to design a more appropriate program. CRS thus determined the costs of an average small–scale business investment at a maximum of ETB 800 (mostly in cash). Of these, 5 percent (or ETB 40) were deducted up front and transferred to a community fund. The repayment period was limited to two years.

The community fund was set up to ease possible tensions between community members and ex–combatants and seems to have ensured the communities' participation in the scheme. The fund was used mostly to build social infrastructure, for example, a kindergarten or a school; thus, the ex–combatants also benefited from the fund. The communities had a good perception of the fund, and the ex–combatants did not complain about 'financing' community–based activities.

CRS designed the scheme with a welfare motive in mind as the situation was still tense at the time. Ex–combatants were only required to repay the principal. The selection of these ex–combatant beneficiaries was undertaken by the communities on a needs basis. If a community deemed an ex–combatant particularly poor, he/she was given a chance to participate in both of CRS's support activities (cash payments and credit scheme).

**Achievements**

The grant scheme has benefited some 300 ex–combatants (around 200 in 51 groups and 97 individuals). According to monitoring data, 57 percent of beneficiaries invested the money in retail trade ventures, 19 percent in agricultural activities, and the remaining 24 percent were shared between cottage industries and the service sector. To a large extent, this breakdown may have been dictated by the urban nature of the project sites.

A CRS evaluation of the scheme (CRS 1994b) concluded that the program had generally been an effective vehicle for social and economic reintegration assistance. The evaluation found that the program had enhanced the technical, business management, and microproject planning skills of beneficiaries. Furthermore, it had strengthened the institutional capacity of the implementing counterpart in the areas of grant administration, project planning, and management. Finally, community participation levels were found to be satisfactory.

The relatively small amount of capital per beneficiary has limited the number engaged in the service sector. Almost two thirds of beneficiaries applied individually instead of in groups as initially envisaged. Indeed, CRS has found that most ex–combatants prefer to work individually, despite the benefits of pooled capital.

Many ex–combatant beneficiaries were not overly successful; their average annual income may lie between ETB 200 and ETB 500. As a result, they were reluctant to repay a credit, which they tended to see as a gift from a
church, rather than a loan to be repaid. This attitude was compounded by the fact that the implementing agency
did not pursue a strict repayment strategy. To secure repayment, CRS used a system of peer pressure from the
community and close monitoring that eventually ensured a rate of 75 percent.

The CRS evaluation identified a number of other, project–specific shortcomings and constraints (CRS 1994b, p.
12ff.). Given the depth of poverty, the length of time since the conclusion of the war, and the lack of
reconciliation in some areas, some community members resented the fact that ex–combatants received special
assistance; however, as the reasons were explained to communities, complaints were, in fact, few.

CRS also found that assistance to ex–combatants at both the macro– and micro–levels had taken too long to reach
the beneficiaries. CRS assistance, for example, was delayed by planning and fundraising lags. As a result,
inflation reduced the real value of the assistance received.

When receiving the credit, ex–combatants were given some orientation with a leaflet focusing on management
issues, for instance the preparation of business plans. CRS found this information often insufficient. Moreover,
the lack of appropriate training for beneficiaries (especially in business skills) contributed to the failure of some
projects.

Training, however, can be of limited value. Even trained soldiers have found it difficult to penetrate a tight labor
market. Moreover, many ex–combatants have little to no education, making training difficult to accomplish. It
was, thus, often difficult to motivate ex–combatants for training, which is a long–term process with uncertain
benefits. In addition, there was a general shortage of training facilities, and agencies have sometimes provided
inappropriate training.54

Some ex–combatants have marketable skills which require significant start–up capital (e.g., auto mechanics,
electricians). Such ex–combatants are often not in a position to pursue these profession due to lack of capital. The
problem of a low capital base was exacerbated by the devaluation which took place during the implementation
phase. The resulting inflationary pressure diminished the value of the rehabilitation grant.

54 CRS cites a weaving enterprise proposed by the TGE that failed to secure the interest of potential beneficiaries
because weaving is a low status profession in Ethiopia.

From Emergency to Development

On the basis of the experiences of the emergency phase I, CRS initiated its development phase II in 1995. During
this phase, credit will no longer be interest free. CRS plans a participatory approach along the lines of the
Grameen bank system in Bangladesh. The program is to last for two to three years. According to CRS,
ex–combatants are still a vulnerable group and warrant target support.

CRS will encourage the creation of savings and credit cooperatives among ex–combatants and widows. It also
plans to have project proposals first evaluated and approved by small beneficiary 'solidarity groups' before they
are technically reviewed by the counterpart. A credit management committee consisting of beneficiaries and
counterpart staff will then decide on the allocation of funds.55

CRS will retarget its assistance to Region 3 (Gojam and Gonder) as the socioeconomic situation is still weak in
this area. It will also open up access to the credit fund to non–ex–combatants. Using the same targeting
mechanism (identification by communities), CRS plans to reach 400 beneficiaries in three years. Furthermore, the
National Bank of Ethiopia will replace ACS as the implementing agency as it appears to be capable of
undertaking projects in a more economically rigorous manner.
Ethiopian Social Rehabilitation Fund

Description

In collaboration with the TGE, the World Bank initiated the pilot phase of a social fund, the Ethiopian Social Rehabilitation Fund (ESRF) in December 1992 as part of the broader Ethiopian Rehabilitation and Recovery Program (ERRP). Operations started in mid–1993. The pilot phase was extended for a six–month period and was completed by September 1995. The fund's target groups are demobilized soldiers, returning refugees, internally displaced persons, orphans, street children, and households headed by women. During the pilot phase, three regions were targeted: Addis Ababa (Region 14), Tigray (Region 1) and Southern Shewa (Region 7).

The basic characteristics of the ESRF are as follows:

• The ESRF is primarily a funding agency. Implementation is the responsibility of counterparts, whether they are NGOs, private sector or community–based organizations.

• It only assists demand–driven and community–based projects. Three general types of projects have been funded: productive and income–generating projects; social infrastructure and social assistance projects; and economic infrastructure projects.

• Communities and implementors are encouraged to contribute to the financing of infrastructure and income–generating projects.

• The ESRF supports relatively small and technically simple projects. An individual project must be below US$100,000 and have a project lead time of as short as four months.

55 In similar arrangements with women's groups, CRS reached repayment rates of 97 percent.

For infrastructure projects, the ESRF cooperates with NGOs as implementing agencies. It contributes materials and cash whereas NGOs manage the project as a food– or cash–for–work program. One of the main project promoters, however, is the Commission which identifies proposals and forwards them to the ESRF on behalf of the beneficiaries. The Commission and ESRF coordinate activities closely; however, it seems that a skills shortage at the Commission impairs it from the viability and fundability of some projects.

Some of the ESRF's projects are, thus, specifically ex–combatant oriented. In the majority of cases, however, ex–combatants jointly participate with civilians. In general, the ESRF encourages ex–combatants and civilians to form cooperatives. Such groups comprise on average fifteen members. The average loan size amounts to some ETB 150,000, or ETB 10,000 per capita. Proposals from individuals are accepted but priority is accorded to legally instituted groups.

The ESRF funds income–generating activities as well as infrastructure projects. Accordingly, it provides loans and grants, depending on the type of project and the proposal's feasibility. Loans are provided on soft terms and are mainly for capital equipment. Only up to 20 percent of the principal has to be repaid after one year, and no interest is charged. Before receiving the funds, two members of each cooperative group receive a fifteen–day training in different management skills, such as marketing.

Achievements

The ESRF completed funding for 105 projects by March 1995, another 112 were under implementation. The total project costs amount to ETB 51.5 million. Social infrastructure projects (practical training) have benefited 437
ex–soldiers, while a further 5,129 ex–combatants have been participating in diverse income–generating projects, such as grain mills, agriculture projects, and sewing (ESRF 1995, p. llf.).

Of the ongoing thirty–four income–generating projects amount to ETB 5.1 million, 81 percent (ETB 4.1 million) is funded by the ESRF, the remaining 19 percent by communities. Assuming that the average number of beneficiaries per ongoing project is equivalent to the overall average, the per capita costs amount to ETB 982. For all 5,129 of the 63 targeted, ongoing or completed income generating projects, thus, the ESRF and spent ETB 5.0 million. Assuming similar per capita costs for the three training activities targeted at ex–combatants, they have been supported, through the ESRF and communities, with a total of ETB 5.5 million. 56

Despite the soft credit terms, the repayment record is poor for both management–related and psychological reasons. On the one hand, the cooperative groups may have good technical skills but often lack business acumen and entrepreneurial abilities, especially in bookkeeping. On the other hand they know that it is the government's responsibility to help them reintegrate; therefore, they take the loans as grants and do not repay (even though over 90 percent of projects are said to be viable and many could repay on time). Moreover, the repayment period of one year appears to be too short.

56 It cannot be established whether there is an overlap between these projects and the ESRF–funded AIDB projects.

The ESRF also suffers from implementation delays. Several micro–projects have been completed ahead of time but in perhaps half of all cases, the schedule had to be extended in some cases by up to 300 percent. Although such problems also affect ex–combatant initiatives, ESRF staff see them as very disciplined group members who work hard and produce good products.

**Other Assistance**

It is not known which projects of which other promoters catered for the needs of how many ex–combatants as their support was not targeted at this particular group. An exception was OXFAM UK/I that as early as 1992 started opening up its projects for ex–combatants and initiated several projects specifically for ex–combatants. Frequently, ex–combatants received priority in ongoing projects. The rationale for the involvement of OXFAM UK/I was that ex–combatants, irrespective of army affiliation, are a specially vulnerable group that lacks resources to start a civilian life.

OXFAM UK/I is mainly involved in rural development, especially agriculture and basic infrastructure, but also supports some urban–based initiatives. Examples of assistance are the provision of containers for shops in Addis Ababa, support to the Relief Society of Tigray in the form of tools, seeds, and oxen, financial assistance to the Commission to translate into Amharic and distribute a training manual for its revolving credit fund,57 and education materials, blankets, and clothes for ex–combatant children. OXFAM UK/I also provided two water tanks and financed model homes, a vegetable garden and some small–scale vocational training for disabled ex–combatants in the Adigrat center. The coverage of these interventions is unknown.

**Efforts toward Social Reintegration**

**Social Reintegration of Ex–Combatants**

The Commission claims that its reintegration program contains social dimensions.58 First, the economic assistance to disadvantaged ex–combatants would enhance social and economic justice. Furthermore, it has ensured the ex–combatants' human right to work. Second, the reintegration program's focus on local decisionmaking strengthens the capacity of local and regional authorities. In the long term, the Commission hopes
that the experience gained will enable local institutions to support social activities without requiring central government assistance.

The predischarge orientation during the demobilization phase focused on making the ex–combatants understand the responsibilities of an individual in a civil and peaceful society and introduced some social and environment–related topics (in particular deforestation and AIDS). Beyond this rather rudimentary support, the Commission claims that economic and social counseling is offered to ex–combatants in the branch offices; however, staff have not received any specialized training.

57 It is currently undertaking a survey on the use of these guidelines by ex–combatant beneficiaries.

58 The Commission also took the responsibility of reuniting the ex–combatants with their dependents, in particular those expelled from Eritrea. No information is available on how this reunification program was implemented.

It, thus, seems, that specific efforts pertaining to the acceptance of the ex–combatants by the communities have been lacking. For instance, it is not known which social problems arose during reinsertion at the community level. It is also not clear whether and, if so, how communities and ex–combatants were encouraged by the Commission's branch offices to solve these problems.

Community–Oriented Interventions

Communities to which ex–combatants returned were often consulted in program design and implementation. Nevertheless, there were relatively few community–based projects. The most notable community–oriented efforts are the following:

• The inclusion of community representatives by the Commission and CRS in the committees that managed assistance to ex–combatants at the community level.

• The requirement by CRS that all beneficiaries donate 5 percent of their assistance to the local authorities for use in community–promoting projects.

• Indirectly, the public works programs from the Commission, GTZ, and CRS that benefit communities.

In short, the partial neglect of social reintegration may well have been one of the few deficiencies of an otherwise successful program.

Achievements of Reintegration Programs

The reintegration programs for the different target groups that were implemented by the Commission, GTZ, CRS, and ESRF reached a remarkable number of ex–combatants. The four promoters implemented seven types of program interventions and provided support to at least 332,435 ex–combatants or 69.9 percent of all demobilized from the Derg and OLF armies (Table 5.4).

The total reintegration budget is estimated at ETB 132.4 million. Cost estimates are available for most interventions and can be used for comparative purposes. The credit programs are by far the most expensive component. On the other hand, ESRF and CRS spent roughly less than half as much on each beneficiary in income–generating projects. Overall, the per capita costs of the Ethiopian reintegration program amount to ETB 398.
Table 5.4
Achievements of Reintegration Programs a/

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Program Promoter</th>
<th>Program</th>
<th>Amount (ETB)</th>
<th>Ex–Combatant Beneficiaries</th>
<th>Per Capita Costs (ETB)</th>
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<tr>
<td>Tehadisso</td>
<td>Rural reintegration b/</td>
<td>52,001,026</td>
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<tr>
<td>OXFAM UK/I e/</td>
<td>Reintegration support</td>
<td>156,521</td>
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<td>n/a</td>
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<tr>
<td>ESRF f/</td>
<td>Credit and training</td>
<td>5,463,946</td>
<td>5,566</td>
<td>982</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>o/w credit projects</td>
<td>5,034,959</td>
<td>5,129</td>
<td>982</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total g/</td>
<td></td>
<td>132,382,472</td>
<td>332,435</td>
<td>398</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a/ Derg and OLF only.
b/ Derg ex–combatants only. Rural settlers received multiple support.
c/ Including the moderately impaired.
d/ Includes community contributions worth some ETB 103,000.
e/ Known contributions amount to UK£ 20,479.
f/ Including the contribution by communities.
g/ Excluding pension scheme; per capita costs excluding OXFAM UK/I. Assuming that there is no overlap between the programs of the Commission on the one hand, and of GTZ, CRS, and ESRF on the other.

Source: Tehadisso Commission.
The Reintegration Experience

The evidence from survey data on the experience of ex–combatants reintegrating into civilian life paints a picture of the transition from combatant to civilian that is similar to the experiences of ex–combatants in other countries: they are generally welcome in their communities of settlement but for many, economic reintegration has proved difficult.

Economic Reintegration

By and large, rural reintegration was comparatively easier for several reasons. On the one hand, many ex–combatants had a rural background and were, therefore, broadly familiar with the methods necessary for survival. Moreover, the Commission tried to provide land to those who experienced access problems. After the first harvest, most ex–combatants felt as if they were in the same or an even better economic position than civilians.

Those whose living standards remained below average had returned to resource–constrained communities, faced natural calamities, misused funds (i.e. not for productive purposes), had difficulties in adopting new farm implements or lacked inputs at crucial moments in the crop cycle (due to funding and procurement delays). In some areas, difficulties in securing access to land were an additional factor. For instance, land that had been cultivated by ex–combatants prior to their mobilization was reallocated by communities, and the new users refused to return it.

Urban reintegration has been hampered by two factors. On the one hand, ex–combatants, even those with an urban background, often did not have the skills necessary to find gainful employment. On the other hand, the labor market in urban Ethiopia is tight. In both problem areas, the Commission facilitated economic reintegration and many of the better educated (among them many former commissioned officers) and the young (between twenty–five and thirty years of age) have found jobs. The major reasons for the economic success of the latter group may be the fact that they have not been away from home for long periods of time and—in the eyes of their employers—know how to perform their jobs more efficiently. There does not appear to exist any form of widespread discrimination in the workplace. Nevertheless, many ex–combatants are either unemployed or underemployed, even in microprojects funded under the DRP.

In and around Addis Ababa, the unemployment rate is higher, partly due to the high rate of immigration from rural areas. At the same time, however, there are more development agencies active in the capital city and, thus, more opportunities to find support. Still, their skills level is likely to prevent ex–combatants from taking advantage of many of these opportunities. Many in fact lament that they had lost their chance of education and training while serving in the army. In other regions, for example, Region 3 (Gonder), the labor market situation appears even more destitute. Despite these problems, ex–combatants have often preferred to return to urban environments. Others mi–soft

59 A survey of about 500 ex–combatants, 240 spouses (wives), and 390 community members from 16 communities countrywide has recently been undertaken with assistance from the Commission (Woldu 1995b). This chapter is largely based on the results of this survey.

grated from rural to urban areas after the initial transportation because they had become used to urban/peri–urban life.
In the early stages of reintegration, many communities in insecure areas could not accommodate ex–combatants. By late 1994, however, the Commission estimates that 60 percent of ex–combatants have established sustainable activities; however, they show a low level of initiative and consequently lack a business mentality, reflecting their adaptation to the army command structure. Given these restrictions, sustainable activities may mean not much more than plain survival, thus placing many ex–combatants among the poor and poorest segments of Ethiopia's population.

No specific information is available about the reintegration experience of female ex–combatants. In many cases, women held auxiliary and logistical positions in the Derg army (e.g., as musicians, secretaries, radio operators, and cooks), rather than serving in combat units. Compared to their male comrades, they generally have skills that appear more marketable. Consequently, it is said that female ex–combatants often found it easier to reintegrate economically.

Most of the young recruits did not have any marketable skills and had never had any jobs prior to being drafted. In fact, many did not even complete their primary education at the time of recruitment. These combined factors made it difficult for child soldiers to reintegrate and independently sustain themselves; however, there was no special program component (such as psychological counseling) to address the needs of this vulnerable group. Judging from similar experiences in other countries, the situation of former child soldiers is probably the worst, both economically and psychologically.

Social Reintegration

Social reintegration depends heavily on a few factors. Almost three quarters of ex–combatants seem to have returned to their previous communities; thus, their social capital, the informal networks with family, relatives, and community members, was probably still intact at the time of their arrival. The shorter the duration of service and the younger an ex–combatant on demobilization, the less difficult this process was perceived. Successful economic reintegration was a crucial factor for facilitating social reintegration as was ownership of a house. A positive indicator of reintegration is the fact that many ex–combatants married after their return to civilian life, especially in urban areas.

On the other hand, many ex–combatants found their families and relatives killed or dispersed, and many wives had remarried. In these cases, it depended on the ex–combatant's relationship with...

60 The number of women was more significant in the Derg police than in the army. Many of these women have been hired into the TGE police force.

61 Their limited number and their command of marketable skills are two major factors why practically none of the project promoters explicitly targeted female ex–combatants. Rather, women are seen as being part of the wider target group of poor Ethiopian households.

62 Some of the soldiers who had been in Eritrea for up to twenty years had taken second families or formed liaisons with Eritrean women. This was underlined when the EPLF expelled at least 65,000 Eritrean women and their half–Ethiopian children from Eritrea, significantly swelling the ranks of the civilian displaced in Ethiopia.

the community as to whether he/she would be welcomed. The longer the duration of military service, the higher the rates of separation and divorce. Many ex–combatants also became frustrated by the difficult living conditions to which they had returned. Generally, the problems faced by ex–combatants were similar to those of civilian returnees.
Immediately after demobilization, lawlessness, armed banditry, and crime were on the rise in the eastern and southern parts of the country. Many ex–combatants seem to have harassed the population, looted property, and sometimes committed murder. The crisis escalated with the war between the EPRDF and the OLF in the summer of 1992. By early 1993, however, the internal security situation has improved to normal levels and the ex–combatants' participation in crime seems to have decreased markedly. Presently, community members see no relationship between the presence of ex–combatants and the occurrence of crime in their locations.

Interviews suggest that female ex–combatants have greater difficulties in social reintegration. Having lived an army life for some time, many are no longer willing to accept traditional family roles. It is probable that those female ex–combatants returning to rural areas, thus, encountered manifold obstacles when rebuilding their family ties. Many of the Derg soldiers had been recruited as boys (some as young as thirteen years) and/or by force, especially in rural areas. On their return they were likely to find the men who had forcibly recruited them still in their villages. Resentment between 'victim' and 'culprit' was likely to arise, placing child soldiers under a formidable psychological and social challenge.

**Ex–Combatant Networks**

Most ex–combatants meet their former comrades at least occasionally to discuss their present life, work opportunities, income–generating projects, and the general economic and political situation. Such informal contacts have proved helpful in facilitating the transition to civilian life. In fact, over a third of ex–combatants cooperate with former comrades in economic ventures. From an economic perspective, these ex–combatants seem to earn higher incomes and, thus, find economic reintegration less difficult. Informal contacts also help them to cope better with the challenges of civilian life.

The ex–combatants have achieved a sufficient degree of reconciliation. For instance, in the disabled centers, ex–combatants from the Derg and OLF receive treatment side–by–side. Likewise, the EPRDF ex–combatants serving as the Commission's outreach staff have been accepted and are trusted by Derg and OLF ex–combatants alike. Many ex–combatants also cooperate with their former enemies in projects or simply meet to discuss issues.

**Experiences of Ex–Combatant Spouses**

The relationship of ex–combatants to spouses and families is generally good as most ex–combatants are sociable and disciplined. Most wives felt that the communities welcomed their husbands and continue themselves. Nuclear and extended families have been important sources of support for ex–combatants, providing economic assistance, advice, and moral support.

Spouses faced several problems (from loneliness to the inability to finance daily needs) while their husbands were in service; however, they do not seem to have been discriminated against because of the military service of the husbands. On the contrary, many rural and urban communities have supported the families of those who were serving in the Derg army.

Violence within most ex–combatant households is not significantly different from violence in other households. In fact, about a fifth of spouses feel there is less violence in their household. On the other hand, intrahousehold violence seems rather closely related to divorce. A particular problem of family reunion after prolonged periods of separation has been the fact that some children were alienated and unsure about the identity of the true father.
Community Acceptance

When the political affiliations of ex–combatant and community differed, hostilities occasionally arose. OLF ex–combatants in particular were not welcome outside their native area because they had fought for an unpopular cause. Otherwise, with the possible exception of former officers, Derg and OLF ex–combatants have by and large been equally well received by the communities, who are aware that many former soldiers had been recruited forcefully. In fact, communities had been involved in mobilizing villagers into the Derg army. They, thus, have the responsibility, if not the liability, to help ex–combatants reintegrate.

The local committees established by the TGE and the Commission often tried their best to assist ex–combatants. They raised and distributed funds, prepared feasible projects, provided access to land and credit, paid school fees for ex–combatant children, searched for job opportunities, provided free medical care, and gave moral support or help in cultivating the fields. For example, a number of beneficiaries of different projects in Addis Ababa claimed that the surrounding civilian population supported their economic ventures because of the fact that they were ex–combatants.

Nevertheless, some communities and social strata perceive themselves as equally disadvantaged and resent the fact that ex–combatants received special assistance, for instance, when unemployment was high and land scarce. Such resentment was compounded when an ex–combatant was unwilling to work and could not sustain himself/herself economically and continued to be a burden to the host community, despite the assistance received. For other community members, ex–combatants deserved this special treatment.

Ex–combatant behavior contributed significantly to community reception. When they were disciplined and participated in community social functions, they found acceptance much more easily. In many cases, communities have welcomed the return of productive citizens and appreciated small innovations (for example, a small–scale irrigation system) introduced by ex–combatants and the responsibility they have shown to the community. By and large, therefore, social reintegration proceeded well.

64 For example, it was more difficult for a Tigrayan who had fought for the Derg to return to his/her village. This problem is probably more serious in those regions that are still politically unstable.

7—
Institutional Structure

Implementing a demobilization and reintegration program in a country emerging from war with little institutional capacity and lack of administrative coherence was a formidable task. A substantial number of agencies were, therefore, involved in the Ethiopian DRP. First among them was the Commission for the Rehabilitation of Members of the Former Army and Disabled War Veterans, specifically set up by the TGE to deal with the demobilization, reinsertion, and reintegration of ex–combatants. During the three phases, the Commission received direct implementation assistance from other Ethiopian government departments, NGOs, and bilateral donors. (Table 7.1 at the end of this chapter summarizes their responsibilities.)

The Tehadisso Commission

A complex program like the Ethiopian DRP cannot be implemented successfully unless there is an implementation unit set up and directly responsible for operations. In particular, administrative coherence among the different government bodies directly or indirectly involved in such a largescale process was seen as a key
factor. The TGE established the Tehadisso Commission only three weeks after it ascended to power.65

The TGE entrusted the Commission to reach the following objectives (Commission 1994b, p.42ff.):

• Facilitating the integration of Derg (and later OLF) ex–combatants into civilian life and enabling them to become self–supporting and productive citizens.

• Providing rehabilitation services and vocational training to injured and partially disabled war ex–combatants to facilitate their economic self–sustainability in the medium–term.

• Providing long–term medical care to severely disabled war ex–combatants with injuries that rendered them unable to become productive civilians.

In addition, the Commission was to assist the Ministry of Defense in identifying and selecting those Derg ex–combatants whose services would be of use in the new Ethiopian National Defense Force (ENDF). The Commission's headquarters were set up in Addis Ababa, ironically in the headquarters of the 'Mobilization Commission' of the Derg regime.

65 The speed with which the Tehadisso Commission was set up can be explained by both the magnitude of the problem and the prior experience of the TPLF/EPLF with demobilizing Derg soldiers. This experience dates back to early 1988 when 20,000 Derg soldiers were captured by the EPLF after their defeat at Af–Abet.

Institutional Issues

Organigram

The Commission is not part of the regular government structure. Legally, it is under the Ministry of Defense, but this ministry has never had any influence in the Commission's operations. In practice, the Commission is under the Prime Minister's Office and is supervised by a Board (or Advisory Committee), which consists of the Commissioner (chairman), the RRC (director) and vice ministers of relevant ministries (Defense, Agriculture, Health, Education, Labor and Social Affairs, Industry, and Communication and Transport). The Ethiopian Red Cross Society is also represented on the Board.

The Commission consists of three departments and four units. The departments are responsible for (a) administration and finance, (b) logistics and general services, and (c) social services. The social services department comprises two important divisions for (a) training and placement and (b) pension and health. The service units are (a) planning and programming, (b) legal, (c) public relations,66 and (d) audit and inspection (which is also responsible for monitoring). Despite the shift from emergency (reinsertion) to development (reintegration), the organigram of the Commission essentially remained the same (see Chart 7.1 in the Appendix to this chapter).

All three departments are under the Deputy Commissioner who is also responsible for the activities of the branch offices and the two disabled war veterans centers in Adigrat and Debre Zeit. The service units are managed by a unit head and report to the Commissioner. The Commission's head office is responsible for a wide array of activities, which include, among other things:

• Preparing short– and long–term work programs

• Assessing the feasibility of proposed projects and coordinating the allocation of budgets for projects approved by the Board
• Organizing fund-raising measures

• Collecting and analyzing monitoring data

• Organizing training programs to improve operations

• Coordinating training and other support activities for disabled ex–combatants

• Advising higher authorities on improving the program and its implementation.

The Commission also provides administrative support to NGOs and donors involved in the DRP. A case in point is GTZ’s RP for which the Commission provides administrative assistance. The Commission is also responsible for coordinating DRP interventions with other government departments, most notably the RRC and several line ministries; however, due to lack of coordination among the Commission, donors, and NGOs, duplication of efforts has likely occurred.

This unit is responsible for the dissemination of information on DRP activities. It prepares, prints, and distributes documents (e.g., regular progress reports) and receives and answers queries from the general public.

Field Representation

Representation in the field was judged to be one of the crucial elements for successful program implementation. To this end, the Commission established field offices at the same time that ex–combatants were transported from the discharge centers to their destinations. On the basis of the regional distribution of ex–soldiers, the Commission eventually set up seven regional executive offices and thirty–six branch offices.

The executive offices at the regional level have the task of reporting difficulties to higher authorities or relevant line ministries and of devising guidelines for overcoming these difficulties in conjunction with the Board. The branch offices are located in administrative regions and zones in which the Commission is active and are responsible for the organization and coordination of the field implementation. On average, there are ten staff in each branch office.

To accomplish these objectives, the branch offices:

• Collect relevant information on ex–combatants and disabled war veterans

• Classify ex–combatants into urban–rural target subgroups according to their preference

• Register self–demobilized soldiers who did not participate in the demobilization phase

• Provide ex–combatants with emergency assistance (stipends and coupons) until they become self–supporting

• Coordinate and/or implement the reintegration programs in the respective regions

• Facilitate access of ex–combatants to training courses

• Monitor the distribution of funds and food aid

• Promote and coordinate the participation of regional government offices, welfare, and other organizations
Monitor the conditions of ex–combatants being assisted by NGOs and help these NGOs get the necessary administrative support.

Periodically issue performance evaluations of ex–combatants to the Commission.

With the introduction of the Revolving Credit Fund, the Commission's Board established regional branch office committees, which consist of representatives from the concerned ministries, the AIDB, NGOs, and communities, as deemed necessary. The tasks of these committees are to:

- Design procedures for raising funds for the reintegration program in the region
- Coordinate the relevant organizations in the region
- Present reintegration projects to donors for funding
- Organize and coordinate the activities of the organizations responsible for providing training programs
- Help ex–combatants sell their products.

Headquarters staff regularly interact with the branch office staff. Quarterly meetings are organized to report on program implementation and discuss further actions. The field–based staff are mostly EPRDF ex–combatants. In many cases, they are familiar with the problems and opportunities at the localities. They also understand the particular problems of the target group.

**Outreach Staff**

EPRDF ex–combatants were used as outreach staff. Although they mostly did not have transport, they were mobile, even walking from one community to another. Two to four ex–combatants were assigned to each branch office. They were supposed to have high school education and received some training prior to starting their assignment.

The use of ex–combatants seems to have been a major factor in the successful implementation of the program. They were accepted by most ex–combatants, even those from the Derg army. The outreach staff are stationed at the zonal level but spend most of their time in the field, thereby covering most woredas (subdistricts). Their main responsibility is to solve ex–combatant problems, be they social or program–related.

Ex–combatants also collect information, register new ex–combatants, and counsel their former opponents. They are also involved in recovering loans from the RCF and apparently perform better than AIDB staff. In short, these ex–combatants are needed greatly and are effective troubleshooters at the grassroots level.

**Community Involvement**

To broaden its base, the TGE set up advisory committees at the regional and district levels, consisting of representatives from the Commission and relevant line ministries (in line with the Commission’s Board). At the lower levels, the TGE established peace and stability committees. The latter committees were not much involved in the DRP process, except for the evaluation of some project proposals under the RCF at the zonal level (through the respective line ministry); however, each peace and stability committee had a development subcommittee the responsibility of which was to promote general development at the woreda level.
At the time the Commission started its operations, there were no adequate government structures in place to support implementation. As a result, the Commission decided to use extended development subcommittees, which consisted of elected members, to participate in the implementation process. It, thus, created local committees, which consist of representatives from the development subcommittees, the Commission (technical representatives from the line ministries), and the ex-combatants themselves. The ex-combatants were asked to send a representative whom they elected independently.

During the first two years, these extended development subcommittees were heavily involved in implementation and thereafter only occasionally. The local committees registered, identified, and continue selected ex-combatant beneficiaries. They had to ensure that beneficiary selection was undertaken on the basis of needs. They procured oxen/heifers and seeds and provided information on the credit worthiness of project applicants. They were also responsible for the issuing of land.

The role assigned to the ex-combatant representatives was to organize labor (e.g., the unloading of trucks) and assist in the procurement, transport, and distribution of inputs. They were not paid to perform these functions. As these activities were completed, the Commission terminated the further formal involvement of ex-combatant representatives in program implementation. Overall, the Commission attributes the success of its rural reintegration program primarily to the institutional arrangements and the commitment of local committee members, who were motivated despite not being paid.

Management Issues

Staffing

The Commission has a total of 1,169 staff: 312 at headquarters, 298 at branch offices, and 559 at the two disabled ex-combatant centers. From the outset, the Commission realized that staff were the critical resource for successful implementation. As the implementation of the DRP attests, the Commission was able to solicite a high degree of commitment and motivation from its staff.

The Commission arranged a fourteen-day training program for twenty-nine branch office representatives. Depending on their position within the Commission as well as their academic status, the trainees attended top-level and middle-level classes on various administration-related issues (such as development administration, distribution management, and auditing) at the Ethiopian Management Institute. No further staff training seems to have been offered since.

Monitoring and Evaluation

The audit and inspection unit has overall responsibility for monitoring and evaluation. Its activities include, among other things:

- Monitoring the implementation of the work plans as well as the directives on financial, administrative, and general activities of the Commission
- Evaluating the performance of the Commission in relation to targets that are set annually

Management Issues
• Assessing the performance of staff at all levels.

Each department and unit has its own work program and agenda. To coordinate activities, quarterly meetings take place at the Commission's headquarters that are also attended by staff from the branch offices. These meetings serve to evaluate recent progress and agree on future activities. If the performance evaluation identifies shortfalls, the Deputy Commissioner is charged with analyzing the reasons for failure and taking measures to rectify them.

The branch offices keep current lists of the whereabouts and activities of the ex-combatants. At regular intervals, these lists are forwarded to the Commission's headquarters. On the basis of these lists and other information, the Commission prepares quarterly reports (in Amharic only). It is not known to what extent and how systematically this information is used for program monitoring and evaluation.

Beyond Program Completion

At the beginning of the DRP, the TGE envisaged a program duration of around three years; however, the slow start and ensuing funding delays led to the extension of the program to approximately five years. The rural and urban programs were essentially completed by 1993, and the Commission has already closed sixteen of the thirty-six branch offices. The Revolving Credit Fund is now planned to be closed by early to mid–1996. Only the program for the disabled ex-combatants will continue in all likelihood, however, with a different institutional structure. The plan is to hand over the still ongoing activities to the relevant ministries.

Implementation Support

The most important institutions supporting the Commission in implementing the DRP were the Ministry of Defense, RRC, ICRC/ERCS, UNHCR, USDOD, and WFP during the demobilization and reinsertion phases and the Ministry of Agriculture, AIDB, GTZ, CRS, ESRF, and OXFAM UK/I during the reinsertion and especially reintegration phases. Unfortunately, information on support during demobilization is scant, mainly because these operations have long been completed and staff have been reassigned.

Coordination with other government offices has sometimes been difficult. For instance, the regional offices of the Ministry of Agriculture and other supporting offices seem to have not been as responsible during the reinsertion phase as expected. Lack of an effective information exchange system between the central and regional bodies, absence of follow-up on the distribution of funds, and problems faced in securing land have also contributed to implementation irregularities. By and large, however, institutional support from government and other agencies proved vital for the execution of the program.

Support During Demobilization

Ministry of Defense

The Ministry of Defense played a critical role in the demobilization phase of the DRP. In particular, its tasks were to (a) disarm ex-combatants who reported to the discharge centers or surrendered to EPRDF forces, (b) trace the whereabouts of ex-Derg soldiers and disarm them with the collaboration of local community leaders/members, and (c) prevent the escalation of political or criminal violence with the help of the police force. Together with the Commission and the ICRC/ERCS, it also managed the assembly of former Derg soldiers in former military training centers.

The defense forces were able to accomplish these tasks and ensure stability within a relatively short period of time. Incidents of armed robbery with which ex-combatants were initially associated declined markedly and
criminal activities in the discharge centers remained limited. After the demobilization phase, cooperation between the Commission and the Ministry of Defense regarding Derg continue

and OLF ex–combatants has been on limited pension issues. Both, however, manage the demobilization of ENDF soldiers.

**Ethiopian Red Cross Society**

The ICRC is nonoperational. Its major responsibility was the provision of food to the discharge centers. The ICRC’s implementing counterpart, the ERCS, however, played a major role in the demobilization phase and also during reinsertion through its regional branches. The ERCS provided food and health care to ex–combatants in the discharge centers and managed the transport operation returning ex–combatants to their communities of choice. It also was in charge of food aid distribution during the first three months after demobilization.

**Support During Reinsertion and Reintegration**

**German Agency for Technical Cooperation**

At the time the Federal Republic of Germany decided to support the Ethiopians in late 1991, the Tehadisso Commission was not sufficiently established to implement its contribution. The German government, therefore, decided to create its own implementation unit to respond more timely to the ex–combatants’ needs; thus, the GTZ established an RP Project Unit in June 1992. This unit's headquarters are in Addis Ababa adjacent to the GTZ Main Office and virtually independent of the Commission.

The GTZ–RP unit has branch offices in Harer (530 kilometers east), Nekemte (327 kilometers west) and Arba Minch (450 kilometers south).68 Its operations are managed and supervised by an Ethiopian project manager, an expatriate project advisor, and an expatriate backstopping officer. Three subunits are responsible for training/credit, agriculture, and housing/infrastructure, respectively. The field offices are supervised by a local Senior Project Officer. The total GTZ–RP comprises approximately twenty staff.

The GTZ Reintegration Program was evaluated by the German Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development in October 1994. While generally positive, the evaluation identified a number of key concerns in the areas of coordination, management problems, disbursement delays, community participation, and gender.

*Coordination.* The Memorandum of Understanding, which regulates cooperation and coordination with the Commission, limits coordination requirements to a formal minimum. While this has facilitated implementation speed and political neutrality, it has contributed to a perception of inadequate consultation, information, and coordination on the Commission's side. Nonetheless, the Commission and the GTZ have been directly linked at the field level, because some GTZ field offices are located in the Commission's branch offices. The establishment of the Open Fund later encouraged other donors to allocate resources to similar schemes, and the GTZ is administering OLF reintegration funding from ODA and SIDA.

68 Initially, five field offices had been set up but two have already been closed. The directions here are east, west, and south of Addis Ababa.

Program planning and modification was initially the task of GTZ, the project manager, and the senior project coordinator. Failure to include the Commission, project officers, and field officers in this process led to a loss of transparency on such issues as policies, objectives, and duration. Currently, the Commission and GTZ meet around four times a year at the program level. At the project level, the Commission and GTZ cooperate more
regularly, especially with regard to project proposals. The Commission appraises ex-combatant proposals and forwards them to the GTZ for funding.

**Management Problems.** The program was based on the assumption that a comparatively small staff could administer a broad range of projects using a variety of interventions. To this end, the GTZ initially relied on the Commission and partner organizations to undertake supervision activities and kept its resources to screen, monitor and evaluate adequately projects implemented by counterpart agencies to a minimum.

The differing professional quality of counterparts in project design and implementation, however, required greater levels of monitoring and support at all stages of the project cycle than had been expected from GTZ staff. Moreover, many NGOs in Ethiopia were relief oriented and lacked development experience. The Project Unit has, therefore, become involved in the day-to-day management of projects as well.

Consequently, the number of staff was increased in response to increased follow-up demand. The approval time of project proposals is three months on average, rather than the few weeks initially envisaged under the 'quick response procedure,' reflecting in particular the often poor quality of proposals submitted. Further delays repeatedly occur, for instance, when the project beneficiaries cannot acquire a suitable site, electricity is not online, or a business license is not issued.

**Monitoring and evaluation** were not planned in terms of larger surveys or impact assessments; however, 'output monitoring' has always been undertaken as envisaged. For in-depth impact studies, an arrangement has been concluded with a German university and several studies have been completed in this context.

Staff did not receive any specific training because the operation was initially limited to two years. Moreover, GTZ tried to ensure that only staff with sufficient qualifications were hired and then relied on on-the-job training to ensure competence. Because of the depreciation of the Ethiopian Birr, however, the value of the funds to be spent in ETB has multiplied and the program has been extended to June 1996. The lack of initial training may have been compensated for by on-the-job training during implementation.

Experience has shown that implementation partners and beneficiaries have not been adept at identifying market gaps. They often relied on proposing 'orthodox' projects (e.g., tailoring) in sectors in which supply is already adequate; therefore, GTZ began in early 1995 to provide training (workshops) in microenterprise design, management, monitoring, and evaluation. This training is offered to its RP staff, the Commission's staff and also to its implementing partners (e.g., the Tigray Development Association, Redd Bama, Integrated Holistic Approach, and the Region 14 Handicraft and Industry Bureau).

More emphasis is now also placed on market research and business skills. The accompanying increase in administrative efforts, however, implied that assistance had to be reduced to within 100 kilometers of the field offices. Even though the GTZ is aware that outreach activities are important, both for monitoring and for the beneficiaries, it cannot afford further coverage.

The Project Unit requested implementing partners to submit three-monthly or monthly (credit projects) reports on their operations and financial transactions. As no standard had been defined, the quality and completeness of these reports differed considerably. In most cases, additional information was required for the internal monitoring of project activities by GTZ staff.

Consequently, the Project Unit developed an 'Internal Handbook' for guiding implementing partners (1994a). This handbook describes the program, provides information on how to access its various components, explains procurement procedures, and gives clear reporting guidelines for each type of project, using standard formats. It
also includes guidelines for internal reporting by GTZ staff. Since its distribution, project management by the implementors has improved; however, monitoring still imposes a considerable burden on the Project Unit as it has to prepare monthly financial reports and quarterly progress reports.

**Gender Issues and Community Participation.** The program has been criticized for its lack of gender orientation. Women constitute a substantial proportion of the non-ex-combatant groups which the RP also targets (especially Eritrean refugees and internally displaced persons) and roughly 2,500 female OLF ex–fighters received demobilization and reinsertion support; however, few women (fifty–eight ex–combatants from either side) have benefited from reintegration projects. Moreover, the Project Unit has not paid enough attention to the systematic development of community participation.

Initially, GTZ directly contacted communities to disseminate information and get proposals. As the RP is widely known by now, many proposals are now received without further information campaigns. Nevertheless, GTZ continues to contact new communities and potential partner organizations. This dual approach attempts to ensure that projects are truly demand–driven. By itself, however, it is insufficient to promote participation as the dynamics of local–level decisionmaking are not explicitly captured in the process.

Overall, the experiences of GTZ–RP with community involvement has been mixed. On the one hand, the communities are well organized and capable of providing concerted efforts. On the other, especially in urban areas, they pledge assistance in kind (e.g., the transport of quarry for road construction) but at times do not honor their pledges.

**Catholic Relief Services**

**Program Planning.** Prior to program inception, CRS consulted with the TGE, donors and NGOs concerned with reintegration programs to determine the focus and scope of ongoing programs. Preliminary planning was conducted with an emphasis on gathering socioeconomic data on potential beneficiaries, establishing a community participation mechanism and securing funding. CRS developed guidelines to assist ex–combatants in choosing and proposing small–scale income generating activities. The beneficiary selection criteria adopted ensure that the focus is on the neediest among

69 In all likelihood, the Commission suffered from the same shortcomings with its implementation partners.

the ex–combatants. CRS then reached a Tripartite Agreement with the RRC and the Commission regulating its coordination and cooperation with these agencies.

**Implementation Mechanism.** As CRS is nonoperational, it identified the Archdiocesan Catholic Secretariat (ACS) as the implementing counterpart organization. The ACS had limited capabilities to independently manage a development project. Consequently, CRS provided ACS the means to employ necessary staff (on grant officer and four extension workers) and to train them. The extension workers were given Development Education and Leadership Approach (DELTA) training. Community contacts with parish priests, respective laity councils, community leaders and local administrative officials were developed and strengthened. This being a pilot exercise, CRS put particular emphasis on the regular monitoring of operations by its staff.

**Community and Ex–Combatant Involvement.** In each of the project areas, a coordinating committee, an emergency grant subcommittee, and a rehabilitation grant subcommittee were formed. These committees consisted of kebele council members, ex–combatant representatives, local church representatives and extension workers. They were involved in beneficiary selection, project identification and development, approval and agreement, counseling, monitoring, and evaluation.
Local ex-combatants were called to attend meetings by the local administrations where they were briefed and consulted about the proposed programs. Together with ACS, the ex-combatants then chose their own representatives, who joined the previously mentioned committees. Ex-combatants were consulted and advised on project options and proposals. Reflecting former army hierarchy, the representative often was an ex-officer.

Program Deficiencies. Similarly to other reintegration schemes, the CRS program is not self-sustainable and not participatory enough. In terms of management, the ACS approach to the target group was too charity oriented. The ACS seemed reluctant to charge interest, and beneficiaries tended to view the assistance as a church gift. The program's design did not sufficiently discourage dependency and promote self-reliance.

This lack of commitment of the community committee adversely affected the project activities. The communities thus saw the programs as church programs rather than as community programs. Similarly, the ACS approach apparently did not engender a sense of ownership or commitment among participating ex-combatants, as their actual involvement in project planning and ownership was insufficient.

Agricultural and Industrial Development Bank

As commercial banks were unwilling to become involved with ex-combatants under the revolving credit fund, the Commission requested the AIDB to administer the provision of the soft loans to eligible beneficiaries in each of the program regions. The AIDB cooperates with two committees set up by the Commission's Board: a zonal level committee and a technical committee established at every administrative level. The Commission allocated the funds at the zonal level but the final approval and thus the distribution of funds within zones is the responsibility of the AIDB.

The zonal level committee consists of department heads of the various government agencies including the AIDB's branch manager. It decides which projects should be submitted to the AIDB for financing. It also facilitates administrative matters, such as the issuing of permits and legal personnel. The members of the technical committee are representatives from the various ministries including staff from the AIDB branch. The major responsibilities of the technical committee are to identify income-generating projects for self-organized ex-combatants and to conduct prefeasibility studies for recommendation to the zonal level committees.

The AIDB has sufficient experience in such operations and a network of branch offices countrywide; however, the Commission has been dissatisfied with the effectiveness of the AIDB and accuses AIDB staff of following the lax management methods of the Derg regime. AIDB staff seem to lack interest in the scheme and are often reassigned. Much as during the Derg regime, they do not trace loan defaulters efficiently. Moreover, the approval procedure appears unduly long; however, AIDB restraint could also be based on transaction costs that are higher than the 9 percent remuneration of its services.

On the other hand, the AIDB doubts the technical competence of the technical and zonal level committees and ascribes the high default rates to these committees' approval of unfeasible projects. In fact, according to a USAID-sponsored evaluation, "both the zonal level committee and the technical committee lack the know-how for selecting profitable projects. Projects are usually selected on the basis of social and political grounds rather than financial profitability" (USAID 1994a, p.9).

Ethiopian Social Rehabilitation Fund

During the negotiations between the TGE and the Bank over reintegration support, an agreement was reached whereby the Bank's ERRP would be the main conduit for funds to ex-soldiers. The ERRP contains a pilot social...
fund, the Ethiopian Social Rehabilitation Fund (ESRF), to support infrastructure and income-generating projects benefiting vulnerable groups.

The ESRF is implemented by a small Management Unit in Addis Ababa. The unit enjoys a certain level of autonomy from the government in regard to accounting, contractual and procurement procedures, staff selection, and management systems. It has field offices, comprising seven staff each, in the three regions where it has been operational. Monitoring and evaluation are undertaken in a participatory manner in which (a) an implementation schedule is established together with the implementing agencies and the beneficiaries, (b) the progress is reviewed against the schedule, and (c) reports are completed only after discussion and agreement among all parties, including beneficiaries.70

70 No information is available on the effectiveness of this method.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 7.1 Institutions and Responsibilities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Institution</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tehadisso Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RRC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community Committees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Agriculture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Defense</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Agricultural and Industrial Development Bank 99
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ministry of Education</th>
<th>Reintegration</th>
<th>Provision of formal education to ex–combatants.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Health</td>
<td>Reinsertion</td>
<td>Provision of health services for ex–combatants and their families.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Reintegration</td>
<td>Provision of health services for ex–combatants and their families; employment of 1,400 ex–combatant health workers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Labor</td>
<td>Reintegration</td>
<td>Certification of skills; provision of vocational training to ex–combatants; placement of ex–combatants in public works and on state farms.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Transport</td>
<td>Demobilization</td>
<td>Provision of vehicles for transportation of ex–combatants from discharge centers to home communities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>Demobilization</td>
<td>Repatriation of ex–combatants from neighboring countries.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WFP</td>
<td>Demobilization</td>
<td>Provision of food aid for discharge centers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICRC/ERCS</td>
<td>Demobilization</td>
<td>Management of discharge centers; provision of food and health care; transportation of ex–combatants.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Reinsertion</td>
<td>Food aid distribution for the first three months.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USDOD</td>
<td>Demobilization</td>
<td>Provision of food and nonfood supplies to discharge centers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIDB</td>
<td>Reintegration</td>
<td>Implementation of the Revolving Credit Fund.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GTZ</td>
<td>Demobilization</td>
<td>Transportation of OLF ex–fighters.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Reinsertion</td>
<td>Provision of assistance to OLF ex–fighters.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Reintegration</td>
<td>Implementation of Open Fund (reintegration program).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRS</td>
<td>Reinsertion</td>
<td>Provision of monthly stipends.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Reintegration</td>
<td>Implementation of rehabilitation program.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The interventions as large scale and complex as the Ethiopian demobilization and reintegration program could not be implemented without funding assistance. While this support was crucial to its overall success, donor involvement more often than not complicated the planning and execution of the DRP. While donors were reluctant to provide support, NGOs have responded more favorably from the outset.
Background

The donor community was surprised by the suddenness of the Derg regime's collapse in May 1991. In the overall environment of post–conflict insecurity and uncertainty that characterized the Ethiopian situation, international organizations, donors, and NGOs were embarking on a new relationship with a government of which they knew little. Furthermore, the TGE had yet to prove itself capable of governing the country or managing programs. In particular, donors were uncertain of the technical competence of the Commission.

Within a month of the TGE's accession to power, donors were confronted with (a) the immediate reaction of the new government to stabilize the political situation by demobilizing the ex–combatants in an orderly manner, (b) ensuring adequate humanitarian conditions in the transit centers, and (c) the requests for demobilization assistance. Given this emergency situation, there was great pressure on the donor community to respond quickly to needs.

While the ICRC/ERCS agreed to manage some of the camps (in effect treating the exercise as a relief mission), however, most donors were not willing to associate themselves with the encampment process. They distrusted the TGE's rationale for the continued encampment of the ex–combatants and saw the demobilization process as detention with political screening and reeducation. They also worried that this process would not be accepted by the Ethiopian people.

For these reasons and on the humanitarian grounds of the dreadful conditions in the camps, the donors insisted that all ex–combatants be resettled at their home communities as rapidly as possible. The TGE's concern that resettling the ex–combatants without sufficient assistance would be destabilizing and its contention that the group discussions in the centers were a form of justifiable and necessary civic education were not accepted. In effect, despite the emergency condition, the donors were not prepared to respond to the challenges of demobilization as rapidly and effectively as required for both political and technical reasons.

Preparation of a Response

From mid–July onward, the TGE, donors, and the ICRC began discussions on the terms under which ex–combatants could be repatriated to their communities. At the same time, reinsertion and reintegration planning began under the auspices of a Demobilization Technical Committee (DTC), which was established by donors and in which the TGE was represented by the Commission.

The task of the associated steering committee was to mobilize resources, while the DTC's primary objective was to identify cost–effective strategies to reintegrate rapidly a large number of impoverished and unskilled ex–combatants into their respective home communities. A subcommittee of the DTC, consisting of experts from the WFP and the ILO, was responsible for appraising and revising the TGE's initial reintegration proposal before it was approved by the DTC.

By September 1991 the donor group had agreed in an Aide–Mémoire to pledge funds in the amount of US$154 million to a two–phase, training–oriented program.71 This program had been originally submitted by WFP/ILO and adopted by the TGE after a two–month process of negotiation. The understanding of the Commission was that this Aide–Mémoire would ensure funds availability for the program (Interafrica Group 1994, p. 17).

Following intensive discussions and another 'outside' appraisal report (by a team comprising Africans as well), the Commission assumed ownership of the final version of the proposal in mid–November and requested donors to honor their previous pledges; however, while by this time donors had decided the proposal was unrealistic, they could not offer any alternatives.72 Some donors argued that the needs of the ex–combatants would best be addressed in the context of an integrated social action program that would target soldiers among other vulnerable...
groups. At this point, the relationship between the Commission and donors temporarily collapsed.

UNDP then funded a consultant assessment, which presented its recommendations in early February 1992. On the basis of this report, negotiations between the Commission and donors recommenced. The new proposal stressed reintegration into society at large rather than training. To the Commission, this program was essentially a revision of the TGE's (WFP/ILO) program. Mean−while, six months had been lost while the Commission did "exercises with ILO and UNDP" because of what it considers "ILO's interference" (Commission 1994b, p.21).

While the Commission's demobilization activities proceeded independently of the negotiations with donors, the TGE borrowed funds from the Ministry of Finance to procure hand tools; a measure the Commission would have to resort to again. Eventually, the Commission accomplished the provision of a transitional safety net only with the assistance of the ICRC/ERCS, which distributed food aid to urban and rural beneficiaries for the first three months after the ex−combatants' demobilization.

In March 1992 the TGE finally took ownership of the UNDP−revised program and the donor community endorsed the proposal because it appeared to be a more viable and cost−effective way of assisting in the reinsertion and reintegration of ex−combatants. Italy, USA, Japan, and the European Commission (EC) pledged 52,360 metric tons of food, US$7.9 million in hard currency, and ETB 117 million counterpart funds to the new program. The TGE was to cover the salaries of local staff and administrative expenses amounting to ETB 3.8 million.

The fact that the crisis took place during the summer months seems to have delayed decisive donor action. Apparently, many ambassadors were absent and their deputies were not given the authority to act; therefore, although the technical committee met, participating individuals were not mandated to take necessary actions (Interafrica Group 1994, p. 17).

Donors were in disagreement and disarray about how to proceed. Most seemed relieved that the demobilization program was nearly over and had gone so well. They were, thus, disinclined to get further mired in reintegration activities.

Particular Problems with Donor Involvement

Among donors and the TGE, there was a lack of agreement as to whether relief/rehabilitation, development, and/or political criteria should be used to determine program priorities. Such disagreement was in large part responsible for the delay in preparing a concerted donor response to the TGE's request for support. Once agreement had been reached, donors failed to develop an effective and timely response mechanism.

With full confidence in the donors' integrity, the Commission began implementing the program in both rural and urban areas; however, pledged assistance often did not arrive in time, even when the requisite agreements and formalities had been completed. This forced the TGE to revise the content, scope, and timetable of the program and to divert resources from other programs to keep the reintegration process going.

In addition, the steering and technical committees were liquidated early in 1992; there has been no subsequent effort by the international community to coordinate assistance with government. The impact of the DRP is likely to have suffered from the subsequent lack of coordination and cooperation.

Influenced by the experiences between the Commission and donors, the Ministry of External Cooperation has been reconsidering external technical assistance. Donors have also learned that Ethiopians are capable of designing and implementing programs. For instance, while UNDP still proposes the use of external technical assistance, it does so more carefully and with a view to the quality of services needed.
**Multilateral Donors**

**International Labor Organization**

The International Labor Organization (ILO) has been involved in the Ethiopian DRP from an early stage onward; however, the Commission is highly critical of the ILO's role, claiming that it has "several times tried to manipulate the rehabilitation and reintegration of ex–combatants in its own interest rather than in the interest of Ethiopia" (Commission 1994b, p.21).

In conjunction with the WFP, ILO personnel drafted the first reintegration training–oriented proposal, which was later rejected by the donor group. The Commission feels that the ILO recommended unnecessary ILO measures "for the sake of involving ILO technical services" (Commission 1994b, p.21). Moreover, the transaction costs of the international support were deemed unjustifiably high by the Commission.

In one instance, the ILO recommended the establishment of a four–person Project Implementation Unit consisting of expatriates, which would have had administrative and equipment costs of US$1.6 million. According to the Commission, that amount would have been sufficient to reintegrate 10,000 urban and 5,000 rural ex–combatants.

In another instance, the ILO designed a socioeconomic reintegration program for disabled ex–combatants, for which it would be the executing agent. The project was to be funded by USAID, the Government of the Netherlands, and other multilateral sources. When the Commission requested a reduction in the number of work months of the ILO Chief Technical Advisor and the replacement of other expatriate experts by what it considered to be qualified Ethiopians, the ILO withdrew its support from the program and advised other donors to do the same. The donors withdrew their support and the program was canceled.

**United Nations Development Program**

The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) initially played a coordinating role in the DTC. It took the initiative and funded the consultant assessment, which the donor group requested after losing faith in the utility of the initial WFP/ILO proposal. After the donors and the Commission had accepted the UNDP–revised proposal, the UNDP apparently intended to create a contact group that would meet regularly to facilitate donor coordination regarding the reintegration program; however, this committee never convened. In contrast to the ILO, the Commission appreciates UNDP's efforts to develop national implementation capacities (Commission 1994b, p.22).

**Bilateral Donors**

Although a larger number of donors were involved in the DRP, the German and U.S. contributions probably had the most direct influence on the operations of the Commission. The involvement of the GTZ has so far been without major difficulties. U.S. involvement has at times been viewed as having been more problematic.

The United States government was one of the first to respond positively to the TGE's request for support. The Department of Defense (USDOD) airlifted a total of 1.8 million Meals–Ready–to–Eat (MREs) and large quantities of other excess food and nonfood relief supplies from its emergency relief operations in post–war Iraq between June and September 1991. These supplies were consigned to the ICRC and the RRC for emergency programs assisting demobilized soldiers and displaced civilians.

An additional two million MREs were unloaded in Djibouti in August 1991; however, storage and transport complications delayed their arrival in Ethiopia for six months, by which time most had been spoiled and the
urgent need for them had passed. Nonetheless, the USDOD contribution was considered to be a success overall, providing key relief support at a crucial phase of the demobilization.

While the provision of bilateral aid to the DRP started early, its implementation was marred with difficulties. USAID pledged US$5 million in support of the DRP in September 1991. Also in September, USAID and WFP signed a letter grant, which was assumed to be the mechanism whereby funds could be disbursed to the Commission for the WFP/ILO proposal. In December, when the donors belatedly decided they could not support the WFP/ILO proposal, USAID realized it must find another mechanism. It was not until a year later, in January 1993, that the Limited Scope Grant Agreement between USAID and the TGE was finally signed.

This delay seemed to have been compounded by USAID's procurement procedures. The procurement system required that the Commission's requests had to be approved by USAID Ethiopia, continue...

which then partly processed them and forwarded them to headquarters for contract advertisement and execution. This system "resulted in extraordinarily long delays, undermining the Mission's credibility with the Commission in the process" (USAID 1994b, p. 14).

Furthermore, USAID's 'Buy America' policy led to vehicles in support of the Commission's rural reintegration program arriving in July 1993, two years after having been committed. Not only did these vehicles arrive late, they were also ill-suited to Ethiopian road conditions and servicing them has proved difficult.

As a result of these difficulties in disbursement, the remaining US$2 million of the grant was reprogrammed in mid-1995 to support reintegration projects for disabled ex-combatants, which the Commission had proposed for Tigray, Bahir Dar, and other regions of the country. Although requested, USAID declined to participate in the RCF because it did not conform to USAID revolving credit guidelines and is not deemed to be financially sustainable.73

Nongovernmental Organizations

A number of local and international NGOs have initiated projects in support of demobilized ex-combatants, most important, the ICRC/ERCS, CRS, and OXFAM UK/I. While these bodies have coordinated their interventions with the Commission's program, others have apparently followed an independent approach. Information on these activities is thus scant, partly due to the time that has passed, the localized nature of many interventions, and the lack of an explicit ex-combatant targeting. As with donors, the quality of the relationship between the Commission and NGOs varies.

The Commission claims that some NGOs discriminated on the basis of ethnic and religious affiliation. According to the Commission, this has led to dissatisfaction and social unrest in certain instances. The Commission feels that some NGOs provided inappropriate services. This situation was exacerbated by their unwillingness to coordinate with the Commission. Although the Commission believes it has the best information on the ex-combatants' needs, many NGOs treat their support to ex-combatants as part of their regular program and cooperate with the RRC rather than the Commission.

The Commission also argues that NGOs, much like bilateral and multilateral donors, have created expensive administrative machines and that their staff are unprofessional. The Commission also complains that their overhead costs are too high and that they pay their staff too much (perhaps because a number of NGOs have lured Commission staff into their services).

On the other hand, some NGOs accuse the Commission of political bias and favoritism. NGOs also attribute the lack of coordination to the Commission's weakness, certainly in the early days of the DRP. In general, thus, the
Commission is not too keen on working through NGOs. Nevertheless, it has repeatedly requested NGOs to support small projects, especially for its urban reintegration program.

73 USAID Ethiopia would have been in a position to financially support the scheme if the Commission had used the term 'grant' rather than 'credit.'

9—
Program Costs and Financing

It is virtually impossible to offer a precise account of the costs and financing of the Ethiopian DRP. First, many of the expenditures during the emergency demobilization phase cannot be properly established. Second, many interventions have been implemented simultaneously without necessarily sharing pertinent information with the Commission. The devaluation of the ETB during the DRP process further complicates calculations of foreign exchange contributions. Lastly, this study follows a different categorization of the DRP phases than does the Commission.

Program Costs

According to the Commission, the costs of the emergency program for the Derg, which was implemented between June 1991 and August 1992, were ETB 248.8 million (US$128 million). Of these, the TGE provided ETB 78.6 million in local currency. From the available sources, it is difficult to distinguish between the demobilization and reinsertion elements of the Commission's emergency phase. Furthermore, little is known about the costs incurred for the demobilization of the OLF apart from the ETB 735,000 financed by the GTZ for the relief and transport of 7,861 ex-fighters.

Derg Demobilization

The repatriation from the Sudan has amounted to some ETB 31.5 million (US$15 million) and the management of the centers (by ICRC/ERCS) to an estimated ETB 62.1 million (US$30 million). Furthermore, ETB 41.4 million (US$20 million) in food and supplies were received from the USDOD as well as ETB 16.0 million in food aid from donors. Assuming that the TGE spent one quarter of the ETB 78.6 million on demobilization, the total demobilization costs amounted to an estimated ETB 170.4 million (Table 9.1).

Derg and OLF Reinsertion

The major budget items of the reinsertion component were the transition allowances and the monthly cash stipends. For Derg and OLF ex-combatants combined, they amount to ETB 121.4 million. The food rations reach ETB 49.7 million. In addition to the Commission's endeavors, CRS provided some ETB 90,000 for 300 urban ex-combatants and OXFAM UK/I supported children of ex-combatants by covering school fees and materials. The total reinsertion budget is, thus, estimated at ETB 171.2 million (Table 9.2).

74 Foreign currency contributions for the demobilization and reinsertion phases have been calculated at ETB 2.07 per U.S. dollar. For the reintegration phase, an exchange rate of ETB 5 per U.S. dollar was used.

75 The Commission includes these US$20 million in the TGE's contribution.

76 ETB 51.3 million (US$24.8 million) minus ETB 35.4 million used during the reinsertion phase.
Table 9.1
Program Costs: Demobilization a/
(Derg only; known expenses; estimates)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Costs (million ETB)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Management of centers (ICRC)</td>
<td>62.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Management of centers (Commission) b/</td>
<td>19.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Repatriation from the Sudan (UNHCR)</td>
<td>31.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food and supplies (USDOD)</td>
<td>41.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food aid c/</td>
<td>15.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>170.5</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a/ Assumed to include administrative costs.

b/ One quarter of ETB 120 million, corrected by the USDOD's contribution of ETB 41.4 million.

c/ Total food aid of ETB 51.3 million minus food rations during reinsertion.

Source: Commission (1994b); staff estimates.

Table 9.2
Program Costs: Reinsertion
(Known expenses; estimates)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item a/</th>
<th>Costs (million ETB)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Transition allowance</td>
<td>65.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monthly stipend</td>
<td>56.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food rations b/</td>
<td>49.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRS and OXFAM UK/I</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>171.2</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a/ See Table 4.1 for details.

b/ Food rations included 15 kg of wheat, 2 kg of pulses, and 1 kg of edible oil. Wheat and pulses are estimated at ETB 0.7 per kg, edible oil at ETB 3.8 per kg (World Bank 1993, p.59).

Source: CRS (1992) and Commission (1994b); staff estimates.

**Derg and OLF Reintegration**

Five promoters, the Commission, GTZ, CRS, OXFAM UK/I, and the ESRF, spent an estimated ETB 132.4 million on the reintegration of Derg and OLF ex–combatants. Of these, almost 90 percent has been covered by the three programs of the Commission for rural settlers, urban settlers, and disabled (Table 9.3). The programs of the GTZ and ESRF target a broader segment of the population and thus have spent more on post-war reconstruction.
than the amounts shown here. CRS and OXFAM UK/I provided small but targeted support. It should, however, be borne in mind that many other promoters supported ex–combatants in their regular programs and projects; thus, the total assistance remains, unknown.

### Table 9.3
**Program Costs: Reintegration**
(Known expenses; estimates)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item a/</th>
<th>Cost (million ETB )</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rural reintegration (Commission)</td>
<td>52.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban reintegration (Commission)</td>
<td>46.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disabled program (Commission)</td>
<td>20.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reintegration program (GTZ)</td>
<td>8.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rehabilitation grant (CRS) b/ and OXFAM UK/I</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopian Social Rehabilitation Fund</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>132.4</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a/ Excluding pension scheme. See Tables 5.1 to 5.4 for details.

b/ Including community contributions of ETB 0.1 million.


### Local Administrative Costs

The local administrative costs of each promoter for each phase of the program cannot be established; however, cursory data allow for some general comparisons. The budget of the Commission amounts to ETB 10 million annually, or ETB 40 million since the program's inception in 1991 (excluding capital expenditure). Of the 10 percent interest charged on RCF credits, the AIDB keeps a total of 9 percent. If this was sufficient to cover its handling costs, the RCF's administrative budget would amount to ETB 1,295,961.

Between its establishment in February 1992 and June 1995, the GTZ Project Unit spent an estimated ETB 3.1 million (DM 717,906) on administration in Ethiopia, including travel, accommodation, implementation, local consultants, and staff development. This figure, however, does not include GTZ overhead costs in Germany (commonly 12 percent of project funds) and the costs of international consulting involvement. On the basis of the share of ex–combatant participation in GTZ–sponsored projects (69 percent excluding double counting but including OLF demobilization), administration costs of ETB 2.1 million were incurred for supporting ex–combatants, reaching 19.5 percent of total GTZ–RP costs.

CRS provided ETB 300 and ETB 800 to 300 ex–combatant beneficiaries each under its cash and grant scheme, respectively. Deducting these ETB 330,000 from total expenditures, results in administrative costs of ETB 188,000. The overall administrative costs of the ESRF are approximately 12 percent. Assuming equal proportions between project types, the share of ex–combatant projects in the ESRF's administrative budget amounts to ETB 655,700. The overall administrative expenses from these five implementors, thus, reach ETB 43.9 million, of which 91.6 percent pertain to the Tehadisso Commission (Table 9.4).
On a disbursement basis (ESRF 1995, pp. 16, 22).

### Table 9.4

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Promoter</th>
<th>Administrative Costs (million ETB)</th>
<th>Total Program Costs (million ETB) b/</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tehadisso Commission c/</td>
<td>40.00</td>
<td>349.33</td>
<td>11.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIDB</td>
<td>1.30</td>
<td>15.7</td>
<td>8.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GTZ</td>
<td>2.14</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>19.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRS</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>0.52</td>
<td>36.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESRF</td>
<td>0.66</td>
<td>6.12</td>
<td>10.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>44.29</td>
<td>382.67</td>
<td>11.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a/ Excluding UNHCR and ICRC/ERCS.

b/ Including administration expenses.

c/ Includes management of centers and food aid distribution during demobilization, all reinsertion support, and the rural, urban, and disabled reintegration programs.


On average, administration expenses account for 11.6 percent of program costs. The AIDB has the lowest estimated percentage, but this is unlikely to cover all expenses. The Commission and ESRF have almost identical shares of 11.5 percent and 10.8 percent respectively. The GTZ, on the other hand, is implementing its reintegration program with higher administrative outlays of 19.5 percent. The most expensive implementor has been CRS with 36.3 percent of program funds used for administration.

#### A Comparison between Phases

The total costs of the Ethiopian Demobilization and Reintegration Program between mid–1991 and mid–1995 are estimated at ETB 518.3 million, of which ETB 474 million (91.5 percent) has been for program interventions. Expenditures for the demobilization and reintegration phases were almost identical with around ETB 170 million, covering 455,000 and 476,000 ex–combatants, respectively. The reintegration program, which targeted the more needy among ex–combatants, covered more than 332,000 ex–combatants at costs of ETB 132 million. Administrative expenses (excluding UNHCR, ICRC, and USDOD during demobilization) account for another ETB 44 million.

The per capita costs of the three phases are similar, ranging from ETB 360 to ETB 398. Moreover, the shares of demobilization and reinsertion in the total DRP budget are equal with 33 percent. Reintegration amounts to 25.5 percent of total costs. Administrative expenses add another ETB 93 million.
78 This low remuneration of 9 percent of the loan principal could be a decisive reason why the AIDB is not keen on collecting outstanding loans.

79 This ratio may in fact suggest that there is a lower limit for credit schemes below which even necessary administrative costs become inhibitive.

per ex–combatant beneficiary, or 8.6 percent of program costs.80 Overall Derg and OLF ex–combatants combined, per capita support amounted to ETB 1,089 (Table 9.5).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 9.5</th>
<th>Demobilization–Reinsertion–Reintegration Coverage and Costs (Known expenses; estimates)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Segment</strong></td>
<td><strong>Coverage (ex–combatants)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demobilization a/</td>
<td>454,559</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reinsertion</td>
<td>475,759</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reintegration</td>
<td>332,435</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administration b/</td>
<td>475,759</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>475,759</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a/ Excluding the 21,200 OLF ex–fighters. Assumed to include administrative costs for UNHCR, ICRC/ERCS and USDOD.

b/ Excluding UNHCR, ICRC/ERCS, and USDOD during demobilization.

**Source:** Commission (1994b); staff estimates.

Although the above calculations are by necessity based on a number of assumptions, there is no doubt that the Ethiopian DRP has been a major government program of approximately US$195 million. Although the TGE received major support during the demobilization phase, the implementation of the later phases was mostly in the hands of government. The Commission is, thus, responsible in large part for the DRP and its remarkable achievements.

**Program Financing**

The Commission calculates that the costs of the demobilization phase were US$128.0 million (ETB 248.4 million). Of these, US$70 million have been covered by donors (in foreign currency), the remaining US$ 58.0 million (ETB 120.1 million) by the TGE. The foreign currency contributions cover the expenses for the ICRC and the UNHCR in the amount of ETB 93.6 million (US$45.2 million). In addition, the GTZ provided ETB 0.8 million of support to OLF ex–fighters in the camps and for transport.

It is estimated that the Commission used part of the food aid for the reinsertion phase. Other contributions cannot be clearly attributed to either phase: the US$19.3 million (ETB 40.0 million) pledged by Italy from its commodity fund for paying monthly stipends to urban ex–combatants, and the European Community's US$7.2 million (ETB
The administrative expenses for UNHCR and ICRC/ERCS are not known and are, therefore, not explicitly included in the calculations. Consequently, the share of administration in overall program costs (8.6 percent) is lower than for the local program costs (11.6 percent).

This contribution excludes the administrative costs of the Commission.

The GTZ, CRS, OXFAM UK/I and a few other NGOs contributed a total of ETB 12.1 million, mainly to the reintegration phase. The Bank, through the ESRF, committed ETB 6.1 million. The Commission claims that another ETB 20 million were transferred by the TGE from the ESRF to the AIDB. A further ETB 3 million were raised by the Commission through such activities as lottery and music shows. SIDA and ODA donated SKr 3 million (ETB 1.8 million) and ETB 500,000 (US$100,000) to the GTZ's OLF reintegration program, respectively. Considering the size of the OLF group, the Commission deems these funds inadequate.

The Government of Italy donated an additional Lit 600 million (ETB 2.5 million), one-third of which was allocated in support of the physical rehabilitation and vocational training at the Adigrat center. The rest was budgeted for self-employment and income-generating microprojects in North and South Welo. The government of Japan provided US$1 million (ETB 2.1 million) for the purchase of seeds and other agricultural inputs under the rural reintegration program as well as for the Commission's administrative costs. Lastly, USAID contributed US$5 million (ETB 25 million) for the following major budget items: plastic tubes for coffee growers, vegetable seeds for farmers, vehicles and spare parts, fuel and maintenance costs for vehicles, and office equipment including computers, copy machines, and calculators.

Over all phases, government expenses are estimated at ETB 227.0 million. Of these, ETB 68.7 million have been received as donations or through the liquidation of Derg associations (for instance for women, youth, and peasants). The total known donor and NGO contributions to the program amount to ETB 291.3 million (Table 9.6). Of these, the demobilization (emergency) expenditures of ICRC, UNHCR, USDOD, and WFP alone reached ETB 186.3 million, or 36 percent of total costs. Clearly, reinsertion and reintegration have largely been the responsibility of the TGE, in terms of both funding and implementing. Overall, the share of donors in the DRP is equal to the government's share (44 percent and 43.8 percent in local currency, respectively).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 9.6</th>
<th>Program Contributions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Source</td>
<td>Amount (million US$ ) a/</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TGE b/</td>
<td>67.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multilateral donors</td>
<td>41.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDA/ESRF c/</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNHCR d/</td>
<td>15.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WFP and others (food aid)</td>
<td>24.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bilateral donors</td>
<td>56.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Community</td>
<td>7.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GTZ c/</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>20.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ODA</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIDA</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USDOD</td>
<td>20.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>195.5</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NGOs</th>
<th>30.2</th>
<th>63.2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CRS c/</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICRC/ERCS d/</td>
<td>30.0</td>
<td>62.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OXFAM UK/I</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>others e/</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>195.5</strong></td>
<td><strong>518.3</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a/ Foreign currency contributions for the demobilization and reinsertion phases have been calculated at ETB 2.07 per US$. For the reintegration phase, an exchange rate of ETB 5 per U.S. dollar was used.

b/ Known government contributions amount to ETB 145 million (US$51.3 million). It is assumed that the TGE has covered the discrepancy between program costs and total contributions of ETB 80.2 million (US$16 million).

c/ Including administration.

d/ Funds provided by donors to these agencies for implementation.

e/ Including support from the Catholic Church, the Swedish Philadelphia Church Mission (SPCM), World Vision, Canadian Physicians Aid for Relief (CPAR), and Nazareth Children's Center and Integrated Development (NACID).

Source: Commission (1994b); staff estimates.
10—
Returns to Peace and Demobilization

In spite of the fact that the annual GDP growth rate for the decade between 1983/84 and 1993/94 reached 2.1 percent (as compared to 1.6 percent for Sub-Saharan Africa between 1980 and 1993), the costs of the war to Ethiopia in terms of economic development were substantial. During the period covering the last three years before and the first year after the end of the war, the Ethiopian economy shrank by 1.2 percent annually.

After twenty-nine years of civil warfare, peace came to Ethiopia in mid-1991 with Eritrea seceding to form an independent state. Any financial data after 1990/91, therefore, exclude Eritrea. After the first post-war year, growth averaged 3.9 percent during the following two years but was erratic. If the economy had grown with the two-year post-war average during the last pre-peace period, output would have been an estimated ETB 7.9 billion (1 billion = 1,000 million) higher, corresponding to 18.4 percent of GDP at factor cost.

The Derg's military spending on the Ethiopian armed forces was independent of the spending of the EPLF and TPLF during the war. While the former can easily be established, the expenditures of the rebel forces are unknown; thus, the budgetary savings are calculated by comparing the demobilization of Derg soldiers with the hiring of EPRDF fighters into the new armed forces.

Little is known about the actual employment status of the ex-combatants and their yearly incomes. The calculations of the economic returns to demobilization are based on estimates drawn from the wider population and can, thus, not be undertaken with any degree of accuracy.

Financial Returns

In a country as large and diverse as Ethiopia, the 9.7 percent of GDP that government spent on average on defense in each of the final three years of the war were seriously draining already limited resources. At the same time, government spending accounted for 20.8 percent of GDP at market prices. After Eritrea's secession, government's importance dwindled only briefly; in 1993/94 it slightly surpassed its 1990/91 GDP share of 18.4 percent. Real current defense spending, however, peaking in 1989/90 with ETB 1,339 million, plummeted. It shrank to an average of ETB 321 million or 2.6 percent of GDP at market prices in the three years after demobilization and peace (Tables 10.1 to 10.3). Indeed, the defense expenditures of the last three years combined were below those of the final year of war.

82 It is beyond the scope of this study to assess the potential output on the basis of the damage inflicted on the population (labor), infrastructure (capital) and the knowledge base.

83 Somewhat imprecisely, this period is referred to as the 'pre-peace period'.

84 However, by 1992/93, Ethiopia's real GDP at factor cost already surpassed the highest pre-peace level (1989/90).

85 Tables and charts are presented in the Appendix to this chapter.

Moreover, the arms imports of the Derg regime between 1989 and 1991 had amounted to an impressive US$1,626 million in constant terms (U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency 1995, p. 110). Annual arms imports accounted for no less than on average 52.1 percent of total imports during this period. The TGE has completely cut imports of weaponry after its seizing of power in May 1991.
The financial savings of this shift in real government expenditures are, therefore, highly significant. In the three years prior to demobilization, the Ethiopian government spent on average ETB 1,222 million or 46.6 percent total current government expenditures on defense. In the three years following demobilization, defense's share decreased to just 16.4 percent, reaching ETB 300 million in constant prices or 12.5 percent of recurrent expenditures in 199394 (charts 10.1 and 10.2). Compared with pre–peace spending patterns, government saved over ETB 2,700 million in real terms in the post–war period, that is, 5.2 times the costs of the DRP. This translates to yearly savings of 73.7 percent over the average annual pre–demobilization defense budget.

Government's social expenditures confirm this dramatic turnaround. In the three years up to 199091, they accounted for 17.0 percent whereas after peace, they rose to more than 23.5 percent on average. In real terms, they surpassed defense for the first time in 199192 and reached ETB 561 million in 199394. Overall, during the last three years of war, the annual ratio of social to defense expenditures was below 0.4. It increased by 300 percent to an average of 1.4 during the three postwar years, finally reaching 1.9 in 199394.

**Economic Returns**

By 1992 the Transitional Government of Ethiopia demobilized 476,000 combatants, representing 2.2 percent of the country's labor force of 21.5 million. Although a small number in relation to the size of the population, the reintegration of such vast numbers posed tremendous problems as well as potential for the local economy. The economic returns to demobilization are calculated on the basis of the following assumptions (see also World Bank 1995):

- The income of ex–combatants is based on the income distribution of 198182 (the latest available). Annual wages in 199394 are estimated at ETB 570 for the first quintile, ETB 840 for the second quintile, and ETB 1,090 and ETB 1,400 for the third and fourth quintile, respectively.

- Fifteen percent of ex–combatants are effectively unemployed, 35 percent work in subsistence agriculture in the lowest quintile, 30 percent are engaged in agriculture and unskilled nonagriculture activities in the second quintile, and 15 percent and 5 percent are skilled workers and professionals in the third and fourth quintile, respectively.

- Moderately impaired and more severely disabled ex–combatants are not included in the calculations.

86 Between 1983 and 1991, arms imports totaled US$8,233 million in constant terms, or 73.7% of total imports per year (ibid.).

- Derg ex–combatants were engaged in productive activities for three quarters of fiscal 199192 (July 8, 1991 to July 7, 1992), OLF ex–combatants one half of fiscal 199293.

- Cash benefits were used for consumption purposes only.87

Ex–combatants in subsistence agriculture earned ETB 87.3 million annually since demobilization; those in the second quintile (agriculture and unskilled nonagriculture) earned ETB 110.6 million. Skilled workers and professionals earned ETB 71.4 million and ETB 30.6 million per year, respectively. In total, ex–combatants in productive activities jointly earned ETB 824.7 million between early 199192 and 199394 or ETB 299.9 million per year. This annual income represents 1.4 percent of GDP at factor cost during the three–year period.

For all ex–combatants, economically active and unemployed alike, the total average earnings of ETB 299.8 million imply a per ex–combatant income of ETB 642.7 per year. Compared with the per capita GDP of Ethiopia's working population of ETB 1,161, an ex–combatant earned only 55.4 percent of his/her civilian
counterpart, indicating rather dire circumstances for ex-combatants in their new civilian environment.

From this perspective, the support extended to ex-combatants through the DRP seems justified. Compared to the DRP budget of ETB 518.3 million, the three-year earnings were 1.6 times higher. On a per capita basis, total earnings of ETB 1,767 compare with benefits of ETB 1,089 for each Derg and OLF ex-combatant. (Table 10.4 provides a synopsis of financial and economic returns.)

87 Cash payments to a large number of ex-combatants can have inflationary effects; however, for distinct reasons these effects are likely to be small. First, ex-combatants settle in a dispersed pattern and their income injected into the local economy can have various multiplier effects. Second, in Ethiopia they have been paid in monthly installments, thus stretching the cash support over a period of seven to ten months. Nevertheless, it is clear that larger cash payments would be necessary if an ex-combatant is to invest in a small business.

Appendix

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 10.1</th>
<th>Central Government Recurrent Expenditures by Functional Category in Constant Prices, 1988/89-1993/94 (Millions of Ethiopian Birr, 1980/81=100)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>General Services a/</td>
<td>268.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defense</td>
<td>1258.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education and training</td>
<td>320.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public health</td>
<td>94.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other social services b/</td>
<td>64.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic services c/</td>
<td>160.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>679.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2846.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total social services d/</td>
<td>479.32</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Fiscal year ending July 7.

a/ Includes organs of state, judiciary, public order and safety, and other general services.

b/ Includes culture and sports, labor and social welfare, and relief and rehabilitation.

c/ Includes agriculture, industry, mining and energy, trade and tourism, transport and communications, and others.

d/ Includes education, health, and other social services.
Table 10.2
(in % of GDP at market prices)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>General Services a/</td>
<td>2.12</td>
<td>2.38</td>
<td>1.66</td>
<td>2.13</td>
<td>1.83</td>
<td>2.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defense</td>
<td>9.92</td>
<td>10.30</td>
<td>8.83</td>
<td>3.08</td>
<td>2.68</td>
<td>2.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education and training</td>
<td>2.52</td>
<td>2.55</td>
<td>2.18</td>
<td>2.38</td>
<td>2.24</td>
<td>2.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public health</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>0.74</td>
<td>0.61</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>0.71</td>
<td>0.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other social services b/</td>
<td>0.51</td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>0.71</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td>0.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic services c/</td>
<td>1.27</td>
<td>1.28</td>
<td>1.06</td>
<td>1.16</td>
<td>1.27</td>
<td>1.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>5.36</td>
<td>3.85</td>
<td>3.71</td>
<td>5.20</td>
<td>5.71</td>
<td>7.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>22.44</td>
<td>21.50</td>
<td>18.39</td>
<td>15.33</td>
<td>14.85</td>
<td>18.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total social services d/</td>
<td>3.78</td>
<td>3.69</td>
<td>3.14</td>
<td>3.76</td>
<td>3.37</td>
<td>4.38</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Fiscal year ending July 7.

a/ Includes organs of state, judiciary, public order and safety, and other general services.
b/ Includes culture and sports, labor and social welfare, and relief and rehabilitation.
c/ Includes agriculture, industry, mining and energy, trade and tourism, transport and communications, and others.
d/ Includes education, health, and other social services.

Source: Ministry of Finance, Ethiopia.

Table 10.3
(in % of total central government expenditure)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>General Services a/</td>
<td>9.43</td>
<td>11.07</td>
<td>9.01</td>
<td>13.92</td>
<td>12.32</td>
<td>14.96</td>
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<tr>
<td>Defense</td>
<td>44.21</td>
<td>47.91</td>
<td>48.03</td>
<td>20.10</td>
<td>18.02</td>
<td>12.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education and</td>
<td>11.24</td>
<td>11.87</td>
<td>11.88</td>
<td>15.50</td>
<td>15.08</td>
<td>14.56</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Ministry of Finance, Ethiopia.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Public health</th>
<th>3.33</th>
<th>3.45</th>
<th>3.33</th>
<th>4.38</th>
<th>4.80</th>
<th>3.81</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Other social services b/</td>
<td>2.27</td>
<td>1.82</td>
<td>1.85</td>
<td>4.63</td>
<td>2.79</td>
<td>5.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic services c/</td>
<td>5.64</td>
<td>5.96</td>
<td>5.75</td>
<td>7.57</td>
<td>8.53</td>
<td>9.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>23.88</td>
<td>17.92</td>
<td>20.16</td>
<td>33.90</td>
<td>38.45</td>
<td>39.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total social services d/</td>
<td>16.84</td>
<td>17.14</td>
<td>17.06</td>
<td>24.51</td>
<td>22.68</td>
<td>23.45</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Fiscal year ending July 7.

a/ Includes organs of state, judiciary, public order and safety, and other general services.

b/ Includes culture and sports, labor and social welfare, and relief and rehabilitation.

c/ Includes agriculture, industry, mining and energy, trade and tourism, transport and communications, and others.

d/ Includes education, health, and other social services.

*Source:* Ministry of Finance, Ethiopia.

**Table 10.4**

Returns to Peace and Demobilization

(Estimates)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Returns</th>
<th>Amounts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Financial Returns (three–year averages)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defense/expenditure ratio (current)</td>
<td>Before: 46.6%, after 16.4%; decrease of 64.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social/defense ratio (current)</td>
<td>Before: 0.36, after 1.44; increase of 300%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Budgetary savings per annum (current)</td>
<td>ETB 901 million; 30.2% of expenditures; 73.7% of Before defense expenditures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defense savings (capital; two year average)</td>
<td>US$ 542 million annually from arms imports</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Budgetary savings (over 3 years) to program costs</td>
<td>5.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income of ex–combatants a/</td>
<td>ETB 299.9 million per annum</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Income per capita compared to GDP per capita b/

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>55.4%</td>
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Program costs compared to income (over 3 years)

<p>| | |</p>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ETB 518.3 million vs. ETB 824.7 million; ETB 1,089 vs. ETB 1,767 per capita</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a/ Employed ex–combatants only.
b/ For the economically active population.

Source: IMF and World Bank; staff estimates.

Chart 10.1
Government Recurrent Expenditures by Functional Category (in % of total expenditures)

Chart 10.1
Government Recurrent Expenditures by Functional Category (in % of total expenditures)

Source: Ministry of Finance, Ethiopia.
11— Lessons Learned

The Ethiopian experiences with demobilization, reinsertion, and reintegration provide a number of lessons that appear pertinent to any such program. These lessons are presented below, grouped according to topics rather than in chronological order. This list, thus, serves as a quick reference guide to the program as well as for comparisons with other countries.

**Political Rationale**

- Strong *political leadership*, exemplified by commitment, realism, and pragmatism, is a crucial factor for successful program implementation. Such leadership, however, should not be mistaken with concentrating decisionmaking power at the central level.

- Although government and donors are under pressure to assist all displaced and poor people after the termination of protracted warfare, ex–combatants are a *particularly vulnerable*, and dangerous target group that warrants particular attention.

- National *reconciliation*, between the hitherto belligerent factions is crucial for sustainable peace. It can best be achieved by transparent policies that aim at building a relationship of trust.
Targeting

• An identification mechanism with a photograph serves as a targeting mechanism that effectively avoids leakages. Comrade committees can be a useful element in the identification process.

• The classification into several target groups and subgroups should be based on the ex–combatants' mode of subsistence and, hence, their different needs, requirements, and aspirations. This allows for the development of a differentiated, relevant, and cost–effective menu style approach. Good socioeconomic data, which can be collected during encampment, are essential for such classifications.

• A study of the opportunity structures for ex–combatants in rural and urban areas are important to design appropriate interventions. These interventions should be linked to the government's overall rural and urban development strategies.

Design

• The transition from combatant to civilian can be split into three phases: demobilization, reinsertion, and reintegration. During each of these phases, the needs of ex–combatants are different and require different support measures.

• To avoid resentment, ex–combatants should receive the minimal support necessary that helps them achieve the standard living of the communities into which they reintegrate.

• Prioritization of program components by simplicity in implementation, implementing the simple components first, puts scarce resources to optimal use.

• Linking the DRP with ongoing government, donor, or NGO programs enhances synergy and, thereby, reduces the need to build elaborate implementation structures.

• Information about program benefits should be disseminated to all beneficiaries so that they have equal access to support services.

• A specially targeted credit scheme, operated with nontraditional collateral and at subsidized rates, can help ex–combatants establish themselves as small–scale entrepreneurs. The calculation of the rate of profitability of such schemes should not be limited to economic variables but should take into account possible social opportunity costs by weighing security risks against economic optimization techniques.

• Ex–combatants can be encouraged to form groups to reduce per capita costs of program interventions; however, support should not be limited to groups and ex–combatants should not be forced to participate in groups.

• The particular problems of female and child soldiers as well as of disabled combatants warrant the development of targeted interventions.

• Low administrative (transaction ) costs put scarce resources directly into the hands of beneficiaries.

Demobilization

• Encampment poses a difficult trade–off. On the one hand, a longer encampment period facilitates the registration process and buys time to develop a comprehensive program. On the other, it increases health and security problems. A shorter period appears preferable.
• Proper orientation prior to discharge on topics that include social and psychological issues and the environment is an important element in the transition from combatant to civilian.

Reinsertion

• Immediately after demobilization, ex–combatants are the most vulnerable. Targeted assistance through a transitional safety net can effectively ease the initial pressure.

Reintegration

• Urban reintegration is more complex and requires a more diversified approach with more detailed planning.

• A placement and referral system can effectively enable ex–combatants to reintegrate economically. At the same time, job search skills of ex–combatants are critical and should be enhanced.

• The certification of skills acquired in or prior to joining the army is a highly effective and lowcost intervention.

• Linking ex–combatants to the labor market through emphasis on the demand side (e.g., through an employment subsidy scheme) provides on–the–job training for ex–combatants and increases their chances for successfully competing on the labor market.

• Social and psychological counseling by professional or specially trained staff help ex–combatants to learn how to cope with everyday civilian life.

• A link to extension services should be established to enable rural settlers to make full use of modern technology inputs (seeds and fertilizer) they receive.

• Informal networks between ex–combatants in the form of either loose discussion groups or economic ventures are key elements for both economic and social reintegration.

Community Involvement

• Local communities should be directly involved in decentralized decisionmaking, especially on crucial local aspects (e.g., the provision of land within the existing institutional set–up) and to allocate scarce public resources in a transparent manner (e.g., by identifying the most needy ex–combatants). Such involvement facilitates the communities' acceptability of the program.

• The establishment of a community fund, even if only at a small level, through which communities benefit from the assistance to ex–combatants can make communities appreciate the presence of ex–combatants.

• Social capital, the network between the ex–combatant and his/her social environment, is essential to successful reintegration and should be fostered throughout the program.

• Communities, serve an important role as intermediaries for problem solving, for example, through community advisory committees. They can also provide guidance to ex–combatants in their reintegration efforts. This potential should be tapped to the maximum.

• Ex–combatant representatives who are voluntarily elected by their constituency represent the interests of the target group well. They are a valuable contact point for program implementors and communities.
Institutional Issues

• Coordination within government and other promoters is important in maximizing the effectiveness of program interventions. The establishment of one agency with overall responsibility can serve this purpose best. Central coordination, balanced by decentralizing implementation authority to the districts, makes for a powerful institutional arrangement.

• Through field offices, beneficiaries have easier access to program benefits. Field offices also enable the government to make the program more responsive to local needs. The use of qualified ex-combatant representatives in field offices and as outreach staff amplifies these positive effects.

• The establishment of a temporary bureaucracy saves resources in the long-term. Once the major objectives have been fulfilled, any remaining activities should be integrated into the government's mainstream development efforts.

Donor and NGO Involvement

• Each phase in the development continuum requires specific skills and experience. Donors and NGOs should utilize their particular comparative advantage to participate optimally in the process.

• Because of a lack of clear policies on DRPs, donors can fail to develop an effective and timely response mechanism. Conflicting interests and failure to honor pledges can further derail a program. On the contrary, a quick donor response can substantially facilitate operations. It is useful to have a lead donor (preferably chosen by the government) providing overall donor coordination.

12—
Chronology of DRP–Related Events:
May 1991–March 1992

1991

May 28
EPRDF forces enter Addis Ababa. Derg army capitulates.

June 6
Airlift of USDOD excess food and nonfood relief supplies from Saudi Arabia begins.

June 14
The TGE establishes the Commission for the Rehabilitation of Members of the Former Army and Disabled War Ex–combatants.

June 21
In response to TGE request for assistance, USAID Ethiopia requests airlift of blanket and tents from USDOD excess supplies.

July 16
The Commission's Chairman briefs donors on TGE's repatriation, rehabilitation, and reintegration plans. Six–month encampment phase with reeducation component proposed.
August 6
Commission: Donor Group Meeting

August 8
First meeting of Demobilization Technical Committee (DTC) meeting convened under USAID chairmanship. Subsequent meetings on August 12, 16, and 23.

End–August
USDOD ship unloads 2 million MREs at port of Djibouti.

September 10
Aide–Mémoire to the Commission in which donor group pledges US$154 million in support of the ILO/WFP/Commission proposal for training.

September 11
Airlift of USDOD relief supplies is completed with last of twenty–four C5 Galaxy flights from Saudi Arabia.

September 30
WFP reluctantly signs agreement to implement US$5 million of U.S. support.

October 9
Meeting between the Commission, USAID, and WFP to discuss options for speeding up delivery of agricultural orientation courses for rural ex–combatants. The Commission does not raise issue of training or object to a Project Coordination Unit.

October 13
Meeting between the Commission and ILO. Organizational structure of project discussed. The Commission does not raise issue of training or object to a Project Coordination Unit.

October 14
Commission letter to USAID, copied to ILO, in which the Commission comments on WFP/ILO proposal. The Commission accepts proposal in principle, but expresses reservations about focus on training during an emergency situation and wants to eliminate international management unit as it feels that TGE line ministries are capable of executing these functions. Also skeptical of need for new training centers and revising curricula.

October 16
ILO/WFP letter to donors strongly protesting the Commission's comments (especially in light of the Commission's failure to raise these issues in October 9 and 13 meetings).

October 21
DTC meets.

October 28
DTC meets.

November 5
ILO staff issue brief on the status of ex–servicemen's reintegration schedule phase II with modification agreed on in Commission/ILO/WFP meetings.
November 11
The Commission approves and issues the ILO/WFP project under its own name and requests donor funding for
the US$154 million proposal (re: Aide-Mémoire, September 10).

November 21
UNHCR repatriates 50,888 Derg ex-combatants from Kassala, Sudan, to Ethiopia by air.

December 3
TGE announces that all but 900 of the 18,000 officers being held at Botar Tole discharge center will be released
and repatriated by the ICRC.

December 5
ICRC reports that approximately 220,000 ex-soldiers have been repatriated.

December 13
Donors decide they cannot recommend support for the WFP/ILO proposal in the absence of some sort of
assessment. Donor group meeting reviews terms of reference for consultant group.

December 17
Revised terms of reference submitted to prospective donors.

December 28
The Commission sends letter to donors urging them to honor their pledges to support the DRP. Almost all
ex-soldiers have been released from the camps (a precondition for donor assistance) and repatriated to their
communities of choice. Food supplies are only assured though January. Planning for the consultancy is underway
but there will be a gap while it is carried out. Recommendations are considered and implementation is initiated.

1992

January 4
UNDP-funded consultancy on Rehabilitation Phase of demobilization begins its work.

February 1
UNDP consultancy team completes its task and issues report and recommendations for phase II.

February 7
RRC submits plan to WFP for the distribution of 8,082 MT of food aid for 237,691 ex soldiers.

February 27
RRC issues distribution plan for food aid to ex-soldiers through WFP.

February
GTZ initiates its Reintegration Program.

March 23
Donors pledge following resources for the proposed reintegration program in a meeting with the Ministry of
Defense: US$7.8 million in foreign currency (US$5 million USAID); DM 6 million from GTZ (US$3.9 million)
for separate project; 40 million ETB for TGE counterpart funds; US$2.7 million from TGE in-kind contribution;
50,300 MT of food (20,000 MT USAID); 1,800 MT of fertilizer from Japan. UNDP Addis Ababa intends to
establish "an overall coordinating and monitoring mechanism, as recommended by the consultant mission."
committee was never convened.

SECTION II— NAMIBIA: BEYOND REPATRIATION

"National reconciliation is easy at the top but very difficult at grassroots."
(Development Brigade official; February 1995)

"Integration is not our problem. We want to survive."
(Ex-combatants in King Kauluma resettlement project; February 1995)

"With only 50 Dollars and vague government promises, they are a time bomb that can explode anytime."
(An ex-combatant about Development Brigade trainees in Ondangwa; February 1995)
Prologue

Historical Background

In 1978, the U.N. Security Council approved Resolution 435 outlining a plan for Namibia's transition to independence under the United Nations Transitory Assistance Group (UNTAG). After ten years of bitter warfare, Resolution 435 was finally implemented in the context of a U.S. brokered multinational agreement linking the departure of Cuban soldiers from Angola to the withdrawal of South African troops from Namibia and the latter's independence.

The peace agreement was signed by Angola, Cuba, and South Africa in December 1988. Significantly, no Namibian party was a part of the accord. "The Namibian equities were entrusted mostly to the Angolans and the Cubans; their military equities were largely ignored and the PLAN (People's Liberation Army of Namibia) leadership and their concerns not a factor" (Woods, Snyder, and Hess 1992).

The demobilization of opposing forces in Namibia took place in the context of a U.N.-supervised war-to-peace transition prior to the county's independence after twenty-five years of armed struggle for independence. The subsequent repatriation and reintegration process coincided with the creation of a new nation after seventy-three years of South African rule.

U.N.-supervised elections took place in November 1989 giving the South West African People's Organization (SWAPO), the former guerrilla movement, a majority of 57 percent of the vote. The last South African troops then departed Namibia, and the country celebrated its independence on March 21, 1990. SWAPO's political power stemmed overwhelmingly from the north of the country, in particular from Ovambo voters. Non-Ovambo ethnic groups accounted for only 5 percent of SWAPO's support (Esterhuysen 1991). In December 1994 SWAPO also convincingly won a second set of national elections, winning 70 percent of the votes.

SWAPO's policies since independence have been notable for their economic pragmatism, their emphasis on social sectors, and the abandonment of Marxist rhetoric. SWAPO has espoused a policy of national reconciliation and nation building. The political situation in the country is stable; however, the executive is institutionally centralized and inexperienced and lacks human resources and capital. Moreover, few profound economic reforms have taken place. The white elite still dominates the private sector and owns large tracts of land.

Socioeconomic Context

The northern part of the country, which bore the brunt of the war, is the most densely populated; 40 percent of the national population lives in Ovamboland (5.6 percent of the country's total area). Ovamboland and the other northern regions of Tsumeb, Kavango, and Caprivi receive the most rainfall in the country and have the best lands for agriculture and stock farming.

Economic growth since independence has been constrained by the economy's previous dependence on the military and the global recession, which has reduced the prices of its primary exports: uranium, gold, and diamonds. The return to civilian life of an estimated total of 57,000 ex-combatants further strained the labor market. The job absorption capacity of the formal sector in Namibia was already low, and approximately 37 percent of the labor force was formally unemployed in 1993. The potential for rapid employment generation remains limited.
The public sector, which has 67,000 Namibians on its payroll, is by far the largest single employer. The number of employees in the public sector has increased by at least 50 percent since independence. This is partly due to the fact that the peace accord specified that none of the civil servants who had worked for the South African colonial administration could be retrenched; therefore, SWAPO had to place its members into the existing structures. The formal private sector employs only 5 percent of the labor force.

GDP per capita in 1993 was US$1,820 or N$5,946 (World Bank 1995, p. 163). This figure is deceptive, however, because it does not reflect the extremely uneven distribution of income and wealth in Namibia. Whereas 5 to 7 percent of the population enjoy high living standards, the rest of the country shares per capita earnings similar to those of many countries in Sub-Saharan Africa (World Bank 1992, p. 2); thus, while Namibia does not qualify for IDA assistance in GDP terms, the case for special assistance to vulnerable groups is clear from a microeconomic perspective, particularly in the northern region.

Objectives

No demobilization and reintegration program (DRP) existed to provide short- to medium-term assistance to ex-combatants after discharge. In fact, demobilization was completed prior to independence in 1989. Thereafter, the UNHCR and the Council of Churches in Namibia (CCN) repatriated over 43,000 refugees, among them at least 22,000 ex-PLAN fighters, from southern Angola to Namibia. The DRP was simply subsumed within the broader process of repatriation.

The government has since designed a number of ad hoc reinsertion and reintegration activities that more often than not lacked coherence and coordination. The Namibian DRP, therefore, rather resembles a patchwork of well-intended program responses than a strategic government policy and a planned program response. Nonetheless, throughout this report, the individual programs are analyzed as being part of an overarching DRP process.

As such, the Namibian DRP can be broken down into three phases: demobilization, reinsertion, and reintegration. Demobilization was undertaken within the framework of Resolution 435 and the Brazzaville Accords with the objective of disarming and repatriating PLAN fighters in Angola and disarming and disbanding fighters of the South West African Territorial Force (SWATF) in Namibia. In addition, the demobilization phase included the withdrawal of the South African Defense Force (SADF) from Angola and Namibia.

1 According to *The Economist* (1991), "some 25,000 workers in the northern provinces—over half the local formal sector wage earners—lost their livelihoods when South Africa's occupying army departed."

2 These 57,000 ex-combatants represented around 11 percent of the economically active population at the time of independence (United Nations Development Program 1992, p. 159).

Reinsertion addressed the short-term needs of PLAN (and SWAPO) returnees and ex-SWATF soldiers for a period of up to one year. Its objectives were to (a) ease the transition process to civilian life for ex-PLAN and (b) retain the loyalty of ex-SWATF to SADF should the peace process fail. Consequently, neither demobilization nor reintegration initiatives targeted ex-combatants as one group but reinforced the separation between ex-PLAN and ex-SWATF.

Neither the United Nations in its Resolution 435 nor the new government envisaged any reintegration assistance to ex-combatants. Only disabled veterans and San SWATF ex-combatants have been receiving specialized assistance, especially in skills training and resettlement, soon after independence; thus, many former soldiers of both sides failed to reintegrate economically and in 1991 began to voice their sentiments through demonstrations and the media. The government hastily responded to this potential national security threat by:
• Devising a cash payment scheme

• Designing a training program in the form of development brigades

• Extending its resettlement program to ex-combatants.

These interventions, although well-intended, have not fulfilled their ultimate objective of facilitating the ex-combatants' transition into a productive civilian life. On the contrary, ex-combatants are once again taking their grievances to the streets; therefore, the review of DRP initiatives to date suggests a framework for future initiatives that may better respond to ex-combatants' needs.

2—
Target Groups and Targeting Mechanisms

Target Groups

Resolution 435 foresaw the demobilization of the PLAN, SWATF, and Koevoet (the paramilitary unit of SWATF) as well as the withdrawal of the SADF. Fighters of the PLAN and SWATF were, therefore, the target group of demobilization and reintegration support. Overall, these armies comprised some 57,000 fighters, of whom some 7,500 were absorbed into the Namibian Defense Force (NDF) and the Namibian Police Force (NAMPOL) (Table 2.1).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Army</th>
<th>Combatants</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PLAN (estimate) a/</td>
<td>32,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SWATF (approx.)</td>
<td>25,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San (estimate) b/</td>
<td>2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Koevoet (approx.)</td>
<td>3,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total strength (estimate)</td>
<td>57,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total remobilized (approx.) c/</td>
<td>7,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDF (approx.) d/</td>
<td>6,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAMPOL (approx.) e/</td>
<td>1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total demobilized (estimate)</td>
<td>49,500</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a/ Ministry of Defense estimate. This number coincides with the number of PLAN ex-combatants registered for the severance pay.

b/ The estimated number of San ex-soldiers and their dependents is 10,000. The average size of San families applying to the San Resettlement Program was
approximately five. Assuming only one combatant per family, the total number of San active in SWATF was 2,000.

c/ It is conservatively estimated that 80 percent of those remobilized into the NDF and NAMPOL were former PLAN fighters.

d/ By 1995, the NDF was just 6,100 strong compared to an establishment of 7,300. The 21st Guard Battalion, performing ceremonial duties and providing for the security of the President, comprised another 500 members.

e/ SWAPOL nonparamilitary staff have been incorporated into NAMPOL, which by 1995 comprised 4,200 (against an establishment of 2,800) for the combating of crime and another 100 for road traffic control. The ex–combatants are probably among the 1,600 Protection Officers whose position in fact is not established.

Source: Ministry of Defense and staff estimates.

It is particularly difficult to establish the exact number of PLAN combatants. They did not have to inform UNHCR personnel that they had been fighters when registering at camps in Angola. Consequently, UNHCR repatriated 43,400 SWAPO refugees to Namibia as civilians without distinguishing between civilian or military background. Moreover, an unknown number of PLAN fighters remained hidden in camps in Angola as a reserve army. They returned independently and mostly unaided after the final South African withdrawal.4 Furthermore, PLAN, in effect, was not a standing army. In many cases, SWAPO refugees have followed a continuous cycle of fighting with PLAN and returning to SWAPO camps behind the line.

Many black Namibians had joined the South African side for economic rather than political or ideological reasons, that is, for a regular income and the opportunity to live at home. As the SADF kept records about service and discharge, the number of SWATF ex–combatants can be established quite accurately. The SADF demobilized some 22,000 SWATF soldiers and close to 11,600 part–time 'citizen forces' and 'commandos.' Estimates for Koevoet range from 2,500 to 4,000. It is known that 1,600 Koevoet combatants were demobilized by UNTAG in autumn 1989 after having violently harassed communities in northern Namibia; however, SADF had transferred Koevoet to the South West African Police Force (SWAPOL) just prior to demobilization. Moreover, an unknown number of Koevoet members retreated with SADF to South Africa. It is, therefore, not possible to determine the exact size of this paramilitary force.

In conjunction with the returning refugees, ex–combatants formed the main target group of the war–to–peace transition in Namibia.5 These ex–combatants were identified as individuals, so the support they received was almost exclusively limited to them. Families of ex–combatants were not considered for assistance except in the case of the resettlement scheme through which ex–combatants would resettle with their families. This, however, does not imply that family members might not have received support as members of other target groups. This relates especially to spouses and children repatriated by UNHCR together with an ex–combatant.
No individual program component was targeted to all ex–combatants. In particular, PLAN and SWATF ex–combatants received different treatment regarding the demobilization package and postdischarge salary payments. As refugees repatriated by UNHCR, PLAN ex–combatants received the UNHCR reintegration package of one year's food ration as well as blankets, mattresses, and kitchen utensils. SWATF ex–combatants, on the other hand, continued to receive their salaries after discharge until independence in March 1990.

Some sources claim that as many as 10,000 PLAN fighters may have been kept in Angola by SWAPO authorities to safeguard against possible backlashes in the independence process. The 1,600 PLAN combatants who entered Namibia on April 1, 1989, in contravention of the cease–fire agreement were part of this larger group. Their intrusion led to bloody clashes and almost derailed the peace process. It cannot be established how SWAPO decided which PLAN combatants were to be demobilized and which were to remain hidden in secret camps.

The terms 'ex–combatant' and 'veteran' possess distinct connotations in the Namibian context. Whereas 'ex–combatant' (or 'ex–serviceman') refers to any person having fought on either side of the war, a 'veteran' is a person above the age of forty–five and receiving a pension. This terminology is followed throughout the report.

This package is, of course, identical with the support received by the non–PLAN returnees. It is called a 'demobilization package' to highlight it as an element of the Namibian DRP.

Among the ex–combatants, three subgroups can be identified: the unemployed, the disabled, and the San fighters. Only unemployed ex–combatants were eligible for the cash payment of N$1,400.7 Moreover, only they can apply for training through the Development Brigade Corporation (DBC) or land through the resettlement program of the Ministry of Lands, Resettlement, and Rehabilitation (MLRR). Disabled ex–combatants of both sides can benefit from several vocational training programs administered by the MLRR and the Evangelical Lutheran Church in Namibia (ELCIN).8 Finally, San SWATF ex–combatants received preferential support for special resettlement projects; however, 4,000 San (including an estimated 800 ex–combatants) had left Namibia for South Africa on independence; only few have returned since.

A Profile of Ex–Combatants

There was no systematic collection of socioeconomic data of PLAN or SWATF combatants at the time of demobilization, constraining the feasibility of developing a socioeconomic profile of former guerrillas or soldiers. This lack of predemobilization profile data consequently limited the planning and effectiveness of subsequent reintegration programs.10

Recent ex–combatant survey evidence from eleven communities (Sitari and others 1995) suggests that most ex–combatants joined the army in their twenties and stayed in the military for over ten years. The majority seem to be married and have, on average, approximately four children. Overall, their health status does not appear worrisome.

PLAN ex–combatants are predominantly of Ovambo ethnic origin, and most have resettled in the northern region. An unknown but probably sizable number have since moved to urban centers, especially Katutura in Windhoek. The number of female PLAN ex–combatants is also not known. Some estimates range up to 30 percent but most of these do not seem to have fought in combat. More often, they were providing support services, for example, cooking.

Maybe a third of ex–combatants have acquired some useful skills while serving in the army that could be used for gainful employment after demobilization; however, their overall educational at– soft
7 In September 1993 the Namibian government introduced its own currency, the 'Namibian Dollar,' which is still at par with the South African Rand (ZAR). Even the severance pay had been effected in Rand; however, throughout the report, the Namibian Dollar is the currency quoted.

8 It appears that care of the disabled has not been integrated, however, and that ex–combatants of the two sides receive different treatment.

9 Hunters and gatherers as well as pastoralists were the indigenous people of southwestern Africa when Europeans first arrived in the fifteenth century. Their indigenous names were 'San' and 'Khoikhoi' but they were called 'Bushmen' and 'Hottentots' by the Europeans. There is no precise correlation between the linguistic, physical, and economic variations among these people as a whole, but the term 'San' is used throughout this report to refer to the indigenous people of Namibia (Curtin and others 1978, p. 290f.). It is, however, acknowledged that the Namibian 'San' do not recognize any one name that would be valid for all of them; to them, the term refers to their language group only.

10 This section largely draws on the findings of the War–Affected People study commissioned by the European Union in 1991 (Preston and others 1993). The other major source is a small–scale, in–depth study of thirty–seven ex–combatants in eight communities commissioned by the Bank in 1995 (Sitari and others 1995).

**Targeting Mechanisms**

Targeting mechanisms are used to ensure that only the envisaged target group actually benefits from an intervention. In the case of the Namibian demobilization and reintegration program, different but by and large uncoordinated target mechanisms have been used to single out ex–combatants for assistance.

The **PLAN** ex–combatants who reported to UNHCR in Angola for repatriation were registered and issued identification cards. No target mechanism was applied as repatriation was open to all those reporting to UNHCR.11 Although designed for a different purpose, this identification card, has become the essential target mechanism for **PLAN** ex–combatants. With this identification card they received the demobilization package as well as transport to their destination of choice, could register for the cash payment, and apply for training.
Major problems occurred when the government embarked on disbursing the cash payment to PLAN ex-combatants. In the first place, the vast majority of ex-combatants did not have a Namibian identification card. Moreover, PLAN had lacked reliable records on its fighters. Moreover, not all PLAN ex-combatants were registered and repatriated by UNHCR; they consequently had not been issued repatriation forms. The government then decided to create—a committee of former officers who acted as a verification mechanism.

In fact, the determination of the number of returnees from Angola was sensitive, as the South Africans feared that SWAPO would 'import' Angolans to bolster its election hopes. The negotiating parties eventually agreed that the recognition of the status of refugees lay with both the host country and UNHCR. An identity check of returnees was made at the time of registration for voting, but the identity card as such was not questioned.

This exercise seems to have been undertaken without thorough planning and, as a result, the lists drawn up by the verification committee were still incomplete. In the short term, this led to unrest among those PLAN ex-combatants not included. In the long term, the registration exercise essentially had to be repeated after the President's decision in the spring of 1995 to further support ex-combatants, clearly indicating unsatisfactory first-round execution.

The SADF demobilized all SWATF members in Namibia under UNTAG supervision by June 1, 1989. The SADF had complete computerized records of all its soldiers. No additional target mechanism was, thus, needed to enable SWATF ex-combatants to access program benefits. It seems to be more difficult to target Koevoet members. Many had served in particularly notorious units and were transferred to SWAPOL before demobilization. It is possible that these, therefore, decided not to register with the government and intentionally gave up reintegration assistance.

Regardless of army affiliation, all ex-combatants are a target group of the MLRR resettlement. They first have to register at the regional offices of the MLRR, whose regional staff verify that the applicants are indeed landless ex-combatants, presumably by way of the identification card. The local church and community leaders are used to assist in the verification of land ownership.

When launching its San resettlement program, ELCIN did not use any targeting mechanism for reaching San ex-combatants. In fact, any San who wanted to resettle was supported. No specific targeting mechanisms seem to have been employed by the MLRR and ELCIN to reach disabled ex-combatants.

**Targeting Leakages**

With no coherent targeting mechanism in place and uneven registration to link ex-combatants to the benefits safety net, it is not surprising that targeting leakages were numerous and substantial at all stages of the process. Most of these leakages, however, seem to have affected PLAN ex-combatants because the SWATF record base was a good one.

PLAN appears to have deliberately failed to demobilize an unknown number of combatants. As decided by SWAPO, these ex-combatants were not registered when receiving their demobilization package on their independent return. For the purpose of the Namibian DRP, these ex-combatants in reserve cannot be interpreted as either a monitoring or a targeting failure of UNTAG or UNHCR. Still, a possibly large number of potential beneficiaries were initially completely unattended to.

The verification process initiated to cover these and other 'missing' cases enabled more ex-combatants to access their entitlements; however, the procedure itself produced additional leakages. As the second attempt to register PLAN ex-combatants in the summer of 1995 shows, not all of them were registered through the verification
The verification of the employment status (a precondition for assessing an ex-combatant's eligibility) proved a substantial problem. The Windhoek-based verification commission was ill-equipped to verify each request in detail. Furthermore, frequent communication problems in reaching ex-combatants in remote areas implied that many of them simply did not know that they would have been eligible and required to register for such a cash payment.

The commercial bank effecting the severance pay used the incomplete lists of eligible persons for effecting the payment. Many ex-combatants were illiterate and, thus, could not sign the bank form as required. The bank then had to also accept thumbprints. In short, there was much dissatisfaction with the manner in which this process was administered. A number of non-ex-combatants received their severance pay while a significant number of eligible PLAN ex-combatants did not. In fact, Ministry of Defense estimates of eligible ex-combatants not having benefited range as high as 40 percent. On the other hand, an unknown number of non-ex-combatants have been paid the N$1,400.

Just prior to the cease-fire, the SADF transferred an unknown number of Koevoet to SWAPOL to avoid the demobilization of these forces. As members of SWAPOL, they consequently were not eligible for any of the support measures but may have been catered to under a separate arrangement. These reassigned ex-combatants cannot be considered a targeting failure in the context of DRP procedures but would be considered as such from the point of view of initial eligibility criteria; however, based on records established by the South Africans, the cash payment to SWATF ex-combatants was effected smoothly.

Regarding the reintegration programs, it is difficult to establish whether and to what extent targeting leakages have occurred. The leakages of the registration and verification processes directly affect the access of ex-combatants to DBC training and to the MLRR resettlement program. Moreover, neither the DBC nor the MLRR application and admission procedures are transparent. A serious targeting failure seems to be the low representation of SWATF ex-combatants among the recent trainee intakes. The targeting failure could be ascribed to the local DBC staff discouraging them from applying as well as within the political situation in general, that is, the hitherto incomplete degree of national reconciliation.

Regarding the MLRR, complaints of staff favoritism for friends and family in the selection process are common. Such criticism is not surprising, given the fact that all applications are sent to Windhoek for final selection. Headquarters staff commonly lack knowledge of a particular local environment and, thus, decide on the applications using inappropriate criteria.

The MLRR rehabilitation and resettlement programs and the DBC training program, however, also cater to other target groups, because even the DBC training is now open to non-ex-combatants. Targeting leakages that occur may, thus, always be claimed to be the result of decisions necessary to select a limited number of beneficiaries out of a large number of applicants from all target groups. ELCIN's Nakayale rehabilitation and San resettlement projects have from the outset not been limited to ex-combatants, therefore, leakages cannot occur by definition. It cannot, however, be established how many of civilians have actually benefited in proportion to non-ex-combatants.

12 If indeed all 32,000 who applied for registration were eligible, that is, unemployed at the time of registration, the strength of PLAN would have been substantially higher, at least by the 6,000 rehired into NDF and NAMPOL.
3— Demobilization Segment

Overview

Formal demobilization in postindependence Namibia never occurred. In accordance with the requirements of U.N. Security Council Resolution 435, there were no armed forces left in Namibia at the time of independence other than some hastily created units of the new Namibian Defense Force (NDF). The SADF had withdrawn to South Africa, and SWATF and the paramilitary groups sponsored by South Africa had been discharged before the elections. PLAN fighters had been assembled in camps in southern Angola, and those who returned under the UNHCR repatriation plan were disarmed by UNTAG and thereafter considered civilians. At independence, all assembly camps in Angola had been dismantled; hence, demobilization of each army was undertaken separately.

The Role of UNTAG

The United Nations Transitory Assistance Group to Namibia (UNTAG) played a critical role in the demobilization process of ex-combatants. Its political mandate was to organize free and fair elections and to facilitate the independence process. At its peak, UNTAG consisted of 8,000 personnel, including 2,000 civilians, 1,500 police (CIVPOL) and 4,500 military personnel. The military component of UNTAG was deployed in Namibia starting February 26, 1989, and remained in the country until April 1990. Among other duties, CIVPOL monitored SWAPOL's activities. The demobilization programs started with the implementation in April 1989 of U.N. Security Council Resolution 435. UNTAG's military force included 300 military observers from February 1989 onwards, whose tasks were to:

• Monitor the restriction of the PLAN to bases north of the sixteenth parallel in Angola.

• Monitor the restriction of the SADF and SWATF to bases outside the former war zone.

• Verify the withdrawal of SADF from Namibia and monitor those forces that remained in the country.

• Monitor the demobilization of SWATF and Koevoet forces and secure associated weaponry.

• Monitor SADF members carrying out civilian functions.

• Monitor and manage the encampment and disarmament of PLAN forces in southern Angola.

• Repatriate SWAPO exiles, including demobilized PLAN forces, from Angola to Namibia.

13 The withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola and the demobilization of PLAN on one side and the withdrawal of SADF and the demobilization of SWATF on the other were integral components of the peace accords, which facilitated the implementation of Resolution 435. A major objective of the Namibian demobilization, therefore, was to end foreign military intervention in the Angolan civil war.

• Monitor SWAPOL and ensure that no military forces or demobilized combatants could hinder the election process in Namibia.

• Monitor entry points along the South African and Walvis Bay borders.
The People's Liberation Army of Namibia

Discharge

UNTAG military officers were deployed in southern Angola to monitor the confinement of PLAN forces to bases prior to their repatriation. The ex–combatants then joined civilian members of the SWAPO exile community in UNHCR assembly camps. Those PLAN fighters who wished (or were assigned) to return to Namibia under the UNHCR repatriation program were required to hand in their weapons to UNTAG and agree to return as civilians. In all, some 43,400 SWAPO members had been repatriated by UNHCR from their refuge abroad, principally in Angola.

After discharge, PLAN ex–combatants were entitled to the same benefits (demobilization) package as the civilian refugees. The rationale for reinsertion assistance for SWAPO returnees, including PLAN ex–combatants, was that many lacked food and shelter on their return and would need a modicum of security if the election process was to proceed smoothly. The objective of this assistance was, thus, to ensure their food and accommodation security for a transitional period, until they could be reunited with their families or accommodated in a resettlement project. The demobilization package included:

- Repatriation.
- Transition allowance (mattresses, blankets, food, kitchen utensils).
- Temporary shelter in transition centers.
- Transport to a final destination.

Repatriation

The repatriation program did not distinguish between combatants and civilians; all returnees were unarmed and treated as civilians. The repatriation program was an integral part of the UNTAG plan for Namibian independence. UNHCR designed, funded, implemented, and monitored the repatriation program. Most returnees were flown back from their host countries, as were those repatriated from southern Angola. Transport by road was impossible due to fighting between the Angolan government forces and UNITA in southern Angola. Transit by sea was not feasible because, at the time, Namibia's only harbor, Walvis Bay, was legally still considered part of South Africa.

During the registration process in Angola, UNHCR collected some socioeconomic and demographic data. Refugees had to state their preferred community of destination, which was entered on the repatriation form. Apart from the community of destination, the information collected by UNHCR was of a highly sensitive nature. Consequently, it was not made available to design reintegration initiatives, possibly not even within the SWAPO government.
SWAPO had fielded a mission to Namibia before repatriation and CCN had visited the repatriation camps in Angola. Refugees were thereby briefed on the situation they could expect on returning; however, ex-combatants had not been demobilized by the time CCN visited the camps and, consequently, missed these orientation sessions.

Reception Centers

After arriving at the airports in Namibia, the returnees were initially transferred to reception centers that were operated by the Council of Churches of Namibia (CCN) and its coordinating committee for Repatriation, Resettlement, and Reconstruction (RRR), UNHCR's local program implementation partner. From the centers most returnees were expected to return home; however, secondary centers were established for a small group of needy returnees. Overall, four reception centers and thirty-four secondary centers were used in the repatriation process. UNTAG units provided military and police protection and logistical support at the reception centers. They also assisted in the construction of some centers.

On arrival at the reception centers, returnees were registered, allocated a tent, issued a food ration card, and provided with a basic kit consisting of blankets, mattresses, kitchen utensils, and some pocket money (transition allowance). The pocket money could be used for the final transport to the community of destination. Returnees also received their first monthly food ration from food that had been purchased locally by CCN/RRR.

Because of the rapid pace of repatriation by UNHCR, as well as the unwillingness of several returnees to leave the centers, overcrowding at the reception centers at times became a serious problem. The major reason for the returnees' unwillingness was the security situation in their location of settlement. Other returnees had lost their luggage during repatriation and hoped it would still be found and delivered. The accommodation capacities of the centers, thus, had to be increased by setting up more tents; however, sanitation facilities could not be expanded, leading to increased health risks.

CCN/RRR offered two distinct services at the reception centers: family tracing and counseling. Staff received special training to provide these services. They also provided mostly young refugees with some short-term employment by using them for the construction of temporary housing facilities. Ex-combatants were likely to have been among those thus employed.

16 UNHCR was already beginning, however, to feel that the security concern was overplayed and that instead the returnees had been suffering from a dependency syndrome since their time in exile.

Secondary Centers

Secondary centers were initially only planned for special groups of destitute, handicapped, and homeless returnees, especially the young and old. To this end, some fifty facilities (such as community halls, hostels, kindergarten, schools, and old peoples' homes) were made available by the various constituent churches of the CCN who were responsible for managing these centers. It soon became clear, however, that, for various reasons, far more returnees were requesting transfer from reception to secondary centers rather than to their homes.

Secondary centers also became a mechanism for alleviating the congestion at the reception centers. As a result, returnees stayed in the secondary centers for up to three months, and few places at secondary centers were left for the initial target group of truly vulnerable people. Some returnees were even transferred to a center at the opposite end of the country in relation to their place of final destination. For instance, Ovambo returnees accommodated in the South faced some hostility from the local population. They were then afraid to leave the centers, even to receive treatment in a nearby clinic.
Each secondary center offered qualified counseling services for dealing with the orientation needs of returnees. Most of them also had trained counselors who assisted with family tracing requests. To manage the centers, the churches received an allowance of N$50 per month for each adult and N$25 per month for each child in their care for a period of three months. This allowance was used to cover the running costs of the center, medical treatment and transport, supplementary food, and basic commodities. Returnees in secondary centers received their monthly food ration at these centers as well as some cash.

Transportation to Final Destination

On registration at the reception centers, the returnees stated their final desired destination. They were then transported by air or road either directly or through secondary centers to locations close to their place of settlement. More than 66 percent of returnees settled in the North and another 20 percent in and around Windhoek. Although UNHCR had collected information in the repatriation camps about the refugees' community of destination, this information does not seem to have been communicated well to the Lutheran World Federation (LWF), which was implementing this service. Prior planning proved difficult as LWF did not know in advance how many returnees would eventually settle in which part of the country. Overall, however, the transportation seems to have been accomplished without serious problems.

The 'PLAN Reserve'

An unknown number of PLAN combatants remained hidden in camps in southern Angola at the time when UNHCR undertook its registration and repatriation program. Members of this army in reserve returned to Namibia independently in late 1989, after the elections and the final withdrawal of SADF. Informed by UNTAG, CCN provided a one–month food ration and the basic kit to each of these ex–combatants; the expenses were still covered under the RRR budget. CCN was not entitled to register them. They were also not transported to their communities.

South African Forces

Withdrawal and Discharge

The SADF in Namibia and southern Angola reached a force level of 35,000 troops between 1986 and 1988. Resolution 435 called on South Africa to reduce SADF forces in Namibia to 12,000 before the start of the peace process and to 1,500 troops by June 24, 1989. The SADF withdrew its forces to South Africa in accordance with the agreed schedule. The remaining 1,500 soldiers were confined to bases monitored by UNTAG and departed for South Africa one week after the elections, on November 21, 1989.

SWATF soldiers numbered some 22,000 on demobilization, just more than half of whom were combat forces. While most of the soldiers were locally recruited, the majority of the officers were on secondment from the SADF. The force was completely demobilized by June 1, 1989, except for a number of particularly notorious SWATF forces (e.g., the 32nd Battalion) that withdrew to South Africa with the SADF. All SWATF arms, equipment, and ammunition were under the guard of UNTAG infantry elements; the ex–combatants kept their uniforms.

The South Africans are said to have provided some orientation to ex–SWATF members about reintegration issues during the demobilization process. Moreover, the SWATF ex–combatants reported twice monthly to their erstwhile headquarters for their pay, in most cases from officers who had previously commanded them. Koevoet/SWAPOL members collected their monthly pay from their former SWAPOL payroll officers. These
arrangements provoked condemnations from the United Nations that the force had not been properly disbanded but merely suspended on full pay with most of its command structure still intact (United Nations, not dated).

Special arrangements were made for two San units of SWATF deployed in the northern part of Namibia comprising about 2,000 ex−combatants. These soldiers had been hired as tribal communities. Since military camp life represented their community life, they had nowhere to return to and no alternative means of livelihood on demobilization. They were, thus, allocated land in the vicinity of the bases and benefitted from ELCIN−managed reintegration schemes. Several thousand San also left for South Africa with SADF.

Paramilitary forces established by South Africa, totaling some 11,600, including the 'citizen forces' and 'commandos,' were demobilized prior to the elections, with their weapons and equipment under UNTAG guard. Some of these units were reactivated in April 1989 during the clashes that ensued after PLAN forces crossed the border in violation of the peace accords. Members of these paramilitary forces were not eligible for any support under the Namibian DRP.

The South African−sponsored paramilitary force Koevoet, an estimated 3,000 strong, was ostensibly transferred from SWATF to the police as a counterinsurgency force prior to the implementation of Resolution 435. Koevoet units continued to patrol in armored vehicles and heavily armed convoys in the northern region and were violent, disruptive, and repressive until the Security Council passed a special resolution (No. 640) in September 1989 demanding their disbandment under UNTAG supervision; 1,200 Koevoet were promptly demobilized in September 1989, and a further 400 followed on October 30, 1989. These demobilized forces were free to roam the sensitive areas near the northern border and were accused of violent intimidation of SWAPO sympathizers and returnees. After independence, fearing retaliation, many departed for South Africa.

SWAPOL was the South African−sponsored police force under the control of the South African Administrator−General for Namibia. Resolution 435 did not provide for SWAPOL's dismantling; neither were SWAPOL members eligible for DRP assistance. Its paramilitary units, later strengthened by reassigned Koevoet, created serious problems and were eventually disbanded during the transition process. The nonparamilitary divisions of SWAPOL, however, retained their jobs.

Demobilization Assistance

SWATF ex−combatants did not receive any of the demobilization benefits accruing to PLAN ex−combatants. Not having left the country and mostly having served for a period of two years only, there was no need for repatriation or basic assistance for establishing a civilian life in an independent Namibia. Moreover, most SWATF units resided in the vicinity of their former bases; therefore, transport was not considered an issue, even for those whose home villages were situated further away. SWATF ex−combatants, however, continued to receive their salary payments until independence.

4—
Reinsertion and Reintegration Support

Reinsertion and reintegration are important phases of the transition from combatant to civilian life. These two overlapping phases lie on a continuum rather than being defined stages; however, their definitions are distinctly different. Reinsertion pertains to the short−term period of approximately six to twelve months after demobilization.17 During this phase, ex−combatants face the challenge of establishing a civilian household. Reintegration refers to a long−term period of approximately two years during which ex−combatants gradually become 'normal' community members, both in social and economic terms. During the two phases, ex−combatants...
are the most vulnerable and targeted government assistance is most warranted and effective.

**Background and Rationale**

**Setting the Stage**

The reintegration of ex–combatants and civilian returnees in Namibia occurred in the context of a war–to–peace transition brought about by foreign powers and the United Nations and the creation of a new state intent on national reconciliation and nation building. This political environment had several key consequences for the reinsertion and reintegration of special groups, especially ex–combatants.

The issues of reinsertion and reintegration of returnees and ex–combatants from both sides into postindependence Namibian society and economy were not accorded any consideration in the peace settlement among South Africa, Angola, and Cuba, which facilitated the demilitarization of Namibia and the implementation of Resolution 435; therefore, UNTAG's mandate did not make provision for any targeted and sustainable reinsertion or reintegration assistance between the implementation of U.N. Resolution 435 in April 1989 and independence in March 1990. *Demobilization, reinsertion, and reintegration were not linked in design or practice.*

Namibian leaders did not foresee the need for reinsertion and reintegration programs for ex–combatants at the time of independence. They assumed that civilian and military returnees and demobilized SWATF combatants would reintegrate independently after they had resettled. Only some of the ex–combatants and returnees were to be absorbed in the armed forces or in civilian ministries and government agencies. In general, the new and inexperienced government faced the daunting challenge of nation building and was plagued by chronic human resource deficiencies at the political, administrative, and field levels. These factors inhibited the effective design and management of a sustainable support program.

As the international community converted its aid from solidarity with liberation movements in exile to support for national development and away from the targeting of groups still suffering from the effects of war. Some of the nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) active in Namibia foresaw difficulties with the reintegration of ex–combatants and launched programs in support of this group; however, they suffered from financial and human resource constraints.

By August 1990, many ex–combatants were voicing their disappointment and protesting through the media and on the streets against the lack of recognition and economic support. Planning and resourcing of ex–combatant integration programs became a priority in the face of potential violent destabilization. This fear was compounded by the fact that ex–combatants of either faction most likely had access to arms caches in the former conflict zones of northern Namibia.

**Program Interventions**

In response to the perceived security threat from disaffected ex–combatants, the government rather hastily and in an uncoordinated manner initiated or extended to ex–combatants three major interventions: a one–time severance cash payment (reinsertion support), a vocational training program, and a resettlement program (reintegration...
support). The latter had already started in 1990 and targets all landless Namibians. Neither of the reintegration programs has been implemented effectively or successfully, although both continue to function today.

These three interventions are accompanied by a number of other programs that target only a subgroup of ex-combatants. Among them are the government's rehabilitation program as well as several projects implemented by NGOs, for example, a vocational training program for disabled ex-combatants and the resettlement of ex-SWATF San communities, both managed by ELCIN. Ex-combatants also benefited from project activities of other NGOs and donors but are not an explicit or distinguishable target group.18

Information Deficiencies

Information deficiencies exist at three levels: at the ex-combatants level, at the level of the government as implementor, and at the level of government as coordinator. First, many ex-combatants are still ill-informed about all assistance initiatives, mostly due to scant local program representation. These ex-combatants were effectively left out during the first registration process for severance pay, the lists of which are still being used to identify beneficiaries for the DBC training courses. Second, local staff of the two ongoing activities (DBC and resettlement) lack current information about each other's program. The single target group of ex-combatants is, therefore, treated differently under the programs. Lastly, no information is available on how many ex-combatants benefit from all project interventions, either from government, donors, or NGOs. The government, therefore, lacks a clear perspective of the whole range of support activities and is consequently unable to initiate a concerted effort.19

18 It is beyond the scope of this study to identify and analyze these interventions.

19 In at least one instance, the government seems to have discouraged the implementation of reintegration programs of an NGO because of its ties with the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (DTA) opposition party.

This chapter first presents the reinsertion support extended to ex-combatants: severance pay and various smaller, untargeted reinsertion initiatives. It then discusses the reintegration measures: employment support and the rehabilitation program for the disabled. The major reintegration interventions, training and resettlement, form part of Chapters 5 and 6.

Reinsertion Segment

Severance Pay

The South African government wanted to reward its former Namibian allies with an ex post pension substitute and offered ZAR 36 million (US$1= ZAR 2.9 at the time) to the Namibian government to this end; however, the SWAPO authorities would not permit the distribution of the money if it discriminated among former antagonists. A compromise was then reached, whereby (a) ZAR 12 million was set aside for ex-combatants of each side,20 (b) direct compensation (severance pay) of N$1,400 would be made to each unemployed ex-combatant who had been in active service at the time of the implementation of Resolution 435. The objective of this policy was to address the basic needs of the neediest of ex-combatants.

More than one year after demobilization, in August 1990, the Namibian government initiated the registration procedures. The registration records of SWATF were well organized, facilitating the identification of those individuals eligible for the cash benefit. The situation for ex-PLAN guerrillas was more chaotic, because PLAN combatants had not always been formally registered by UNHCR. Eventually, 32,000 PLAN ex-combatants presented themselves for payment. Of them, the verification committee of former commanding officers finally identified 16,080 for payment. The exact criteria applied by the committee to identify the beneficiaries are not

Information Deficiencies

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known.

It would take another seven months until the government embarked on the payment procedures, which would again last for several months. This procedure was complex and tedious, involving two ministries and a commercial bank. The Ministry of Information and Broadcasting was responsible for administering the ZAR 24 million. These funds, however, were budgeted under the Ministry of Defense, which was also charged with the verification of applicants. The bank's role was to pay each ex–combatant his/her entitlement in a single cash installment.

It is estimated that 24,650 ex–combatants received the severance pay (see Table 4.1), but the disbursement process for PLAN ex–combatants was not transparent. The lists drawn up by the verification committee were evidently incomplete and so were the payment lists the bank used to pay out the cash. In several instances, the bank seems to have refused payment or dropped a beneficiary's name from the list without justification.

The payments to former SWATF and other South African–sponsored forces in Namibia seem to have gone smoothly; however, there were many complaints from PLAN ex–combatants that non–ex–combatants received payments while others, convinced of the validity of their claim, were ex–soft

20 The remaining ZAR 12 million (US$4.1 million) was to be used for reintegration initiatives but seems to have been transferred back to South Africa because the two governments could not agree on its specific use.

Not surprisingly, therefore, the compensation payment was considered inadequate by many of those who received it.21 They were joined in protest by those who did not receive it but thought they were eligible.22 The ensuing street demonstrations (including a siege of a bank at Grootfontein) led the responsible minister to promise 'to do something,' which, however, did not happen. Eventually, protest died down.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 4.1</th>
<th>Severance Pay</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Army</strong></td>
<td><strong>Beneficiaries</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLAN</td>
<td>16,080</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SWATF a/</td>
<td>8,570</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>24,650</strong></td>
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a/ It is known that 16,080 PLAN ex–combatants have received severance pay. At the inception of the DBC the President promised that training would be provided to 25,000 ex–combatants from both sides (World Bank 1993a, p. 132). Only those who were registered for the severance pay were eligible for DBC training; hence, the number of SWATF having received the pay must be close to 9,000. If each unemployed ex–SWATF/Koevoet received N$ 1,400, then the total number of ex–SWATF benefiting would be 8,570. Another estimate from the Ministry of Defense puts the number closer to 7,000.
b/ Some ex–PLAN have actually received N$1,400. N$746 is the entitlement on average.

c/ Unemployed in percent of demobilized only, that is, excluding those who were hired by NDF or NAMPOL.

Source: Ministry of Defense and staff estimates.

Assuming that all 24,650 beneficiaries were indeed unemployed, the unemployment rate for all ex–combatants two years after demobilization stood at 50 percent. Ex–PLAN seem to have fared much worse than ex–SWATF, with almost two–thirds not having found a paying job two years after demobilization.

**Other Reinsertion Assistance**

**Food Allowance**

At the reception centers, all SWAPO returnees (including PLAN ex–combatants) were issued food distribution cards, which entitled them to receive food rations for a total of twelve months, starting in July 1989. This food was provided by the World Food Program (WFP), shipped through Walvis Bay, and handed over to CCN/RRR in Windhoek. On behalf of CCN/RRR (and financed by UNHCR), LWF established six major food stores around the country, which in turn served somecontinue

21 It was certainly insufficient to finance a productive investment or permanent housing.

22 Some ex–combatants claim to have still been in Angola at the time the severance pay was administered (Sitari 1995 and others, p. 10).

seventy distribution points. Major food stores, parish centers, and commercial shops were selected to be these local distribution points. The provision of the food allowance to the majority of returnees was achieved without undue delays.

The monthly food ration was WFP's standard full ration and consisted of maize or rice, cooking oil, canned fish, and beans. In addition, UNHCR provided rations of tea, sugar, and salt; thus, each person received a food equivalent of approximately 2,000 Kcal per day. Pregnant and lactating women as well as children, the aged, and infirm received another 425 Kcal. Complaints soon arose from returnees that these rations were insufficient. Some even thought the ration was to last for one week instead of one month. Still, this ration is used by WFP in comparable programs worldwide. Others who had found a job did not even bother to collect it; thus, not all refugees received food aid.

**Postdischarge Salary Payments**

**SWATF** ex–combatants did not receive a year's food ration from WFP. Members of both groups were, however, aided by the South Africans and continued to receive their monthly salaries up until independence in March 1990, that is, for a period of nine months. The objectives of these post–discharge salary payments were to (a ) ease the transition process to civilian life and (b ) retain their loyalty to SADF should the peace process fail. SWATF officers were eligible for pensions financed by South Africa. The combination of relatively high salaries and the postdischarge salary payments seemed to suffice for many SWATF draftees to reestablish their lives as civilians.
Pension Scheme

Pensions, being open-ended, support ex-combatants through both the reinsertion and reintegration phases. They are, therefore, effective but also expensive. Already before independence, the South Africans had established a pension fund and pension payment system for SWATF and associated paramilitary (Koevoet) forces; however, a pension was only granted to officers; they had been taken into the ranks of the SADF. No pension deductions were made from the scheme of privates or noncommissioned officers. After independence, the Namibian government assumed responsibility for this pension payment system.24

Pensions are now also received by PLAN ex-combatants over the age of forty-five; these are organized in the SWAPO Veterans Trust. It seems that ex-SWATF who had been receiving pensions before independence are also catered to by the SWAPO Veterans Trust. The monthly pension amounts to N$120 and is paid by the government through an insurance company.23

23 Because of Namibia's independence on March 21, 1990, the final postdischarge salary payment paid out in February was equivalent to two monthly salaries. Erroneously, this payment is sometimes referred to as a 'mustering-out' pay. Ex-combatants did, however, receive two sets of civilian clothes with this last payment.

24 While some reports indicate that the South African government is no longer paying the pensions, which have technically become the responsibility of the government of Namibia, others suggest that the former soldiers still receive South African pension checks.

Other Assistance

Immediately after discharge, PLAN as well as SWATF ex-combatants received some form of health support. All returnees received free basic health care in the CCN-implemented UNHCR reception centers. With the exception of special measures for the disabled, no health care measures targeted at SWAPO returnees or PLAN ex-combatants were provided once the returnees left the camps. Demobilized SWATF and South African–sponsored paramilitary could meet their health care needs at the remaining SADF bases until the elections. There were no special health care programs for these forces after the withdrawal of the SADF.

In addition to their transition allowance, many returnees also received initial rehabilitation assistance for their immediate needs, including agricultural production packages (tools and seeds) and shelter construction and supplementary family support. As part of the overall target group, PLAN ex-combatants were eligible for this type of support as well, but the actual number of ex–PLAN beneficiaries is unknown. SWATF ex-combatants were not in need of such assistance because they had established homes.

Many of the people returning to urban areas found housing a particular problem. Apart from the scarcity of facilities, the cost of housing had risen significantly since the arrival of UNTAG and other external organizations. Unlike in rural areas, churches in urban centers had little spare capacity for offering accommodation or plots for erecting a structure. Municipal authorities, however, at least in Katutura in Windhoek, the major destination for migrants, have been slow in taking effective measures to deal with emerging housing problems. Only occasional assistance has been provided by CCN to returnees, among them probably also ex–PLAN members, which established a 'Building Brigade' for construction of housing for returnees. Again, this type of support was not needed by ex–SWATF members.

Reintegration Segment

Reintegration can be categorized into two interrelated elements: social reintegration and economic reintegration. The former implies acceptance by the family and community as well as participation in community life while the
latter signifies independence from outside financial resources, at least commensurate with the local conditions. Reintegration in general has not received the attention it deserved from the government. But social reintegration appears to have been almost completely neglected. Apart from an appeal to national reconciliation, the government did little to ease tensions sustainably between ex-combatants and their communities, especially for former SWATF fighters.

Among the reintegration support activities for ex-combatants, assistance for finding public sector employment was the most prominent; however, there seems to have been little coordination with private sector employers to overcome their hesitancy of hiring PLAN ex-combatants (Preston and others 1993). Moreover, no direct support (apart from the CCN/RRR package) was provided to those ex-combatants resuming subsistence agriculture or starting informal sector activities.

**Employment Support**

A major proportion of skilled returnees were absorbed in the *public sector*. Public Service Commission statistics indicate that employment in the public sector increased by 50 percent (23,486 new positions) between January 1989 and February 1991 (Preston and others 1993). Most of the jobs in the nonmilitary public sector required qualifications, thereby excluding most ex-combatants.

The different treatment by the SWAPO authorities for refugees and PLAN fighters led to a sense of injustice among the ex-combatants. Those having been given the opportunity to study abroad received government jobs whereas those who fought for independence in the bush were left to fend for themselves. Consequently, the SWAPO government did provide a number of less qualified PLAN ex-combatants with jobs and would have done so even more, had it not had to restrain the increase in civil service for budgetary reasons.25

In early 1990, even before independence, a Tripartite Military Integration Committee was established under the chairmanship of UNTAG and with representatives from both sides to develop a structure for the postindependence Namibian army. After the elections, a new integrated *Namibian Defense Force* was established with Kenyan and British technical assistance. A civilian Ministry of Defense was also created to establish accountability of the NDF to the government.

The integration of ex-guerrillas into a formal, government-armed force has been a difficult process. The selection process was based on theoretical and practical tests and exams, requiring an education level too high for the often illiterate ex-PLAN combatants (World Bank 1993a, p. 138); thus, hundreds of ex-PLAN fighters eager to join the NDF had to be rejected due to their failure to meet already lowered entry standards.

Until the rehiring of ex-combatants in late 1995 the NDF (including the 21st Guard Battalion) consisted of over 6,500 soldiers of which approximately 80 percent, that is, some 5,200 soldiers, were ex-PLAN fighters. The remainder were either new recruits or former SWATF, whose expertise and professionalism were valued. In addition, an unknown number of ex-combatants joined the Ministry of Defense staff. Although the initial objective of the Parliament in 1990 had been a force of 10,000 and a great number of ex-PLAN have wanted to join the NDF, restrictive defense budgets since independence have consistently prevented expansion of the NDF; thus, less than 20 percent of ex-PLAN combatants have integrated economically and socially in postindependence Namibia by joining the NDF (and NAMPOL).

The *Namibian Police Force* succeeded SWAPOL in 1990 and was racially integrated. Extensive training was provided to the 1,000 new recruits, of whom the vast majority were ex-PLAN combatants. Many ex-combatants were integrated into the Namibian Police as 'special constables.' These 'special constables' were permitted to join the NAMPOL as part of a pro-PLAN affirmative action program established by the government, despite having

**Employment Support**
failed their police exams (World Bank 1993a, p. 138). More recently, as a result of protests by unemployed PLAN ex–combatants, about 3,000 have been recruited into the NDF and NAMPOL.

An unknown number of former combatants have been able to secure posts in other ministries and agencies. The Ministry of Wildlife, Conservation, and Tourism integrated former combatants, apparently successfully, into units of the wildlife protection service, ”a process which has contributed to the forging of an efficient antipoaching service” (World Bank 1993a, p. 139).

Apart from the NDF and NAMPOL, no data exist on the absorption of ex–combatants by the public sector.

Notwithstanding SWAPO's control over the political arena, the formal private sector continues to be dominated by white Namibian and external, mostly South African interests. Consequently, the possibility of the SWAPO government finding employment for ex–combatants in this sector is limited. Few of the private companies seem to have hired returnees, much less PLAN ex–combatants, pointing to their lack of work experience and education. But even without these deficiencies, prospects of finding employment in the Namibian private sector have been bleak. The sector is small, supporting only 5.1 percent of the population, although it accounts for 71.2 percent of the GDP.

The informal sector comprises agricultural subsistence production, small business and hawkers, and self–help groups and cooperatives. Although 54.9 percent of the population rely on these sectors for their survival, they produce only 3.4 percent of GDP. The informal sector has been neglected by the colonial and SWAPO governments despite its high potential to absorb unskilled and semiskilled Namibians. Without government support, both regarding the legal framework as well as training and financial assistance, none but a few of the ex–combatants (and ordinary black Namibians) can make a living in the informal sector.

In fact, only few returnees have made their way into small–scale business enterprises. There are numerous cooperatives, often supported by NGOs, that may also include ex–combatants (Preston and others 1993); however, without comprehensive support, few of these cooperatives are self–sustaining; most still depend on external financial support. Problems faced by individuals and cooperatives include (a) poor appraisals of project feasibility, (b) limited market access, (c) lack of project management and bookkeeping skills, (d) lack of monitoring and evaluation mechanisms, (e) lack of access to credit and secure work site, and (f) lack of technology and skills.

Rehabilitation for Disabled Ex–Combatants

Background

Up to 10 percent of ex–combatants are disabled (Preston and others 1993). Afflictions observed include physical impairment, as well as a high incidence of continuing psychological distress. Some variation in stress patterns has been observed in the cases of ex–PLAN and ex–SWATF fighters.

The main conduit for the rehabilitation of former PLAN fighters reentering Namibia from Angola were the centers for the disabled in northern Namibia. Their purpose was to provide skills and income generation training to enable eventual self–sufficiency in the community. Provision for the rehabilitation of disabled members of the South African forces was through local health services in Namibia or else in South Africa itself. Apparently, disabled ex–SWATF still receive support from South Africa. This segregation of care for the disabled has led to different standards of care and has bred resentment.
The Government's Rehabilitation Program

Prior to independence, NGOs and church institutions were the main providers of rehabilitation services in the country. With the creation of the Ministry of Lands, Resettlement, and Rehabilitation in 1990, the government took over the main responsibility for supporting disabled people. While Namibia's health services appear sufficiently equipped to meet the needs of physical rehabilitation, systems of effective assistance for those seeking to support themselves through employment and other income-generating activities were lacking. The MLRR, therefore, initiated a rehabilitation program, the objective of which was to generate employment opportunities for disabled people through gardening, tailoring, and leatherwork.

The rehabilitation program is a mixture between resettlement and training. Apart from training and tools for gainful activities, beneficiaries also receive general support similar to the resettlement program, such as land, food, and clothing. So far, six income-generating projects for the disabled have been established by the MLRR with an average duration of four years (Table 4.2).

The projects cater to an estimated three hundred disabled, that is, fifty per project. All rehabilitation projects are open for disabled civilians and ex-combatants. The exact number of former fighters participating in the program cannot be established. Rather than integrating the disabled people into mainstream society, the rehabilitation projects attempt to create communities around them.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location/Name</th>
<th>Total Estimated Cost</th>
<th>Duration</th>
<th>Expenditure by 199495</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Elao</td>
<td>386,000</td>
<td>199293 to 199596</td>
<td>320,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gibeon</td>
<td>176,000</td>
<td>199293 to 199596</td>
<td>131,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khomi—Hos</td>
<td>730,000</td>
<td>199293 to 199697</td>
<td>563,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Siya</td>
<td>350,000</td>
<td>199293 to 199596</td>
<td>290,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Okuryangava</td>
<td>553,000</td>
<td>199394 to 199697</td>
<td>384,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khomdare</td>
<td>622,000</td>
<td>199394 to 199697</td>
<td>454,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2,817,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>2,142,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Not included are the Development Brigade and the Vocational Training Center for youth training in practical vocational subjects.*

*Source: Government budget documents.*

The total estimated cost of the six rehabilitation projects to MLRR between 199192 to 199495 is N$2.1 million. Assuming that the administrative expenses for each of these project activities are roughly the same, the government spent another N$5.9 million on program management. Total program costs, thus, amounted to approximately N$8.0 million, of which 73.8 percent was for administration (especially for salaries, goods, and other services; see Table 4.3). The expenses per beneficiary are N$6,670 annually or N$26,670 over four years.
The rehabilitation projects suffer from several shortcomings. Sites seem to have been chosen without preparatory research and the skills training provided to disabled ex-combatants seems inappropriate. For example, the settlers in Elao (like members of other low-income groups) have been encouraged to grow tomatoes, cauliflower, and aubergines, and they have done so quite successfully.

26 The budget document for 1994-95 states expenses for six rehabilitation projects (plus two that are not considered here, the Development Brigades and the Vocational Training Center). On the other hand, an MLRR poster on 'Resettlement and Rehabilitation in Namibia' shows only three projects but lists the others as resettlement projects.

27 MLRR main division 04 (rehabilitation), operational expenditure.

28 OXFAM UK and Ireland provided in-kind contributions, but they have not been valued by MLRR.

However, the market for these products is limited. Elao is located 13 kilometers from the main road, and 70 kilometers from Oshakati, which is the nearest significant market. A trip to Oshakati costs N$40, which erodes most of the potential profit.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 4.3</th>
<th>Rehabilitation Program Budget (199192 to 199495; estimates)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Component</strong></td>
<td><strong>Amount (million N$)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resettlement projects</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MLRR administration</td>
<td>5.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>8.0</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Source: Government budget documents; staff estimates.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The economic prospects of the disabled on completion of the training are, thus, limited. Not surprisingly, they suffer from lack of motivation. In spite of this, psychological support and counseling services are virtually nonexistent, even though these could help the disabled to take more initiatives.

**ELCIN Rehabilitation Center**

Planning for the ELCIN Rehabilitation Center (ERC) started in 1986. Its objective was empowering the disabled individuals and their families, communities, and organizations to improve the lives of the disabled to integrate them into the community and society. To this end, the ERC selected the community-based rehabilitation approach and used church leaders and traditional community leaders to reach the communities. Operations finally commenced in 1990.

In 1991 the two rehabilitation centers at Engela and Nakayale were placed under ERC management. During the repatriation process, CCN/RRR operated Engela and Nakayale as two of the centers where the disabled were gathered. Thereafter, the European Community gave financial support to expand these facilities for disabled people; however, CCN/RRR could not finance the centers beyond 1991 and requested ELCIN to take over their administration and financing. At that time, neither an operational policy nor a program budget existed for running them.
Engela and Nakayale cater to two different groups of disabled. In Engela, the target group are the blind, the deaf, and those with difficulty in learning; in Nakayale, it is the physically disabled. MLRR and ELCIN identify the beneficiaries on a needs basis. The first group at Nakayale consisted of ex–combatants only, but the overall number of ex–combatant beneficiaries is unknown. Both centers offer training courses. The Engela Training Center arranges short courses from one to three months to give disabled people basic skills in various activities such as daily living, mobility, and communication. The Nakayale Vocational Rehabilitation Center (NVRC) offers one–year courses in carpentry, agriculture, and tailoring.

29 Engela had been institutionalized by ELCIN in the 1960s as a school for the deaf and blind. Nakayale was a church hospital.

ELCIN funds the centers, as of 1992, with financial assistance from several church groups. Total expenditures for 1992 and 1993 are estimated at N$1,423,400, 50 percent of which are personnel costs.30 NVRC is also selling goods produced by trainees and, thus, creates a modest additional income. Since 199495, the Ministry of Education and Culture has supported Engela while the MLRR provides financial assistance to the NVRC. In that year, MLRR provided N$535,000, and in 199596, the allocation was increased to N$565,000. Between 199293 and 199495, Nakayale received a total of N$1.2 million and trained and supported an estimated 140 disabled. On average, each beneficiary received assistance worth N$8,570.

Differences in Approach

The MLRR and ELCIN use different approaches to help disabled people. ELCIN's support is for only one year and focuses on training, whereas the MLRR provides assistance for four or more years and places heavy emphasis on resettlement. These approaches reflect differences in philosophy. ELCIN attempts to empower disabled people to become fully accepted and independent members of their community. On termination of the course, the disabled are expected (and aided) to integrate into their community socially and economically. On the contrary, the MLRR provides farther–reaching assistance and thereby inadvertently stifles individual initiative and creates a dependency syndrome. Although not without problems (see Box 4.1), ELCIN's approach provides the disabled with more human capital. In the long run, this can make a crucial difference.

30 Engela received funding worth N$720,800, Nakayale N$702,600.

**Box 4.1: The Nakayale Vocational Rehabilitation Center: A 1994 Situation Report**

The aims of the Nakayale Vocational Rehabilitation Center (NVRC) are to:

- Teach disabled students new skills
- Give disabled students knowledge in skills–related as well as general subjects
- Prepare disabled for employment
- Enable the disabled students to operate a small business successfully
- Enable disabled students to contribute to the development of their community and country.
Consequently, the center offers basic vocational skills training for a period of one year. The skills training comprises three lines of study: agriculture, carpentry, and tailoring; they are complemented by common literacy and small-scale business study classes. In addition, the NVRC offers the general subjects of English, history, mathematics, and practical work. Nakayale management also plans the introduction of new trades, such as typing and telephone operating.

Nakayale's target group are persons with any kind of physical disability, provided they are adults and able to learn. Each year, about fifty disabled people receive training, an unknown number of whom are disabled ex-combatants; however, the NVRC also trains a limited number of nondisabled persons for reasons of integration and with the understanding that the disabled are not going to work in the communities alone.

Until the end of 1994, NVRC provided vocational training to eighty-three students. Some of them are now working independently in the communities while the majority have either established a project of their own or joined existing projects in their field of training. For joint projects, graduates have received land from the local headmen or the MLRR. Many of these projects, among them also the Elao self-help project, benefit from the skilled Nakayale graduates. These projects are also likely to absorb the next generation of graduates.

Overall, training was progressing well. Most of the students were interested in the training and willing to learn. The carpentry and tailoring classes, however, experience a shortage of work space. Moreover, staff accommodation is scarce and electricity and water supplies are erratic. The agriculture course also suffers from water shortages. In addition, NVRC staff had to develop their own syllabus for general education because the Ministry of Labor and Manpower Development had not yet prepared a national standard.

A major problem during the early years was that the courses did not have official recognition. The uncertainty about the value of the certificates undermined the morale and initiative of trainees; alcohol abuse became a special problem. Moreover, they get free boarding and lodging while in training. As a result, many have developed a dependency syndrome and want to stay in the center even after termination of their course.

At the end of 1994, ninety-nine persons stayed at the center, seventeen of whom were staff and forty-eight were students. In addition, the NVRC supported twenty-five graduates until their project site was completed and nine disabled persons who did not leave the center for medical reasons.

During 1994, Nakayale received support from a variety of sources: OXFAM UK and Ireland with equipment, Kamphaku Hospital with medical supplies, the Community Development Liaison office at Outapi with materials for carpentry and tailoring, and Swedish and Finnish churches with funds. The President donated an ox to celebrate Heroes Day (August 26, 1966).

5—
The Development Brigade Approach

Background and Outline

Inspired by the Botswana Youth Brigades and the skills training centers for ex-combatants in Zimbabwe, the Development Brigade (DB) was established in 1991 to quell the disillusionment of the many ex-combatants who had been unable to secure employment and were beginning to voice their disappointment.31

Objective

The objective of this approach was to cater to the needs of those unemployed ex-combatants who—due to their lack of formal education—could not apply to other government training centers. The DB would not only provide PLAN and SWATF ex-combatants with collective skills training but, on completion of their training, would also assist graduates to find employment or to start their own business.

According to the President, the DB was ultimately to provide various marketable skills to 25,000 ex-combatants of both sides (World Bank 1993a, p. 132). Eligibility for DB training was, thus, to be limited to those 24,650 individuals (16,080 ex-PLAN, 8,570 ex-SWATF) who had been identified by the verification committee as having been combatants and still remained unemployed.

Initially, it was planned to train 7,500 participants as construction workers and 10,350 in agricultural production to the point where they would be able to (a) generate an income that would enable them to satisfy their basic needs and (b) fill skill deficits in the labor market. For the first cycle, 9,000 Brigade members were to be 'deployed' in six training centers. Eventually, the number of centers increased to twelve, covering each region of the country, although the number of trainees was cut by more than half.

Initial Donor Involvement

During the preparatory stage, bilateral donors played important roles. SIDA undertook two missions to appraise (a) the suitability of different bases for habitation and for conversion to training centers and (b) the government's request for tools and equipment. SIDA pointed out that the DB approach would only function properly if established according to clear principles and guidelines. Despite minimal preparations by the government prior to the DB's inauguration, however, both missions recognized the government's need for immediate action and endorsed the approach.

Furthermore, a delegation from Cuba visited possible sites for Brigade centers and identified costly infrastructural improvements such as water supply, access roads, storage, workshops, and transport. Neither the Cuban nor the first SIDA mission, however, provided any details of the financial implications of their suggestions. A final SIDA report in late 1991, undertaken by the time the DB continue had already started, was skeptical of the viability of the DB approach and recommended that SIDA withdraw from the scheme or play a substantially reduced role.

Cuba implemented its technical assistance program and is the only donor that has been supporting the DB (and later the DBC) since its inception. On the other hand, SIDA followed the final recommendation and reduced its assistance to a small financial contribution in 199192. The withdrawal of major support by SIDA put the government under severe financial pressure. Although other bilateral donors, notably the European Community in
1992-93 with NS 4.2 million, contributed to almost one-third of total costs, the critical evaluation probably influenced their decision to cease funding after the initial two years.

**Concept and Design**

The concept of the DB is problematic. It reassembles in one place large numbers of people, nearly all of whom are male former liberation fighters. The DB centers, thus, invoke the familiar but minimal conditions of the past and encourage the camaraderie of times gone by. Once created, the centers are difficult to contain and disband (Preston 1994, p. 28). In fact, unrest has been frequently voiced by DB/DBC trainees. Disgruntled DBC trainees were also at the center of the most recent demonstrations in May 1995. The DB concept, thus, proved inadequate to defuse the political threat posed by dissatisfied ex-combatants.

The DB was not to be or become another training college. It was purposefully restricted to the lower end of the vocational training market with an emphasis on practical training and employment. The DB, thus, complements related activities by the Ministries of Labor and Education by focusing on imparting ‘survival skills,’ for example, in carpentry, poultry, bricklaying, drilling, and as mechanics, and electricians. Meanwhile, the DBC use the materials of the Vocational Training College (VTC), the government's showpiece in vocational training. But unlike the VTC with four levels, the DBC only undertakes training at the first level.

There was initially much dispute about course duration. Six months were deemed necessary for the acceptance of the formal sector, whereas twelve months or more were required for the issuance of national certificates. Eventually, training courses were to last for twelve to eighteen months, thereby meeting government standards. The emphasis was to be on practical skill development complemented by the execution of commissioned projects rather than on theoretical classroom learning. Even then, though, the DB certificates were not standardized with government vocational training directives. Consequently, the private sector has until recently not accepted the DBC certificates. The introduction of full comparability is now planned for 1996.

During the training course period, trainees receive assistance in the form of accommodation, food, and an allowance of N$50 per month. Brigade members enroll as individuals without families. They live in barrack conditions, largely in poor-quality housing, often sleeping on the floor. They cook and eat communally. Basic rations are provided under a food-aid program because food self-sufficiency has not even been achieved in the agricultural centers. As the training cycle stretches over a prolonged period, trainees are paid transport once a year to visit their families during the holiday season.

With such comprehensive assistance provided throughout the course duration, ex-combatants remained in a dependent state of mind. There was little interest among Brigade members in self-hard initiated projects, either within the DB or outside. On the contrary, ex-combatants upheld their belief that government and SWAPO are responsible for them and would introduce the necessary measures to train them and ultimately find employment for them.

**Institutional Arrangements**

**The Development Brigade**

The Development Brigade was created by Parliament as a department of the MLRR in July 1991. The administration and implementation of the DB was strongly centralized, controlled by the MLRR in Windhoek. There were no planning or consultative mechanisms at center level. Center managers and staff, certainly in the early days, were not informed of their budgetary allocations. They were also not involved in the selection of applicants, although they might have been able to assess their needs better.
Until 1993, the implementation of the DB was directed and supervised by a cabinet−level steering committee under the chairmanship of the Minister of Information and Broadcasting. Other members of the steering committee included the Ministers of Home Affairs, Defense, Education, Lands, and Foreign Affairs.

It was clear that the success of the venture depended on government commitment to the approach through the willingness to subsidize the DB during the period of its establishment and thereafter. It also depended on the Brigade's ability to persuade donor agencies to provide financial support. With this support seriously lacking and reacting to severe implementation problems, a strategic management decision was made to professionalize the Brigade through downsizing, focusing on profitable enterprises and more rigorous on−the−job training.

**The Development Brigade Corporation**

In the course of 1993, the Development Brigade was converted to a parastatal organization and was renamed the Development Brigade Corporation (DBC). With this reorganization, a Board of Directors was appointed that provides guidelines and overall supervision; its involvement in day−to−day management issues seems to be limited. The reorganization was also to reduce the bureaucratic requirements that hampered DB management and above all to ensure direct and immediate access to Brigade funds from donor agencies.32

As a parastatal, the DBC is able to undertake income−generating activities on a commercial basis. New initiatives, for example water drilling, were, therefore, introduced or extended to enhance the profitability and sustainability of the Brigade. Furthermore, the Berg Aukas mining complex was acquired as a training and conference center and converted into DBC headquarters.

The downsizing and refocusing of the DB to a single−centered business organization with a few hundred workers was a qualified success. Even so, without contracts and revenue, without any prospect of skilled, committed, and experienced teaching staff, and without any prospects of sus−soft

32 The reorganization also opened up the DBC to civilians; however, up to now trainees have been almost exclusively ex−combatants.

32 The reorganization also opened up the DBC to civilians; however, up to now trainees have been almost exclusively ex−combatants.

The exact number of trainees was undecided and the budgets had been only partially prepared.

**Brigade Corporations**

A second restructuring took place at the end of 1995, when the government approved the establishment of four brigade corporations (BCs) as commercialized enterprises. Each BC specializes in one trade, for instance, brick making or horticulture. As a result of this restructuring, the training and employment functions have to some extent been delinked. Consequently, although not totally privatized, improvements in management and operations can be expected in both areas.

**Implementation**

During the first year of operations, DB staff were preoccupied with curriculum development, rehabilitation of facilities, and the employment of staff, especially trainers. Training did not start in earnest before 1992, although trainees had already been waiting in the centers during the whole period. Despite one year of effort, preparations for the inauguration of the DB were inadequate. For instance, neither the administrative structure nor the training program had been fully designed and the relevance of the skills to be developed to national human resource requirements remained unknown. The exact number of trainees was undecided and the budgets had been only partially prepared.
Furthermore, former SADF/SWATF bases had been chosen as training facilities, including headquarters; however, no systematic decision about which bases to use had been taken, no operational planning (including the provision of basic services to them) had been done, and little renovation of centers had been carried out. The slow process stemmed in good part from the fact that the DB was reluctant to rehabilitate entire bases that it might soon have to relinquish.

In 1992 the DB experienced its first major crisis. As the expectations and needs of the trainees have not been met since the inception of the Brigade, unrest erupted. Trainees demonstrated against delays in monthly payments, lack of practical training and living conditions. Development Brigade members in the north organized a protest march in June 1992, claiming increasing frustration with the government's inability to provide them with support or jobs. They even attempted to detain the responsible minister and the Brigade Director and, for several days, prevented the police from investigating the murder of a local politician in Ondangwa.

Trainees who were not part of the drilling or construction units were implicitly encouraged to leave the Brigade voluntarily. By late 1992, the government's ability to pay the N$50 monthly allowance was stretched. Brigade members were ordered to leave the centers for the holiday period and then to wait until management recalled them for training. With the exception of 400 who remained to work on the construction of the Berg Aukas and the Rundu centers, most trainees left the centers. Only a limited number were readmitted later.

33 Further protest erupted in 1994 from a second generation of equally discontented ex–combatant trainees.

After the reorganization, the basic DB design remained essentially unchanged but the mandate and activities of the DBC were broadened ultimately to cover four areas:

- Skills training for unemployed ex–combatants
- Income–generating activities with a limited number of graduates and trainees
- Placement of graduates
- Resettlement schemes for graduates.

Many of those graduates who could not be absorbed in DBC project activities returned to their former unemployed status. The latter two of the DBC's activities can, thus, be seen as a political move to make good on the employment promises that the government had made at the inception of the DB. The recent restructuring is expected to streamline operations in training and employment.

**Selection of Trainees**

The selection of trainees follows a well–established procedure. Radio announcements are made to call for applications to the next cycle. Eligible ex–combatants are encouraged to register at the individual centers. Their applications are then forwarded to the Berg Aukas headquarters where the selection is undertaken based on the acceptable number of new trainees decided by the Board.

Once the successful applicants are called on and transported to the centers, they undertake a two–week orientation program during which they take a literacy entry test. This orientation program also serves to assign the new trainees to their respective trades, a process that seems to be taking into consideration their interest and motivation.
In principle, DBC training is open to ex–combatants from both factions; however, it appears that DTA leaders initially discouraged ex–SWATF members from applying, because they perceived the DB as being too closely associated with SWAPO. Still, a number of ex–SWATF did apply and were selected for training. For the most recent cycle, though, it seems that there have not been any ex–SWATF applicants, although it is unlikely that none of them meet the selection criteria.

Relatively few female ex–combatants were hired by NDF and NAMPOL. Consequently, a larger number of them have been receiving training. In some trades and centers, female participation is said to be close to 50 percent. Still, none of the documentation available acknowledges the particular requirements of female members of the Brigade.

Initially, the only selection criterion for the 24,650 eligible ex–combatants was their employment status; however, during the first cycles it became clear that those with little or no education were holding up progress of the others, especially as the medium of instruction is English. This has led to repeated criticism by the eager and capable trainees. Consequently, a second criterion has been introduced: a minimum formal education of grade 7.

Moreover, a third criterion is now being applied: a maximum age of forty. The reasoning behind this decision is that the older a graduate, the shorter the period he/she can make use of the training received. The introduction of this criterion also means that an ex–combatant who has turned forty while waiting for reception is automatically disqualified from DBC training.

The DBC is in the meantime talking of providing training to no more than 10,000 ex–combatants; thus, the three criteria combined seem effectively to bar 15,000 ex–combatants from low skill training, likely leaving unattended the needs of the most vulnerable. For those who remain eligible, the selection is on a 'first–come, first–served' basis.

The response from ex–combatants has been surprisingly low during the call for the current cycle. Apart from not meeting all three selection criteria, indifference among the target group has certainly increased; consequently, demand is dwindling. In fact, with ex–combatants from the first batches often not having found satisfactory employment, if at all, the DBC has established a poor reputation.

Skills Training

The training program has been marred with difficulties from the outset; its execution seems ineffective, the quality poor, and the costs high. The DBC centers suffer regular resource deficits to the extent that training is—contrary to intention—almost entirely classroom based, and even that is minimal because of the lack of training materials. Despite these funding problems, many of the 4,000 first–cycle trainees had to stay in the centers for more than two years, often in barracklike living conditions. In the meantime, they were idle and experienced frequent frustration. As a result, quite a number of trainees have dropped out of DBC training.

The DBC is currently using over ten centers with a capacity of around 1,300. Since training started in 1992, three batches of ex–combatants have graduated: 400 in 1993, 500 in 1994, and an expected 1,600 in 1995. Currently, 500 ex–combatants are receiving training while another 800 slots are open pending future budget developments.
Placement

Despite its focus on imparting survival skills, the actual course contents often seems to bypass the real-world environment of most ex-combatants; thus, some of the skills offered by DBC are in high demand, for example, drilling, while others are not, for example, bricklaying. Consequently, graduates face a different labor market depending on the trades in which they have been trained. Furthermore, the focus on classroom teaching does not prepare them to compete in the informal sector.

To facilitate employment after training, therefore, the DBC has recently installed a small placement unit under an Employment Contracts Manager. The placement unit is a highly needed link between training and employment, both within the DBC and with the labor market. The Employment Con–soft

35 For instance, the transport subsidy to pay for each trainee to visit her/his family once a year is covered under each center's budget, thereby reducing already scarce resources even more.

tracts Manager is cooperating with the Ministry of Labor as well as with private companies directly, apparently with some success. From the last batch of graduates, 20 percent have been placed with companies, 40 percent have joined DBC resettlement schemes, 15 percent are employed or self-employed in small businesses, while the remaining 25 percent are unemployed and inactive.

The ultimate responsibility of the Employment Contracts Manager should be to enable a graduate ex-combatant to find a job in the private, formal and informal sectors. Judged from this angle, the success of the placement activities is limited. Even though the labor market is tight, the placement unit would have great potential for real assistance. To this end, however, staff would need to be increased. In addition, counseling a graduate about the mechanics of the supply and demand of the labor market would also be desirable.

The training offered at the Development Brigade is essentially supply–side oriented .36 The focus is on imparting skills that are perceived to be marketable; however, little market research on the 'demand side' has been undertaken beforehand, as the high rate of graduate unemployment attests. With training poorly connected to the labor market and of poor quality, the placement of graduates is a daunting task, even more so when proper knowledge about the ex-combatants' opportunity structure is missing. In particular, counseling and placement require up-to-date information about the labor, credit, and goods markets to match existing opportunities with their skills, aspirations, and capital. Perhaps the recent commercialization of the brigades into semiautonomous corporations will reduce the need for outplacement.

Income–Generating Activities

The implementation of income–generating projects was added as the second cornerstone to the newly formed parastatal in 1993. There are two different categories of projects: (a) the DBC designs projects and submits them to the National Planning Commission and other ministries for funding and (b) the DBC participates in public and private tenders. Thus far, the former have not been numerous, while the latter, although profitable, are insufficient for self-financing.

Income–generating activities are undertaken by approximately 850 workers who are mostly DBC graduates, sometimes supported by expatriate advisors and in selected trades complemented by trainees for on-the-job training. Even when working on commercial projects, trainees are only paid their N$50 per month. Income from work completed by trainees during DBC training activities is put to an overall Brigade fund rather than to individuals or to centers themselves. Consequently, this arrangement has caused considerable resentment among DBC trainees who claim that "staff [DBC workers] eat our money."37
Trainees (and graduates hired as workers) repeatedly claimed they should be paid at workers' salaries for the project work they are performing while in training, not as students. The government defended the DBC as a training service and not a public works program, although the DB approach continue

36 A demand–side approach would, on the other hand, provide incentives to employers to hire ex–combatants for on–the–job training and also offer the beneficiaries a choice on which kind of training or which employer to choose, for example, through a voucher system.

37 The low morale of trainees is reflected in the fact that many leave the centers on receiving their monthly pay only to return when the money has run out.

contains significant elements of the latter. Not surprisingly, the DBC has also, in practice, not proved effective. The recent restructuring, thus, aims at improving results.

The implementation of projects necessitates the DBC functioning eventually as a commercial business. With its staff and structure, however, the DBC seems ill equipped to compete with private businesses for tenders. Where it has been successful thus far, it was because government favored the DBC over its private sector contenders or because of its low labor cost.38 Indeed, local private public work contractors resent the Brigade for the unfair cheap labor competition it represents.

Ventures such as the water–drilling initiative have proved symptomatic of the ineptitude of the DB's conceptual approach. In terms of employment, it would offer sixty people training for two years and long–term skilled work for no more than ten specialists. Related job opportunities for relatively unskilled labor would be available for forty people at most. In other words, this capitalintensive type of activity was hardly suitable for meeting the Brigade's need for labor–intensive work if it was to cater to all its graduates. Besides, the profitability of the venture was questionable from the start.

Thus far, only five commercial projects, among them, drilling and bricklaying, are being undertaken; three of them are to finish soon. All these are government–funded projects. For two of them, the construction of dams and 'low–cost' housing units, the DBC has been receiving technical and financial assistance from Cuba and Malaysia, respectively. With so few projects implemented, the DBC is far short of its initial goal of project cost recovery to the tune of 30 percent over the first two years for construction activities alone. Only time will tell whether the recent further commercialization of the brigades will lead to increased sustainable employment generation through the development of viable enterprises.

**Brigade Resettlement Scheme**

To combat the high rate of unemployment of graduates, the DBC has recently started to acquire land for its own resettlement scheme. By offering such assistance, the DBC tries to enable graduates especially from agriculture trades to become commercial farmers; however, problems faced by MLRR resettlement schemes are already becoming apparent, for example, soil fertility or difficulties of local integration when the surrounding communities are of different ethnic origin.

The placement of some 640 ex–combatants (40 percent of the last batch of graduates) on the DBC resettlement scheme should sound a warning signal. First, DBC graduates evidently still cannot find jobs; their unemployment rate would be two–thirds without the scheme. Second, the DBC is entering into an area that is the general responsibility of the MLRR. The DBC resettlement scheme, thus, continues to mark the real deficiencies of the DBC training approach. At the same time it creates a parallel resettlement institution with overlaps and wastage quite impossible to avoid.
38 The perception in the Department of Water Affairs was that there was demand for a low-cost drilling unit that could be given preference in government tendering procedures (Preston 1994, p. 30).

39 In fact, the housing construction program is implemented with unit costs that are higher than what poor Namibians—the intended target group—can afford.

**Management Issues**

In addressing the initial inadequacies, the DB underwent a first management change in 1992. Six directors were appointed under a managing director to assume responsibility for each line of the DB’s organizational structure. Few of these directors, however, had any experience in ventures of this kind. Lack of clarity of purpose and direction became quickly apparent. For example, a business plan for the development of activities that would provide the financial basis of the Brigade was never completed. As a result, a new managing director who oversaw the ultimate transformation of the DB to the DBC was appointed in late 1993.

As a legacy from the DB, the DBC still has too many management layers. For instance, center managers in the northern region report to a regional manager in Ondangwa DB center instead of to headquarters directly, also located in the North. Such a multilayered hierarchy inevitably leads to manifold inefficiencies and waste of funds.

Since the reorganization late in 1993, the DBC appears to be under more professional management and, therefore, is functioning better. Still, the deficiencies were manifold and sometimes serious, confirming the assumption that the DBC design and implementation were questionable; hence, the restructuring of 1995 also attempted to improve overall management efficiency.

In 199495, a first audit was undertaken that brought to light a substantial number of deficiencies. The DBC suffered from an exceptional lack of accountability of funds. For instance, bookkeeping was not undertaken before May 1994, and records were incomplete. Income from project activities was not disclosed, and salary records and a great number of petty cash vouchers were missing. Furthermore, some of the land used was not registered in the DBC’s name, fixed assets were missing, and inventory existed that did not appear on the balance sheet. Simultaneously, no monitoring of and reporting on activities has been undertaken. Such deficiencies seriously undermined the DB’s credibility in the eyes of any potential financial supporter.

The DBC has engaged in a number of unrelated business activities for which it did not keep proper records either. For instance, machinery and land were let to farmers without proper agreement or documentation, and a bank account for a taxi business was opened. DBC members also worked in so-called production units, which are known for their involvement in dubious, economically unviable ventures.

Although the DBC experienced serious financial problems, management did not seem to prepare proper budgets. Not surprisingly, then, no budgetary provisions had been made for the reconditioning and maintenance of machinery and vehicles. Equally worrisome was the fact that the DBC continued to function without an accountant when the qualifications of its financial staff were inadequate. In responding to the Audit Report, an effective accounting system has now been put in place. The DBC also hired two qualified accountants and one financial manager.

Regarding equipment, the DB had at its inception received government and external support to acquire machinery, tools, and so on as required for its training and production activities. Since then, the DBC has amassed a substantial amount of equipment worth an estimated N$20 million but apparently still suffers shortages. First, some of the equipment might have had to be purchased for...
specific purposes since rendered unnecessary. Second, DBC staff appear to have neither much competence to use it nor the means and knowledge to service it properly.

**Staffing Issues**

DBC management has to create employment for its trainees; thus, in its first phase, the DB had hired up to 1,300 graduates as workers, a number subsequently reduced to 850. But neither they nor the managerial staff or instructors had much training or experience in the work required; indeed, most of the staff had been former PLAN officers and were provided jobs by the SWAPO government. Such staff were not necessarily qualified or motivated to provide training to ex-servicemen, including ex-SWATF members. The few with adequate skills were unable to use them because of the lack of tools and equipment.

The lack of experience and qualification of instructors is one of the DBC's major deficiencies. Twice since 1993, instructors have been tested; at both times, the results have been discouraging. After the first examination, those whose aptitude and skill scores were below the acceptable standard were retrenched. During the second testing, 50 percent of trainers seem not to have met quality standards, possibly leading to further retrenchments. The DBC, thus, continues to be plagued by a shortage of competent staff, especially in high technology areas, for example, drilling.42

In line with the DBC's standardization of certificates with the VTC planned for 1996, instructors will undergo additional examinations of qualification. But given the lack of motivation and competence as well as the corporation's hiring policy, it remains doubtful whether the DBC will be able to improve substantially the quality of the training it offers to ex-combatants.

**Program Costs And Financing**

The total estimated DB/DBC budget for the four years, 199192 to 199495 is N$85.2 million, of which N$33.1 million were provided by donors within the first two years of operation. The government's contribution is N$52.1 million (Table 5.1). The major donors were the European Community, SIDA, South Africa, Japan, India, Indonesia, and Cuba. In addition, a Malaysian N$30 million development loan was partly used to buy equipment; the amount could not be established. Of these donors, only Cuba is still providing technical assistance to the tune of some N$300,000 per year.

After an initial restrained response from donors, funds essentially dried up from bilateral sources. The DB and later DBC, therefore, had to rely mainly on the government to fund operations. Initially, 199495 was considered by government to be the last year of funding support to the DBC; however, given its many mandates from government, the DBC claims to be underfunded (as the continue overdrawing of the salary account by 1994 in the amount N$6.7 million would attest). According to the budget documents, funding was, therefore, increased from N$15 million to N$25 million in 199495 and continued in 199596 to the tune of N$18 million, part of which is now budgeted under the Ministry of Finance.
Table 5.1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Amount (thousand N$)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total inside</td>
<td>61,088</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MLRR a/</td>
<td>52,055</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donors b/</td>
<td>9,033</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total outside</td>
<td>24,139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donors c/</td>
<td>24,139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>85,227</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a/ Includes a N$10 million subsidy in 199495 that had not been originally included in the 199495 budget.

b/ That part of the donor assistance that was channeled through the State Revenue Fund rather than directly to the DB.

c/ Includes the contribution of N$1.7 million from Cuba that is not included in the government sources.

Sources: Government budget documents; staff estimates.

Surprisingly, with such large a budget, the cost per trainee or activity has never been calculated. A detailed breakdown along the four DBC activities is, therefore, not available; however, for the two years that the DB was under the MLRR, expenditures by category can be approximated. Between 199192 and 199293, a total of N$33.4 million was budgeted for remuneration, materials and supplies, vehicles, and operational equipment. By that time, only four rehabilitation programs had started; these are in any event not capital-intensive. Assuming that 90 percent of the MLRR's capital expenditures for rehabilitation had been for the DB in these two years, one-third of the funds was spent on salaries and two-thirds on capital equipment and supplies (Table 5.2).

Table 5.2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Amount (million N$)</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Remuneration</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>33.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Materials and supplies</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>36.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vehicles</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>9.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Staffing Issues
Assuming that 50 percent of the DBC’s recurrent expenses and 25 percent of its capital expenses have been used for training, the cost per trainee for the 2,500 graduates thus far is a staggering N$15,040. Assuming that until 199495 the other 50 percent of recurrent expenses and 75 percent of capital expenses were used for income–generating projects for, on average, 1,000 ex–combatant workers, the government subsidy per ex–combatant to the DBC is N$47,600.43 With courses lasting from twelve to eighteen months, it would take at least 20 years to provide training to 25,000 ex–combatants as envisaged by the President at the DBC's inception. Even the revised target number of 10,000 would require at least eight years and another N$112.8 million to achieve.

### Errors Repeated

The second SIDA appraisal mission also analyzed the development brigades in Botswana (for youth) and Zimbabwe (for ex–combatants). Ideally, the lessons from these countries would have been incorporated into the design of the Namibian Development Brigade; however, the Namibian experience shows not only that the lessons had not been incorporated but also that the errors have essentially been repeated. The critical issues for consideration from the Botswana and Zimbabwe cases and their Namibian equivalents are summarized in Table 5.3.

By the time the comparative information from Botswana and Zimbabwe was available, the government had not yet inaugurated the Development Brigade. Although under perceived pressure of time, it would, thus, have had the possibility to alter the DB’s design. Proper consideration of the experiences of other countries would indeed have been warranted to improve operations.

43 In a comparable program in Mozambique, informal sector apprenticeships focusing on on–the–job training for ex–combatants for six months are estimated at less than N$1,500 each, including tool kit, administration, and monitoring. An average small–scale, income–generating project for forty ex–combatants amounts to some N$36,000, or N$900 per ex–combatant.

### Table 5.3
**Critical Issues for Development Brigades**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue</th>
<th>Botswana/Zimbabwe</th>
<th>Namibia (DB and DBC)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cost</td>
<td>The projects are both capital– and labor–intensive. Income generated in the training process falls far below that required for the centers to become self–sufficient; thus, the programs remain dependent on external and government support.</td>
<td>The DBC project activities are highly costintensive and provide few employment opportunities for trainees or graduates. Even after four years, the DBC is far from self–financing and almost entirely depends on government budgetary support.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staff</td>
<td>Competent local staff are often not available to work as instructors or at managerial levels. This leads to</td>
<td>The DB mostly hired former PLAN members as trainers and managerial staff. Their competence in the</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
dependency of expatriate volunteer workers. It seems that brigade graduates are not prepared to return as instructors themselves.

respective fields is limited. Expatriate workers have been employed but, with the exception of the Cubans, do not provide long-term assistance. The training is inadequate to turn trainees into trainers.

Curriculum

The integration of productive activities with the maintenance of basic education and simple instruction in commercial skills needs careful preparation.

The curriculum was initially designed without taking into consideration compatibility with regular government training programs. Instructions in commercial skills seem to be largely inadequate.

Policy

Clear policy about the purpose of the projects and their links to present and future labor market needs is critical.

The DB was designed as an emergency response to ex-combatant unrest. During implementation, government added responsibilities without cost-benefit analyses. Labor market requirements were neglected during design and training.

Management

A considerable amount of autonomy at local level in planning and implementing training and productive activities within clear operational and administrative structures ensures minimum disruption to the implementation of the brigade program.

Despite its transformation into a parastatal, the DBC heavily relies on a top-down management approach. Moreover, even as a parastatal, the DBC depends almost entirely on the government for funding and is, therefore, subject to repeated government interference.


6— The Resettlement Program

Objectives and Outline

The Ministry of Lands, Resettlement, and Rehabilitation (MLRR) came into existence in September 1990 with the provision of land to destitute and resourceless persons being one of its priorities; thus, the main objective of its resettlement program is to create homes for landless Namibians by allocating arable land to them to settle on, use, and develop to make a living as individuals, families, or groups. Members of the San community as well as of the former fighting forces are explicitly targeted under the resettlement policy.

While all resettlement projects are carried out under MLRR auspices and land is allocated centrally, bilateral donors as well as NGOs have been providing additional assistance to settlers. NGOs active in the resettlement program include CCN, CRIAA, 44 ELCIN, and OXFAM UK/I (for training). This chapter presents the two major initiatives: (a) the MLRR resettlement program and (b) the San resettlement program. The latter is part of the overall MLRR program and funded by the ministry; however, its independent implementation by ELCIN as well
The special target group warrant closer analysis.45

The MLRR Resettlement Program

Overview

Land is acquired either by government purchase of commercial farms from white settlers (Kalkfeld and Voigtsgrund) or as a gift from tribal leaders (e.g., King Kauluma). It is made available to settlers in two types of resettlement: (a) individual plots of 47 hectares for a settler or a settler family and (b) common fields for income-generating projects such as cattle farming, cash cropping, vegetable gardens, brick making, or tailoring. The size of the individual plots should provide for the adequate production of food crops, estimated at 2.2 tons of mahangu per year. Income derived from the communal plots is to be divided as follows: 40 percent to the settlers, 40 percent to be reinvested in the project, and 20 percent to be placed in a bank savings account.

In addition to land (and transport to the resettlement project), MLRR provides the settlers with all the necessary means and tools to start a new living and to cover their basic needs. Among the goods and assets received by settlers are food, water, clothing, tools, seeds, fertilizer, and fencing materials. In the short term, settlers are expected to erect traditional and/or semipermanent structures. At a later stage, settlers are also to be provided with materials and helped to build permanent houses. Furthermore, access to roads, schools, and health care facilities is provided, especially to projects located in remote areas.

44 CRIAA, for instance, supported six centers with a strong emphasis on community development and capacity building. It created beneficiary committees for participation and used a local community developer to ease tensions with surrounding communities.

45 Two of the resettlement projects implemented by the MLRR in fact also cater to the needs of Sanspeaking people. These, however, are analyzed as part of the MLRR's program.

The support to settlers is planned under a food-for-work program extending normally three years on the following terms: 100 percent in the first year, an additional 50 percent in the second year, and a further 30 percent in the third year. Thereafter, settlers are expected to have gained enough experience and self-confidence to be able to stand on their own. In exchange, it is the settlers’ responsibility to clear the plots and make the fields productive. Support was to be extended to a fourth year if external circumstances, for example, a drought, inhibited the achievement of self-sufficiency.

Institutional Arrangements

There are essentially four groups involved in the implementation of the resettlement program: the ministry, regional offices, project staff, and settlers. The decisionmaking process of the resettlement program is highly centralized. Despite regional offices in all parts of the country, even day–today decisions are taken in Windhoek. Not surprisingly then, communication, coordination, and cooperation between these groups are weak.

At the central level, there appears to be discord among the relevant ministries as well as between government and agency representatives. Differences concern funding conditions and appropriate strategies for the realization of settler self-sufficiency. Such disagreement results in delays in decisionmaking and blockages in implementation, ultimately discouraging potential beneficiaries from applying. Furthermore, despite a backlog of around 10,000 applications at the central level, not all resettlement projects have been filled because the demarcation of plots has yet to be completed.
In theory, settlers can propose income-generating projects for funding through MLRR; however, while regional offices have regularly forwarded such proposals, decisions from Windhoek are all too often outstanding, leading to further frustration and disinterest. While MLRR headquarters staff visit resettlement centers at times, these visits are mostly issue-related and irregular. Seldom, therefore, would settlers talk to those who would have the decisionmaking power.

At the regional level, MLRR staff are frustrated by the centralization of decisionmaking in Windhoek. They are usually not involved in allocating budgets; indeed, they may not even be informed as to what the budgets are (Preston and others 1993). Their role in the resettlement program essentially is to receive applications as well as project proposals and forward them to headquarters. They themselves have almost no decisionmaking authority and are, therefore, powerless when it comes to helping ex-combatants. Feeling their impotence and being caught between settlers' grievances and a slow bureaucracy, regional staff often respond passively to requests from settlers instead of actively promoting or supporting development initiatives.

Each resettlement project is managed by resident MLRR staff, consisting of a record clerk, technical skills adviser, and other officials as may be required. The duties of these staff are mainly administrative, especially the distribution of the monthly food rations; however, most of the settler communities are quite capable of assuming these responsibilities. The effect of this paid staff has, thus, been to add an unnecessary level of bureaucracy, which inhibits communication between central government and the settlers and discourages settler motivation and self-sufficiency. With limited decisionmaking authority, the motivation of resident staff is also low.

At the project level, the ministry encourages the election of project representatives and the formation of management committees. Their function is, however, not clearly defined; thus, they are either dormant or create additional problems. For instance, power struggles within management committees have been aggravated by what is perceived to be the nepotistic selection of settlers. This is a serious problem at King Kauluma, Otjihao, and Voigtsgrund.

Although settlers are encouraged to establish committees, they are essentially excluded from the important decisionmaking process at every level. This centralized decisionmaking has compounded the settlers' dependency syndrome. They expect Windhoek to provide them with all their requirements and to make decisions and initiatives on their behalf. For example, with or without good reason, settlers demand that the government continue to supply them with additional tools and equipment even when the regular support period has expired.

Implementation

The resettlement program started at the end of 1990, and by mid–1992, eight projects had been created, catering to the needs of some 5,500 people, that is, some 700 people per project. About half the projects were populated by family groups. More numerous were ex–combatants of either side, in the main without families. By 199495, the number of resettlement projects had increased to ten, including the two San resettlement projects (see Table 6.1).46 Excluding the two San projects, some 6,000 people had been settled or 750 per project, catering to an unknown number of ex–combatants.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 6.1 MLRR Resettlement Projects a/</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Location/Name</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Caprivi</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table: Resettlement Projects

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Western Bushmanland</td>
<td>1,267,000</td>
<td>1991-92</td>
<td>1,167,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mara</td>
<td>875,000</td>
<td>1992-93</td>
<td>725,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drimiopsis b/</td>
<td>1,500,000</td>
<td>1992-93</td>
<td>1,300,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>King Kauluma</td>
<td>600,000</td>
<td>1992-93</td>
<td>580,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tsintsabis b/</td>
<td>1,800,000</td>
<td>1992-93</td>
<td>1,500,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greenwell Matongo</td>
<td>1,050,000</td>
<td>1993-94</td>
<td>1,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hangane Katjipuka</td>
<td>350,000</td>
<td>1993-94</td>
<td>300,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fikameni Tulongeni</td>
<td>350,000</td>
<td>1993-94</td>
<td>300,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emergency Fund c/</td>
<td>1,145,000</td>
<td>1993-94</td>
<td>710,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>10,279,000</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>8,801,000</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* a/ Not included are the Ovambo Feasibility Studies and the Herero Repatriation Program.

* b/ The Drimiopsis and Tsintsabis projects primarily involve San-speaking people.

* c/ The Emergency Fund is designed to provide informal agricultural training for landless people.

*Source: Government budget documents.*

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46 The budget document for 1994-95 states expenses for ten resettlement projects (plus two that are not considered here, the Ovambo Feasibility Studies and the Herero Repatriation Program). On the other hand, an MLRR poster on ‘Resettlement and Rehabilitation in Namibia’ shows fourteen projects, several of which are listed as rehabilitation resettlement projects in the budget document.

Much like its institutional arrangements, the implementation of the resettlement program has been dogged by controversy. The main issues of contention are the selection criteria for recruitment, land tenure, economic sustainability, government assistance, and social integration. These are now discussed in turn.

**Selection of Settlers**

MLRR ensures that only the needy are participating in the resettlement program. Initially through churches and community leaders and later through the radio, announcements are made for applications. Applicants of the resettlement scheme first fill in an application form at their local MLRR office. In theory, then, MLRR works in close cooperation with church and community leaders in the selection of potential settlers. If MLRR is sure that the selected applicants satisfy all the requirements (i.e., landless, destitute, unemployed, and without any source of income), they are invited to indicate their preferred location and are eventually called on to be transferred to a resettlement project.

In practice, clear selection guidelines do not exist and the process of recruitment is not entirely transparent. The selection of settlers takes place in Windhoek, with little input from regional MLRR staff or community leaders.
Consequently, admission is often not needs-related. Furthermore, allegations persist that family and friends of MLRR staff are sometimes selected to work for a project or to settle at the projects sites. While there is a large backlog of applications for resettlement, evidence from ex-combatants suggests that overall the program's publicity may nonetheless be low, probably not reaching some of the neediest living in remote areas.

**Land Tenure**

Whatever way land is acquired, settlers are told that the land is theirs; however, not all settlers seem to be clear about their tenure status and feel they have only informal rights of access and use. This lack of land tenure security may discourage motivation and willingness to use their energy and is probably a disincentive for some to invest in the project.

The demand for resettlement appears to far surpass available project sites. The expansion of the program has been limited by the unwillingness of farmers to sell (part of) their land as well as the current land tenure arrangements. Currently, government is finalizing a land tenure reform, which would make land more easily available for the resettlement program. But even then, the resettlement program alone could not cope with the problem of landlessness in the country.

**Economic Sustainability**

The MLRR expects settlers to achieve self-sufficiency over a three-year period through a combination of subsistence and commercial agricultural production. To meet this expectation, the land allocated to settlers has to meet three requirements: (a) suitability for sustainable production, (b) adequate water supply, and (c) adequate rainfall (200 mm to 600 mm for dry crop production).

As the numerous problems that bedeviled agricultural production in the resettlement projects attest, these requirements often have not been met. Indeed, the economic viability of several sites is questionable in light of their remoteness from markets, infrastructural deficiencies (e.g., inadequate roads, distance from health centers and schools, and unreliable water supplies) and inadequate soil fertility.

It is MLRR's responsibility to provide settlers with potable water. In theory, therefore, settlers are transported to the project site after water has been installed; however, the supply of water to some of the centers has been erratic and unreliable. In other cases, water had not been properly installed at all. This has been due to, among other causes, the fact that land has often been situated in remote or inaccessible areas without proper infrastructure for water conveyance.

It appears that there were no feasibility studies done of the resettlement sites. For example, the King Kauluma site had previously been a SADF shooting range, with some of the ordinance remaining underground. Settlers and their children have repeatedly been injured or killed by abandoned explosive devices concealed under the earth. Other resettlement projects suffer from poor soil quality insufficient to produce the target output. In fact, because of shortage of funds or land MLRR often did not have any alternative to providing a specific piece of land.

Settlers are supposed to be encouraged to undertake income-generating activities; however, support from MLRR is often not forthcoming. Settlers frequently lack tools, even for agricultural production, and the on-site training available in some centers is insufficient. Settlers are also not assisted in accessing credit to acquire some start-up capital. With feeder roads servicing some centers in such a poor state that settlers cannot access markets easily, many have been unable to sell their products profitably. Consequently, the sustainability of these
income–generating schemes under current conditions is highly questionable.

**Government Assistance**

The remoteness of some of the projects has complicated the provision of basic services and infrastructure to the settler communities. In particular, problems have been experienced with housing, education, and health services. *Housing* facilities at most of the projects are minimal and still mostly traditional. This has exposed settlers to floods and other threats as well as health risks. Contrary to government intentions, some centers still lack proper *health* facilities. This deficiency is compounded by the fact that many settlers cannot afford to use health services farther away and, thus, are bypassed by the government's health policy.

While some larger projects have *schools* of their own, generally, lack of access to schools for children is a serious constraint that may have serious consequences for their future. At the smaller centers (e.g., Onandjendje and Voigtsgrund), because there will never be enough children to justify a government school, children have to be sent away. This option, however, is feasible only for settlers wealthy enough to pay for food and lodging. There is also the ever–present trade–off between child education and child labor. Alternative means of education provision have thus far not been explored.

MLRR originally intended to provide new skills and upgrade the existing skills of settlers. *Training* was to be provided in fields such as tailoring, knitting, brick making and poultry farming and to be geared to the creation of sustainable, community–based enterprises. In reality, little training has continued materialized. Furthermore, insufficient account has been taken of the skills that many settlers already had on arrival at a resettlement project (Preston and others 1993). For example, at Voigtsgrund where there is no school, two settlers had the ability with a little training to teach preschool children.

Government chose a *phased approach* to wean settlers off assistance and encourage them to take their lives into their own hands; however, in practice, none of the resettlement projects have become self–sufficient to date. A three–year drought has undermined agricultural production in many parts of the country, leading to the extension of government assistance to settlers; therefore, settlers have now been receiving 100 percent of their food and other basic needs for up to five years.

While such developments cannot be attributed to the government alone, they expose the general vulnerability of many settlers on the project sites and reflect unfavorably on the design and implementation of the program. Many settlers have already reached a point where "we don't want to live on handouts, we want to do it ourselves." If this attitude is not captured while still present, the government runs the risk of creating a serious *dependency syndrome* that could lead to discontent, eventual abandonment, and a drain on resources for many years to come.

**Social Integration**

Settler communities face a number of social problems both within and in relation to surrounding communities. Having been created by ministerial fiat, none of the communities has had the benefit of indigenous development. While settlements were intended to be ethnically mixed, in practice they are generally ethnically homogeneous. Even though most settlers had not known each other before joining in a project, building on their *social capital* should have been easier.

Sharing a dependent state of mind, however, settlers seem unwilling to build or enhance their social capital. At the same time, virtually nothing is done from a management perspective to strengthen this area. On the contrary, there are cases where settlers formed cooperatives but did not find support; they, thus, disintegrated quickly. The same holds for reciprocal labor services on each others' fields that after a good start have faded. With hindsight, the
highly centralized approach of MLRR and lack of beneficiary participation in design making was a lost opportunity for the beneficiaries.

Full social reintegration and self-sufficiency is the expected eventual outcome of the resettlement program. But just as economic self-sufficiency has proved difficult in most cases, the social integration of settler communities with neighboring communities has encountered problems. In general, local communities are not always consulted or included in either the design or the implementation of resettlement projects. Furthermore, the remoteness of some settler communities has minimized social interaction with neighbors as has the unity of many settler communities; thus, feeling excluded, local communities can easily undermine integration.48

48 In Voigtsgrund and Kalkfeld, for instance, the relationship of settlers with local white farmers, the indigenous communities, and the respective local authorities has been tense due to disputes over ancestral land rights and ethnic tensions.

Program Budget

It is inherently difficult to estimate the amount of money spent on the resettlement program that benefits ex-combatants. First, the number of ex-combatant beneficiaries is not known, because MLRR has received earmarked financial support in an unknown amount. For instance, the European Community provided some N$2 million in 199293 for the purchase of productive equipment (pumps, tools, seeds, and so on).

The costs of these additional interventions and the extent of bilateral support cannot be established with any degree of accuracy; however, MLRR expenses for the eight projects until 1994 are known, amounting to N$6.4 million. Additionally, proportional operational expenses are estimated at N$9.7 million; 49 thus, the overall resettlement budget from known contributions amounted to at least N$18.1 million for a period of four years (Table 6.2). Administrative expenses amounted to 53.6 percent of the program budget. Assuming a settler population of 6,000, each beneficiary was supported with approximately N$3,000 between 199192 and 199495 or N$750 per year.

Table 6.2
Resettlement Program Budget
(199192 to 199495; estimates)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source/Component</th>
<th>Amount (million N$)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Government</td>
<td>16.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MLRR development (projects)</td>
<td>6.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MLRR operational (administration)</td>
<td>9.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Community</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>18.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Government budget documents; staff estimates.
San Resettlement Program

Context

Approximately 2,000 San fought with SWATF. Many originally came from southern Angola, and entire communities had settled with their families around SWATF camps—around 10,000 San overall. The SADF provided these communities with salaries (up to ZAR 600 per month), food, housing, and social services. With the end of the war and the withdrawal of the SADF, these ex-combatants and their families faced a bleak future. They did not have homes to which to return, they had no marketable skills, they had fought on the losing side, and their communities had historically been marginalized socially and economically. ELCIN became aware of this situation in 1989 and was given permission by UNTAG, SWAPO, and the interim administration to design a two-phase resettlement and rehabilitation program in conjunction with LWF.

49 Assuming that the administrative expenses per project are roughly equal.

50 This chapter is largely based on the program's evaluation report (Jansen, Pradhan, and Spencer 1994). The two MLRR-implemented resettlement projects that involve San-speaking people (Drimiopsis and Tsintsabis) are excluded here.

The San Resettlement Program rests on the government's policy to create homes for landless Namibians by allocating arable land to them. San particularly qualified for resettlement support as they "have endured exploitation and discrimination at the hands of their fellow men throughout history" (Government of the Republic of Namibia, National Resettlement Policy, undated, p. 2). "Their subsistence platform in the Subcontinent has suffered tremendous historical changes due to new political constellation and constraints on ecology" (Government of the Republic of Namibia, National Resettlement Policy, undated, p. 2) and government's explicit policy is to involve the San people in development activities that will improve and better their situation for good.

Phase I: Emergency Program

Initially, ELCIN/LWF secured funding for a six-month rehabilitation and resettlement program. The main objective of this program was to offer the San ex-combatants an incentive to remain in Namibia; however, despite assurances from SWAPO that they would not be persecuted, approximately 4,000 of these San had accepted a South African offer to resettle in South Africa. They were resettled at the Schmidtsdrift army base near Kimberley.

During the first phase, the San received food aid, shelter, tools for agricultural production, and legal aid (e.g., pension and other SADF payment obligations). The program also included infrastructure development (water, roads, and health education), community development, and logistics. While the San received this emergency aid, ELCIN, the new government, and other interested parties drew up a targeted resettlement plan geared toward ensuring San self-sufficiency.

Phase II: Reintegration

Phase II was started in early 1990 and has just been extended by government for another two years. All San who wanted to resettle were supported by ELCIN. From April to May 1990, 1,143 applicant families or 6,022 persons (respectively, 407 and 2,100 in West Bushmanland and 736 and 3,900 in Western Caprivi) applied for this resettlement program through a registration census. On the basis of this census, land surveys were conducted to determine agriculturally viable settlement locations and to demarcate the settlements. The settlement area and physical layouts were approved by the Cabinet in July 1990. The first plots were handed over to community
leaders in November 1990.

The support program for the San settlers is comprehensive. The settlers first received tents until they were able to erect houses. The clearing and cultivation of fields and the building/rehabilitation of infrastructure was implemented as a food–for–work program. The two project sites also offered schools and health facilities and some vocational training. These activities were complemented by a community development initiative and spiritual care.

No attempt seems to have been made, however, to build on the San's traditional nomadic subsistence mode of hunting, gathering, and cattle herding, neither in the resettlement process nor in the skills training. Although this mode of subsistence has been undermined over decades, given their skills and background, the San may still be well suited for specific professions, for instance as park wardens, ecotour guides, and cattle ranchers.

December 1993 figures suggest that 700 families/3,295 persons resided on the West Bushmanland project. The current Western Caprivi population was 6,400 in January 1994. This would suggest a 60 percent increase in settler numbers over a three–year period. Although the San resettlement program seems to be quite successful overall, a number of problems have occurred since program inception in each of the program components.

### Land Rights

It is unclear whether residents' names have been officially registered with the government, and therefore, whether they have de jure or only usufructory rights. The Land Act of 1936, which is still applicable in the communal areas, stipulates that the government is the state land–allocating body; however, in practice, chiefs and headmen perform these duties.

The insecurity of tenure will persist until individual land grant certificates or 'Permission to Occupy' have been issued to the beneficiaries. Without these certificates, settlers have a disincentive to work that could well hamper future development. The uncompleted allocation of land foreseen for grazing activities (the rehabilitation plans anticipated the San becoming livestock farmers) compounds the uncertainty of the land situation.

### Agriculture

The program intends to advise farmers, organize training, promote vegetable gardens, engage in a draft power scheme, train draft oxen, undertake small–scale irrigation farming, encourage agroforestry and establish tree nurseries. Some of these activities have not materialized, namely tree nurseries, irrigation activities, and agroforestry projects, and overall soil quality and technology have frequently impeded the achievement of sustainable agricultural production.

Land is often sandy and rainfall inconsistent in West Bushmanland where only 15 percent of allocated land has thus far been cleared. In 1994 the area could harvest only approximately 33 percent of its food needs. An initial lack of draft power has been remedied by the acquisition of oxen and donkeys. In Western Caprivi, more land has been cleared, but this area is still food deficient as well (by 200 tons in 1994). Settlers suffer from a severe lack of draft power and, thus, have to use traditional labor-intensive and time-consuming manual methods to prepare, plow, and plant the land. Such low productivity acts as a disincentive to crop farming.

### Education and Training

*Primary education* has been offered to children through the provision of school facilities and teacher training. Adequate infrastructure has been provided in the form of six schools with an average of thirty–eight children per classroom. For further education, children are transferred to government schools. Sixteen teachers who have been trained by ELCIN are employed at these schools. English and Afrikaans are the common teaching languages.
because of lack of curriculum material in different San dialects.

52 Of these, 1,600 people are not covered by the ELCIN program.

A part of WFP's food aid program, students receive school uniforms as well as a midday meal. The meals are an incentive to attend and serve as well as an important food supplement; however, for those children in remote communities, distance and travel time are a constraint to attendance. For girls, teenage pregnancy is cited as an additional major reason for discontinuation of education.

There has been little coordination between ELCIN and the Ministry of Education and Culture (MEC). The ELCIN schools have not yet been registered, although a request to this effect has been made. MEC guidelines for school construction (number of children, distance from nearest school) have not been taken into account; therefore, the eventual transfer of the schools to government may be complicated.

Frequently binding constraints exist regarding secondary education because children have to attend boarding schools. Apart from prohibitive hostel fees, parents are reluctant to send their children away for various reasons. They fear negligent supervision, teenage pregnancy, inadequate nutrition, and cultural alienation.

ELCIN runs a nonformal adult literacy program and employs twenty-two literacy facilitators who instruct over 450 adults. This is significantly beyond original project targets. The adult literacy program is registered with the Department of Adult and Continuing Education. Attendance of women is particularly facilitated. The medium of instruction is primarily Afrikaans. The program faces some distinct constraints, especially a lack of materials, lack of qualified teaching staff, and loss of facilitators.

A vocational training and income generation component has also been initiated by ELCIN as part of its resettlement program. The objective of this component is to provide and sponsor skills and management training as well as to support and guide the establishment and running of income-generating groups. To date, a limited number of San have benefited from this component.

Sixty women have received training in needlework in West Bushmanland through the assistance of locally employed instructors. Six sewing groups were established and provided with sewing machines, which are also used for training. Their effectiveness is, however, hampered by the lack of raw materials, poor quality production, and business management problems. Market possibilities for sewing ventures also appear questionable. In addition, fifteen people were trained in such diverse activities as dam building, agronomy, typing, building construction, blacksmithery, and carpentry. Still, a direct relationship between income-generating options in the program areas and related vocational training could not be established.

Health and Nutrition

During the emergency phase, the International Committee of the Red Cross had set up a network of paid village health workers. These health workers were trained in TB diagnosis and treatment, referral of pregnant women and young mothers to health clinics for necessary treatment, and immunizations. The Ministry of Health and Social Services (MHSS) stresses that community-based health workers are considered unpaid volunteers and has consequently discontinued payment of these workers, leading to the gradual collapse of the system.

The resettlement program includes a health and nutrition component, which is to provide health facilities and improve health and hygiene through a program of health education and training.
West Bushmanland, the Ministry of Health and Social Services provides services through a clinic at Tsumkwe and a health center at Mangetti Dune. In Western Caprivi, ELCIN has established and staffed three health clinics, whereas MHSS staff provide mobile clinics.

In both program areas, government clinical curative services are featured at the expense of preventive aspects of health care. Health and nutrition education for children and adults alike receive inadequate attention, although some community-based health workers continue to work as volunteers. Traditional healers and birth attendants/midwives perform a complementary role in relation to mental illnesses, minor accidents, and child deliveries.

The major diseases are malaria, tuberculosis, and sexually transmitted diseases. High HIV/AIDS rates are suspected, although no data exist to confirm this. Vitamin C and iron deficiency are common. The poor nutritional status of the area's population is compounded by limited access to meat, green vegetables, and fruit. In this area, ELCIN has undertaken only limited activities, for example, the cultivation of several vegetable gardens and the distribution of the produce for local consumption.

Employment

Formal employment in both project areas is scarce. Indeed, ELCIN itself is the single largest employer, with fifty-two staff in West Bushmanland and fifty-seven staff in Western Caprivi. In addition, one hundred beneficiaries are employed by the Omega Development Brigade, and some seasonal labor is available on surrounding commercial farms. The informal sector, on the other hand, is quite diverse. Hawking, small shops, traditional healing, handicraft production, wood carving, basket making, and beer brewing exist; however, no employment or income figures are available for these activities.

Community Development

San communities have repeatedly suffered since the first colonization of the country. Their social capital is, therefore, severely depleted (Preston and others 1993, pp. 1013). At the same time their traditional way of life has substantially changed to that of sedentary agriculturists in many instances. Acknowledging this fragile situation, ELCIN included several measures of community development in its resettlement program. The objective of this component was to create a local structure that would facilitate the participation of the community in the development process and its related decisionmaking procedures through the strengthening of community awareness, leadership, and development skills.

Different methods have been employed by ELCIN to achieve this objective. In Western Caprivi, the local traditional leadership structure of chief and headmen was adopted and attention given to the establishment of an apex organization in the form of a council of local leaders. In West Bushmanland, where no traditional hierarchy existed, ELCIN encouraged the establishment of Village Development Committees (VDCs) in each settlement with members elected by the settlers.

While involving the beneficiaries more directly in project implementation than MLRR, ELCIN's consultation process appeared to have been inadequate. In fact, there is a perception among the settler communities that, although they were regularly informed about project matters, they were not necessarily consulted in an appropriate and accepted manner. Clearly, consultation means more than just informing beneficiaries. It means empowering them with decisionmaking authority.

For instance, the San agreed to the land allocation principle of individual plot ownership and on the plot residence (as was common with Ovambo–Kavango farmers), but they were dissatisfied with the division of land into long,
straight rectangular blocks, some of them stretching over several kilometers. They had envisioned having nearby individual farms while maintaining residential clusters. Moreover, it seems that too few San had seen the areas prior to allocation.

This use of extensive single or double-row linear plot layouts is also more expensive in terms of service and infrastructure provision because of the associated long distances. Concentrated block or small block allocations in a circular shape around residential areas would have been preferable. Some San families actually refused to move to the fields, while others decided to work the plot but reside nearer one another and closer to the infrastructure and service facilities. Consequently, societal cohesiveness, community development, and agricultural performance were unnecessarily strained.

The VDCs remain weak and evidently not fully used in the top-down management of the program. It is important to note that the relationships between different San groups have not effectively been taken into account. For instance, in West Caprivi, the ethnic minority group (Vasekele) claims that the chief, who is Mbarakwena who also serves as ELCIN community development promoter, discriminates against them and ignores their needs and grievances. At the same time, Vasekele children have not been attending school regularly and complain about discrimination by Mbarakwena children who fight with them and chase them away from school. Significantly, no training of local leaders has taken place in this area.

Overall, therefore, it seems that community development and empowerment have not been high on ELCIN's priority list. While the approach chosen was acceptable in theory, in reality, it was undertaken too hurriedly and consequently lacked proper preparation. Genuine consultation and participation have not been sufficiently pursued. Consequently, the approach had an unplanned negative side effect. By working against the interests of the beneficiaries, especially in the case of plot demarcation, the program contributed to the further weakening of the San's social capital. Judging from the beneficiaries' reaction, that is, abandoning fields to live closer together, it is clear that social capital still exists. The San resettlement program would have had a real chance to actually reinforce it.

**Spiritual Care**

This component first appeared in 1992. Its objectives are not spelled out, but can be deduced as providing pastoral services in pursuance of a holistic approach to human well-being. Pastoral care includes Bible studies, catechism classes, baptism/confirmation, and Sunday services and sacraments. Deaconal care concentrates on the elderly, chronically ill, and disabled, as well as the youth.

Cooperation between spiritual care and project management staff appears to have created some problems at the beginning. On one occasion, spiritual care staff interfered with the development work through the dissemination of incorrect information linking development activities with church attendance. This conflict was, however, easily solved, especially as it is the explicit policy of EL-soft CIN not to link program assistance to church services. Since MLRR is promoting the program, no other such incident has occurred.

**Program and Project Administration**

A distinct division of labor has been devised to handle program and project administration. *Program management* includes overall coordination; project monitoring; staff performance guidance; project implementation management; liaison with government ministries, suppliers, partner organizations, and NGOs; financial administration; control and budgeting; and reporting.
ELCIN has established the position of Project Coordinator based at its office in Windhoek. This office functions as a service office for the ELCIN head office in Oniipa, Ovambo. The coordinator answers to the Development Secretary in the Department of Finance and Development. The person visits the sites on average on a monthly basis and prepares monitoring reports and is also responsible for financial administration of the program with the assistance of a part−time accountant/bookkeeper. Cooperation between the coordinator and project area staff is good.

In general, ELCIN's relationship with government is positive. Liaison within the government structure is the responsibility of the MLRR. This ministry maintains communication with the line ministries responsible for the sectors where ELCIN's activities in the field affect government portfolio responsibilities (especially agriculture, health, and education). At the working level, however, the alliance between ELCIN and government is not always smooth. Planned monthly project monitoring meetings among ELCIN, MLRR, and the line ministries never materialized. MLRR also did not consult with relevant ministries over the establishment of schools and clinics. This has delayed the registration process.

*Project management* is the responsibility of the Project Managers in each area who are charged with the coordination and implementation of project activities. The managers are also responsible for vehicle use and maintenance, financial administration and control of project funds, and the operation and maintenance of the project bases and assets in the areas. They produce monthly and annual monitoring and evaluation reports that are used as regular management tools.

In the absence of local bookkeepers, the managers also perform bookkeeping activities, adding to their already heavy administrative burden. There does not, however, seem to be any misappropriation of funds. Because of their manifold duties and several new appointments, their reporting has not been consistent and regular. Quantitative reporting with reference to set targets is neglected. This has resulted in limitations of the utility of general program reporting, because the Windhoek reports are based on the information provided by the project managers.

*Local coordination* is given particular attention during implementation. It is intended to (a) maintain close contact with the communities and community leaders and (b) liaise with government ministries and other agencies involved. In both respects, however, program implementation shows several weaknesses. For instance, MLRR District Health Teams are not fully aware of the health and nutrition activities of ELCIN.

Moreover, communication with VDCs in West Bushmanland is constrained by time, distance, and cultural differences between the managers and the beneficiary community. Too few vehicles and a lack of fuel constrain travel and cause tensions among staff. The manager in Western Caprivi is simultaneously performing the duties of Agricultural Extension Officer, creating serious time and prioritization constraints. In both regions, beneficiaries complain about the lack of meaningful consultation and participation.

**Program Costs and Financing**

Between 199192 and 199495, the government contributed about N$2.4 million to the two projects. Another N$0.2 million is budgeted for 199596. Administrative expenses include the running expenses of government officials and material as well as the opportunity cost of the free accommodation provided by the government in the project areas. The government also covered the costs of drilling and equipping of boreholes, surveying and plot demarcation, the salary of a health consultant, food–for–work projects, fencing materials and agricultural seeds, water reticulation material, four Chinese tractors, as well as housing and office space. The administrative expenses, budgeted under the operational expenditure section of the MLRR resettlement division, amount to an estimated N$2.4 million over the same period.53 As of April 1, 1996, MLRR will assume sole funding and
implementation responsibility for the San program.

Known donor contributions up to January 1994 amounted to N$2.8 million. The Norwegian Agency for Development provided N$1.4 million, Finnchurchaid provided N$0.9 million, and the Church of Sweden Aid provided N$0.4 million. The Canada Fund and LWF donated another N$0.1 million. In addition, WFP and CRIAA have provided food aid in an unknown amount. The total known expenses for phase II of the San resettlement amounted, thus, to around N$7.6 million (see Table 6.3), of which 42.1 percent was for administration. The expenses were almost equally divided between the two areas (see also Table 6.2).

Assuming that by early 1994, 1,200 of the 9,700 settlers were ex-combatants in the two areas, the average cost per ex-combatant was N$780 over the four-year project period 1991-1994 or N$195 annually.

### Table 6.3
**San Resettlement Program Budget**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Amount (million N$)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Government</td>
<td>4.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>MLRR development expenses (projects)</strong></td>
<td>2.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>MLRR operational expenses (administration)</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donor contributions</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>7.6</td>
</tr>
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</table>

*Source: Government budget documents; Jansen, Pradhan, and Spencer (1994, p. 27); staff estimates.*

53 This estimate assumes that the administrative expenses for each of the twelve resettlement project activities are roughly the same.

54 The budget of the emergency phase I is unknown, because this segment was managed by LWF and no detailed records exist. The total amount spent by LWF until the end of 1991 is estimated at N$2.4 million. Moreover, it is assumed that no further donor contribution has been received after early 1994.

55 San (ex-combatants and family members) linked to the SWATF numbered around 10,000. Of these, 4,000 went into exile to South Africa. Assuming that the family size was five, 1,200 of the remaining 6,000 must have been ex-combatants.

Budgeting appears to be poor, in part due to optimistic production assumptions, which led to deficits for infrastructural components, while social service components were underspent; however, a flexible fund allocation system facilitated the use of funds from the latter to compensate for the former. Approximately 20 percent of funds was reallocated on such an ad hoc basis.

For 1992 and 1993, detailed expenditure data are available from the evaluation report. According to this source, the expenditure pattern has a bias toward salaries, vehicles, and overheads as opposed to capital investments. The
former comprised 54 percent of 1992 expenses and 71 percent of 1993 expenses. Salary payments including all area–based staff and Windhoek–based officials amounted to approximately 33 percent of 199293 expenditures. Capital investments are largely confined to schools, clinics, community halls, equipment/machinery, and tools.

During the same period, the breakdown by component reveals that 29 percent of funds were used to cover expenses for program management. Formal education was the most important component and received another 17 percent of the funds. The community development and health components received 9 percent and 7 percent, respectively.

7—The Impact of Reintegration Efforts

The demobilization of ex–combatants triggers a reintegration process affecting not only the ex–combatants themselves but also their families and the communities within which they settle. The feelings, reactions, and emotions of each group are different from the other, but there are also variations within each group. In the final count, the degree of coincidence of positive or negative experiences among members of each group and within each group will determine the lasting success of reintegration as a social, economic, and political phenomenon.

Little is known about the profile of combatants of the Namibian war of liberation that could guide such analysis or program design, for that matter. Little is also known about these individual reintegration experiences. Overall, however, the social, economic, and psychological situation of ex–combatants indicates that the processes of integration and reconciliation are proceeding with difficulty. Recent events at the national level—six years after demobilization—the protest of ex–combatants against protracted neglect by government, attest that true reintegration of many an ex–combatant has not yet been fully achieved. This chapter, thus, uses two studies to shed some light on the predicament of ex–combatants, their families, and communities.

The Individual Reintegration Experience

An unknown number of female combatants and staff served in both armies. In fact, some estimates for PLAN are as high as 30 percent. Although the majority of these are not likely to have been part of combat units. Little is known about their reintegration experience compared to their male counterparts. Their male comrades in arms see no differences in their own reintegration experiences to female ex–combatants, at least regarding economic reintegration.

Socially and psychologically, female ex–combatants might well find it more difficult to reintegrate into civilian society or accept the traditional roles assigned to them (World Bank 1993a, p. 151). Moreover, single female ex–veterans who returned with children are discriminated against in many traditional environments, making the transition even harder.

Economic Reintegration

Those ex–combatants who have been absorbed by the NDF and other public sector organizations were the relatively more educated. Consequently, many of those who have failed to reintegrate eco–soft

56 These studies are Preston and others (1993) and Sitari and others (1995). The former is based on several community studies in 199293 in rural (Ovambo), peri–urban (Oshakati, Ondangwa), and urban (Katutura–Windhoek) areas, which were identified as having been affected by the war. Questionnaire data were collected about the situation of different categories of war–affected people, including male and female civilian and military stayers and returnees. The latter is based on in–depth interviews with thirty–seven ex–combatants,
twenty-one spouses, twenty-five returnees, and twenty-one community leaders in twelve communities in the northern and central regions, equally divided between rural and urban areas. The study also attempted to capture the views of the different groups of people actively or passively participating in the reintegration process.

Economically are those with the least education and a lack of skills. Formal sector unemployment among ex-combatants is still estimated at a disconcerting 50 percent and, among ex–PLAN, possibly as high as 66 percent. Informal sector employment is not sought after by returnees or ex–combatants, because the earnings it provides are below those of the formal sector.

Many ex–combatants had, thus, no alternative but to return to rural areas and resume subsistence production as their economic mainstay. Overall, their monthly income could fall below N$200 per month; average monthly income could hover at around N$500, that is, around N$6,000 per year. Most ex–combatants are, therefore, not in a position to save much or at all.

Ex–PLAN, for many years not having had security, income, or a regular family life, may not be suffering the material losses experienced by ex–SWATF combatants as a result of the end of the war. Still, the latter seem better off employment–wise than the former; their unemployment rate may be close to one–third only. Contrary to their former enemies, SWATF ex–combatants have frequently found employment as security guards in rapidly growing private companies, a trade in which they can best make use of their military skills. Their problem is primarily social reintegration.

Overall, the employment situation in rural areas seems to be better than in urban areas but formal sector unemployment is higher. The disheartening formal employment situation and dreary rural life act as a potent push for ever more Namibians to migrate to the cities; ex–combatants are no exception. In fact, many ex–combatants from resettlement projects would like to escape their dire straits but do not even have the money for transport. Moreover, at the project sites, they at least have a place to stay.

Given the low level of skills, ex–combatants are ill–equipped to find gainful employment in the formal sector in urban areas. Ex–combatants are aware of the fact that their level of skills negatively impacts on their chance to find employment. In fact, many an ex–combatant regrets having lost his/her opportunity to study. Still, having acquired skills in the army (for instance, shoe craft, logistics, driving, first aid, nursing, and management) is no guarantee of a job. Indeed, surprisingly, many seem to have some marketable skills that are wasted in the depressed economy.

Repeatedly, ex–combatants stated that it was difficult to find out about training and employment opportunities. Apparently, most were ill informed about ongoing government initiatives; only few know of and even fewer have benefited from the two main initiatives of training and resettlement. Not surprisingly then, the government has been seen as a main supporter during reintegration by only few ex–combatants.

Many ex–combatants, irrespective of marital status or age when they joined the military, found access to land a serious problem. Few have access to land in their own right, although many have it through their family. The problem is, thus, compounded for those who did not find their family or relatives on their return. Ex–combatants feel that this problem should be solved by government and community leaders. While the resettlement program is one of the possible approaches, it alone is not enough to absorb all the landless Namibians.

Comparing their life with those who stayed in their communities, ex–combatants felt that by and large theirs were the same; however, in economic terms they felt that they were worse off, irrespective of their employment status. For ex–combatants, the sign of successful reintegration appears to be housing, followed by employment and other basic needs, especially food and clothing.
On the other hand, employment is seen as the crucial factor for successful reintegration, followed by relations with family members (see Box 7.1).

**Box 7.1: A Female Child Soldier's Successful Reintegration**

I was born in Omusati region in former Ovamboland in 1970. I was only 13 years old when I went to exile. I was trained in PLAN and served until I returned in 1989. I am not married and have no children. I am now learning carpentry in Katimo Mulilo. I think that the time in the army has had a positive effect on my life. I am proud that I have contributed to our independence and I am not sick.

After returning from exile I resettled. I have felt neither welcome nor unwelcome in the new community because where I resettled nobody knew me and I felt like a stranger at the beginning. So the community did not help me.

I think that a fighter is reintegrated when she has settled in a community of her choice and has a paying job. Most fighters have made the transition successfully and their families have helped them. If there have been difficulties, I think that has been because of conflicts between them and their families.

I have found it difficult to go back to civilian life because of the conflict between the political parties. When I look at the others, I think that my economic standard is also lower. I did not learn any useful skills while in the army. But overall I think that my life is now better than others in the community because I am receiving training. My family is also supporting me; we live off our fields.

I think that men have now more problems than women because it is more difficult for them to get assisted if they do not have a job. Government is helping me because I receive training at the Development Brigades. But my biggest worries are land and a house, and it is also not easy to find out about employment and training opportunities.


**Social Reintegration**

A majority of ex–combatants seems to have felt welcomed by the community, although most see their transition to civilian life as a difficult process. The key factors for such successful social reintegration are good relations with family, friends, church, and community, in effect the ex–combatant's social capital. Such social capital still seems relatively strong overall, even after years of prolonged civil war.

The acceptance by the community seems to be independent of an ex–combatant's marital status or his/her place of settlement, whether it was the place of origin or not. Still, those ex–combatants who resettled in a community other than their own seem to be under higher social pressure both regarding family and community; clearly, they first have to prove and establish themselves. Apart from any ethnic troubles, they also often face language problems.

Single ex–combatants were more likely to resettle than their married comrades. Overall, however, married ex–combatants seemed to have found reintegration more difficult than single ex–combatants because of their greater responsibilities regarding sustaining their families. Social and economic reintegration are linked in other ways as well. Those ex–combatants whose economic standard is lower than that of other community members
Reintegration, in the final analysis, is a social phenomenon. Ex-combatants who have a good relationship with their family also have a good relationship with the community; disharmony with family members tends to be reflected in disharmony with community members.

San communities in Caprivi and Bushmanland form a distinct subgroup of SWATF ex-combatants. Many had been forcibly imported, as communities, from Angola in 1976, and a large number of the men served in the security forces. Dislocation, settlement in the proximity of army camps, their marginal status in the SWATF/Koevoet, unemployment, alcohol abuse, and domestic violence have deepened social disorder among a group already marginalized before recruitment.

Despite its shortcomings, the San resettlement program has assisted the target group reasonably well in its difficult dual transition to civilian and sedentary agriculture-based life. Obviously, the San who stayed behind in Namibia and participated in the program from the outset have fared better than their 4,000 tribesmen who had migrated to South Africa. Many of these have since indicated the desire to trade their tented camp existence for resettlement facilities in Namibia. Plots and extra land have been made available for these potential returnees, and by mid–1995, an unknown number of San have already quietly returned to Namibia from South Africa (Jansen, Pradhan and Spencer 1994, p. 5f.).

Psychological Reintegration

PLAN ex-combatants know that they helped bring about independence; they consider themselves the victors of the war. Still, perhaps because of long years of regimented activity, many have little knowledge of how to give themselves a purpose in life or how to take initiatives toward self-sufficiency. In some cases, this was associated with the brutalizing effects of irregular war. On the loser's side, SWATF ex-combatants bear the guilt of having fought for the vanquished oppressor. Often, they are ashamed and shy and are bound to remain outsiders in many communities (see Box 7.2).

Evidence suggests that the incidence of mental stress among ex-combatant groups is higher than that present in the population at large. A clear sign is the high incidence of alcoholism, sometimes coupled with domestic violence. Psychiatric staff at both the Windhoek State Hospital and Oshakati General Hospital reported the high incidence of ex-combatants among their patients. In more than 90 percent of these cases, first requests for assistance had been made to customary healers. Referral to the health service happened only after these measures failed to produce results. There is a shortage of psychological support services to assist ex-combatants with such problems.

Many ex-combatants are by now experiencing a dependency syndrome. On the one hand, they have developed unfounded expectations, which they themselves cannot meet in the opportunity-constrained environment. On the other hand, they see it as the government's responsibility to fulfill the promises of economic well-being that served as a SWAPO motivational strategy during the war. The sometimes astonishing lack of initiative evident among many PLAN ex-combatants is often explained in terms of the expectation that the state or party will eventually provide for their needs; thus, after only piecemeal support during six years of independence, many are frustrated at the party and the government for their apparent failure to fulfill the promises.

Ex-combatants from both sides seem to have greater difficulty than returnees or stayers in coping with civilian life in an independent Namibia. Possibly the greatest contributor to ex-combatant dissatisfaction with government assistance is the discrepancy between their expectations (often influenced by government promises) and the reality of an opportunity-constrained environment. While this discrepancy is bound to arise in any event, any
promise made, however urgent the need to appease rioting ex-combatants, has to be based on realistic assumptions about the situation and implementation. This discontent is likely to intensify when one group of ex-combatants perceives the benefits received by another group as superior to its own, independently of whether or not this perception is correct.

Box 7.2: A SWATF Fighter's Unsuccessful Reintegration

I was born in Oshana region in the former Ovamboland in 1938. When I joined SWATF in 1976 I was already 39 years of age. I have served in the military for 18 years and, when I was discharged, I had the rank of corporal. Now I live in Ondangwa.

The time in the army has had a bad effect on my life. I have been killing my own people, and I feel guilty for that. My health is also not good, and I cannot see well. When I came back to my old community, the people here were indifferent. They were not excited to see me back and did not welcome me. I was also afraid and ashamed to return. My wife is from Oshikoto region, and we do not have any children to take care of. My wife was treated the same way by the community.

To me, a fighter is reintegrated when the neighbors and friends in the community are with him. Most fighters have made the transition, I am sure, but I do not know what has helped them. Others, like me, suffer for what they did to their communities during the war.

Reintegration has been difficult for me. The community hasn't helped me, and so the church has been our main supporter. Looking back I think that my life is worse than that of others here. I feel useless and do not have anything to do. Finding out about training and employment opportunities is also not easy. Because I don't work, we are living off my wife's income; she is selling biscuits. So our economic standard is lower than that of the others.

Government has helped me a bit. They gave me 1,400 dollars, but I have not received anything else. They don't give me pension. Although I am disabled, I am not receiving the pension, because I did not have the identity document. Now I have applied for it, but I am still waiting.

When I joined the army in 1976, I did not have any skills; neither have I learned skills in the military. When I came back, I did not have any land. I think government and community leaders together should do something to solve this problem. I do not know of any resettlement project. My big worry is just surviving.

Source: Sitari and others 1995, p. 28.

Ex–Combatant Cooperation

The SWAPO Veterans Trust was established in 1989 with the objectives of (a) providing loans and grants to SWAPO veterans (over forty-five years of age), especially the disabled, (b) organizing workshops and training courses, (c) coordinating complaints and requests from the veterans' community and acting as an ombudsman with the government, (d) assisting veterans to overcome psychological problems through the provision of a forum for sharing experiences, and (e) publishing newsletters.
The Trust comprises six staff and thirteen regional coordinators and claims to care for more than 30,000 veterans.57 Recently, the President has donated some N$10,000, but overall the Trust is dependent on SWAPO for funding. It is severely underfunded up to a point where it cannot even purchase fuel for transport.

The Trust has been implementing several small projects, mostly in agriculture. OXFAM Canada had provided N$28,000 in 1990 to buy equipment for a poultry project in Ovamboland. This project caters to only six veteran families. Because of unsatisfactory progress, OXFAM Canada has discontinued funding. The SWAPO Trust Fund was also entrusted with some individual support activities, for example, the distribution of donated second-hand clothes to veterans.

Beyond such small-scale activities, the SWAPO Veterans Trust is short of human and capital resources and has only a negligible impact on veterans' reintegration. The Trust is, thus, essentially nonfunctional. One of its apparent weaknesses is that it caters mostly to PLAN veterans (at least 90 percent), thereby exposing itself to accusations of political bias. In the context of the government's overarching policy of national reconciliation, it appears that government is wary of being associated with such a biased and malfunctional organization. The recent creation of a PLAN Trust Fund to reregister PLAN ex-combatants is a case in point.

Although there does not exist a functioning mechanism for exchanging or coordinating views among ex-combatants, they evidently created their own informal networks. The clearest example for cooperation at the national level is the recent concerted protest to voice their discontent six years after demobilization. At the local level, interaction with former comrades in arms also seems to flourish. Many work together, for example, on resettlement projects, in the same business, or on the fields.

**Family Reintegration**

Most ex-combatants were initially welcomed and supported by their families on their return. Only in some cases, where families were divided along political lines, were ex-combatants viewed with mistrust. Family and relatives were, thus, the main support mechanism for want of government assistance. Often, for instance, spouses contributed substantially to a family's survival through businesses established while the husbands were in the military.

In other cases, the dependency of ex-combatants on the family structure became a burden, because so many ex-combatants failed to secure a job. Often, tensions arose within a family, sometimes reversing the initial welcome. In some cases, large families were broken up and absorbed into several sympathetic households.

The spouses who had stayed behind in the communities generally did not encounter any problems due to the participation of their husbands in the military campaign. Those who did felt threatened by PLAN or SWATF/SADF, depending on the army the husband had joined. While alone, spouses had been aided by extended family and friends. This social network was in most instances strong enough to also facilitate the reintegration of returning ex-combatants.

57 It is likely, however, that a different definition of 'veteran' than that used in this report was applied to calculate this number.

If family members had been away with the ex-combatant in exile, they were by and large accepted in the same positive way by both extended family and community. For the ex-combatant and returnee families alike, it was therefore of considerable importance that children had been immediately accepted by schools, enabling them to...
resume their education.

There were, however, exceptions to this generally positive pattern of acceptance by the ex–combatants' families. For instance, spouses faced difficulties if they were from a different ethnic group. Occasionally, ex–combatant couples actually had to resettle because a family would not accept the spouse.

**Community Acceptance**

The majority of ex–combatants seem to have returned to their old communities. In most cases, this is likely to have helped social reintegration as the ex–combatants were known to the community members and in many cases still had family in the community; however, ex–combatants faced cold to hostile community reactions when they had fought for the 'wrong' side (see Box 7.3).

On the national level, the cold acceptance of ex–combatants by the communities points to a regional pattern that, by and large, coincides with ethnic divisions: Ovambos predominantly fought with PLAN for independence, whereas Hereros and other groups fought with the South Africans. Consequently, Ovambos generally have greater problems of reintegration in the central and southern regions. Ex–SWATF members face hostility in the north. Relationships among different ethnic groups still have much friction, reflecting an incomplete national reconciliation.58

The ex–combatants affected the most by hostile responses were those ex–SWATF and ex–Koevoet members who had served in particularly notorious units and settled in the Ovambo region. In some instances, they suffered from psychological disorders also. For these ex–combatants to be accepted by the community, community leaders expect public repentance and promises to start a new life.

The government did not devise any community sensitization strategy. It was believed that all returnees, civilians and ex–combatants alike, would integrate into their communities without much trouble. This proved to be an overly optimistic assumption; however, during the repatriation process, many communities set up *repatriation committees* through the local church or CCN. While not explicitly targeted toward returning ex–combatants, these more than fifty committees nationwide also served the purpose of sensitizing the communities and easing tensions. Such committees commonly consisted of headmen, pastors, social and health workers, businessmen, other respected community members as well as ex–combatants.

58 Such tensions probably lie behind the general unwillingness of Herero ex–combatants and community leaders in Gobabis area to be interviewed about a war 'won' by Ovambos.

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**Box 7.3: A Resource–Scarce but Peaceful Community**

We live in Okalongo community, which is located in the former Ovamboland. About 4,000 people are living here. Our main economic activity is agriculture, but some families also have cattle. The nearest town is Oshakati, which is 30 kilometers away. There is also the nearest hospital. Schools are a little bit nearer. In our community, all people speak Oshiwambo. We think there are 100-200 hundred fighters here.

In our community, crime rates were low before independence, because there were road blocks. There was also night curfew, and controls were tough. After independence, crime has increased here because there is less control.
Almost all the PLAN fighters here are fully integrated. At the beginning when they came to our community, they felt very high (sic). But now many have become disappointed. They only know one job and that is the army. They used to have the power of their gun, but now they have lost it. Still, they are working and building their houses just like other civilians.

The parish organized a repatriation committee in our community. There was the pastor, teachers, youth, and businesspeople in the committee. They collected money to assist those fighters and civilians who did not have any families. They also tried to find the families for those who did not know where they were. We have helped fighters personally by giving them accommodation and transportation.

Some fighters in our community have special problems. The SWATF and Koevoet fighters now feel guilty for what they have done. Others came back and found their families destroyed. Generally, the relationship with their family, relatives, community members, civil leaders, and other fighters is moderate. Some of them participate in social events, for example, they play soccer, participate in weddings and funerals, and dig wells with stayers.

There is no employment for the fighters who came back. There are also many other unemployed people in the community; however, we would not want them to have settled elsewhere. We are glad that they are back. Although some fighters were rejected because they have stolen before they had left the country.

The fighters in our community are on average poorer than the others. They mainly till the land for a living; only some have found a job. Others participate in our agricultural projects. But many do nothing. In fact, unemployment is our biggest worry. We just don't have sufficient resources for all members and returning fighters. And recently we suffered from a drought. The fighters have not brought any innovations, and we have not experienced any social or economic changes as a result of their return. But the big positive result is that they brought peace and freedom.


These committees assisted ex-combatants and returnees to find and contact their families. They also arranged for temporary accommodation, food, and clothing when needed and provided transportation. In addition, counseling was offered primarily by pastors. Committee members also accompanied the returnees to their family. Without doubt, such committees have helped in short-term reintegration, but they evidently have not been able to clear those prejudices that were beyond their mandate. Moreover, in the northern region, many committees were explicitly SWAPO-oriented, making social reintegration even more difficult for ex-SWATF.

Repatriation of ex-combatants, or demobilization as such, does not seem to be closely associated with crime. On the one hand, the curfew and strong presence of the armies before independence seem to have suppressed crime; this view suggests that it is now increasing. On the other hand, continue these armies also seem to have committed frequent criminal acts, suggesting that crime has since diminished. In either case, the presence of ex-combatants does not seem to be related to the incidence of crime but rather to the general phenomenon of unemployment.
Community leaders, among them village headmen, pastors, teachers and council members, can play an important role in facilitating every aspect of reintegration. It is important that they seem to judge the individual and not some stereotype notion of ex-combatant. Even though many believe that some ex-combatants are involved in crimes in their or other communities, they commonly accept the ex-combatants in their communities.

Apart from peace and independence, many leaders have noticed something positive as a result of the return of ex-combatants, for example, the exemplary self-reliance of some of them. On the other hand, some community leaders are unhappy about their presence, because there is no employment in the area. Still, they would not have liked to see them resettle elsewhere.

Frequently, communities have actively helped ex-combatants to return to civilian life. Such support ranged from staging a welcome party (social and psychological support) to providing tools to open a small store (economic support). Ex-combatants themselves can contribute to induce such support. Their relations with community members seem to be better, the more they participate in community activities and the better their relations with their relatives. Such participation takes place through community development projects, sports and social events, church activities, and community meetings.

An important element of community acceptance was the label attached to a person. As long as an ex-combatant is considered and addressed as a ‘returnee,’ he/she will feel stigmatized. On the other hand, the acceptance of an ex-combatant as one of a community can provide psychological support, as has been the experience of a number of ex-combatants.

8—

Returns to Peace and Demobilization

The costs of war to Namibia in terms of economic development were comparatively modest. Between 1981-82 and 1993-94, the GDP growth rate was 2.0 percent. This rate was roughly equivalent to growth in middle-income countries (2.1 percent) and higher than in Sub-Saharan Africa (1.6 percent). After recuperating from a drought in the early 1980s, the Namibian economy grew by 2.6 percent annually, covering the period of three years before and one year after the end of the war. After the first postwar year, growth averaged 3.9 percent in the four following years but was erratic. If the economy had grown at the four-year postwar average during the last prepeace period, output would have been an estimated N$374 million higher, corresponding to 1.9 percent of GDP at basic prices.

The calculation of economic and financial returns to demobilization is hampered by several distinctly Namibian complexities that mainly relate to the history of the country and its war of liberation. First, Namibia’s GDP is dominated by the government. During the first three years of independence, government accounted for, on average, 54.1 percent of GDP each year—or on average 30.2 percent more than during the three years before independence, reflecting the centralist approach chosen by the newly elected SWAPO government. Second, the private formal sector is highly developed but concentrated regionally in Windhoek and socially in the hands of white Namibians and South Africans. The informal sector, to which most of the ex-combatants returned, is, however, poorly developed and offers only limited employment and earnings potential.

Financial Returns

As a protectorate of the Republic of South Africa, Namibia was essentially governed as a fifth province until independence in 1990. Although separate budgets, including expenditures on defense, exist for Namibia, the financial costs of the war of liberation cannot, thus, be exactly determined. This is so, first, because capital and recurrent expenses for SADF troops—as part of the regular South African army—were covered under the South
African budget and, second, because SWAPO and, thus, PLAN were financed from abroad by different countries. The subsequent discussion is, therefore, limited to the Namibian budget only, that is, to SWATF demobilization and NDF remobilization.

In real terms, defense spending reached its peak in 1987/88 and 1988/89 with N$382 million (Table 8.1). After the signing of the peace accord in December 1988, spending dropped sharply to N$186 million in 1989/90; thereafter increasing again to above N$300 million every year since 1991/92. The trough in 1989/90 coincides with the demobilization of approximately 25,000 SWATF combatants, the following increases with the remobilization of around 6,500 ex-combatants to establish the Namibian Defense Force as well as the severance payment in 1991/92.

It is beyond the scope of this study to assess the potential output on the basis of the damage inflicted on the population (labor), infrastructure (capital), and the knowledge base.

Somewhat imprecisely, this period is referred to as 'pre-peace period.'

For the foregoing reasons, defense spending as part of government expenditures remained at low levels for a country at war. Its share in government expenditures hovered between 11.7 percent and 13.3 percent between 1985/86 and 1988/89. Since then, it has never surpassed 7.0 percent. At the same time, expenditure on the social sectors never fell below 40 percent after 1989/90; however, because of the large share of government spending in GDP, the country's overall resources devoted to the military were substantial. During the three years prior to peace, defense accounted for 5.1 percent of GDP; after independence, its share leveled out at 3.4 percent (Table 8.2 and 8.3 and Chart 8.1).

The financial savings of demobilization are, therefore, not overwhelming. Comparing the three-year averages before and after demobilization in 1989/90, the government saved a total of N$352.2 million or N$117.4 million per year. The yearly budgetary savings to the government reach 6.1 percent. Compared to the pre-peace defense expenditures, the annual defense savings amount to 31.3 percent (chart 8.2). Social expenditures have constantly been higher than defense expenditures, a fact that is reflected in the ratio between these two spending categories. This ratio of social to defense expenditures decreased between 1984/85 and 1988/88 from 3.9 to 2.8 but doubled in the following year to 5.9. In line with the development of the defense budget since independence, the ratio further improved significantly and reached 8.3 in 1993/94. Overall, the three-year before/after peace averages for the social to defense expenditure ratio improved from around 2.8 to 7.2, an increase of 158 percent; however, just like the distribution of income in the country, social expenditures are skewed toward the better-off segments of the population. Unless social expenditures are restructured, a high ratio of social to defense expenditure, therefore, does not mean that the savings from defense cuts benefit the poor.

Economic Returns

With an economically active population as small as 420,000 in 1989/90 (World Bank 1995, p. 146), the return of 49,500 ex-combatants into civilian life—representing 11.7 percent of the labor force—was bound to have a strong economic impact. Two indicators have been developed to identify the economic returns to demobilization that follow the taking up of productive activities by ex-combatants. These are (a) the ex-combatants' contribution to GDP at factor cost and (b) their per capita income as compared to the per capita income of the economically active population.
The calculation of the economic returns rests on the following assumptions:

• Out of a total of 57,000 demobilized combatants, 7,500 were rehired into the NDF or NAMPOL, leaving 49,500 to enter the labor market.

• Monthly earnings estimates are based on IMF data for 1992 for the following categories: unskilled workers in agriculture (N$366), average unskilled worker (N$656), skilled plant machine operators (N$913), and professionals (N$4,178).

62 It should be remembered, however, that the Namibian budget only includes SWATF and later NDF soldiers but not PLAN fighters and SADF troops. The overall savings from expenditure restructuring related to the war of liberation are, therefore, certainly higher.

• DBC trainees are paid the equivalent of unskilled workers, taking into consideration the indirect cost of food and lodging incurred by the DBC.

• The cash package received by unemployed ex–combatants in 199192 was used for consumption purposes.

• Forty percent of ex–combatants are engaged in subsistence agriculture (self–employed, casual, or family), other low–income informal sector activities, DBC training, or resettlement/rehabilitation programs.

• A conservative 35 percent of the ex–combatants are effectively unemployed.

• Three and 7 percent of ex–combatants are estimated to have found employment as professionals and skilled workers, respectively.

• Ex–combatants are assumed to have been hired into NAMPOL and NDF immediately after demobilization.

Under these assumptions and covering the period 198989 to 199394, the total yearly earnings of ex–combatants in agriculture, including DBC, is estimated at N$76.5 millions at current prices, that of unskilled workers at N$51.4 million, that of skilled workers at N$33.4 million, and that of professionals at N$65.5 million. Together, the economically active ex–combatants earned approximately N$226.8 million per year or 4.0 percent of GDP at factor cost.63 This income is earned without much government assistance.

For all ex–combatants (employed and unemployed), the total income of N$226.8 million implies an average yearly income of N$4,582 at current prices, almost 30 percent of which is accounted for by only 3 percent of professionals. This contrasts with a postdemobilization per capita GDP at factor cost of N$12,826 for the economically active population; thus, on average, an ex–combatant earns 35.5 percent of the income of the average Namibian worker.64

Income, however, in Namibia is extremely unevenly distributed, for black Namibians ranging in 1988 from N$193 for subsistence agriculture (approximately N$407 by 199495) to N$1,705 in the modern sector (N$3,598 in 199495). At the same time, white Namibians in the modern sector earned N$37,514 (N$79,154 in 199495) (World Bank 1992, p. 2 and data from the Ministry of Finance, Government of Namibia). From this perspective and given the above–mentioned assumptions, the ex–combatants' average earnings of N$4,582 would compare rather favorably with those of the civilian population, however, probably 50 percent of ex–combatants remain unemployed.

63 For the period overlapping with program interventions (199192 to 199394), the total yearly income amounts to N$254 million.
Over the period 1991-1992 to 1993-1994, this share is 36.7 percent. Assuming the 3 percent of ex-combatants earning wages as professionals instead work in subsistence agriculture, the earnings per ex-combatant decrease to N$3,375 between 1989-1990 and 1993-1994, or 26.3 percent of per capita GDP at factor cost for the economically active population.

Table 8.1
Government Expenditures by Functional Category
(1984/85-1993/94; millions of N$, December 1992=100)

<table>
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</table>

Note: Fiscal year from April 1 to March 31.

a/ From 1984 to 1990 includes welfare.

b/ From 1984 to 1990 excludes welfare.
c/ From 1984 to 1990 includes fuel and energy.

d/ Includes education, health affairs and services, social security and welfare, housing and community services, and recreational, culture and religion.


### Table 8.2
Government Expenditures by Functional Category
(1984/85−1993/94; % of GDP at basic prices)

<table>
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<tr>
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<td>9.51</td>
<td>6.26</td>
<td>7.15</td>
<td>9.63</td>
<td>12.84</td>
<td>14.52</td>
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<td>Defense</td>
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<td>5.15</td>
<td>5.47</td>
<td>4.83</td>
<td>2.37</td>
<td>3.35</td>
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<tr>
<td>Public order and safety</td>
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<td>4.52</td>
<td>4.52</td>
<td>3.94</td>
<td>3.70</td>
<td>4.49</td>
<td>4.48</td>
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<td>7.68</td>
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<td>7.23</td>
<td>13.89</td>
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<td>4.57</td>
<td>4.65</td>
<td>4.05</td>
<td>4.61</td>
<td>6.27</td>
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<td>1.39</td>
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<td>0.96</td>
<td>1.05</td>
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<td>0.89</td>
<td>1.66</td>
<td>1.54</td>
<td>1.49</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fuel and energy</td>
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<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.38</td>
<td>0.38</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture, forestry, and fishing</td>
<td>1.56</td>
<td>0.91</td>
<td>0.85</td>
<td>0.88</td>
<td>0.64</td>
<td>0.51</td>
<td>2.62</td>
<td>3.57</td>
<td>4.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mining, manufacturing, and construction</td>
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<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>0.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport and communication</td>
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<td>5.68</td>
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<td>6.34</td>
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<td>4.57</td>
<td>5.38</td>
<td>6.28</td>
<td>7.33</td>
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<td>1.74</td>
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<td>37.51</td>
<td>34.10</td>
<td>62.35</td>
<td>66.49</td>
<td>67.46</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Fiscal year from April 1 to March 31.

a/ From 1984 to 1990 includes welfare.

b/ From 1984 to 1990 excludes welfare.
c/ From 1984 to 1990 includes fuel and energy.

d/ Includes education, health affairs and services, social security and welfare, housing and community services, and recreational, culture and religion.

*Source: Development Information Report, 1990, Department of Economic Affairs, Namibia; Economic Review: Namibia, Ministry of Finance, Namibia.*

### Table 8.3
**Government Expenditures by Functional Category**
(1984/85-1993/94; % of total government expenditures)

<table>
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<td>16.68</td>
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<td>15.45</td>
<td>19.31</td>
<td>21.52</td>
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<td>Defense</td>
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<td>12.59</td>
<td>11.68</td>
<td>12.88</td>
<td>6.95</td>
<td>5.38</td>
<td>6.58</td>
<td>5.90</td>
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<tr>
<td>Public order and safety</td>
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<td>10.51</td>
<td>10.84</td>
<td>7.20</td>
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<td>6.40</td>
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<td>22.28</td>
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<td>Health affairs and services a/</td>
<td>13.94</td>
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<td>11.18</td>
<td>9.93</td>
<td>10.80</td>
<td>13.53</td>
<td>10.06</td>
<td>8.73</td>
<td>8.61</td>
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<td>Social security and welfare b/</td>
<td>3.30</td>
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<td>3.00</td>
<td>4.11</td>
<td>4.59</td>
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<td>Housing and community affairs</td>
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<td>2.60</td>
<td>2.67</td>
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<tr>
<td>Agriculture, forestry, and fishing</td>
<td>3.59</td>
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<td>1.72</td>
<td>1.49</td>
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<td>6.85</td>
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<td>Mining, manufacturing, and construction</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.73</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td>0.39</td>
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<td>8.09</td>
<td>5.25</td>
<td>11.85</td>
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<td>100.00</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>100.00</td>
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</tr>
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<td>32.29</td>
<td>36.56</td>
<td>40.74</td>
<td>46.85</td>
<td>44.24</td>
<td>44.99</td>
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</table>

Note: Fiscal year from April 1 to March 31.

a/ From 1984 to 1990 includes welfare.

b/ From 1984 to 1990 excludes welfare.
c/ From 1984 to 1990 includes fuel and energy.

d/ Includes education, health affairs and services, social security and welfare, housing and community services, and recreation, culture and religion.


Chart 8.1
Government Recurrent Expenditures by Functional Category
(in percent of total expenditures)

Program Costs and Coverage

Government has initiated three large-scale support activities: the severance pay, the Development Brigades training and employment program, and the resettlement programs of MLRR and ELCIN. Another important activity is the rehabilitation program for disabled ex-combatants under the MLRR. The exact budget of these activities benefiting ex-combatants is difficult to determine; any estimate inevitably rests on several restricting assumptions. Still, the program budget (for ex-combatants only) derived from known incomes and expenditures is impressive, amounting to an estimated N$123.8 million (Table 9.1). Over half of these funds (51.2 percent) were provided by donors. The only major reinsertion (transitional safety net) component, the severance pay, accounted for almost one-fifth of the total costs.

Known administrative costs are high. They are estimated at 73.8 percent for the rehabilitation program and 53.6 percent and 42.1 percent for the MLRR and ELCIN resettlement programs, respectively. Administrative data for the other interventions are not available but likely to be substantial as well. An estimated 32,570 benefits were distributed among ex-combatants; however, because most have received the severance pay as well as another benefit, the actual coverage of ex-combatants is lower. Assuming that overlap is complete, the Namibian DRP would have reached no more than half of all demobilized (24,650 ex-combatants).
The costs per beneficiary for the program interventions differ substantially. The DBC average costs for training and income-generating activities are staggering at N$15,040 and N$47,600, respectively. The average cost for the MLRR resettlement program is also high, on average N$3,000 for a four-year period; however, the standard of living of those resettled remains low in many cases. On the other hand, the San Resettlement Program costs only N$780 per ex-combatant, even though their overall situation appears better. Rehabilitation has been expensive as well, reflecting the intensive care disabled people receive in the project centers. The MLRR per capita costs amount to N$26,670. In Nakayale, which seems to be more professionally organized, per capita costs reached N$8,570.

By far the most expensive component, therefore, has been the Development Brigade approach, with N$24,340 per ex-combatant over the four-year period. The costs for the rehabilitation of ex-combatants were N$20,910 per beneficiary. The least expensive intervention has been resettlement at only N$2,380, less than one-tenth of the DB/DBC.

### Table 9.1
Program Costs and Coverage
(Known incomes and expenses, 1991-92 to 1994-95; estimates)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Program Component</th>
<th>Program Cost (million N$) a/</th>
<th>Percentage of Total Program Cost</th>
<th>Beneficiaries b/</th>
<th>Percentage of Total Demobilized</th>
<th>Cost per Beneficiary (N$)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td>Severance pay</td>
<td>24.0</td>
<td>19.4</td>
<td>24,650</td>
<td>49.8</td>
<td>974</td>
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<td>DBC total c/</td>
<td>85.2</td>
<td>68.8</td>
<td>3,500</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>24,340</td>
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<td>DBC training d/</td>
<td>37.6</td>
<td>30.4</td>
<td>2,500</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>15,040</td>
</tr>
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<td>DBC projects e/</td>
<td>47.6</td>
<td>38.4</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>47,600</td>
</tr>
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<td>Resettlement f/</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>4,200</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>2,380</td>
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<td>MLRR resettlement g/</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>3,000</td>
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<td>San resettlement h/</td>
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<td>0.8</td>
<td>1,200</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>780</td>
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<td>Rehabilitation f/</td>
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<td>3.7</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>20,910</td>
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<td>MLRR rehabilitation</td>
<td>4.0</td>
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<td>150</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>26,670</td>
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<td>ERC Nakayale</td>
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<td>70</td>
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<td>Total o/w donors</td>
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<td>100.0</td>
<td>32,570</td>
<td>65.7</td>
<td>3,790</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a/ For ex-combatants only; including donor support.
b/ Most of the ex–combatants having received DBC training or support from the MLRR have also received the severance pay. The actual number of ex–combatants reached by the Namibian DRP cannot be determined.

c/ Including estimated capital expenditures of N$20 million.

d/ It is estimated that 50 percent of the DBC current budget and 25 percent of the capital expenditures equipment have been spent on training.

e/ It is estimated that 50 percent of the DBC current budget and 75 percent of the capital expenditures equipment have been spent on income–generating projects. The number of DBC workers ranged from 1,300 before to 850 after reorganization. The DBC resettlement scheme started only recently and is, thus, not included.

f/ For ex–combatants only, estimated at 50 percent of beneficiaries in each of the programs, excluding their families. MLRR costs include project costs and administrative costs (development and operational expenditures).

g/ Excluding the San resettlement program.

h/ Excluding emergency phase I.

*Source:* Government budget documents; staff estimates.

Returns to Demobilization

*In financial terms,* peace in independent Namibia led to a sharp reduction of defense spending from 12.4 percent to 6.3 percent between 1991–92 and 1993–94, a decrease of almost 50 percent. The yearly budgetary savings amount to an impressive N$117.4 million. Compared to the program costs of N$98.4 million during the same period, budgetary savings were 3.6 times higher. At the same time, the ratio of social to defense expenditures almost tripled to 7.2. On the *microeconomic* level, ex–combatants earned a yearly average of N$254 million. Yearly income was, thus, more than six times higher than the per capita program costs (N$1,000); however, their income reached only 36.7 percent of that of the economically active population (see Table 9.2).

### Table 9.2

*Returns to Peace and Demobilization*  
(Estimates)

<table>
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<th>Returns</th>
<th>Amounts</th>
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<td>Financial Returns (<em>three–year averages</em>)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Defense/expenditure ratio</td>
<td>before: 12.4 percent, after: 6.3 percent; decrease of 49 percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social/defense ratio</td>
<td>before: 2.8, after: 7.2; increase of 158 percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Budgetary savings per year</td>
<td>N$117.4 million; 6.1 percent of expenditures; 31.3 percent of predemobilization defense</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Amount</th>
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<tr>
<td>Income of ex-combatants a/</td>
<td>N$254 million per year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income per capita compared to GDP per capita b/</td>
<td>36.7 percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income over program costs</td>
<td>7.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*a/ Employed ex-combatants only.*  
*b/ For the economically active population.*  

*Source:* Government budget documents; staff estimates.

### The Deficiency

Although government did not back away from large-scale program support, the impact on the ground is limited. The major reason for this failure seems to be the highly unequal distribution of benefits. In fact, only 7.1 percent of demobilized ex-combatants (DBC trainees and workers) received 71.6 percent of the government's assistance. Many of the DBC graduates are again unemployed; thus, by far the most important component has negligible multiplier effects. The N$123.8 million could well have been spent more effectively and more efficiently under a more comprehensive and better-planned program.

### Lessons Learned

A number of lessons can be drawn from the design and implementation of the Namibian DRP. The most pertinent are presented here, grouped according to topics rather than in chronological order. These topics are rationale and political dimension, information needs, program design, rebuilding social capital, and management issues. This list, thus, serves as a quick reference guide to the program.

65 Assuming that all DBC trainees had also received the severance pay.

### Rationale and Political Dimension

- Whatever the cause of war and however peace is reached, the medium- to long-term reintegration of combatants should not be neglected in favor of immediate pacification and repatriation.

- While support to the poor population at large is the legitimate interest of the donor community, it should not neglect the short-term need to provide assistance to a target group directly associated with warfare. No development efforts are sustainable without national security.

- Even if a war ends with a clear political victor, national reconciliation should be actively promoted and the needs of the losers should be accommodated to the extent possible to avoid further distrust and discontent.

- In agriculture-based economies, land is the critical production factor. At the same time, land possesses a strong social meaning. The land issue, thus, needs to be treated carefully to accommodate the needs of all population groups.
• Program guidelines are important for beneficiaries to understand the scope of the support they receive; however, the strict observation of these guidelines by government is necessary to avoid the creation of a dependency syndrome.

• In a fragile society such as Namibia’s, failure to take into account the needs of different ethnic groups can seriously endanger the success of any intervention.

• National reconciliation is the responsibility of each individual, consequently, it has to be put into practice first and foremost in the relationship of an individual with his/her immediate environment; however, it needs to be encouraged at the national level.

• Political action should avoid raising expectations beyond a realistic level. Furthermore, whenever problems develop, they should be addressed promptly and comprehensively.

• Savings from reduced defense spending should be made available to increase social spending; however, an increased ratio of social to defense expenditure does not necessarily mean that these savings benefit the poor unless social expenditures are restructured.

Information Needs

• Knowing the real needs and concerns of ex–combatants through a profiling survey beforehand makes the design of program interventions more appropriate. Socioeconomic data should, therefore, be collected on all ex–combatants to (a ) reach all of them with adequate interventions and (b ) reduce the risk of discontent. This pertains especially to ex–combatants who have been withheld from registration for political or security reasons.

• For each program component, a list of verifiable indicators (e.g., the number of beneficiaries reached, current expenses, and leakages) should be established to monitor, audit, and evaluate implementation and ensure transparency.

Program Design

• Even if program interventions have to be designed under pressure, expediency should not be traded for either quality or relevance.

• Equal access by ex–combatants to program benefits rests on their equal access to information about these initiatives. Local program representation with a decisionmaking authority can play a crucial role in the dissemination of information and provision of benefits.

• The reintegration of ex–combatants inevitably requires repeated decisions regarding coverage of beneficiaries and expected sustainability of an intervention. Any such decision should, however, cover the most vulnerable groups, the landless, disabled, women, and also the educationally disadvantaged.

• Ex–combatants should not be kept in military–type centers for prolonged periods of time lest they become a serious threat to security.

• An analysis of the opportunity structure for ex–combatants (e.g., demand for labor and availability of land and credit) is a prerequisite for targeted counseling and adequate placement as well as for program design. Placement services, complemented by counseling and the provision of general information, are a critical link between training and employment. These activities should be offered by specialized and well–qualified staff.
• The trade-off between quality of training and cost recovery through gainful activities is inescapable. The prioritization of activities, based on a strategic approach, is, therefore, necessary.

• Female ex-combatants face a distinct set of social and economic problems. While they may be less likely to revolt even when suffering more, their problems need to be identified and addressed from the outset.

• The resettlement program is a useful attempt to keep ex-combatants and other returnees from moving to urban centers; however, such efforts should be covered under a wider rural development strategy.

• As important as skills training is for ex-combatants, sight should not be lost of the linkage to employment opportunity. A demand-driven approach to develop such skills would be far less cost-intensive but requires specific labor market data before, and attention during, the design stage.

• Even for those ex-combatants who have won a war, politically or militarily, the importance of information, orientation, and counseling about the transitory phase from combatant to civilian cannot be overemphasized.

• Program interventions should attempt to focus informal networks of ex-combatants on mutual support, interaction with the civilian population, and possibly participation in program implementation.

• Major noneconomic concerns of ex-combatants are housing and the education of their children. In both cases, they should be aided through program intervention.

• An unequal distribution of benefits creates discontent within the target group that may lead to violent eruptions.

**Rebuilding Social Capital**

• Government cannot provide all support to all people. It, therefore, has to rely on communities to assist and help their members. Efforts to strengthen social capital, for example, by using existing community channels, enable the communities to take development into their own hands and are, therefore, warranted.

• Centralization in design and implementation is a chance lost for beneficiaries to build local social capital and ensure that the program actually responds to their needs.

• Community participation requires planning and time. It is, however, likely to improve results significantly if (a) the community's concerns have been included in program design, (b) the communities have been assigned an explicit role in the program, and (c) they understand this role.

• Community sensitization facilitated by program staff, for example, open discussions of issues and problems between community members and ex-combatants during reintegration workshops, serve as an important means to ease tensions sustainably.

• Government and donors alike should avoid using labels that contribute to ex-combatant stigmatization. By necessity, this requires that such terms are identified and discouraged within a reasonably short time period after demobilization.

**Management Issues**

• The multiple difficulties experienced during the transition process warrant multiple answers; however, the more sectors included in a project intervention, the higher the pressure on scarce human resources to manage professionally such diverse activities. This invariably overstretches management capacity.
• A proliferation of support activities—to be seen 'to be doing something'—does not imply that these activities reach more beneficiaries or that the overall effect will be more beneficial. To the contrary, inefficiently coordinated endeavors are likely to lead to duplication and unnecessary waste of resources. The initiation of new or the extension of existing program components should be the result of strategic planning decisions.

• Field visits from headquarters and other program staff are critical elements for (a) understanding the anxieties, problems, and constraints faced by the beneficiaries and (b) boosting their morale by showing them that program staff from the top to lowest level are paying attention to their situation.

• Many reintegration activities of NGOs and donors alike are multisectoral; hence, they affect a varying number of ministries. While, on the one hand, these ministries should be informed about all activities, at the same time, they should provide every possible support to ensure the success of operations.

• The higher the transaction (administrative) costs, the smaller the resources available to ex-combatants. Efficient program implementation can, thus, significantly increase target group coverage and help contain discontent.

The Road Ahead

Matching the lessons from the Namibian demobilization and reintegration program with the ex-combatant discontent that emerged in spring 1995 points to a number of issues that require the government's full attention. Taking these issues into account when designing future program interventions can significantly increase its possibility of success.

When accepting Resolution 435, the United Nations focused on pacification and repatriation without paying sufficient attention to postindependence economic and social development. This short-term focus ex post created a path littered with obstacles. The new-born nation itself was understandably preoccupied with the immediate goal of nationbuilding. Still, the potential threat to national security is always a critical concern.

Although the new government had political clout, it appeared short on vision. Repeatedly, the immediate concerns of ex-combatants were passed over in favor of the long-term perspective on the overall development of the country. For the most part, government used the rhetoric of "national reconciliation" as an easy but inadequate means. The voiced appeal to "national reconciliation" could hide deep-rooted resentments but not solve them.

The lack of political will power is, thus, reflected in the government's reactions to ex-combatant unrest. Instead of addressing the problem squarely, it bought time in the hope that the discontent would eventually fade. Consequently, program initiatives were planned in a haphazard and uncoordinated manner without addressing the underlying social and economic factors.

These ad hoc measures not only failed to ease the pressure but created even more expectations. In a country where the labor market is tight, government does not have the ability to provide employment to all ex-combatants; thus, awareness is now dawning that ex-combatant dissatisfaction is the result not of an emergency situation but of a structural problem. Consequently, the problem needs a strategic solution.

First and foremost, such a strategic response has to rest on the recognition that by now the predicament of ex-combatants is by and large identical to that of civilian returnees and those who remained in the country. As such, the problem of full reintegration of ex-combatants should be seen in conjunction with alleviating the living conditions of other poor Namibians; however, even though ex-combatants are unlikely to "turn Namibia into another Rwanda," as threatened during their protest, they would be rightfully considered an explicit target group of whatever efforts are made.
As the experiences of ex-combatants and returnees clearly show, labor and land are the crucial structural production factors for survival. The government's approach toward both might warrant reconsideration. If the recent discussions about land reform are found to be biased, tensions are likely to intensify. Such tensions would then be felt most by those Namibians who lack access to land; these are already among the poorest, ex-combatants included.

Given the structure of the labor market in Namibia, formal sector employment is out of reach for all but a few poor Namibians. Apart from any ethnic resentment, their skills are simply insufficient to make them serious contenders on the market. As in other countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, a major venue for (passive) employment creation appears to be the informal sector. There, large numbers of unemployed or underemployed and unskilled Namibians could be absorbed.

Starting Over

In mid-1995, the government installed a committee of Deputy Ministers under the chairmanship of the MLRR. A technical committee consisting of former commanding officers was again set up to verify the claims of applicants. While the registration process proceeded well, its results appear questionable. Both PLAN and SWATF ex-combatants took their grievances to the streets. But so far only a PLAN Trust Fund has been established where PLAN ex-combatants were registered. While lists for SWATF ex-combatants are still available, they might need some updating as well (and no technical committee would have been necessary for them). Apparently, this was not considered.

It should be remembered that the severance pay of N$1,400 was entirely funded by South Africa and had initially been planned for SWATF ex-combatants only. In the spirit of national reconciliation and equal treatment, the Namibian government decided to use half of the funds for ex-PLAN members. A PLAN focus now is likely to cause resentment among equally disgruntled ex-SWATF members and not serve to facilitate the larger objective of national reconciliation.

By early July 1995, 15,890 ex-combatants had registered for job opportunities with the government's special committee. If these ex-combatants are indeed unemployed and ex-PLAN only, their number is amazingly similar to the 16,080 unemployed PLAN ex-combatants who received a cash payment in 1991. In this case, the ex-PLAN unemployment rate would have persisted at over 60 percent for four years; therefore, the government's emphasis on the promotion of employment seems appropriate.

The government's initial approach to job creation, however, is not up to the magnitude of the task. Almost two-thirds of ex-combatants request employment in general work areas, but others look for high-skill jobs as, for example, teachers, economists, dentists, and pilot navigators. This should be a clear sign to the government that unemployment is not strictly an ex-combatant problem. Rather, the labor market is weak in general and cannot even absorb professionals.

The government's approach of setting up a large-scale affirmative action program "to get employment for everybody immediately," in both the public and private sectors may be justified in cases where unemployment is the result of discrimination. Again, it may help to defuse ex-combatant unrest in the short term; however, it still fails to tackle the structural problems of the labor market in Namibia.

In response, the ILO has been requested by the government to assist in the redesign of the reintegration program. At a recent UNDP-sponsored Round Table, about US$10.6 million was pledged for support measures targeted at ex-combatants. The funds have been provided by the Government of Namibia, the European Union, and the Government of the Netherlands. Apart from this effort, the government has been placing 1,000 ex-combatants each into the NDF and NAMPOL. Moreover, another 1,000 ex-combatants are being employed by other
government offices and the private sector. The public expenditure implications of this rehiring will be tremendous.

Unless the jobs thus created are sustainable, ex–combatants may continue to demand support in the future. If jobs are in the government, sustainability depends on the overall budgetary situation. If ex–combatants have been placed in the private sector (and parastatals) by moral persuasion, they are likely to either crowd out other employees or increase costs beyond the optimum level, thereby reducing the firms' competitiveness.66 Either way, the overall unemployment problem remains unchanged.

Finally, information on the characteristics, needs, and aspirations of ex–combatants as well as a realistic assessment of the opportunity structure for ex–combatants are still missing. The assessment would analyze the demand for labor, the supply of credit, and the demand for goods and services; in short the three basic markets in the country. Matched with the ex–combatants' skills, needs, and aspirations identified with the help of a socioeconomic profile, a comprehensive program could be developed.

Program Options

The government is currently reconsidering its reintegration strategy. Judging from similar programs in other countries in Sub–Saharan Africa, the result of such deliberations could be a comprehensive training and employment program for ex–combatants and other vulnerable groups in rural and urban areas alike that includes:

• A counseling and placement program to assess the needs of the individual beneficiaries and direct them to the most suitable intervention

• An informal sector apprenticeship training program, in which master craftsmen train beneficiaries on the job for six months, moving training close to the point of production and employment

• A voucher training program, whereby beneficiaries are enabled to select the training provider of their choice, shifting emphasis from supply to demand for skill enhancement

• An employment subsidy program (through wage subsidies and/or tax credits), in which the government reimburses employers for six months for hiring ex–combatants or other vulnerable Namibians

• A grant and/or credit program to assist (groups of) ex–combatants and other vulnerable groups in establishing small–scale business ventures or improve on farming activities (the latter in conjunction with the provision of extension services).break

66 It is assumed that the product demand does not change significantly. Otherwise, higher wage costs could be covered by higher product prices.

The more such a program design involves the beneficiaries from the beginning, the greater would be its effectiveness in reaching them. Decentralization is, therefore, likely to be key. Although a well–planned program would not guarantee employment for all ex–combatants, it would assure each ex–combatant that the government is following the best strategy to solve his/her problem sustainably.

Trade–Offs in Design

In planning a comprehensive approach, government needs to address a number of trade–offs that have occurred in the Namibian DRP to date. Some of the most important trade–offs are:break
• Coverage vs. sustainability: If a program intervention intends to support a large segment of the target group (high coverage), an increasing number of beneficiaries may not be able to make full use of it (low sustainability), leading to high opportunity costs. Unless their needs are similar, a diversified and scaled-down approach may be warranted.

• Expediency vs. relevance: To appease rioting ex-combatants, a prompt government intervention seems necessary; however, promptness is likely to compromise on the relevance of the intervention to both the society/economy and the community/beneficiary. The timing of the government's response has to be weighed carefully against the benefits of better program preparation.

• Complexity vs. capacity: The needs of ex-combatants and other vulnerable groups are manifold. A comprehensive approach is, thus, called for. Such an approach will, however, exert substantial pressure on the government's implementation capacity. Simple but targeted interventions may be a better answer.

• Comprehensiveness vs. quality: Multiple-purpose interventions (training cum production cum resettlement) targeting the various needs of the target group are often difficult to manage. Unless sufficient resources are available (which, given their magnitude, are unlikely), priorities have to be established. This counters the initial purpose. A smaller number of well-planned benefits, on the other hand, can probably be provided with higher quality.

• Control vs. initiative: The higher the degree of centralized and bureaucratic decisionmaking, the lower will be the ownership and subsequent motivation of regional and local staff and beneficiaries. The appropriateness of an intervention to a specific local context is also likely to suffer and a dependency syndrome will develop. The desire to control implementation has to be weighed against the value of personal initiative. An efficient management information system to supervise and guide decentralized implementation could solve this trade-off.

The Challenge

A formidable task lies ahead, one that not only demands utmost attention to the poorest members of the society but also must be an implementable approach. If the government fails, domestic terrorism may result. On the other hand, if the task is resolved successfully, it would go a long way toward planned, inclusive, and sustainable development for all Namibians.

10—
Chronology of Demobilization Events

1978
The U.N. Security Council passed Resolution 435, which called for free elections leading to the independence of
Namibia from South African rule. It also created the United Nations Transitional Assistance Group (UNTAG) to assist the Secretary General's Special Representative in implementing the plan to secure Namibian independence under U.N. supervision and control. South Africa refused to recognize the settlement plan.

1988

May
Formal negotiations on the implementation of Resolution 435 and related matters began among Angola, Cuba, and South Africa with U.S. mediation and with support from the Soviet Union. Angola and Cuba signed a bilateral accord for Cuban troop withdrawal.

August
South Africa completed its troop withdrawal from Angola.

December
South Africa, Angola, and Cuba signed the Brazzaville Protocol, which recommended that the U.N. Secretary General set April 1, 1989, as the deadline for the implementation of Resolution 435. The Protocol also established a 'Joint Commission' to facilitate and monitor the implementation process.

South Africa, Angola, and Cuba signed the New York Treaty that finalized agreements reached earlier in Geneva. Under this agreement PLAN forces were to be restricted to bases north of the 16th parallel and demobilized prior to the elections, while most SADF were to withdraw from Namibia. The remaining SADF fighters were to be confined to bases after April 1, 1989.

Angola and Cuba also signed a bilateral agreement, which paved the way for the implementation of Resolution 435 on April 1, 1989. The U.N. Security Council established the United Nations Angola Verification Mission to monitor and verify the withdrawal of Cuban and South African forces from Angola.

1989

January
Cuban troop withdrawals from Angola commenced. The U.N. Secretary General recommended substantial cuts in the size and cost of UNTAG's military component. South Africa cut back the size of its military and police presence in Namibia.

February
By passing Resolution 632, the Security Council agreed on the terms of implementation of Resolution 435. Senior U.N. peacekeeping and UNTAG officials arrived in Windhoek at the end of the month. The South African Administrator−General assumed control of the Namibian administration.

March
The U.N. General Assembly accepted the Namibian peace plan but cut its budget from US$700 million to US$416 million (March 1). The first contingent of UNTAG troops arrived (March 15).

April
The cease−fire between SWAPO and the SADF came into effect; however, while SADF forces were confined to base, about 1,600 heavily armed PLAN fighters entered Namibia from Angola. With no UNTAG peacekeeping forces yet deployed in the northern territory, the U.N. Special Representative had to agree to a limited redeployment of the SADF. Heavy fighting between the two sides ensued: 300 PLAN fighters and 27 South Africans were killed (April 1).
Representatives of South Africa, Angola, and Cuba in the Joint Commission, under U.S., Soviet, and UNTAG observation, salvaged the independence plan at Mount Etjo. The parties agreed that SWAPO troops should withdraw from Namibia under guarantees of safe passage (April 910).

May
UNTAG military forces and civilian police personnel finally reached their mandated strength. The United Nations appointed a commission to investigate all complaints of violations of the principle of impartiality during the transition.

June
The South African Administrator—General declared a general amnesty for all Namibians living abroad, lifted prohibitions on political activity, and repealed or amended forty-six discriminatory laws. This enabled the return of Namibian exiles and refugees (June 6). Repatriation of Namibian exiles began under the auspices of UNHCR (June 7).

July
The Namibian election campaign officially started. Registration of the electorate commenced. Continued violence, especially by paramilitary units of SWAPOL (Koevoet), persisted in the north of the country.

August
The U.N. Security Council passed Resolution 640, which called for the demobilization of all paramilitary groups and local commandos (Koevoet) to halt intimidation in Namibia.

November
Voting for the Constituent Assembly took place (November 711). Turnout exceeded 97 percent. SWAPO polled 57 percent to win forty-one of seventy-two seats in the Assembly. The DTA prevented a two-thirds SWAPO majority by winning 28 percent of the vote and twenty-one seats. The United Nations certified the elections as 'free and fair' (November 14). The last 1,500 SADF troops began to withdraw from Namibia (November 20). SWAPO's President, Sam Nujoma, opened the Constituent Assembly (November 21).

December
The first UNTAG forces left Namibia (December 28). The Namibian Constituent Assembly voted unanimously for Namibian independence on March 21, 1990 (December 31).

SECTION III—
UGANDA: CONSOLIDATING PEACE

"The demobilization exercise is an example of good governance."
(Representative of a major program donor; September 1993)

"I have never been a failure in my life."
(NRA veteran who owns six acres of coffee and two acres of bananas; January 1995)
1— Prologue

The Political and Economic Context

After fifteen years of civil strife and prolonged guerrilla struggle that left Uganda with a war–torn and ravaged economy and society, the National Resistance Movement (NRM) came to power in 1986. Since then, the NRM and its military wing, the National Resistance Army (NRA), have been able to reestablish a state of increasing national security and have begun to move the country toward a peaceful path of social and economic reconstruction and development.

Historically, continuing rebellion and banditry in different parts of the country have been a heavy burden on scarce government resources. Despite the termination of full–fledged civil war in 1986, recurrent expenditure on defense continued to rise: from 28 percent in 1986 to 43 percent in 1991. Over the same period, capital expenditure on defense rose from 18 percent to 38 percent of government's contribution to development expenditure. These expenditure increases initially reflect the assimilation of defeated rebel forces and later the deliberate professionalization of the regular army through, for example, the establishment of a command structure, personnel and logistics systems, training, and the acquisition of necessary equipment and supplies as much as new recruitment. Only by 1991 was open rebellion defeated.
Objectives and Rationale

Under these stabilizing conditions, the government decided to shift the burden of its public expenditure away from its earlier emphasis on defense and security to the promotion of social and economic development. This shift in investment from nonproductive (destructive) to productive assets entailed the demobilization and subsequent reintegration into productive civilian life of 36,358 soldiers of the estimated 90,000–member strong NRA. This demobilization would be undertaken in three phases of 23,903, 9,308, and 4,147 soldiers, respectively, between 1992 and 1995.1

Veterans constitute a specially vulnerable group, facing difficulties in five major clusters: inadequate shelter, lack of civic awareness and self-reliance, lack of skills, health and related problems, and lack of financial resources. Within each of these clusters, the veterans' problems are similar to those of the general public; however, when veterans encounter all these problems simultaneously, they may find it extremely difficult to reintegrate sustainably into civil society.

The dual objectives of the demobilization exercise are, thus, (a) to resettle veterans and their families and facilitate their social and economic reintegration into a peaceful, productive, and sustainable civilian life and (b) to restructure public expenditure to increase the funds available for priority programs, and especially for economic and social infrastructure and services.

initiation Process and Program Preparations

Donors and government alike were concerned about the heavy burden that the defense expenditure exerted on scarce government resources. Although the NRA considered the possibility of demobilization by the late 1980s, the government did not pursue this option until it deemed the political situation sufficiently stable. In 1991, following a World Bank Public Expenditure Review, the government's attention was called to the fact that inordinate defense expenditures were seriously crowding out other sectoral development efforts, particularly in education and health. Finally, in December 1991, the President of Uganda, in consonance with the Financial and Economic Sector Adjustment Program, approached the Bank for technical and financial leadership in demobilizing about 50 percent of the NRA.

In response to the government's request, the Bank agreed to fund three preparation studies under its Program for the Alleviation of Poverty and the Social Costs of Adjustment (PAPSCA): a socioeconomic profile of the NRA (baseline survey), an examination of the opportunity structure for employment leading to a settling-in kit and long-term reintegration program design, and the design of an implementation structure. The socioeconomic profile formed the basis for program design and was carried out by a task force from the Prime Minister's Office and the Ministry of Defense (MOD) with technical assistance from the Bank. The other two activities were undertaken by Ugandan consultants. All studies were conducted between March and July 1992.

The consultants worked in close cooperation with NRA and MOD officials, especially the Secretary for Defense and the Army Commander. During this process, donors were also consulted and their comments considered in the design of the program and institutional structure. After completion of the program proposal, the government legally established the Uganda Veterans Assistance Board (UVAB)2 through a Parliamentary Act and then submitted a formal request to the Bank and other donors to finance the proposed Uganda Veterans Assistance Program (UVAP). After their favorable response, the first Bank appraisal mission visited Uganda in September.
1992 to initiate the three-year demobilization program.

In response to the government's request for support in the demobilization of the NRA, the Bank agreed to redirect funds from PAPSCA to co-finance UVAP, given the need for speed in delivering funds and efficiency in implementing the proposed program, and because of the consistency of its overall objectives and thrust. Although PAPSCA was utilized as a legal and financial framework for UVAP, PAPSCA's implementation unit was overburdened with ongoing work; therefore, the government and donors agreed that the government should set up UVAB as a civilian body under the Prime Minister's Office.

Assuming that a substantial number of soldiers would leave military service (and, thus, the NRA payroll), the MOD budget for 1992 had already been drafted with corresponding ex antecontinue

2. The Executive Secretariat came to be known as 'UVAB.' Although in the strict sense of the term this abbreviation is inaccurate, it is nonetheless used for convention. Throughout the report, the actual board is described as the 'Board.'

3. The Bank's statutes and legal guidelines inhibit any direct contact with the military. The establishment of a civilian entity, thus, ensured that the Bank could actively participate in the program and coordinate donor support.

deductions. As it became clear that the identified number of soldiers could not be discharged at the expected date, the NRA pressured UVAB to release them as soon as possible. On the NRA's insistence, the bulk of phase I demobilization was, consequently, undertaken within only two months of program inception.

Although it would have been more desirable under normal conditions to launch a smaller trial demobilization program, given the budgetary and political pressures to demobilize, the size and timing of the first phase was understandable. Nevertheless, the phased approach chosen enabled government to learn from experience and adjust subsequent phases whenever and wherever necessary.

Program Description

The program is divided into transitional safety net entitlements, reintegration initiatives, and administration. Entitlements provided to veterans are split into two categories: basic benefits for all veterans and enhanced benefits for eligible veterans and other target groups. The benefits are also spread over time and location (before discharge and in the district) as well as by nature (cash payments or bank transfers) to serve as an incentive to stay in the home districts, to better track and support the veterans, and to limit logistical problems.

The rationale for setting up UVAP was the need to provide basic essential needs for a reinsertion period of six months. The target group was assumed to be rather homogenous and their needs similar in nature. Individual problems, place of origin, period of service, and rank were all disregarded as a basis for classifying individual needs. As an example of program components, Table 1.1 presents the benefits of phase III as the most comprehensive of phases.

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Table 1.1 Phase III Components</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Transitional Safety Net</strong></td>
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Program Description
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<tr>
<th>Components Deliberated but Not Included</th>
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<tr>
<td>• clothing allowance</td>
<td>• scholarship training fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• food allowance</td>
<td>• social communication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• health care</td>
<td>• counseling and economic information support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• per diem</td>
<td>• personnel costs (UVAB and districts)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• agricultural supplies</td>
<td>• nonpersonnel costs (UVAB and districts)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• shelter (iron sheets and ridges in kind, other support in cash)</td>
<td>• auditing and accounting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• education fees for children</td>
<td>• monitoring and evaluation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• enhanced health care fund</td>
<td>• institutional development</td>
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*Source: Uganda Veterans Assistance Board.*

**Components Deliberated but Not Included**

Table 1.1 provides an overview of UVAP's program components. During the appraisal of each phase, a large number of other issues was discussed and their inclusion weighed against their cost implications. Indeed, most of these additional components were rejected for want of funding and/or because of administrative implications, even though in many cases elaborate design and costing procedures had already been undertaken. The most important of these potential components are outlined subsequently to (a) reflect on the range of issues to be considered and (b) put the actual design into the perspective of addressing the veterans' social needs of economic and political adjustment.

Delivering, for example, draft oxen instead of iron sheets would have made the package more appropriate in a specific environment but would have complicated administration. If veterans had the choice of receiving iron sheets or draft animals, they would have to state their preference prior to discharge at the latest, so that proper arrangements could be made to procure the right quantity of iron sheets; however, at this point, they might not know what their actual needs would be. If they were to decide after a short period of settlement, that is, after having carefully evaluated their own needs, administrative arrangements and proper financial planning would be impossible to put in place on a cost-efficient basis.

While serving in the military, the family of a soldier receives a coffin, transport, and food for mourners in case of death. Veterans frequently requested funeral support (e.g., covering the expenses for a coffin) to help their families. Apart from its administrative complications, such a fund would have necessitated another USh 2.5 billion (roughly USh 50,000 per veteran, retroactive), almost equivalent to the reintegration initiatives of phase III.

As initially designed, the basic benefits would also have included a distinction between rural and urban settlers, providing each group with appropriate means of support; however, most veterans indicated their preference to return to their villages. A veteran might migrate shortly after arrival in the district of destination but it was impossible to establish ex ante how many veterans eventually needed support of one type or another.
School fees for all children of primary school age were paid for one year. Extensions of this support to (a) the full cycle, (b) a second year for children of disabled or deceased veterans, or (c) children of female veterans would have proved too costly.

Only approximately 10 percent and 15 percent of veterans will be able to enjoy enhanced training and health benefits, respectively. Opening up access to the training and health funds for wives of veterans as well as access to the health fund to a veteran's children was beyond the means of the program. Transferability of entitlements to wives was also not possible as veterans who were left out would have insisted on receiving support that was initially developed for them.5 Wives of deceased, chronically ill or severely disabled veterans, however, will have access to the training fund under phase III.

4 Table 10.2 provides the budgeted costs for each component for each phase and, thus, also an overview of how UVAP's design changed over time.

5 The same argument applies for considering the transfer of part of the cash benefit directly to a veteran's wife.

Transporting all veterans and their families as well as the iron sheets to which they are entitled to the county level would also have been beyond available funds, given the dispersed settlement patterns in rural Uganda. Also regarding transport, the provision of allowances for veteran representatives to travel between district offices and villages was not possible.

Issues

Prior to the finalization of each phase, donors requested detailed information from the government on several specific issues of concern. Over the course of the program, other issues that pertain to the program as a whole arose. The most important of these issues are presented here.

Conditionality

Before donors pledged to support the demobilization program, the government gave assurances that:

• The demobilization of over 36,000 soldiers would represent a permanent reduction—in—force of the army. It would not be offset in part, or in total, by additional recruitment.

• The demobilized soldiers would not be absorbed into the public sector or the military's commercial activities.

• The demobilization would lead to a permanent reduction in defense expenditures (although not specified whether in real or nominal terms and whether compared to the status quo ex ante or annual reductions).

• The program's administration would be under a civilian administration separate from the military authorities.

While at the end of phase II, the net reduction—in—force has been achieved as envisaged, donors at phase III appraisal raised concern over the recruitment of 'home guards' and 'local defense units' in lieu of the insufficient national police force and in response to the increase in rebel insurgency from the Sudan in the north. This issue had already been addressed during preparations for phase I but did not cause any concern at that time. The government and army officials referred to the government's right to take temporary and localized measures in the interest of national security, a reasoning that did not convince all donors.
Returns to Demobilization

The financial returns to demobilization, calculated in terms of the budgetary savings from demobilization, has been impressive. The first two phases of demobilization led to a relatively small decline of recurrent defense expenditure from 29.3 percent in 1992/93 to 26.1 percent in 1993/94, a decrease of 33.7 percent since 1989/90. The real budgetary savings of phases I and II (what is spent as against what would have to be spent if no soldier was demobilized) are calculated at USh 29.0 billion against program costs of USh 31.7 billion. At the same time, social expenditures, especially on health and education, have steadily increased and—for the first time in many years—jointly surpassed defense expenditure in 1994; thus, one of the donors' conditions, a permanent reduction in defense expenditures, was fulfilled beyond expectations in the short term.

After phase II, however, the financial returns to demobilization became an issue of concern. In early 1995, there were signs of a rise in defense expenditures. On closer scrutiny, however, these developments did not appear to be violations of government assurances. Apart from changes in accounting procedures (the allocation of expenditure for several intelligence units under the defense budget), the government attempted to bring the abysmally low military salaries in parity with the civil servant wage scale and to improve the poor living conditions of the average soldier. The only truly military-related increase were allowances paid to the 8,000 members of the home guards, a move that anticipated the security requirements of recent political developments.

Comparability with Civil Service Reform

Concurrently with the demobilization of soldiers from the NRA, government undertook a retrenchment program to reduce the number of civil servants and improve the efficiency of the civil service. Donors intending to participate in both policy interventions, therefore, requested clarifications on comparability. Moreover, some veterans complained that their package was small in comparison to that of a civil servant.

The package for a retrenched civil service was based on a different rationale and approach and included payment equivalent to three months salary in lieu of notice of termination of service, one month pay in lieu of leave, a severance allowance as compensation for the abrupt termination of service, and a (substantially higher) repatriation allowance.

The packages designed for the two groups of beneficiaries are, thus, different for two reasons. First, they have different terms and conditions of service, and second, they have different profiles. The terminal benefits payable to civil service retrenchees were governed by the Civil Service Terms and Conditions of Service, while the demobilization program was designed with the basic needs of veterans in mind, recognizing that most of them were young people with little or no established development roots in their homes. There was, thus, as government stated, no basis for comparison between the two interventions.

Access to Land

The majority of veterans was expected to and actually did return to rural areas and start farming activities. With a large number of veterans settling with families in established communities, access to land was potentially a major issue notwithstanding the fact that most veterans returned to the districts of origin where many had rights to land in one form or another.

This potential constraint to economic and social reintegration was acknowledged from the outset. The first appraisal mission, therefore, attempted to quantify this constraint on the basis of population density on cultivable land, percentage of cultivable land used, and the number of veterans settling in any particular district.

Noting that differences exist among districts with regard to (a) land tenure arrangements, (b) the socially
acceptable use of land (e.g., cattle−keeping or farming) and (c) soil quality, a rough district

6 While the actual cash benefit is indeed lower, a gap between overall benefits for civil servant retrenches and soldiers, that is, including all in−kind and enhanced benefits, still existed but was considerably smaller.

settlement index was made to identify those districts where access to land may pose a problem. For each of the regions, particular problem patterns were established of which UVAB was made aware. In general, the analysis revealed that land would not play a role as critical as in other African countries.

Indeed, cases of landlessness are relatively few. To deal with these cases, UVAB set up a procedure at the district and national levels. If veterans encountered problems in accessing land, they first approached the District Veteran Program Officer (DVPO) who helped them to pursue their land claim with the district authorities. To expedite this process, UVAB advised District Veterans Advisory Committees (DVACs) to identify public land where landless veterans could settle. In more severe cases, UVAB consulted with the Ministry of Local Government to find land for those veterans who needed support in resolving this problem.

Inclusion of Noncitizens

In phase I, the NRA identified 338 noncitizens for demobilization, a move questioned by the donors. According to the government, these were soldiers who had resided most of their lives in Uganda but had never formerly declared citizenship. Eventually, a total of 158 noncitizens were demobilized. As it turned out, many of those were actually Ugandans who had thought that, by declaring themselves noncitizens, they would certainly be discharged; only four did not have an established home in the country. In any event, part of the government's contribution to UVAP was used to finance their discharge at the end of phase I.

Publicity of the Program

Being such a politically sensitive policy intervention, UVAP received a great deal of attention in the media. Newspaper reports ranged between being positive, neutral, and negative. It appears from their contents, however, that cases of negative publicity with objective criticism on UVAP and the veterans are rare. More often than not, negative publicity tends to come from uninformed sources or sources with preconceived personal or political attitudes.

UVAB itself attempted to inform the general public about the program and its activities through the press, television, and radio to dispel any unfounded allegations. While important, these endeavors might have been too sporadic and belated to counter false accusations, for example, of veterans being involved in criminal acts without any proof, effectively.

The Seamless Web of Demobilization, Reinsertion, and Reintegration

Following UVAP's primary objective of demobilizing over 36,000 soldiers, the design of each phase was oriented toward short−term reinsertion; the ultimate goal was a veteran's reintegration into civilian society. But reinsertion and reintegration have no definite boundaries: a veteran is in a constant process of transition, gradually progressing through various phases of transformation from soldier to civilian.

The government and donors have understood this complex seamless web of immediate and future needs. In a number of cases, donors have bilaterally and in parallel initiated programs and projects that cater to long−term needs; however, reintegration activities can only be undertaken for demobilized soldiers. Demobilization—although diverting funds from possible use for reintegrationcontinue
initiatives—had thus to be undertaken first. Moreover, in the medium term, the distinction between 'veteran' and 'civilian' will hopefully have disappeared. Successful reintegration efforts, therefore, might well be integrated into general interventions to fight poverty.

As "survival is not enough, we want to catch up with our brothers," UVAP increasingly included reintegration components in response to some medium–term needs of veterans. In this endeavor, UVAB was confronted with balancing the desire to promote new reintegration initiatives and the need to complete the basic demobilization and reinserion program as envisaged. To address this need, UVAB followed some general criteria for assessing the inclusion of reintegration initiatives:

• Services required that were already available through other project interventions
• Implications for retroactivity to cover veterans from all phases
• Financial cost as compared to overall funds availability
• Administrative burden on an entity specialized in logistics operations
• Potential high impact on the veterans, their families, and the communities.

On the basis of such deliberations, phase III—the most advanced in design—contains components addressing most immediate reintegration needs by enhancing a veteran's skills, education, and health status as well as improving the veterans' reputation (or 'acceptability') among the general public.

A Caveat

When evaluating the program, it should be borne in mind that UVAP is principally a demobilization and reinsertion program; it needs to be evaluated as such. As in any retrenchment exercise, the person immediately affected is also the primary beneficiary. Moreover, donor funding and project design are interdependent factors, jointly determining the ultimate outcome of demobilization and reintegration exercises. Phases II and III contained a number of reintegration measures, although their ultimate objective is to complete the downsizing of the armed forces, while addressing most pressing postdischarge needs.

Implementation Schedule

Even before the official inauguration of the Board, UVAB undertook a trial run, demobilizing 410 members of the military police. The objective of this endeavor was to identify and correct any unforeseen difficulties in effecting the movement of soldiers from their units to the demobilization centers and then to their districts of destination. This exercise provided valuable insights into dealing with dependents and luggage. As no donor funds were yet available to cover the expenses, funds were loaned from the Ministry of Defense.

The entitlements provided to the veterans were calculated to help them for a reinsertion period of six months after discharge, with each phase lasting until all entitlements are handed out and accounted for. With the proliferation of reintegration components in later phases, time requirements increased. This was compounded by a late start–up because of a shortage of funds. (The program's complete implementation schedule is provided in Table 1.2.)

The six–month implementation period for phases I and II was too short because of delays in (a ) mobilizing donor funds, (b ) procuring iron sheets, and (c ) providing enhanced benefits. Because of these delays, UVAB experienced a substantial overlap of activities from phases I and II. For example, while PTA fees were still being paid out to phase I veterans, the first phase II veterans were already being demobilized. This overlap
led to a marked increase in workload for UVAB staff. Phase III has accordingly been extended to cover a period of about twelve months.

Once veterans return to the community and secure access to land, they have to clear it for cultivation. Although initially targeted to meet the crop calendar, demobilization was eventually undertaken whenever funds were available. Many veterans, therefore, arrived in their districts just after the planting season while others returned to severely drought-affected areas.

Table 1.2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Activity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>October 1992</td>
<td>Testing discharge procedures in a trial run.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 1992</td>
<td>Inauguration of the Board.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 1992</td>
<td>Start of phase I demobilization.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 1993</td>
<td>Last discharge of phase I (total 22,904).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September-October 1993</td>
<td>Phase II appraisal mission.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 1993-February 1994</td>
<td>Distribution of iron sheets for phase I.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 1994</td>
<td>Start of phase II demobilization.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 1994</td>
<td>Last discharge of phase II (total 9,307).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 1995</td>
<td>Phase III demobilization (total 4,147).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 1996</td>
<td>Estimated termination of UVAP.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Uganda Veterans Assistance Board.

2—Target Groups and Targeting Mechanisms

Target Groups of the Uganda Veterans Assistance Program

Demobilization in Uganda entails the laying off of soldiers from the NRA. The soldier as an individual army employee is the immediately affected person and consequently the primary target for support. Nonetheless, a soldier is embedded in a multitude of nonmilitary-related social relations which the program directly or indirectly affects. The most notable groups are a veteran's spouse(s) and child(ren), especially when living with the veteran in the barracks. Other affected groups are the extended family at the place of settlement and the receiving community.
The Veteran as an Individual

The Ugandan demobilization is not a random discharge of soldiers. Rather, it is the consequence of rational and professional personnel management by the army; thus, the soldiers to be retrenched were selected by the army command and had several distinct characteristics. This can be seen in the reasons applied by the army for discharge. During the three phases, the breakdown was as follows (Table 2.1):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reason for Discharge</th>
<th>Phase I</th>
<th>Phase II</th>
<th>Phase III</th>
<th>UVAP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Reduction in establishment</td>
<td>7,294</td>
<td>4,779</td>
<td>1,878</td>
<td>13,951</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voluntary</td>
<td>8,289</td>
<td>785</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>9,087</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>1,999</td>
<td>1,160</td>
<td>424</td>
<td>3,583</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical</td>
<td>4,974</td>
<td>2,584</td>
<td>1,818</td>
<td>9,376</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Claim non–citizen</td>
<td>189</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non–citizens</td>
<td>158</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>158</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not stated</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of soldiers discharged</td>
<td>22,903</td>
<td>9,308</td>
<td>4,147</td>
<td>36,358</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Uganda Veterans Assistance Board.

As can be seen from Table 2.1, during phase I 'voluntary' and 'reduction in establishment' (RIE) were the two most important reasons for discharge, accounting for more than two-thirds of veterans. Moreover, one in every five soldiers was discharged on medical grounds. Phase II, on the other hand, included only a few voluntary retrenchees, whereas the army further reduced the number of medically unfit soldiers and those whose services were no longer required. Apart from a genuine reduction in force, those who did not measure up to army discipline and standards can be subsumed among the latter group. This pattern continued in phase III.

A substantial number of soldiers was discharged on medical grounds. Although it was the explicit policy of the army not to discharge the severely disabled until a special assistance program was in place, some mentally and physically disabled soldiers have also been among those demobilized. The small group of noncitizens was a special target group, many having served in the NRA since the early 1980s. While the intentions of the NRA were...
clear, to make the military an all-Ugandan force, many of these 'noncitizens' were in fact Ugandans who had declared themselves foreigners.

From this approach it is clear that one of the army's objectives, that is, the further improvement in quality and standards of the armed forces, can be expected to have been achieved. Overall, 26,910 soldiers (or 74 percent) have been demobilized for reasons of age, health, or reduction in force.

Irrespective of the reason for discharge, every veteran forms part of UVAP's primary target group and is, thus, eligible to receive the basic settling-in kit. Beyond this package, a veteran as an individual is also entitled to other program services if he/she meets specific criteria, such as having biological children or severe health problems. These qualifications limited the number of individual beneficiaries per component to varying degrees.

A veteran was entitled to the same package irrespective of rank, age, or years in service. The reasons for extending the same package to all veterans were (a) resource constraints and (b) the government's envisaged pension and gratuity scheme. Apart from such political reasons for this decision, one group of soldiers was thereby not given explicit attention throughout the program: the child soldiers. The view of the Army was that the child soldiers on attaining the age of eighteen years were to be treated like any other soldier. Moreover, they had the choice of continuing with their education financed by the Army if they remained in the military. Although specific reintegration problems have been identified for child soldiers during the process, the program does not contain any specific component for this otherwise vulnerable target subgroup.

The Veteran's Spouse(s) and Child(ren)

The veteran's spouse(s) was (were) not entitled to any direct benefit. Children of veterans, however, were supported by the payment of a year's PTA fees to the school of enrollment. It should, however, be noted that most of the veteran's entitlements were targeted toward his/her family through the veteran. As such, the families of veterans were an explicit target group from the beginning. What the program did not provide was direct access for family members to benefits, except in the case of a veteran's death.

Although (a) a gender-focused review of phase I had identified a number of substantial problems that wives face on resettlement and (b) veterans had repeatedly expressed disappointment over lack of assistance to their wives, the design improvements of phase II were mainly targeted toward the veteran as an individual. The focus on children was strengthened by providing assistance to a larger number than hitherto possible. Only for phase III did the veteran's wife become an explicit beneficiary of a number of low-cost benefits, most notably the more active involvement in predischarge orientation. Access to more expensive benefits still remained limited to hardship cases for financial reasons.

The limited inclusion of spouse(s) and child(ren) in UVAP is a direct function of the availability of funding. While various donors stressed concern over women's issues, funding of further gender-sensitive activities proved elusive. Genuine improvements were only feasible when their implementation did not incur substantial additional costs (as, for example, the extension of vocational/group training or health services to all wives would have). In conclusion, the focus on gender is limited but, nevertheless, ultimately optimal given available funding resources.

The Veteran's Extended Family and Community

Social reintegration ultimately depends on the willingness of the extended family and community to accept a veteran after many years in military service; their crucial role has been recognized from the initiation process onward. Prior to the first batch of demobilization, sensitization tours were undertaken by UVAB staff and
government officials to inform the communities about the program and their responsibilities and to appeal to their
good will. Acknowledging that the poorer the community, the more difficult full acceptance might be, a
community support program was designed for phase I. This program attempted to strengthen community health
services for treating veterans and civilians alike. Otherwise, a veteran's extended family or community received
no support during the program.

Realizing that—depending on the region and its experiences during the civil war—communities often welcomed
the returning veteran with suspicion rather than good will, outreach activities to communities by district−based
and UVAB staff were continued during phase II; however, not before phase III did the social concerns again
receive explicit attention in program design. A social communication package was introduced to familiarize the
community, the family, and the veteran with problems of social reintegration and to encourage local solutions.
Despite this belated approach, community sensitization and involvement have overall not received sufficient
attention. Neither has any distinction been made—apart from the number of Assistant District Veterans Program
Officers—between communities receiving different numbers of veterans. (After phase II, the number of veterans
per district ranged from 51 to 2,554.) Families and communities should have been a more explicit target group,
possibly receiving some cash or in−kind support for specific activities.

A Profile of Veterans

The monitoring and evaluation of phase I did not furnish sufficient data on the veteran and his/her spouse(s) and
child(ren). Phase II, on the other hand, provided a wealth of information. As monitoring data in phase II were
collected for all demobilized veterans, the sample size (9,307 out of 32,211 or 28.9 percent) allows for a general
description of the program's primary target group.

Demographic Data

Among those demobilized, 5 percent were female in phase I and 3 percent in phase II. In both phases, the
demobilized soldiers were of relatively young age. In phase II (phase I), more than 50 percent (35 percent) of
veterans were under the age of thirty. In phase II alone, it is estimated that continue

one−third or 3,300 soldiers demobilized under the UVAP were less than eighteen years of age in 1986. A
substantial number of veterans, consequently, have little adult experience of civilian life.

Most of the veterans of phase II are married (90 percent), with almost a quarter (22 percent) having more than one
wife; phase II thus affected around 10,200 spouses. These partnerships have mostly been entered into under
traditional rites (73 percent). Another 17 percent had not been formalized at discharge. Even more worrisome, 16
percent of wives did not have knowledge of the local language of the place of settlement. These two indicators
sharply reflect the weak position of wives on resettlement.

Every phase II veteran has on average 3.2 children of whom 2.5 are of school age; thus, a total of 30,200 children
were affected by the second phase of demobilization.

Health

During phases I and II, more than 7,500 soldiers were demobilized on medical grounds. According to UVAB's
monitoring data, 41 percent of phase II veterans consider themselves in poor health or ill. 15 percent are estimated
to be chronically ill or disabled. These percentages are substantially higher than in the army, again indicating that
demobilization was not a random exercise.
The incidence of severe illness is fairly unevenly distributed across the country: the three districts of Kabarole, Mbarara, and Soroti alone account for about a quarter of veterans discharged on medical grounds during phase II. The number of 7,500 veterans discharged on medical grounds, however, disguises the fact that many more veterans have fallen seriously ill after their arrival. Until July 1995, 1,696 veterans (or 5.3 percent) died, one-third of them because of AIDS. The actual infection rate, however, is unknown.

Ill veterans will find economic reintegration more difficult as their ability to provide for themselves and their families is reduced. Even worse, casualty veterans previously receiving treatment while in the army are now experiencing serious problems in meeting health bills. Many have spent considerable amounts of money on treatment and are extremely worried about their health situation after they deplete their cash benefits.

**Education, Skills, and Economic Activity**

Many veterans have little to no education and limited skills. Only slightly more than a quarter of phase II veterans have secondary or higher education; 12 percent had no formal education, and approximately half finished primary school. Of phase I veterans, 70 percent have not progressed beyond primary education. Although more than half of phase II veterans stated that they acquired skills while in the army, most of these skills are not marketable. Only 13 percent possess skills in mechanics, metalwork, woodworking, or tailoring.

Only 34 percent of phase II veterans possess cash cropping skills, whereas 50 percent know how to undertake subsistence farming. No more than 4 percent are familiar with cattle raising. Not surprisingly then, 71 percent of phase II veterans intended to go back to farming on resettlement. Nineteen percent envisaged activities in commerce and production.

Two months after phase II resettlement, 73 percent were actually active in farming; however, 11 percent ended up as agricultural day laborers or unpaid family workers (against 1 percent intended), suggesting that around 1,000 veterans had to lower their expectations substantially. Economic reintegration, thus, proves the most elusive of all problems facing a veteran on resettlement, although personal and social attitudes can ease this process.

**Housing and Land**

Forty percent of phase II veterans did not have a house of their own on return to their home community. The majority of this group, a third of the total, lived with relatives. On the other hand, most veterans were able to secure access to land for cultivation. Only 826 cases of landlessness (or 9 percent of phase II veterans) were reported until October 1994. Around one-quarter had private land (23 percent), one-third had family land (34 percent) while another third (31 percent) had both family and private land. Under phase I, an estimated 700 veterans could not find access to land (although data may be incomplete). Overall, less than 3 percent may actually be landless, a number that allays initial concerns expressed mainly by the donor community, although containing severe individual reintegration difficulties.

A noteworthy fact is that almost one-third (31 percent) of phase II veterans did not have home contact since 1991. Another 22 percent visited home only once; thus, it can be assumed that knowledge about the specific location of resettlement is limited to nonexistent in many instances, aggravating the challenge of reintegration.

**Targeting Mechanisms and Leakages**

The identification of a target group does not by itself ensure that its needs are addressed. To this end, targeting mechanisms need to be developed that secure the target group's access to program services while other groups remain excluded. In other words, targeting mechanisms are applied to minimize leakages and avoid waste of resources.
Depending on the nature of the intervention, each target group requires a (set of) specific mechanism(s) which, to guarantee maximum efficiency, must be authentic and nontransferable. As the vast majority of UVAP's benefits pertain to only one target group, that is, the individual veteran, no elaborate targeting mechanism had to be developed for the other target groups: family members (spouses and children) and communities. For the veteran, an identification system needed to be established that would effectively verify access to the entitlements by the bearer.

The Discharge Certificate

The targeting mechanism selected for the purpose of UVAP was the discharge certificate. Based on the certificate of service designed by the NRA, the government planned the design of the discharge certificate well ahead of the start of phase I. It contains the following:

- Photograph
- Serial number and army number
- Name and ethnic group
- Home district, county, parish, and village
- Date of enlistment, date, reason, and unit of discharge
- Rank and service on date of discharge and years
- Description of veteran (height and marks).

In addition to this general information about the bearer, an entitlements section was provided to the veteran, including a statement of the rights of inheritance vis-à-vis the next-of-kin, should the veteran pass away before the six-month program of entitlements has ended.

The hardcover booklet has an imprinted serial number, which, in conjunction with the army number of the veteran, serves as an identification mechanism for accessing benefits. The discharge certificates were processed by the Ministry of Defense, printed by the NRA, and issued to each veteran at the point of demobilization. The discharge certificate is used by the veteran every time he/she approaches the DVPO, for anything from counseling and examinations by the District Medical Officer (DMO) to receiving iron sheets and enrolling in vocational training centers. The discharge certificate, in conjunction with the data recorded at discharge, is also used as the target mechanism for those benefits that accrue directly to the spouse and child(ren), that is, when a wife is eligible for training because the veteran is severely disabled and for PTA fee contributions. As pointed out, the discharge certificate was also used for enabling next-of-kin to access any outstanding benefits in the event of a veteran's death.

The discharge certificate is the single most important targeting mechanism of the UVAP. Its major security features are the photograph, its bound format, as well as unambiguous identification of the bearer. These features minimize misuse in case a discharge certificate is lost; hence, it proves a highly effective measure in terms of avoiding leakages, facilitating administrative procedures, and reducing costs.
Problem Areas

The standard photograph on the discharge certificate was only included on termination of phase I. Consequently, during the early batches of phase I demobilization, the discharge certificate could not be used as an authentic identification document because it left room for fraud. Several impostors took advantage of this situation by claiming the payment of the first cash installment for colleagues who were unable to present themselves for discharge, either because they were bedridden, away on military operation, or had died after having been selected for demobilization but before official discharge. In most of these rare instances, UVAB was, nonetheless, able to trace those veterans who had received an entitlement more than once, due to its extensive administrative data base and cooperation with the NRA.

Repeated errors occurred when the discharge certificate and other forms were filled in. Depending on the region of origin of the clerk and, thus, his/her mother tongue, names and places are spelled differently. Consequently, a number of veterans had their names misspelled on the discharge certificate, the payment schedule or the bank advice slip. While these problems could all be solved by UVAB, the veterans concerned experienced long delays in accessing their entitlements.

The design of the certificate addressed the issue of authenticity and nontransferability but apparently did not take some practical issues into account; thus, it was considered by several veterans to be too large and cumbersome to carry around as an identity card. Such reasoning could continue in part explain the occurrence of lost or stolen certificates, the replacement of which also implied delays for the affected veterans in receiving their benefits.

In a number of cases during phase I, not all the information supplied at the point of discharge was accurate, especially regarding the place and date of birth and the army number. At various instances, two veterans or more shared the same army number. All such cases have been referred to UVAB for correction. These mistakes could have been caused by some Army Records clerical staff, who may have generated 'ghost soldiers' with the hope that the money for the veterans would be sent to the Army for distribution. UVAB's insistence that each veteran appear physically at the point of discharge for payment was vindicated.

Other Targeting Mechanisms

A number of additional measures have been employed by UVAB to discourage fraud. During the early stages of phase I, as long as the discharge certificate did not include a photograph, pay advices were prepared for transferring the second and third installments; however, this measure proved time consuming and expensive and was suspended once the discharge certificate contained a photograph.

To access cash payments, veterans, while receiving their first installment, sign a payment voucher which—together with the discharge certificate—serves as necessary identification papers for registration at the DVPO and opening a bank account. In fact, they first have to report to the DVPO who verifies their signature. Only afterward are they allowed to proceed to the bank. This procedure is not accepted by all veterans because it seems superfluous to them. It also creates problems because for some veterans their specimen signatures vary from time to time, thus, complicating any bank–related formalities. Still, the joint use of discharge certificate and payment voucher proved effective in avoiding leakages regarding the single most important component: the cash transfer.
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**Demobilization Segment**

The immediate aim of the NRA was the demobilization of over 36,000 soldiers, many of whom had not chosen the army as a career path but had joined during the civil war. For a large number of the 36,357 soldiers who were demobilized, including approximately 125,000 family members (spouses and children), therefore, the demobilization exercise in itself was an appropriate political move, allowing them to leave the army and return to civilian life.

For UVAP, demobilization itself only forms the first of three major episodes that a soldier and veteran was exposed to, namely demobilization, reinsertion, and reintegration. For the purposes of the program, the *demobilization process* is divided into five phases: assembly, predischarge orientation, discharge, transportation, and postdischarge orientation. Once discharged from military service, the veterans receive their first cash payment as well as the predischarge orientation. Only after these activities would they leave the assembly point on transport provided by UVAB.

**Assembly and Discharge**

**Assembly**

The NRA first identified the soldiers to be demobilized as a personnel management decision based on transparent criteria. A computerized list of these soldiers, including information on the district of settlement, was handed over to UVAB for further preparations. The NRA then disarmed and transported the selected soldiers to the identified discharge centers. Although the NRA is in control of all weapons (and uniforms) that have been handed in by the soldiers, many others probably remained unreported and, thus, in circulation. A veteran intending to revert to paramilitary or criminal activities is likely to have access to such weaponry.

It turned out that not all of the soldiers on the computerized list actually appeared for discharge. Some were away on military operations, others were on leave, some were detained on disciplinary grounds while still others had been transferred to other units before discharge. Many had died between the time the list was set up and the discharge exercise, and several soldiers had actually deserted. These inconsistencies between list and presentation for discharge did not pose serious difficulties to the exercise but necessitated some lengthier modifications between the NRA and UVAB.

**Preparations for Discharge**

The discharge centers were selected by the NRA on the basis of the number of soldiers per region. With the exception of the general headquarters, these centers were located at divisional headquarters. To have these units serve as discharge centers, a number of preparations had to be undertaken by UVAB. Normally, an advance group comprising of two UVAB staff members arrived at the discharge center with the aim of preparing the physical pay–out facilities. Their working relationships with the commanding officers and their staff were good in most instances, which facilitated early troubleshooting.

After some initial difficulties in phase I—given the sheer number of soldiers discharged from any one center—UVAB staff acquired substantial expertise and a high degree of efficiency in discharge preparations and
operations. At times, however, when a discharge exercise was considered pure routine, proper preparations were neglected to a point that neither a center had been visited beforehand nor the commanding officer had been informed of the necessary arrangements.

Discharge

A rapid transition exercise—as quick a discharge of the identified soldiers as possible—was deliberately chosen by the NRA to avoid possible disruptions, difficulties, and costs in sustaining large numbers of soldiers and their dependents at the assembly points for any prolonged period. This not only related to the financial implications of feeding and housing them—a cost borne by the Army—but also to the fear that if a soldier was to be demobilized involuntarily and informed far ahead of time, he/she would lack discipline and motivation for that period. In most instances, therefore, soldiers were often given prior notice of demobilization of no more than one to two days, a period to which many veterans objected. Despite this short warning, however, soldiers generally showed outstanding discipline throughout the discharge exercise.

Special problems occurred with the discharge of noncitizens in phase I. Their discharge was postponed various times, so that in the end these soldiers had to wait at the assembly point for more than six months. Despite ample opportunity, the genuine noncitizens had not been aided prior to discharge in obtaining the necessary documents for legally leaving the country. As this issue, consequently, surfaced during the discharge exercise, UVAB decided to put these veterans on hold until specific arrangements were made.

Predischarge Orientation

Having spent many years in the army, soldiers have gotten used to the military way of life. To return them to civilian life, thus, necessitates major personal adjustments to a new environment. From this perspective, it is a prerequisite of successful reintegration that the veteran receive information and orientation of what he/she can reasonably expect from the future.

The Deficiencies of Phase I

Despite general awareness of this issue, phase I did not include any specific component enhancing information to facilitate the veteran's transition. This proved one of the major shortcomings of the initial design. Immediately prior to pay-out, veterans received some briefing (in Swahili), including information on how to integrate formally into the communities through the Resistance Councils (RCs) and DVPOs, as well as several leaflets. The information contained therein, however, was not only extremely limited but also raised some undue expectations.

One leaflet described the procedure for opening up a savings account at the nearest Uganda Commercial Bank (UCB) branch to receive the second and third installments. Another leaflet offered some tips on the program, especially regarding the productive use of the money. It also informed the veteran about the support he/she could expect to receive from the DVPO. Therein, it was stated that the DVPO would assist the veteran in all problems of job opportunities, health, vocational training, economic activity counseling, and the children's education. While this assistance was mostly to be confined to counseling, a number of veterans did get the impression that financial support would be provided as well. An additional leaflet was prepared by the NRA, explaining issues pertaining to the termination of service as well as giving some information regarding the program.

Phase I veterans were, thus, rather ill-prepared to face numerous problems during the transition period back to civilian life. With the limited orientation they received they were not fully aware of all benefits as well as social and medical issues awaiting them in their new environment. Neither was essential data collected at the point of discharge, making subsequent analysis difficult. These shortcomings proved particularly grave in view of the size
of phase I demobilization, which affected almost two-thirds of the overall target population of 36,357.

**The Improvements of Phase II**

To rectify the shortcomings of phase I, a predischarge orientation component was designed for phase II. Its objectives were to provide veterans and wives with information about (a) the program, (b) health issues and AIDS/HIV, and (c) civil society. Moreover, basic health and demographic information necessary for monitoring and planning was collected.

The predischarge orientation was delivered to veterans and their spouses at the assembly points in several modules. Veterans received orientation in eight modules (against the six initially planned), their wives in five modules, two of which were specifically targeted toward women. The issues to be presented had been identified by UVAB staff during extensive tours carried out during phase I. The modules, thus, reflect the areas of greatest opportunity or threat for successful reintegration. For the veteran, they focused on:

- Basic benefits (cash details, schedule of payment, mode of payment, and iron sheets)
- Enhanced benefits (PTA, health, and training)
- Financial matters and banking (UCB, opening the bank account, death and package transfer, and next-of-kin)
- DVPO and DVR (DVPO office, District Veterans Council, District Veterans Advisory Committee, and reception in the district)
- Civic duties and community (RC system, RC1 registration, taxation, civil behavior and discipline, cooperation with civilians, and access to land)
- Environment (economic activities and environment, protected areas, water, and soil)
- Income generation (how to start, how to plan a business, potential sources for funding small projects—credits and grants)
- Family and health (family planning, basic health, and immunization)
- AIDS/HIV (general AIDS problems, where to refer to, what to do when).

The wives of veterans received orientation in:

- Women in society (legal aspects, integration in community, and children's education)
- AIDS/HIV (general AIDS problems, where to refer to, and what to do when)
- Family and health (family planning, basic health, and immunization)
- Environment (activity and environment, protected areas, water, and soil)
- Economic activities (UCOBAC and other projects).

As a preparatory measure, a seminar was organized for module instructors to identify the relevant content for each module and to look for ways and means to make the message understandable to the target audience. The training
program also contained a presentation on how to address a large audience effectively. The seminar was also attended by three selected DVPOs who later participated in the predischarge orientation. After this seminar, a small booklet was printed for future reference by the veteran. It contained the major topics of each module and was distributed to the veterans through the DVP offices.

The orientation sessions were open-air, if possible under a tree, and lasted for forty-five minutes per module. Morning sessions, attended on average by around 400 participants per group, were for veterans while afternoon sessions were oriented toward women in groups that were generally smaller.

The Results of Phase II Orientation

The predischarge orientation proved to be a substantial improvement over phase I: veterans who received this orientation were evidently better prepared for civilian life and had more realistic expectations. They were able to cope better with social problems and were more frequently engaged in economic activities.

DVPOs noted that the phase II veterans also generally reported more quickly than phase I veterans. Because of this orientation, no further explanations by the DVPOs on administrative procedures linked to the arrival in the district were necessary. This increase of awareness also led to higher interest among the veterans in topics directly linked to the package.

Veterans of phase II attributed much of their success in making their social transition successfully to the counseling and education received prior to discharge. Many expressed the view that the predischarge orientation had enabled them to learn the need for humility and patience that helped them withstand the insults and mental abuses many civilians heaped on them. Indeed, the predischarge orientation component was considered by veterans and DVPOs alike as the strongest element of phase II for successful reintegration.

The Weaknesses of Phase II Orientation

Notwithstanding these positive design features of phase II, several shortcomings in execution could not be avoided. For instance, it was not possible to have veterans and their spouses participate in the orientation at the same time as somebody had to stay behind and look after the children and household belongings. Information on family and household-related issues, most notably family planning and HIV/AIDS, could thus not be offered to families, but only to individual family members. In spite of the partial focus on women, not all special issues confronting the wives of veterans were addressed in a satisfactory manner.

The predischarge orientation at each discharge point lasted for three days instead of the planned minimum of five, a result of the NRA's decision to discharge veterans as quickly as possible. Consequently, not all topics as identified beforehand could be covered in the recommended depth. During these three days, each veteran received six hours of orientation, a time period considered inadequate to cover so many unfamiliar issues. Moreover, the instructors' presentations had to be translated into Swahili and vernacular languages, further reducing the time available to each instructor. As a result, time allocated for discussions and questions was extremely limited. This problem was compounded by the large group sizes.

Open-air presentations of the orientation modules were the only feasible option, given the location of the sessions and the numbers of participants. As could be expected, conditions were often rough, with rains frequently interrupting individual sessions. Due to these circumstances, appropriate demonstration materials could not be used effectively by the instructors.

The orientation component provided information related to general issues of UVAP and reintegration. It did not address any district-related issues. This led to some complaints by veterans during orientation and after arrival in
Further Enhancements in Phase III

The weaknesses of phase II and comments by veterans and their wives prompted modifications of the predischarge orientation component for phase III. For instance, closer cooperation with the NRA was sought to extend the orientation period to a minimum of three days, each day containing at least four hours of instructions. This request was accommodated by the Army. Moreover, the participation of wives in joint orientation sessions was increased whenever possible.

To extend the effects of the orientation sessions, the contents of two booklets, one outlining the legal rights of women and the other containing tips for the investment of the entitlements were presented to the veteran and his spouse(s) prior to discharge. The former booklet ("What the Veteran's Wife Must Know") will be translated into as many local languages as possible to ensure that the information material is easily understandable and accessible at any time. Veterans will be issued with copies of these pamphlets when an adequate number of copies are printed.

Phase III extends the objectives of phase II by providing veterans and their wives with joint predischarge counseling. To enhance the relevance of this activity, veterans from both phases as well as DVPOs and District Veterans Representatives (DVRs) from districts close to the assembly points participated in the predischarge orientation exercise. Such individual experiences will facilitate a shift in focus toward more district-related issues and problems.

The presentation of pertinent topics was undertaken in eight modules. This time, however, veterans and wives were be addressed simultaneously. The modules were rearranged to include program-related information (3 modules), health (3 modules), and education (2 modules):

- Entitlements (banking and installments, education and health components, iron sheets)
- Veterans' associations and veterans' experience thus far (projects undertaken and economic opportunities, personal finances)
- Women's legal rights and civil responsibilities
- Services and cost sharing at local health facilities
- Household health issues (preventive care and first aid)
- AIDS/HIV issues (basic education on AIDS and access to resources for counseling and support)
- PTA fees and importance of basic education for veterans' children
- Women's legal rights issues (basic education for both veterans and veterans' wives).

Transportation

Once veterans were registered, had received their first cash payment, and attended the orientation sessions, they were transported to their desired district of destination. Prior to the inception of the demobilization exercise, it had been decided to provide transport to every veteran and his/her family and belongings instead of offering a cash equivalent. The major reasons for this decision were that (a) transport prices would inflate when a large number
of customers traveled at the same time, \((b)\) each veteran carries a substantial amount of money, thus potentially endangering his/her safety, and \((c)\) veterans are likely to experience considerable inconvenience.

The NRA, after identifying the soldiers to be demobilized, established a list of these soldiers, also including their intended district of destination. On the basis of this information, UVAB’s logistics unit prepared computerized optimization schedules, listing the number of vehicles by provider and destination. UVAB then entered into contractual arrangements with the selected transport providers on rates that were fixed during each phase. As only the details for each discharge exercise had to be negotiated, this process took up only a small amount of time and resources.

To ensure road safety, UVAB staff inspected all vehicles one day prior to discharge at the assembly areas. Due to their poor condition, a small number of vehicles had to be rejected for operations. Overall, close to 1,900 vehicles and railway coaches were employed in the phase I and II transport operations.

For most passages, trucks and buses were provided. Trains were used whenever they proved the most cost-effective means and when they could be provided by the Uganda Railway Corporation. Because each vehicle carried large sums of money, every transport was initially escorted by six NRA soldiers to protect the passengers from theft. This number was later reduced to three for budgetary reasons. In phase II alone, 1,285 officers and soldiers were deployed to safeguard the vehicles and trains.

Transport was well organized and executed for all army units and discharge centers. Around 32,000 veterans and over 110,000 family members have been transported during phases I and II. Only one traffic incident occurred during phase II, costing the lives of two escorting soldiers and two veterans. Several minor incidents occurred that could be attributed to the lack of discipline of veterans and truck drivers. A few veterans lost their money en route. UVAB insured all veterans and dependents under an accident insurance for injury or death between the discharge point and the district of destination. All valid claims were subsequently handled by the insurance company.

**Problem Areas**

Veterans repeatedly complained that they should have been given a flat transport allowance instead of being provided with transport to the district headquarters. Many claimed they would need substantially less funds to reach their point of destination; however, for the reasons elaborated previously, the standard approach was used for all veterans for all phases, except noncitizens.

Transport was arranged for each veteran and family from the assembly point to district headquarters. Many, if not most, veterans would then have to proceed to their communities independently at their own expense. They, thus, often lamented that they had to use a substantial part of their cash benefit on an additional transport item. The suggestion to have them transported to at least their county headquarters, also ensuring that they actually returned to their home districts was considered in phase III but was rejected due to its considerable financial implications.

At the beginning of phase I, UVAB calculated that buses and trucks would commute first to nearby districts then return to the assembly points and pick up more veterans for a second trip; however, because of the regular late return from the first trip and ensuing delays for the discharge exercise, this practice was discontinued.

Many veterans did not possess more than a few utensils, basins, and beddings, although some had acquired some foodstuff and furniture beside a bed. Nevertheless, veterans complained that in several instances their personal property was either lost or damaged during transport, a shortcoming that relates more to the transport operators than to UVAB.
Although drivers were supposed to take the passengers to the district headquarters, most veterans disembarked en route when it was easier for them to reach their home village. Due to delays at the discharge centers and these frequent stops, many veterans arrived at the DVP office when it was already closed, often even at night. As a result, the DVPOs were frequently unable to ascertain the actual number of veterans in a district corresponding to the numbers indicated on the transport manifestos. Several drivers also did not approach the DVPO to have the transport manifesto signed. Consequently, payment to these transport companies could not be effected until the drivers finally received the signature.

Finally, several veterans also expressed dissatisfaction about UVAB's apparent failure to make adequate arrangements for transporting spouse(s) and child(ren). The origin of this problem was that, in most instances, the exact number of dependents was not known to UVAB at the time of preparing the transport schedules, either because soldiers had misstated their existence or number or because the records were inaccurately kept by the NRA. In any event, all dependents were entitled to transport with their veteran spouses once they were present at the discharge center.

**Postdischarge Orientation**

During predischarge orientation, a veteran was given information about the steps required on return to the village. These included:

10 The first cash payment was actually designed to cover these transport expenses.

- Registration with the RC1 chairman who provided a letter of introduction to the DVPO
- Reporting to the DVPO within one week of arrival and presenting the discharge certificate and letter
- Preparation of forms with the particulars of the veteran by the DVPO or clerk
- Handing over another letter of introduction by the DVPO for presentation at the nearest UCB branch
- Further counseling on the package, if required
- Opening up a bank account (preferably a savings account) at the bank on presentation of discharge certificate and letter of introduction
- Informing the DVPO of the account number to receive the next installment(s)

Aware of a lack of district-specific knowledge, phase I envisaged a one–to–two day *orientation of veterans on arrival* at district reception centers. This activity was to be organized by the DVPOs and would have included district officials and other community representatives; however, because many veterans preferred to disembark from the vehicles before arriving in the district offices and many others arrived late in the day and found their way home, the DVPOs were not in a position to carry out this activity and effectively address all veterans simultaneously.
To cover the knowledge gap, sensitization tours were to be conducted by the DVPOs and members of the District Veterans Advisory Committee shortly after the veterans' arrival in the district to reinforce the impact of the predischarge orientation package and to add district-specific information. More often than not, however, DVPOs did not have sufficient time or the means to actually visit the veterans in the villages.

While the veteran was enabled to access the basic entitlements, he/she did not possess sufficient knowledge on a number of crucial issues regarding reintegration, because district-specific information was not provided either during phase I or phase II; however, as individual experiences have amply shown, many reintegration challenges confronting veterans and their families are home district specific, because geographic and other conditions vary throughout the country.

Phase III was, therefore, equipped with a postdischarge orientation package, complementing the information provided under the predischarge orientation with counseling of the veterans and their spouse(s) immediately after their return to the home district. One-day information and counseling meetings were organized by the DVPO with assistance from the DVR. They were attended by veterans and their spouses from all phases as well as representatives of the district administration, especially those for agriculture, health, and education.

Phase III veteran families were thereby (a) introduced to relevant district officials (especially the district medical and education officers) and local NGOs, (b) advised on local social reintegration, and (c) informed about local economic opportunities, local customary rights of women, as well as environmental issues. This component was implemented on a decentralized level, taking into account local variations in needs and opportunity structures. It is expected to facilitate community acceptance while at the same time endowing the veterans with the means to cope better with any possible hindrance.

The Virtuous Circle of Information Collection and Dissemination

The introduction in subsequent phases of the pre- and post-discharge orientation components as well as their specific designs are a direct result of the experiences of earlier phases. Those economic and social areas where 'senior' veterans encountered specific problems formed the core of the messages conveyed to 'junior' veterans. Although effectively functioning only after phase I, the program's monitoring and evaluation system provided detailed evidence of such difficulties, evidence that was systematically fed into mid-course program (re)design. In UVAP's monitoring and evaluation system, veterans were, thus, not only the main providers of information but also the main beneficiaries.

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Reinsertion Segment

Conceptually, the three overlapping phases of a veteran's demobilization, reinsertion, and reintegration represent for society as a whole a continuum from a political postconflict context to a transitional phase of social capital (re)formation and eventually to economic reconstruction and development. During this short-term transitional phase, the veteran is in the most vulnerable position after having left his/her familiar military life to settle in an unfamiliar new environment. Specific measures are called for to ease the veteran's burden in this critical phase.

UVAP's focus originated from the above-mentioned rationale. Its major activities were, therefore, directly related to this rather short period after actual discharge. Based on an assessment of what a soldier receives while in service and, thus, what the veteran's immediate needs would be, the reinsertion segment (Transitory Safety Net Package) provides for the following: (a) cash payments to assist him/her until he/she establishes a reliable income source, (b) health care support in severe cases, (c) financial contributions to a child's primary education,
and (d) shelter for the family to meet the most pressing short-term survival needs en route to a sustainable status.

Assuming that veterans would form a rather homogeneous target group, the reinsertion support was the same for all veterans, irrespective of rank, age, or years of service. The egalitarian approach triggered severe protest from the higher ranks prior to the first phase demobilization. The NRA insisted, however, on an egalitarian package, also for reasons of fundability of the program.11 As the experience of the first two phases shows, the assumption of homogeneity did not prove completely accurate. Nevertheless, the uniform package was maintained for reasons of equality and was as such accepted by the veterans.

In a number of instances, however, veterans felt that the composition of the package did not properly address the needs of their particular circumstances. For example, in Soroti district, veterans would have preferred to receive draft animals for cultivation rather than iron sheets. This issue was taken up in deliberations for phase III but eventually not included because of the administrative difficulties involved.

**Cash Payments**

While serving in the NRA, soldiers received a small but steady income. The cash benefits were not, however, a form of severance pay as in the case of civil service reform. Rather, they were calculated on the basis of physical needs for survival and as such covered expenses for:

- Food and clothing
- Medical care and drugs
- Other basic necessities until veterans established themselves in the village economically (settling-in allowance and per diem) break

11 The issue could only be solved outside of UVAP by a political decision to cover retroactively veterans with more than six years of service in the government's pension and gratuity scheme.

- Agricultural tools (hoes, panga [cutlass], and seeds)
- Erecting a simple structure (poles, doors, windows, nails, vents, and skilled labor).

It is to be noted that all these are designed to cover the needs of the veteran's family with the exception of expenses for clothes.

The food allowance was calculated at the same rate as the ration cash allowance paid by the NRA at the beginning of the program, adjusted to family size, and was for a period long enough for a veteran to grow and harvest own crops. Shelter was calculated as a three-room mud and wattle house. Medical care was based on recommendations by the World Health Organization (5 percent of per capita GDP, thus, 5 percent of cash entitlements) and provided estimated medical expenses for the average family of a veteran. The settling-in allowance was intended to provide the veteran with cash-in-hand and covered the veteran's local transport from district to village and other incidental expenditures. All other items were costed at current market prices.

These expenses were calculated and budgeted for a period of six months after discharge when it was expected that a veteran would have sufficiently reintegrated to be able to live independently. In particular, the six-month period as well as the inputs provided were expected to enable a veteran to live through the first crop cycle from planting to harvesting. For urban returnees, the transitional period might well have been longer. Although discussed in the design stage, the delivery of different packages for rural and urban returnees was not taken up in any of the
phases, primarily because of the overwhelming majority of veterans who intended to return to their villages.

It was initially also contemplated to provide most of the benefits in kind (especially agricultural tools and input for shelter). This idea was, however, not taken up in the final design. Principally, because it was decided that veterans should be given a choice and due to concerns about tedious and costly procurement procedures.

**Mode of Payment**

For phase I, the cash payment was to be effected in three installments due to the concern that a veteran could spend the money 'unwisely,' that is, on alcohol or luxury goods, and to ensure that money would definitely be available to him/her in the near future. At the same time, veterans complained that—although they were promised a substantial amount of money—they were not able to invest any of it because of the small individual installments. In phase II, therefore, veterans received their entitlements in two installments, the first to enable a veteran to fund their first steps in civilian life, the other—as a bank transfer—two months after discharge.12 Veterans expressed satisfaction with this arrangement, which was retained for phase III; it also reduced the logistical burden on UVAB.

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12 Exceptions were made for noncitizens in phase I and critically ill veterans in phase II. Noncitizens received their entire entitlement package at once in case they wanted to leave the country. Because some of them did not feel comfortable with suddenly having such enormous amounts of money at their disposal but did not have proper documentation to leave the country, UVAB agreed to have the money returned until specific arrangements could be made. Critically ill veterans of phase II also received their total cash entitlement as well as the twenty iron sheets and five ridges (from the remaining stock of phase I) at the point of discharge in monetized form.

**Administrative Arrangements for the Payment of the First Installment**

Arrangements for paying out the first installment proved more difficult than expected, especially at the beginning of demobilization when UVAB staff had not yet acquired sufficient expertise. First, activities were coordinated with the Bank of Uganda and UCB to provide cash in the required quantity for each exercise. As each discharge exercise entailed the movement of vast amounts of money, transport of the money from the bank to the assembly point was guarded by army escorts. In various instances, the Army commander provided a helicopter to reduce safety risks while transporting the money and staff to remote locations. Moreover, UVAB insured all money transports, covering the total amount carried.

At the discharge center, UVAB's advance group specially adapted selected rooms in the divisional headquarters to keep the money overnight and soldiers guarded these rooms until the following day when pay-out commenced. The advance group also secured accommodation for the pay clerks. To reduce the risk, that is, shorten the time span between receiving and payment of money, all these activities were undertaken immediately before discharge.

Another of the advance group's tasks was to identify proper pay-out facilities. While in many instances some structure was available and could be adapted, pay-out had to take place in the open air at several discharge points; thus, heavy rains at times interfered with the execution of the payout exercise.

Pay clerks consisted of UVAB staff and, on occasion, of staff from government agencies. All clerks had received training in paper handling and balancing procedures. No evidence of fraud occurred during the payment exercises, although some nominal amounts were missing after each phase, of which part was covered by insurance.

The design for phase I had not envisaged the use of army escorts to guard the veterans on their way home; thus, no prior preparations were undertaken to pay these escorts before leaving the discharge center. This failure, coupled with a shortage of pay clerks, led to delayed departures from the centers during the initial stages of
demobilization.

**Payment Procedures for the First Installment**

At the beginning of phase I, the first installment was set at USh 136,000 to be paid out by the pay clerk at the point of discharge. This, however, proved a cumbersome procedure as the cash package had to be counted, recounted, packed, and sealed for each veteran. Still during phase I, the first installment was, therefore, raised to USh 150,000, balanced against the second installment. This amendment allowed the use of bundled bank notes in larger denominations to be provided by the Bank of Uganda and UCB.

To discourage potential impostors, the certificate of service received a broad stamp with the date and amount paid at the first installment. No veteran could, consequently, claim this payment twice with the same discharge certificate. Still, UVAB had to pay the first installment to veterans on the basis of a certified list of soldiers provided by the NRA. In an event of an error, UVAB did not have the possibility to verify the list. Indeed, some veterans had their names missing on the payment schedules, causing undue delays until documentation was properly prepared.

Despite these problem areas, the first cash installment of phases I and II was provided to veterans with exceptional efficiency and control, given the logistical scope of the operation. Compared to the amount paid, the incidence of fraud (by a soldier or pay clerk) or unbalanced accounts was negligible, for example, five cases of impersonation occurred in phase I, only one in phase II.

**Procedures for the Payment of Subsequent Installments**

The most expedient and appropriate manner of effecting subsequent payments was through a veteran's bank account. On reporting to the DVPO, the veteran opened a bank account at the nearest UCB branch and conveyed the number to the DVPO who submitted all numbers to UVAB. UCB was chosen as it has the most dense network of branches in the country.

On receiving the account numbers of the veterans, UVAB transferred the money to the banks together with the payment lists, which were signed by the veterans as evidence that their accounts had been credited. The banks then submitted the signed payment lists to UVAB as proof of accountability. Otherwise, there was a danger that they would be able to debit a dead veteran's account and keep the money.

UVAB contracted the services of UCB and its branch offices to effect the second (and third) installment(s) to veterans. All payments, however, were controlled by UVAB and UCB's headquarters in Kampala. During the initial stages of the program, funds at local bank branches were frequently not available in sufficient quantity to ensure timely payment to veterans. Moreover, UCB did not provide UVAB with prompt returns of payments to veterans. These weaknesses have been corrected during the subsequent phases.

After the bank had credited the veterans' accounts (or prepared the drafts), it informed the DVPOs who in turn announced the news on the radio, inviting veterans to come to the office to collect the payment voucher for presentation at the bank. Out of a total of almost 23,000 phase I veterans, 118 never reported to their DVPO and, thus, never received their second and third installments. The reasons for these incidents are unknown but may include impersonation, sudden death on arrival in the village, mental illness, ignorance, or departure from the country. These veterans could never be traced.
The Veterans' Perception

The procedure of transferring money through bank accounts effectively reduced the risk of fraud. It also had the unanticipated consequence of providing veterans with simple education on money handling and banking and also on banking procedures. The veterans have not only learned how to open an account; many have also started to save money and receive interest. The payment of cash benefits through bank accounts can, thus, effectively contribute to rural capital formation.

Probably as a consequence of incomplete predischarge information, the procedure was, however, not appreciated by all veterans. For instance, many veterans felt that the additional signature was an unnecessary requirement. Others chose to withdraw, for various reasons, all the money credited to their accounts at once after deposit.

Illiterate veterans especially often did not understand bank procedures and found them intimidating. Neither could UCB staff speak the local language in many cases. Veterans, thus, closed their accounts if only to avoid the further humiliation of repeated visits to the bank. Other veterans, when living far away from the bank branch, had to incur substantial transport costs for contacting the bank. For them, closing the account meant that they could use their entitlements for the actually intended purposes rather than transport. In related cases, bank branches in remote areas suffered from liquidity problems when payment of a subsequent entitlement was due, but money had not yet been physically transported to the location. In more serious cases, lengthy delays of up to two weeks occurred for transferring funds to these branches.

Many veterans did not understand these necessary procedures, and some actually threatened the DVPO and the bank manager with violence. Mistrust was another reason for closing one's account: several veterans believed that government would monitor their account balances, and some, therefore, opened another account into which to deposit their money.

For the purpose of expediency, UVAB effected payments to veterans in the order of the demobilization of the various divisions. Consequently, in any one location, some veterans received their benefits sooner than others. This payment in clusters created problems for the DVPO in vindicating these seemingly unjustified delays in payment to veterans of other divisions.

Utilization of Cash Payments

The veterans allayed any fears regarding their spending behavior; most spent the money on goods of necessity or investment, even without appropriate counseling and guidance prior to discharge in phase I. The method of distributing benefits in several installments over a certain period of time has nonetheless proved advantageous, because veterans seem to have spent the money received after settlement more 'wisely.' A reason for this observation could be that—once being accustomed to civilian life—a veteran is better able to judge spending priorities.

Casualty veterans previously receiving treatment while in the army probably face the most serious problems after discharge. They received only little—in some cases token—support in meeting their health bills. Many had spent considerable amounts of their cash benefits on treatment and were extremely worried about their health situation after the depletion of the money.
A large percentage of the total funds distributed was spent in rural areas with positive multiplier effects. Many veterans supported the local economy even more by investing substantial parts of their cash benefits into income-generating activities such as beekeeping, carpentry, fish ponds, or agriculture. They thereby also accelerated the process of economic reintegration on their own initiative.

Problems frequently occurred when extended families expected veterans to share their benefits with them. In many instances, veterans were forced to use their cash benefits for such purposes, as for instance for the treatment of diseases or other exigencies of the extended family. This problem was especially acute in areas suffering from drought. The veteran's cash payments were then mostly used to pay for the food needs of the core and extended family. In still other instances, veterans had to pay for the funeral rites of deceased parents or the bride price for younger brothers.

Moreover, the substantial delay in the distribution of iron sheets forced many veterans to use their complementary cash entitlements (for poles, doors, and so on) for other, more pressing needs, such as renting a house. This has also meant that many veterans do not have the means to erect a house once they finally receive their iron sheets.

Issues and Problem Areas

A shortcoming of the uniform cash entitlement already identified at phase I appraisal was the variation in purchasing power throughout the country. For this basic needs package, veterans settling in urban areas with higher costs of living was on average at a disadvantage compared to the ones returning to their village; however, no complaints have been voiced by veterans about this issue, either because they were unaware of the problem or due to solidarity with their former comrades.

Health Care Support

Overall, the health status of veterans is poor. For this reason, the cash benefit included provisions for drugs and consultations for a period of six months after discharge; however, despite NRA's policy to not demobilize severe cases until a special program is put in place, several chronically ill or severely disabled veterans were among those to be demobilized, thus aggravating the need for health support.

While many of the veterans with poor health were prepared and able to cope with civilian life without medical assistance, chronically ill and disabled veterans in particular are less able to ensure an acceptable level of income that can sustain a family. Furthermore, besides being poor providers, the medical expenses they incur are a considerable burden on meager family resources. Consequently, the drop-out rate of children from school could be high, the nutritional status of the family could be poor, and the number of orphans could increase. They are, thus, in need of extended support, especially given the fact that they had received free treatment while in service. Such support is often available only in district hospitals or at Mulago, the national referral hospital; thus, the original design turned to NGOs for assistance.

Phase I—The Failure of the Community–Based Approach

Phase I involved a community–based approach to deal with this issue; it included support to strengthen community social services in those areas with the highest incidence of this special target group of chronically ill and disabled veterans. The design used a balanced approach and envisaged assisting local providers of health and social counseling as well as financial support to veterans and community members alike through grants to local NGOs and community–based groups working in these areas.
It was not implemented, however, because the funds made available were utilized to support UCOBAC as an initially unplanned component. UCOBAC itself was concerned with supporting women's groups in economic activities rather than counseling disabled, chronically ill, and maladjusted veterans. Veterans with severe health problems, thus, did not receive support during the first phase of demobilization.

**Phase II— The Enhanced Health Care Pilot Fund**

It became apparent during phase I implementation that health, particularly the incidence of HIV, posed the major individual threat to successful reintegration. Given a dearth of monitoring data, 3 percent of all veterans were assumed to be chronically ill or disabled; therefore, phase II included a pilot component targeted at this target group, applying retroactively to phase I veterans as well. They were assisted in securing access to medical care that could not be met locally by:

- Providing transportation to appropriate facilities for the veteran and one helper.
- Providing a daily expense allowance for the veteran and one helper while receiving treatment away from home.
- Covering those medical expenses (drugs, prostheses, and fees) that were not covered by the facility providing treatment.

Veterans of phase I had to contact their DVR or DVPO, whereas phase II veterans were identified during predischarge orientation, receiving appropriate medical records that he/she presented to the DVPO in his/her home district. Veterans whose medical condition predated discharge had first priority with respect to assistance; however, the DVPO, in consultation with the DVAC, was entitled to allocate unused funds in support of other chronically ill veterans.

**Procedure for the Pilot Health Care Fund**

Because district authorities were in the best position to assess the needs of veterans, the DVPO, assisted by a special committee of the DVAC, was given authority to administer 80 percent of the enhanced health care fund on a commitment basis while UVAB retained the remaining 20 percent as a reserve and for hardship cases. Funds were allocated to districts in proportion to the number of veterans in each district.

UVAB had to adjust the initially designed procedure because of the unexpectedly high number of applications. This procedure turned out to be somewhat lengthy but was, nonetheless, deemed appropriate for the purpose of the fund. It follows several clear-cut steps, including registration at the DVP office, examination by the DMO or his/her appointee, decision by the DVAC, payment to the veteran, and periodic medical review. A distinction was made between rejected, granted, pending, and hardship cases. The pending cases were entered on a waiting list with ranking numbers until further funds were available, hardship cases were handled directly by UVAB. For analyzing requests and authorizing disbursements for assistance to hardship cases, UVAB has set up a special health care committee.

The procedure caused some disagreement between DMOs on the hand and DVPOs and DVACs on the other. Some DMOs felt that their recommendations were conclusive without needing any further reexamination by the DVAC. Moreover, to discuss his/her findings in a meeting of district authorities was judged unethical; information pertaining to the illness of a veteran should have been kept confidential. This problem arose because the number of applications approved by the DMOs far outnumbered the funds available; thus, a priority list had to
There have been major delays in implementing this component even though there has been considerable demand at the community level. In fact, by January 1995 only 50 percent of the fund had been transferred to the districts against applications received. These delays can be attributed to the late availability of donor funds and the inactivity of some DVPOs and DVACs. As accountability for payments made by the DVPOs to veterans has in many cases not been received by UVAB, the district funds have not been replenished. Other applicants, therefore, suffer unnecessary delays.

The health care benefit also suffers from various accountability problems. Some records are incomplete and in some aspects conflicting. Until the end of May 1995, 1,481 veterans had benefited from this component in twenty-four districts. (Data for the other fourteen districts are not available.) It is, therefore, not possible to state with certainty whether or not this component is free from malpractice.

The Ambiguity of the Pilot Health Approach

The response to this component was overwhelming, more than confirming the appropriateness of the intervention; however, phase II monitoring data suggest that the target group comprises close to 15 percent rather then the assumed 3 percent. The pilot fund was, thus, far too small to address actual needs. This shortage was aggravated as various cost items for its proper administration, especially the DMO's examination fee of around USh 5,000 per visit and DVAC special sitting allowances, had not been included in the phase II budget. As these unexpected expenses had to be borne by UVAP, the amount left for supporting veterans was further reduced.

Many veterans received only token financial support for the treatment of their illness or disability. More serious was the fact that not all those veterans in need received assistance, because many of them were unable to even contact the DVPO and DMO. Evidently, those who managed to reach the DVPO's office were not necessarily the most needy. Although this lack of mobility regarding hardship cases was known from the phase I experience, phase II did not correct this shortcoming.

As it turned out, while the general health situation was poor, the number of veterans with disabilities was low in several districts. Also, it was often difficult to establish whether an illness had been acquired before or after discharge; thus, district authorities decided to support not only the severely disabled and chronically ill who had been discharged on medical grounds but also those with other illnesses, including AIDS, who were applying to receive support from the enhanced health care fund. This practice in fact contributed to the problem of underfunding: the target group had deliberately been widened because of the dire situation of those who had not been included initially.

Based on NRA medical reports, an estimated 8 percent of phase II veterans were discharged due to mental disorders. While the community support fund of phase I would have made provisions to support this most vulnerable group, phase II did not include assistance to them, their families, or communities. It would be the responsibility of the DVPOs to counsel mentally ill veterans, although they have not received any special training. The failure to provide assistance to this group is one of UVAP's main weaknesses in the provision of health assistance.

Phase III—
Enhancements Toward Wider Coverage

Learning from the shortcomings of phase II, the phase III design features several substantial improvements. They are based on the conviction that poor health is a major negative factor affecting individual reintegration as well as
the overall program. Phase III widens access to health benefits for veterans and indirectly for family members.

Retroactively, UVAP extends health care support to 15 percent of demobilized soldiers; thus, all disabled and chronically ill veterans will obtain medical treatment to enable them to regain their productivity without diverting finances from other family needs. Again, phase III covers expenses for transportation to the facility, daily expenses while away from home, and medical expenses (drugs, prostheses, fees, and physiotherapy).

Recognizing that the severely disabled veterans as the initial target group did not receive appropriate support, phase III introduced a subcomponent targeting the most vulnerable veterans. One hundred severely disabled veterans (amputees and those with other major disabilities) demobilized from Mubende Casualty Unit are to be assisted by a specialized program. This program will include (a) the provision of prostheses, fitting and refitting, physiotherapy, and surgery as needed and (b) two-month training courses in such professions as tailoring, weaving, souvenir manufacturing, bookkeeping, and typing.

While not receiving direct health care support, the (main) spouse of a disabled, chronically ill or deceased veteran will receive preferential access to and extended assistance from UVAP's education and training component. These measures will improve the income-earning potential of the affected family.

No alterations were made regarding the administration of the fund: the DVPOs administer 80 percent, UVAB retains 20 percent as a reserve and for hardship cases; funds for the Mubende Casualty Unit will be allocated to the NGO winning the tender. Again, veterans will be identified during predischarge orientation. Phase I and II veterans can make applications for support directly to their DVPO through the established procedures. Phase III also includes cost allocations to cover expenses for DMO examinations and DVAC meetings. In the event of continuing funding constraints, allocations will be prioritized according to the veteran's potential for future income generation.

**Issues**

In many instances, veterans complained that health support should also be extended to their wives and children because the NRA had provided free treatment for them as well. While this was recognized as an issue during phase III deliberations, budget constraints prevented the inclusion of family members in the health care fund.

AIDS is one of the biggest problems facing a veteran's family on return to the community; thus, predischarge counseling and orientation devotes an entire module to this issue; however, no special AIDS program has been included in phase III for three reasons: first, it would be difficult to reach such a dispersed target group in an equitable manner; second, there is no need to launch yet another vertical initiative; and third, the costs of an enhanced AIDS program would have been beyond the expected funding envelope.

**Education Support for Children**

Given expenditure patterns of Uganda's poor households, children are probably the most vulnerable member in times of economic and social hardship. Recognizing this predicament, UVAP addressed a crucial issue in a child's development from the outset: education. Since the child of a soldier receives free education, all three phases included financial support to a veteran's child(ren) to increase school attendance and mitigate the immediate impact on a veteran's scarce budget.

According to the baseline survey, a veteran had on average two children of primary school age; thus, every phase I veteran received on average USh 26,324, or USh 13,162 per child as contribution to the child(ren)'s PTA or school fees for a period of one year after discharge. In subsequent phases, this contribution was raised to USh 18,250 and USh 23,250 per child to compensate for increases in fees. Each veteran would receive the
standardized rate for each child while a veteran without children would receive nothing.

Due to improved monitoring, more accurate data on the number of children became available with phase II. As a result, the average number of children per veteran supported by the program was raised to 2.5 in phase III. This increase is expected to counter any possible discrimination against female children.

**Administrative Arrangements and Their Weaknesses**

During phase I, each head of a school compiled a list of veterans' children at the school, which was then submitted to the DEO for onward transmission to the DVPO. A number of anomalies occurred and, consequently, UVAB introduced several control procedures.

During phase II predischarge, veterans with children provided information on their children, especially their number, age, and sex. This information was later made available to the DVPO who checked a veteran's application against the initial data. He/she then proceeded to process the application, verifying through the DEO that the child is actually enrolled at the particular school. Each school head then had to sign documents for children enrolled at the school. Thereafter, the DVPO submitted a list to UVAB for transferring funds. On receipt, the school head signed another document for contributions received. Finally, the DVPO sent this document to UVAB as proof of accountability for the funds remitted.

These procedures for administering the children's education fund during phases I and II were chosen for reasons of accountability. Over time, however, they proved cumbersome and, in the end, quite ineffective. In phase III, therefore, UVAB will explore options that will enable DVPOs to disburse education funds more speedily through the regular channels of the Ministry of Education.

By the end of phase I, only 24,138 children had received support, an estimated 65 percent of the total, because UVAB decided to pay each veteran with two or more children the flat amount of continue 14 These amounts were calculated as an average of fees for primary levels P1P4 and P5P7, with the average veteran having one child in each category.

USh 26,324, irrespective of the actual number of children; thus, up to 14,000 children remained unassisted while substantial funds remained unspent at the end of phase I.

While in essence identical to phase I, the second round of demobilization envisaged the coverage of all children, including the retroactive coverage of the unassisted children of phase I for reasons of fairness; however, UVAB encountered a number of nonreconcilable problems in the implementation of this approach. At the beginning, phase I veterans believed that only phase II veterans would receive full coverage and expressed dissatisfaction with this alleged injustice. Moreover, when registering their unassisted children, UVAB would not have been in a position to prove whether these were actually the veteran's biological children, given the lack of accurate data in phase I. In discussions with DVPOs it was, thus, finally decided to support a maximum of two children per veteran in phase II as well. To decide on the remaining balance, UVAB set up an ad hoc committee that allocated the funds among hardship cases in phases I and II.

In both phases, DVPOs received the funds earmarked for the component late in the process, leading to quite substantial delays in the registration of children at the DVP office. Consequently, many children were not able to continue with schooling immediately after their father's/mother's discharge because they could not be registered in a school before the beginning of the next school year. Others were dismissed when the fees remained unpaid after a prolonged period of time. In other instances, children were not allowed to sit for examinations because of the delay in transferring school fees.
In the early stages of demobilization, confusion also arose about the procedures for registering a child at a school and disbursing funds to that school. In several cases, school heads returned money because a child was not actually enrolled. In other instances they failed to collect checks from the DVPO, other checks were collected but never presented to the bank, or schools did not have bank accounts. In still other cases insecurity in the area contributed to the underutilization of the component; children were simply not sent to school.

**Shortcomings and Constraints**

Contributions to school and PTA fees, although alleviating scarce family resources, did not cover a child's educational needs, especially in the urban areas. For instance, expenses for school uniforms and books and pencils still had to be borne by the veteran. At UVAP's inception, it was assumed that the Ministry of Defense would extend its arrangements of providing these items as well. This, however, did not happen.

On returning to their villages, many veterans acquired responsibility for caring and feeding a substantial number of orphans. These veterans felt that orphans should be supported as well. Other veterans wanted the fees to be paid for the full primary school cycle. This additional drain on family finances was acknowledged early in the process but its tremendous cost implications prevented the inclusion of orphans in the program. Although desirable, the design of phase III, for budgetary reasons did not include the extension of PTA funding for a second year either to female veterans or to families in which the veteran is chronically ill or has died.

Some evidence suggests that during phases I and II, girls were discriminated against for receiving PTA fees, in particular when they competed with more than one boy child. The provision of supporting all children in phase III is expected to counteract any possible discrimination. Overall, continue

the above weaknesses cannot be attributed to incomplete design but rather to funding availability. Indeed, veterans generally appreciated the intervention and its rationale.

**Housing Support**

While a member of the army, a soldier receives free housing for himself/herself and his/her family. Clearly, he/she would lose this entitlement on demobilization; hence, the following assistance was rendered to a veteran for erecting a simple house: twenty galvanized corrugated iron (GCI) sheets and five GCI ridges in kind as well as in–cash contributions for the purchase of poles, doors, windows, nails, vents, and skilled labor.

In fact, it was initially contemplated to provide veterans with a total cash package to reduce the logistical and transaction costs of procuring, storing, transporting, and distributing such large numbers of iron sheets and ridges; however, one donor willing to entirely support this component could only contribute to the program through commodity provisions; therefore, the provision of iron sheets to veterans was included as an in–kind benefit.

Concern was expressed prior to phase I demobilization that the import of around 450,000 iron sheets (equivalent to about three months' domestic production) would flood the market if a significant number of veterans decided to sell them for whatever reason. Such actions, it was feared, might cause marketing problems for domestic producers if veterans accept lower than the prevailing market prices. While many veterans indeed sold their iron sheets, their distribution across the country seems to have had little influence on the price structure.

**Administrative Arrangements**

UVAB provided transport of the sheets and ridges to district headquarters. From this location, veterans had to find their own means of transport to the village. As veterans had to incur fairly substantial expenses for this transport, UVAB attempted to make arrangements, for example, the provision of fuel and coverage of handling costs of a
vehicle, to have the sheets and ridges transported at least to county headquarters. Alas, the tremendous financial implications of this additional benefit for the overall budget precluded such assistance in any of the phases.

Capacity in the districts proved adequate to administer this benefit. The DVPOs rented storage facilities for the iron sheets and made logistical arrangements for their distribution. When the iron sheets arrived at the district storage, they were unloaded in the presence of the DVPO who counted them one by one as they entered the store; he/she was responsible for any miscounting. The DVPO then hired guards to protect the store day and night and announced on the radio that the iron sheets had arrived and were ready for pick-up.

The veterans were supposed to arrive at the store at different times according to a distribution program drawn up by the DVPOs. Unfortunately, veterans received the message at different times and, thus, flocked to the stores in large numbers instead of following the program. A veteran then presented the discharge certificate to the DVPO who issued the sheets, stamped the certificate and wrote a receipt. Only in rare instances was an entitlement handed over to a veteran twice when the DVPO had forgotten to stamp the discharge certificate. Later, most DVPOs with large numbers of veterans drew up timetables to handle one county at a time, and the whole exercise became more efficient.

**Procurement Deficiencies and Their Effects**

In phase I, it had also initially been envisaged to employ local competitive bidding for what were to be numerous but small procurement packages. Moreover, it had been intended to extend existing contracts where feasible to procure the building materials for quick delivery. USAID, however, pledged an in-kind provision of a final total of 372,924 iron sheets and 90,146 ridges. Pledged in the autumn of 1992, actual delivery took place between September and December 1993. Part of the shipment was damaged and UVAB funded the purchase of 25,000 sheets locally. Another 76,175 sheets were imported to cover the remaining difference.

Phase II procurement experienced similar delays, this time due to the late arrival of funds and due to the procurement procedures. After reviewing the bids submitted on the tender opened by UVAB, the Central Tender Board (CTB) did not award the contract to the lowest bidder. This decision did not follow the procedures used by the Bank for awarding contracts. The Bank then suggested that the lowest bidder be chosen, a proposal that was not accepted by the CTB. Consequently, a new tender had to be called. Further delays occurred because of technical problems between the importers of the iron sheets and their bankers. The iron sheets for phase II veterans were finally delivered in the summer of 1995. In phase III, the expeditious provision of iron sheets was to be facilitated through a flexible trust fund arrangement, allowing for the procurement of sheets from nearby providers.

Ideally, veterans would receive the in-kind housing benefits immediately after returning to the community. Only then would they be able to make full use of this component. Until the house was built, a period of maybe one to three months, they were expected to stay with relatives or friends. As a result of these delays, however, many veterans did not have adequate shelter for a prolonged period of time after arrival, although few veterans were actually homeless two to three months after discharge.

Given the housing conditions in rural Uganda, living with relatives can be expected to lead to overcrowding, difficult living conditions, and high pressure on facilities. More important, it can also negatively affect health, increase social stress for the veteran's family and relatives, and put additional strain on social reintegration. Another unpleasant side effect could be observed in a few towns: rents increased because of a sudden increase in housing demand induced by veterans.

Because in-kind and cash benefits were not provided at the same time, in fact more than one year apart, many veterans were not able to save the cash components until the sheets arrived. For that reason, evidence from several
districts suggests that more than half of all veterans stored their sheets for later use while another quarter had sold them. Only around a fifth of the veterans actually used them for building a house. Veterans sold their sheets for several reasons: to buy a house, to invest in a commercial enterprise, to buy food or land, or to migrate. Veterans who store their sheets comment that they do not have the necessary resources to put up a shelter as they had used their cash component to cover more immediate family needs. They intend to keep them for later use.

A Brief Assessment

Clearly, the inefficiency in the delivery of the GCI sheets was the single most important deficiency in the implementation of the program. For many veterans, the slow disbursement of iron sheets was a major factor constraining their reintegration. For phase III, therefore, an extension of the contract with the suppliers of iron sheets was considered for purposes of expediency; however, considering the unprecedented delays and high transaction costs, it was finally decided to monetize the housing support component. This decision was welcomed by the veterans who found it easier to administer the money to cater to their needs. 

The logistical planning and implementation of the distribution of 5,000 tons of iron sheets to thirtyeight districts within a relatively short period of time during phase I, however, can be considered as an outstanding accomplishment by UVAB and the transport companies.

15 Nevertheless, for phase I and II, veterans' iron sheets served the important function of a tangible but tradable asset that improved a veteran's economic status. Iron sheets were often perceived as a symbol of the government's recognition of their services in the NRA. On the other hand, in areas prone to insurgency and continued armed conflict, especially in the northern region, veterans also felt vulnerable to persecution as they can easily be identified by their new roofing sheets.

5— Augmenting Reintegration

The Uganda Veterans Assistance Program was from the outset designed as a short–term intervention following the demobilization of soldiers from the National Resistance Army. As such its major components relate to demobilization and reinsertion. Nevertheless, it was also clear from the beginning that UVAP's real measure of success was the successful reintegration of veterans into a civilian environment.

Acknowledging this challenge, issues of reintegration have been progressively addressed in UVAP's later phases, balancing (a) the need for targeted support, (b) the danger of creating a dependency syndrome among veterans, (c) the envy of communities when singling out veterans, and (d) availability of financial resources. These issues were placed against the needs of veterans and their spouses for skills development, information and counseling, access to income–earning opportunities (including land and credit), and acceptance by the community. Consequently, phase III included components for most of these needs.

The provision of access to credit and employment opportunities is highly cost–intensive and requires skills other than those available at UVAB. They have, therefore, not been directly included in any of the phases but are key features accompanying assistance from bilateral donors (although veterans are provided with information on where projects are located and how they can be accessed). Despite the fact that the majority of veterans returned to the rural areas, the problem of landlessness remains spatially limited and is dealt with on an ad hoc basis whenever a need arises; thus, UVAP did not make any provisions for allocating land to veterans.
Economic Reintegration

Although designed as a demobilization program, UVAP increasingly emphasized measures to support the economic reintegration of veterans, among them education and training, counseling, and support to employment and self–employment. These issues have been covered to various degrees during the three phases.

Education and Training Support

Although the veterans’ lack of education and skills was known from the initial baseline survey, no specific support was envisaged to improve their skills during phase I. As had to be expected, phase I veterans found economic reintegration extremely difficult. Many veterans, thus, requested assistance in covering costs for formal and informal education and skills training. On a pilot basis, therefore, phase II included a retroactive enhanced education and training fund. Reflecting the diverse needs of the beneficiaries, the fund enabled a veteran to:

• Continue with formal education for veterans with at least O–level education (20\% of fund allocation)

• Visit a vocational training institution for courses of varying length as well as appropriate short courses (50\%–60\% of fund allocation)

• Participate in individual or group training for on–the–job training and advice by master craftsmen, usually lasting for about one to six months (20\% of fund allocation).

The fund followed a demand–driven approach, whereby veterans could choose the type of training they were interested in. On the basis of unit costs for the individual subcomponents, the fund provided access to some 3 percent of phases I and II veterans combined.

Implementation of the Fund

Funds were allocated to districts in proportion to the number of veterans in each district. The DVPOs, assisted by the DVR, DEO, and DVAC members as required, administered 80 percent of the education and training funds while UVAB kept the remaining 20 percent as a reserve and for hardship cases. Veterans could apply through the DVR or directly to the DVPO.

UVAB developed guidelines for the selection of applicants and established mechanisms for monitoring the award of scholarships by district officials, paying particular attention to the proportions of scholarships awarded in each of the three categories in each district. At the beginning of 1994, DVPOs also conducted a survey of the existing vocational training institutions in their districts, providing UVAB with up–to–date information about the institution, the nature of courses offered, and their duration and cost.

The procedures for the three subfunds worked well. The DVPO, assisted by the DVR and DEO or his/her appointee, assessed the individual needs of veterans who had applied for either of the subfunds for assistance. Subsequently, they identified the type and cost of training in relation to the needs and qualifications of the applicants. In the case of formal education and vocational training, veterans then approached a school or institution, which in turn informed the DVPO in writing about their acceptance. For group training, master craftsmen were also identified by the DVPO (or RC officials for veterans living far away from the DVP office). Lastly, the DVPO, DVR, and DEO or his/her appointee awarded the scholarships from among the applications received.

Numerous institutions contacted declined to admit veterans because many of them did not meet the minimum requirements of formal education. In one district, the DVPO started an initiative to draw up an additional scheme
whereby the remaining funds are used to set up a vocational training institution where local artisans would be trained to train veterans with disadvantaged academic backgrounds. Part of the fund would be used to buy training equipment, tools, and training materials. UVAB also initiated group training courses in areas of high economic impact; thus, courses in animal draft power technology and sericulture were undertaken successfully.

**Problems and Impact**

Overall, preliminary information suggests that demand exceeds supply by a factor of 2.5. By the end of May 1995, a total of 1,361 veterans had benefited in all the three categories of training. District results appear rather ambiguous. While in several districts, demand for the use of this fund outstripped supply, veterans showed little interest in other districts. Moreover, nine DVPOs have not submitted detailed information on payments and beneficiaries.

As a serious side effect of the excess demand and the ensuing lack of funding from headquarters, a number of DVPOs ceased forwarding applications to UVAB and discouraged further applications.

In several districts, DVPOs instituted a 10 percent contribution from veterans to ensure that they were genuinely interested in the training. This approach might have actually worked too efficiently, barring even interested veterans from access to the education and training fund. In other cases, veterans living far away from the district headquarters found it difficult to approach the DVPO or identify a training institution.

The formal education subfund was used the least, mostly because of the low level of education among veterans. The other two, vocational training and group training, proved popular among the veterans with the subfund for marketable skills (vocational training) attracting the most attention. The group training approach also provided several distinct advantages. Trainees are in close contact with their master craftsman, have easy access to tools and other equipment, and have a good chance of being employed by a craftsman after termination of the program.

As many training courses did not start before 1995, no impact can yet be identified. Anecdotal evidence suggests, however, that many veterans have been able to market their newly acquired skills successfully, that is, they subsequently secured employment or were otherwise able to sustain themselves. A number of veterans, on the other hand, felt constrained by a lack of follow–up opportunities and start–up capital. Moreover, many young veterans were critical of the fact that the promised training was not being delivered effectively, that is, that, although having applied, they were not awarded a training opportunity. To them, lack of skills poses a particular constraint to economic reintegration.

Several veterans expressed dissatisfaction with the education and training fund as it would not impart adequate technical skills. They also claimed that the program did not enhance or utilize skills that veterans had acquired while in the army. In individual cases, a veteran can easily feel ill prepared for gainful activities despite the training received; however, due to the demand–driven approach, veterans were free to choose their own type of training. Inadequacy of the courses is the responsibility of the training providers, not of UVAB.

**Modifications of Phase III**

The design of phase II was by and large carried over to phase III; for example, the implementation procedure remained unchanged. Nonetheless, several modifications have been added to adapt the fund to the demand structure. Most important, the planning parameter for funding this component was increased to an application rate of 10 percent of phase III veterans. Phase III will also retroactively finance the excess demand from phases I and II. Based on the application figures of phase II, phase III also alters the allocations per subfund: 15 percent of the fund will be made available for formal education, 50 percent for vocational training, and 35 percent for group training.
It seems that female veterans were disadvantaged in the approval procedure of phase II. As a result, *preferential access* to the fund will be granted to female veterans. Furthermore, one wife of a disabled, chronically ill, or deceased veteran will also have preferred access to enable families in which a veteran is unable to earn an income to develop an income-generating activity. UVAB will also explore options for making vocational training more accessible and sensitive to the needs of female veterans.

The need of beneficiaries from the vocational and group training courses to have access to capital for basic tools, for example, was recognized during the design stage but could not be addressed due to funding implications. Veterans are explicitly encouraged to consult with the respective DVPO and DVR for *information on local credit schemes and microproject funds* and to seek advice on how to apply for these programs.

**Information and Counseling Support**

Providing information to veterans about the program components and counseling them on problems or procedures has always been an explicit aim of UVAP; however, the approach chosen during phase I proved too feeble prior to discharge and too ambitious after discharge. Learning from these mistakes, improvements in UVAP's phases II and III were particularly strong for this component.

**Phase I—The Laissez-Faire Approach**

The basic philosophy of phase I was that veterans would be able to handle their own subsistence needs after the six-month reinsertion period. To this end, they would receive some orientation prior to discharge. After resettlement, DVPOs were given the mandate and some limited training to provide advisory and counseling services on request and monitor the utilization of the entitlements provided. To further buttress their support role, NGOs were expected to provide additional specialized social services to disabled veterans and those with severe medical and social problems, a component that never fully materialized.

Apart from these general guidelines, counseling did not receive explicit attention in program design, nor was it sufficiently offered at the district level. Clearly, the sheer magnitude of demobilizing close to 23,000 soldiers, an unprecedented undertaking in the country, required that all attention was focused on its smooth operation. 'Soft' issues were—lamentably but legitimately—accorded fewer resources. Consequently, many veterans complained that—because there had not been any research on how to invest one's money—they had to use it for consumption purposes only. They felt that their day-to-day needs had been neglected.

**Phase II—Corrective Actions**

Supplementing what had been provided during the predischarge orientation, the DVPOs were given more responsibility for actively counseling veterans on their arrival in the district. Counseling at this stage included information on available job opportunities and income-generating activities, for example, to produce charcoal irons instead of electrical irons—as planned by a group of veterans—because there was no electricity in many rural homes. To strengthen these messages, DVPOs set up a *directory of NGOs* in their districts to be able to advise on financial non-UVAP reintegration support. They also provided counseling on health issues as many veterans did not know where to go for free health services or paid health services at a fee they could afford. In addition, the veterans were advised about existing civilian administrative structures, for example, existing hierarchies of authorities or appeal systems at the various RC levels. The average time that was available for counseling each veteran was about twenty minutes.

To enable the DVPO to offer (quasi-) professional counseling, UVAB organized special training sessions. This training, however, focused more often than not on administration and...
implementation procedures, considering the immediate training needs for successful program execution but leaving too little time to enhance a DVPO's counseling skills.

At the district level, quality and extent of counseling have been dependent on the commitment, skills, experience, and availability of the respective DVPO. Given that phase II counseling was intended to address the vital needs of reintegration, the lack of counseling skills must be considered a serious institutional shortcoming. Indeed, many DVPO qualified as counselors only insofar as their stock of general knowledge and human relations skills was greater than that of the average veteran.

Phase III — A Holistic Attempt

The demobilization program has effectively returned more than 32,000 veterans and their families to their communities and the DVPOs have played a substantial part in this achievement. They are on average working hard to make the program a success. But they are still ill prepared to provide veterans with effective advice, even though many of the problems veterans face can quite easily be ameliorated through more active counseling and community intermediation.

Acknowledging these shortcomings, phase III includes additional training for DVPOs, DVRs, and SVRs in social and gender counseling, microproject preparation and management, and business administration. DVPOs and DVRs will also finally become explicit links between veteran families and the many broader ongoing poverty programs, an area where coordination has thus far been conspicuously lacking. It will be their task to promote the access of veterans' families to such schemes. Phase III will also extend and deepen the network among veterans themselves to enable them to develop indigenous support networks (social capital) and, thus, become the principal agents of change. These modifications will put DVPOs and DVRs in a more appropriate position to assist veterans' families more effectively in their struggle for social and economic reintegration.

To substantiate these efforts, DVPOs will routinely (e.g., monthly) update the information of the NGO directory at the district level, including details on location, sector, target group, type of support, and application procedures. The DVPO will continuously make the DVR and the subcounty representatives aware of existing and newly arising opportunities for regular communication to the veterans and their spouses. Simultaneously, countering various incidences of discrimination, UVAB and DVPOs will sensitize project promoters as well as local and central authorities to allow veterans to apply for loans on an equal basis with civilians.

Support to Employment and Economic Activities

Despite its extension to several reintegration initiatives, providing funds for employment or projects of veterans and their spouses is beyond the scope of UVAP. Nonetheless, it is evident from program monitoring and evaluation that veterans are in need of economic support.

Constraints and Needs

Many veterans suffer from a shortage of capital. Even if pooled in groups, the cash entitlements do not suffice when other, more immediate needs have to be met. Many promising income-generating activities have failed because of lack of funds to overcome the first critical phase. The use of credit has, therefore, often been on the agenda of discussions between veterans and UVAB staff. DVPOs advise veterans that there are principally two options to receive additional funds: existing projects and formal credit. Neither option is without problems.
Promoters often deliberately excluded veterans from accessing a project on the grounds of lack of skills or unwarranted fears regarding a lack of discipline. Others do not want to single out veterans as a target group and wish to avoid friction within the community. At the same time, the current credit system appears ill suited to meet the needs of small would-be entrepreneurs. UCB, with the densest web of branches across the country, offers loans to small enterprises; however, a prerequisite for these loans is collateral that many veterans cannot provide. Often, veterans are ignorant about modern banking facilities and shy away from the lengthy procedures of the formal system.

Attempts to Fill the Gap between Demobilization and Reintegration

Several parallel activities, financed by government and multilateral and bilateral donors alike, are being undertaken to cater to the veterans' income-earning needs. Some of them are ongoing activities and are being restructured to accommodate the needs of UVAP's target group. Others have been initiated for the particular support of veterans and civilians. Most of these activities have only recently started. It is, therefore, not possible to identify any implementation-related problems or the impact of these activities on veterans and their wives. The most noteworthy of these initiatives are briefly outlined below.

Government of Uganda: Entandikwa Scheme

The Entandikwa scheme was initiated by the government in 1994 and became operational in early 1995. The scheme is funded by government in the amount of USh 6 billion (about US$6.7 million) during 1994-95. It intends to improve the socioeconomic well-being of Uganda's poor population in both rural and urban areas by promoting and strengthening the productive capacity of microenterprises, savings for future investments, and institution building at the grassroots level through the provision of credit. The scheme's target group is that section of the population that cannot otherwise obtain credit from the formal credit system; thus, poor veterans will also qualify for support. The Entandikwa scheme will operate in all counties of the country.

At the local level, NGOs perform the role of implementing agencies. They will appraise projects identified by beneficiaries—these projects should have short maturity periods—and ensure that those that are approved are viable in the long term. NGOs will also provide training to successful applicants to enhance their projects' efficiency. Loans, for which a declining rate of interest of initially 12 percent will be charged can be extended to both groups and individuals, although the former option is preferred to increase the multiplier effect. Per county, at least 30 percent of project funds will be granted to women and youth.

International Development Association: Community Action Program

The Community Action Program (CAP) is part of the Bank's Northern Uganda Reconstruction Program and aims at improving the social and economic conditions in the West Nile region (three districts), more specifically the improvement of local capacities, economic and social infrastructure, and the economic status of the poor, especially women. The CAP provides credit and institutional support to beneficiaries through local indigenous (formal and informal) organizations. The fund allocated to the credit scheme is not strictly determined but will probably reach US$1 million with an average of US$500 per group/project.

The credit fund follows several criteria: projects receive priority when they are technically and economically viable, are based on local initiative, support women, and protect the environment. The fund uses various forms of collateral as fixed deposits or group guarantees; interest is charged at market rates. The CAP has been in operation for a number of years and is now slowly opening up access to veterans and their wives.

African Development Bank: Poverty Alleviation Project
The Poverty Alleviation Project (PAP) is one of the farthest-reaching project initiatives to support veterans and retrenched civil servants and other vulnerable population groups, especially war widows and orphans. They are assisted in their fight against poverty by the PAP's credit scheme, which provides support of up to US$10,000 at unsubsidized interest rates on the basis of the following: peer pressure, savings, or assets. The PAP has been operational since late 1994, will cover all districts (initially twenty-two), be in operation for four years, and amount to US$8.5 million.

Apart from the credit scheme as its major component, the PAP contains other supporting features: it helps beneficiaries set up economically viable and employment–generating microprojects, it provides technical assistance (including vocational training and institutional support), it makes available market information to beneficiaries to enable the organized marketing of their produce, and it creates a revolving fund for sustaining the credit facility. The PAP will finance projects in a range of sectors, including farming, carpentry, tailoring, baking, and milling. These projects should have short gestation periods of fewer than twelve months; loan repayment will start after the maturity of the project.

UVAB has already closely cooperated with the PAP to develop proformas and questionnaires for readily understandable loan applications for income–generating microprojects. PAP staff also participated as instructors in UVAB's training seminars for DVPOs and DVRs. The PAP is expected to become an important complementary project to UVAP.

European Development Fund: Microprojects Program

The European Community sponsors four microproject funds for a total of US$11.4 million, covering twenty-three districts. These assist individuals and communities in realizing local objectives, developing project planning and implementation capacity, and developing essential infrastructure as well as supporting income–generating activities at the grassroots and the establishment of sustainable credit delivery mechanisms. Individuals and communities have access to the funds if the project is a local initiative and locally implemented, includes local contributions, and is economically and socially viable, monitorable, and secured (depending on the borrower).

Funds are loaned at interest rates of between 2 percent and 12 percent, depending on the project, and largely provided in kind. No fixed loan period is established; that depends on the project's cash flow projections. Maximum loan amounts range from US$20,000 (for small–scale rural farmers) to US$200,000 for private small– and medium–sized entrepreneurs. The microproject funds specifically target areas of low economic development. Veterans in these districts should have ready access to them.

Usaid: Uganda Demobilization and Reintegration Project

USAID supports the reintegration of veterans with an agricultural technology and credit program for US$1 million (the agreement was signed in August 1994) and has already identified further interventions benefitting veterans. The agricultural technology and credit program is located in five districts in the north central region and is expected to reach around 2,000 beneficiaries. It will be implemented by two NGOs as well as the National Research Organization (NARO) and contains four components: an oxen–plowing and matching grant program (together US$550,000), multiplication and distribution of seeds and plant stock (US$150,000), and oilseed presses (US$270,000) as well as monitoring and auditing (US$30,000). Each component is open to a small group of villagers as well to avoid envy among the civilian population.

The oxen–plowing components will provide training as well as oxen and animal traction implements to small groups of farmers at subsidized prices or on favorable credit terms. A small group will also be trained in how to
produce carts or plows to increase the local availability of implements. The matching grant program is designed to support viable agricultural activities with a grant fund that will have to be matched by groups receiving a grant. The grant fund will be used for a wide range of activities, for example, the construction of on-farm storage facilities, the marketing of produce, or the development of communal wood lots.

The multiplication component will produce and distribute—at production cost—sorghum, millet, soybean, and mosaic-resistant cassava seeds. It will be accompanied by the cultivation of demonstration plots in villages where veterans reside. Lastly, hand-operated oilseed presses will be provided at manufacturing cost on a credit basis. The size of the presses will be such that they can be easily operated by both women and men. In addition, high-oil-content sunflower seeds will be provided; thus, farm enterprises for producing, processing, and marketing sunflower oil will be promoted. Participants in this component will also receive training in maintaining and operating the presses.

Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KfW, Germany): Feeder Roads Project

At UVAP’s inception, the Federal Republic of Germany had pledged special financial assistance toward reintegration measures. After long deliberations and a number of Ugandan proposals, a consensus was reached in December 1993 to establish a training and labor fund for mixed groups of veterans and civilians participating in feeder road improvement projects in ten districts in eastern Uganda. All financial arrangements and working procedures were worked out and signed by 1994 by Germany and the Ministry of Local Government, the Ugandan counterpart to the project. The two-year project, which is executed by a special implementing unit, started in early 1995.

The ‘reintegration of veterans’ project will first provide technical education and on-the-job training for one hundred veterans and civilians who are capable of supervising road works. This initial phase will last for up to one year and will be undertaken in one district center. Subsequently, the activities will spread throughout the ten districts. Around 1,500 workers will be employed to improve an estimated 600 kilometers of feeder roads. The total project cost is DM 5 million (about US$3.3 million).

Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany: Operation Burial

The human disaster in Rwanda in April 1994 brought up a new facet of veterans’ group formation. Decomposing bodies floating in Lake Victoria posed a high risk to the health of the surrounding communities. Following a request from the German Ambassador and later the Lutheran World Foundation, UVAB, through the DVPOs and DVRs in the areas affected, mobilized veterans to collect floating bodies and exhume those buried in shallow graves near the water level or on shore and transfer them to higher ground. During this exercise, local coordination was undertaken with close cooperation among the DVPO, NGOs, and local authorities. The total cost of the operation amounted to USh 14.3 million.

Following the call by the DVPO, DVR, and SVRs, 200 veterans reported on a voluntary basis of whom eighty were deployed immediately. They were divided into eight groups of ten and received necessary tools and protective equipment, which they could later keep (boots, gloves, and shovel). Moreover, they received a remuneration of between USh 5,000 and USh 8,000 per day, commensurate with rates paid by NGOs. Each group stayed at the site for seven to ten days. Afterwards, the team was transported back to the point of departure.

Operation Burial demonstrated that veterans as a group are easy to mobilize and organize for this type of emergency operation. They are used to working in a hierarchic system and are willing to carry out difficult tasks. Although such short-term employment may create income, veterans regard their participation as a contribution toward fostering national development and helping communities. Indeed, this experience has encouraged the Board to consider proposing to the government the creation of a Special Relief Unit to address emergency
situations.

A Synopsis of Reintegration Support

The majority of these parallel reintegration programs focuses on the provision of capital through small credit schemes or direct grants. The total estimated amount is some US$30 million for veterans and other beneficiaries. The Bank is simultaneously working on restructuring the operations of the financial sector, notably regarding the provision of rural credit. These parallel activities will provide essential complementary support for the economic reintegration endeavors of veterans.

The Role of UVAB

Once it became clear that demobilization was working smoothly, UVAB concentrated on designing several reintegration initiatives during phase II. These included (a) structured vocational training, extending UVAP's limited pilot fund, (b) a credit and grant scheme for assisting veterans and civilians in the establishment of income-generating activities, and (c) provision of support to continue disabled veterans. Although these were issues pertinent to the long-term reintegration of veterans, UVAB's institutional capacity was too restricted to allow for the implementation of such elaborate initiatives.

UVAB's current role in reintegration, thus, is basically limited to that of facilitator, negotiating with promoters and assisting them in identifying appropriate projects for UVAB's target groups. On one occasion, UVAB initiated support for veterans by cooperating with 'Alarm Services,' a Kampala-based security company, to hire veterans as security guards. By September 1994, fifty veterans were assisted in finding gainful employment. UVAB has since opened an employment unit at the Executive Secretariat to search for jobs for veterans. More and more veterans are thereby being placed in employment.

With the end of phase II, UVAB has followed a more active path to raising awareness among promoters regarding veterans and their wives as an especially vulnerable group. Under the auspices of the Office of the Prime Minister, for example, a credit programs coordination workshop was held in January 1995 at which representatives of various initiatives (the government, PAP, CAP, and EDF) presented their respective projects for the purpose of comparison and complementarity. It is in this area of active cooperation that UVAB can most directly support the veterans' economic reintegration in the short term.

Social Reintegration

The need for social reintegration has received repeated attention in program design. While the envisaged activities have been carried out more efficiently over time, it is evident that complete reintegration is a long and trying process, especially for female veterans and the wives of the veterans. But social reintegration is not only about preparing an individual on how to reintegrate, it is also about preparing the community on how to accept the individual; hence, the focus on reintegration of women and community support.

Facilitating the Reintegration of Women

UVAP has focused on the veteran as an individual, up to the end of phase II; therefore, limited attention was paid to problems faced by female veterans and spouses of veterans. Although women, on return to a mostly rural environment, assume their traditional roles of caretakers and breadwinners of the family, assistance especially targeted to women has been exceptionally limited.
In fact, phase I did provide support to women through UNICEF's decision to fund activities by UCOBAC in assisting women's groups. As good as these intentions may have been, the failed execution of this component reinforced the program's reputation of limited gender sensitivity.

**Phase I— Program Intervention as Help and Hindrance**

Wives and female veterans are hard workers but often lack appropriate skills to start small-scale income-generating activities. In a male-dominated society, many of their projects are not implemented for want of funding. This problem area was chosen by UNICEF: it selected an approach to impart skills and enable women to earn some income to improve the welfare of the household.

UCOBAC was chosen as a delivery mechanism for assistance to wives of veterans and female veterans. It embarked on a program designed to encourage them to join existing women groups (affiliates to UCOBAC) or create new ones and continued with its community-based approach to delivering assistance; however, UCOBAC was not specifically suited to cater to the needs of this target group.

A UCOBAC focal person was appointed and encouraged to form groups. Women across the country responded with interest to the approach, forming or joining a substantial number of groups with an average number of ten members. Joining existing women groups was the preferred avenue by UCOBAC as it was expected that they would learn or acquire skills from other women. Unless, however, these groups were affiliates to UCOBAC, they were not eligible to receive any support.

These groups were then encouraged to design written proposals for funding and hand them over to the focal person. Heterogeneity of groups or lack of skills hindered many groups from fulfilling this requirement. Many disbanded soon after inception. The written proposals were then forwarded to UCOBAC's secretariat and submitted to its national screening committee in Kampala. Initially, funds were only allocated to districts where UCOBAC was already operating. The DVPOs concerned were then informed about which groups had been allocated what amount. They in turn informed the groups accordingly.

As this approach discriminated against women in other districts, UCOBAC extended activities to these districts and installed focal persons who initiated the process of group formation and proposal writing. With project funds unchanged, UCOBAC had to rescreen proposals from all districts and—consequently—reduced the already committed allocations. This revised decision directly affected the DVPOs who in many instances were suspected of having diverted funds.

Due to the lack of funds, support was only given to a few selected groups. The frustration, however, was not confined to those women not receiving support. Most proposals required moderate funding of several million shillings. When approved, groups were disappointed at having received not more than half a million shillings (about US$500). As a result, projects had to be redesigned, and some were canceled outright. Even some successful groups dissolved and had to be remobilized by the focal person. By September 1994, almost two years after inception, some 1,630 female veterans and wives in 188 groups (projects) have benefited from the program. Although difficult to establish, a substantial number of the projects do not seem to be performing well, despite the training given to a member of each group.

One of the problems of UCOBAC's mixed group approach was that civilian women had already been better off in
the sense of both finances and education. Many female veterans and wives soon found themselves in a disadvantaged and marginalized position in a program that had been intended for them. These experiences led many women to advise wives joining in the later phases to start off with homogeneous groups and only later—once the activity had become sustainable—have civilians join in. Not surprisingly, many female veterans and wives consider UCOBAC a 'bad experience.'

From the outset, cooperation between UVAB and UCOBAC in the execution of this component has been weak. This can partly be explained by the fact that UNICEF decided to redirect funds it pledged to UVAP for the strengthening of community social services to assisting UCOBAC, an institution with which UNICEF had already collaborated before. In a sense, UVAP served as a means to strengthen UCOBAC's capacity.

The original NGO community fund concept would have allowed a range of NGOs to compete for small grants and be rewarded annually on the basis of their performance. Instead, one donor was able to create a monopoly by purposefully providing funding to only one NGO. In the end, resources were stretched too thinly, the capacity–building effect seems to have been short–lived, and the intended target group was left without support.

Counseling: The Soft Approach of Phase II

The predischarge orientation in phase II included matters directly affecting women, most important family planning and AIDS, legal matters, and income–generating activities. The impact of this orientation was limited, given the unique circumstances of large groups, open air presentations, and hectic and sometimes chaotic final preparations. Still, no structured follow–up was included at the district level.

Although sensitized to the problems encountered by women, UVAB lacked the resources and expertise for effective action in this area. DANIDA, therefore, decided to appoint a gender specialist to work with UVAB and improve the relevance of the last phase of the program.

Attempting to Meet the Challenge: Gender Issues of Phase III

The primary target group of phase III remains the predominantly male veteran population, however, the program has become more sensitive to the impact of the demobilization exercise on wives and female veterans. Within the binding budget constraint, coverage within each of the program's components has been extended to this particularly vulnerable target group to the greatest extent possible.

Building on the experiences of phase II, the predischarge orientation will be even more focused on women and their problems. In particular, legal issues will receive more attention. To the extent possible, veterans and their wives will be addressed simultaneously to ensure some form of counseling for couples.

If a veteran is seriously ill or severely disabled, all responsibility for feeding the family will rest with the wife; therefore, the eligibility criteria for the training component under phase III will be modified to allow the wife of a disabled, terminally ill, or deceased veteran to gain priority access to the vocational and group training subcomponents. Simultaneously, UVAB will identify options for making vocational training more accessible and sensitive to the needs of female veterans. Women will also receive priority for project counseling.

A number of other issues were investigated during the phase III design but ultimately not included because of cost implications. Among them were the extension of (a) health services to the spouses of veterans and to widows of deceased veterans and (b) PTA fees for a second year to the children of female veterans and to families in which the veteran is chronically ill or has died.
Sensitization of and Support to Communities

Sensitization as Preparation and Contribution to Conflict Resolution

With social capital progressively weakened over years of civil strife, the Ugandan government clearly understood the potential problems of mistrust and fear that could derail even a well-planned demobilization exercise. Prior to UVAP's inception, therefore, the government issued three different communiques to district-level administrations requesting RC5 staff to meet with communities, explain the program, hear their concerns, endeavor to alleviate their fears, and seek open assistance to making the veterans' reintegration into productive civilian life smooth.

These activities were reinforced by sensitization tours carried out by UVAB board members and staff and government officials in each of the districts. Such tours were continued during the initial phases of the demobilization program. At regular intervals throughout the exercise, DVPOs met with subcounty representatives to discuss what was expected from the communities and what the communities expected. These meetings were well attended. Despite these efforts, community sensitization was at times insufficient to prepare all communities to receive and integrate veterans and their families.

Phase I—A Failed Attempt

As many communities would be in a difficult position to cope with a large number of socially maladjusted, medically ill (including HIV positive) or disabled veterans, phase I envisaged a support program to strengthen community social services for dealing with such problems. Phase I singled out three specific services to be offered by NGOs or private sector agencies, namely testing, counseling (medical, social, and economic), and treatment, with support in kind (e.g. special equipment to assist a disabled veteran's economic activities) provided if possible.

Four target groups were identified: disabled veterans, veterans and civilians with special medical problems (especially communicable diseases including AIDS), veterans with special social problems (especially those addicted to alcohol), and community health staff for training. Veterans should not be perceived by the community as being cared for with unjustified priority; therefore, testing, treatment, and counseling would also be offered to civilians with similarly severe health problems. Rather than creating parallel facilities, existing capacities would be supported to seek sustainability.

No NGO responded to UVAB’s call for implementing the component. UNICEF, who had initially agreed to fund this component, then decided instead—to hire UCOBAC to support economic activities by women groups. The component as a whole was, therefore, not implemented, in spite of the gravity of the needs of veterans and communities.

Phase II—Too Little Too Late

Phase II did not foresee any specific measures for improving community preparedness. In fact, it was not deemed that sensitization as such was further needed, however, UVAB initiated a radio program ('Veterans Quarter Hour'), broadcasting UVAP–related programs in six different languages six times a week for fifteen minutes. The radio program encompassed discussions, features, and interviews on demobilization and entitlements, the promotion of veteran–community relationships, socioeconomic activities, and also answered specific questions from veterans.

Most veterans responded positively to the 'Veterans Quarter Hour.' Listenership is quite high as a result of...
publicity undertaken in the discharge centers. Most veterans expect to be informed through the radio program about entitlements and further procedures. But only limited attempts were undertaken to address negative community attitudes. Moreover, the program's approach was too technical, lacked liveliness, and faced repeated problems with translations into the vernacular languages.

**Phase III—Starting Over**

Hesitation and disinterest regarding the veterans continue in many instances. To overcome such community behavior, phase III includes a social communication package targeted at all groups affected by the program. This package contains several subcomponents aimed at easing social tensions that veterans and their families still face on and after return to their communities. Its three subcomponents are 

- (a) the distribution of booklets on legal and health issues, 
- (b) the use of popular folk media using local languages, and 
- (c) the improvement of the radio program.

The package's objectives are to raise public awareness of the problems involved, improve the image of the veterans, reduce the negative effects of social conflict on children, and assist the spouses of veterans to participate more actively in the reintegration process. The DVPOs and DVRs will form a link between UVAB and the community and feedback on the perceptions of the program in the districts.

At least two booklets will be distributed to all spouses of all veterans, one on the legal rights of women and one on health education, focusing on AIDS, disease prevention, and hygiene. If available, further booklets will be distributed to spouses and children on environmental education and practical aspects of life in the new social surroundings.

Social drama and puppet theater are proposed as alternatives to classical teaching methods. These would transfer the messages in the local language in a simple, easily understandable, and entertaining manner to both adults and children. This approach is expected to raise interest among the affected communities and carry messages more effectively.

The radio program will be expanded into a more comprehensive source of information, focusing on an enlarged target group of veterans, their spouses and children, the communities and the general public. The program will be lively and entertaining, addressing the problems of all population groups, exchanging views on their experiences, and providing suggestions on how conflicts can be resolved.

**6—The Reintegration Experience**

For veterans, families, and communities alike, reintegration is as a continuous process in three different forms: social, political, and economic. Social and political reintegration refer to the acceptance of a veteran and his/her family by the community and its leaders, respectively, the latter especially through the RC system. Economic reintegration implies financial independence of a veteran's household through productive and gainful (self-)employment. After two phases of demobilization, social and political reintegration have, in most instances, been surmountable barriers. Economic reintegration, on the other hand, has proved the most elusive aspect of a veteran's transition to civilian life.

Reintegration is a new and powerful experience for the veterans and their families as well as for the host community. As much as demobilization is the strongest sign of peace and political stability in a country—and, thus, a move welcomed by the vast majority of the country's populace— it inevitably leads to tension and conflict for a variety of reasons. Such tensions and conflicts affect the most vulnerable core group, the veteran and his
wife, most intensively; the reintegration experience offers ample evidence for this.

**Veteran and Community**

**Individual Personalities and Characteristics**

Obviously, their personalities and experiences influence differently the capability of veterans to integrate. All, however, undergo decisive changes of values. According to veterans, success in military life is the antithesis of success in civilian life. Aggression, subservience, and mobility are important elements of a soldier's behavior but are inimical to traditional peaceful life as a civilian. Moreover, over the years, most veterans have acquired a notion that 'somebody' will take care of them; not surprising, considering that soldiers received clothes, food, medical services, or education for children for free.

This modification of values and the adoption of new roles and new rules does not happen overnight. As stated by a veteran: "We have been demobilized but not demilitarized." This change of values is the more difficult, the less a veteran is familiar with these new roles and rules. In particular, young veterans, having joined the NRA when they were children and/or their parents having been killed, struggle with this mental transition. Many simply do not know what it means to live with and provide for a spouse on a day-to-day basis. On return, many do not own productive assets or found their property destroyed. To many, if not most of these child soldiers, therefore, the impact of civilian life has been almost traumatic.

Several personal characteristics have been identified as easing or constraining a veteran's reintegration. A veteran with basic military training settled more easily than one who had joined as a civilian during the civil war. This can at least in part be explained by the fact that many children joined the NRA during this period. Veterans who had operated in settled military units experienced easier and faster transitions as they were already accustomed to a 'sedentary' life. Veterans who had joined the NRA as mature persons with land of their own, even more so when they had accumulated some wealth, faced fewer problems than child soldiers as they did not have to establish new homes on their return. Veterans who had joined the army to run away from problems they had been causing were again facing problems. As put by a civilian: "Children who went as good children of the community have returned as good citizens."

Lastly, and frequently, veterans would find reintegration and community acceptance easier when they were accepted by the extended family. If the extended family provided food and shelter, nursed the children, and took care of the sick, the community would normally show greater and quicker sympathy with the returnee; however, many veterans lost their entire family, had their houses burned down, and/or their economic base destroyed during the civil war and, thus, had no 'home' where to which to return. In these cases, reintegration also proved a formidable psychological challenge.

Veterans who passively respond to the challenge of social, political, and economic reintegration are confronted with a difficult life. They do not pursue serious economic activities and have to be content with life at the subsistence level. Often, they survive at the margin, relying on piecework and casual labor, and depend on food cultivated by parents and relatives. It is also these people who are more likely to become criminalized or become alcoholics.

A number of veterans either did not return to their village or left their village, migrating to urban areas. For many of them, the towns offered better opportunities for (self-)employment. In several instances, the security situation in rural areas was bad. Others felt like *outsiders in the village* because they had married a woman from another region and wanted to stay with her. Or, they were former government soldiers or NRA guerrilla fighters in the
'wrong' territory who did not want to return or were actually driven away when attempting to come back. Moreover, not all could cope with rural life or the pressure put on them by the community.

**Ingenuity and Resourcefulness: The Invisible Hand at Work**

Veterans, male and female alike, have shown immense self-reliance, resourcefulness, and initiative. More than 1,400 income-generating project activities have been started by phase II veterans as individuals and in groups until June 1995. Around half of these projects are in trade, while 325 focus on cash crop production. Many commute to urban areas, especially Kampala, to undertake small-scale activities there, for example, trading in second-hand clothes. By June 1995, phase II veterans invested approximately USh 320 million, that is, an average of approximately USh 230,000 per project. Veterans undertaking an individual project would, thus, have used on average more than 40 percent of their cash entitlement for investment purposes.

These veterans not only improve their well-being but also contribute to local economic development. For instance, by producing foods, such as tomatoes and eggs for local consumption, because such goods are in scarce supply locally, veterans reduce prices through increased supply. They also reduce the time needed for villagers to buy such foods as they no longer need to buy them at more distant markets. Such activities were undertaken despite a shortage of credit for veteran borrowers, a fact that many other veterans cited as inhibiting them from investing in income-generating activities. This problem, however, is as much related to knowledge about credit opportunities as it is about accessing credit and has subsequently been addressed in the program's later phases.

Despite these inspiring initiatives, many veterans lack marketable skills and experience, which severely hampers their economic initiatives and reduce their opportunities on the job market. Frequently, veterans have started projects with a great deal of enthusiasm but with unrealistic profit expectations. In still other cases, local politicians successfully hindered veterans from carrying out lucrative business ventures, for example, by deliberately confiscating capital or denying access to business sites without reason. In several instances, these factors combined to trigger the failure of a project.

**From Veteran to Civilian**

On the basis of low crime figures, it would seem that the majority of veterans and their families succeed in making the difficult social and economic adjustments to civilian life. This, however, does not imply that they are successful in economic terms. In fact, no more than a fifth—and in some districts substantially less—consider themselves on the same economic level as civilians, that is, living in a house of one's own, having enough food, and being productively engaged full-time.

Regarding the majority, civilians and veterans alike believe that veterans and their families will continue to be different because they have unequal opportunities, for example, regarding economic activities, own education, or the education of children. Only if and when a veteran is successful in establishing an independent civilian identity will the distinction between the 'veteran' and 'civilian' vanish. It is, thus, to be expected that the process of reintegration—provided the political situation in the country remains stable—will pose a continuous challenge for some time to come.

**Access to Land**

Landlessness, an issue that received particular attention during the preparatory stages of phase I, is surprisingly low. As low a figure as 3 percent of phase I and phase II veterans combined seem to have no access to land, because either they had never had land or it had been taken away by those who stayed behind. Landlessness is a more serious problem in the more densely populated districts in the southwestern and central regions. In some
districts, the problem is localized within isolated parishes.

Veterans agreed, however, that access to land was a major factor facilitating their economic reintegration. Veterans who were self-sufficient in food production had been allocated land by their parents. Many of the landless, however, had to scale down their ambitions, settling for jobs as agricultural day laborers or unpaid family workers. Landlessness was a minor reason for veterans to migrate to other districts.

**Crime and Other Antisocial Behavior**

The incidence of crime, a most critical factor for successful reintegration, has been negligible: up until mid–July 1995, only 159 veterans had been found guilty of some criminal act, that is, 0.5 percent of all veterans discharged under phases I and II.18 Of these 159 crimes, 28 percent were related to theft, 18 percent to assault and threatening violence, and 16 percent to murder. This is a far lower percentage than the normal crime rate in an equivalent civilian population and allays fears that veterans are undisciplined troublemakers, drug abusers, or thieves. Nevertheless, several veterans (about 10 percent of veterans in the beneficiary assessment) repeatedly show signs of antisocial behavior, such as drinking, fighting, or causing other kinds of public disturbance.

Not infrequently, a veteran was blamed for some criminal act, although quite obviously he/she was not at fault. In a sense, veterans served as easily identifiable scapegoats in areas where insecurity has been on the rise. In other districts, however, the presence of veterans actually improved the security situation due to their vigilance and training. Some communities have even asked veterans to be instructors for the military science and politicization training program undertaken by the government across the country.

**Veterans’ Group Formation**

Veterans show a strong feeling of comradeship, informing, helping, and counseling each other on an ad hoc basis. In many districts, veterans have formed groups to master the challenge of reintegration better. Sharing experiences among themselves was indeed a major factor facilitating reintegration for phase II veterans: they were able to learn from the mistakes, lessons, and advice of phase I veterans. Such advice may pertain to the use of the cash benefits ("don't rush to spend it," "put it in a bank account," "if you don't have land, don't buy it now, buy it later") as well as to the initiation of economic activities (agriculture, fishing, and so on).

Veterans groups were unplanned but important elements in the reintegration process. They can play an effective role in mobilizing communities, encourage the sharing of skills and experiences, serve as pressure groups, facilitate the pooling of scarce resources (especially of the cash entitlements), promote organizational and leadership skills, and promote program sustainability; however, many of these groups lack skills in project design and management and, thus, often have unrealistic expectations about project ventures.

Much as the Ugandan demobilization exercise was a learning process for government and donors, it was also a learning process for the veterans. Improvements, in this case more appropriate behavior in the civilian environment are noted from both veterans and civilians. Indeed, the sharing of experiences will be formalized by UVAP in phase III pre- and post–discharge orientations where phase I and II veterans and their wives will
provide information on their successful reintegration and counsel new veterans.

Apart from loose and ad hoc groups, veterans have also formed more formal veterans associations. UVAB had encouraged the formation of such associations; thus, many members view them as a vehicle through which future reintegration support will be provided. In each district, this association is headed by a District Veterans Representative (DVR) as an elected member. Elections were also held in each of the country's approximately 830 subcounties.

DVRs and Sub-County Veterans Representatives (SVRs) form a quasi–formal link between the DVPO and the veterans. As such, their role is acknowledged by UVAB, and the program makes provisions for their active participation in implementation. They do not, however, receive any support that would facilitate their activities.

Groups and associations may also have some negative side effects. While reinforcing close bonds among themselves, they may actually hinder a veteran from integrating into the wider community. Countering this fear, many mixed self-help groups—consisting of veterans and civilians—have been formed spontaneously at the grassroots, that is, subcounty level. They engage in a wide range of productive activities for mutual economic and social benefit, for example, cotton and rice cultivation, roof tile fabrication, and brick making. Integration into civilian business ventures has in fact been one of the most important signs of a successful transition.

**Wife, Veteran, and Community**

Since the inception of the demobilization program, wives of veterans have suffered from a number of distinct and severe problems. Most of these difficulties are related to the fact that veterans—having been away from home for prolonged periods of time—have established new 'homes' without the consent of their parents or relatives while at the same time the ethnic fabric in rural Uganda is still tightly woven.

Wives face particular problems when they do not belong to the same ethnic group as the husband but have followed him to his home after discharge. Often, they are rejected by the community and/or abandoned by the husband bowing to community or family pressure, leaving them stranded with little or no financial or social support. But even local wives share this fate. In specific cultural environments, veterans are encouraged to marry a second wife on return to be accepted. As in the case of polygamy, a phenomenon especially widespread in the north, the first wife is left to fend for herself and her children. On the other hand, many bachelor veterans also married a local woman since they returned to their districts, implying a measure of social reintegration.

A major factor contributing to family rejection of a wife was the failure of the veteran to sanction the union traditionally through bride price or similar customs. Even worse, a substantial percentage of partnerships (17 percent in phase II) were nonformalized, contributing to the loose commitment of the veteran to the relationship. In such arrangements, wives and children lack any identifiable family rights, leaving them in a vulnerable and
weak legal and social position in case of divorce, death of spouse, or custody disputes.

Another complicating factor of ethnically mixed marriages was that many wives, especially from the northern and eastern regions, do not speak the local language in the district of destination (16 percent of wives in phase II). Not surprisingly, they find themselves isolated and in despair. The couple's children are likely to suffer the most, whether they stay with the father or with the mother. No study, however, has yet been undertaken on how children from divorced or separated veteran couples cope.

Problems are magnified when the husband dies. Frequently, solidarity with the son or brother vanishes with his death, and the widow is often treated with disrespect and her belongings taken away—even more so when she is of different ethnic origin—even though she has clearly defined property rights.

All too often, wives thus find themselves in a dependent relationship with husbands and family members. Many have decided to leave (divorce or separate from) the husband and return to their own home at their own initiative. Avoiding such problems by running away from them also reflects a lack of knowledge on the wife's part, as well as on the family's, about her legal rights and contact persons in case of trouble. In fact, the law would protect even some nonformal marriages—of which the couple might not even be aware of—if the veteran and his wife had appropriate knowledge.

Whether or not a wife of different tribal origin is accepted is essentially a psychological issue for the family and relatives. This becomes clear when considering that female veterans who returned to their homes were warmly welcomed by their families. On the other hand, not all wives really want to 'reintegrate.' Some find it unattractive to return to the hardships of life in a rural environment others had married a soldier for the perceived special status. These women resent a return to civilian life as they see their social status diminish or vanish.

Community Acceptance

Veterans, male and female alike, mostly returned to their families. This in itself facilitated reentry into the traditional safety net and provided a veteran with easier access to land. Still, with memories of a marauding army still fresh for many Ugandans, communities inadvertently or on purpose erected visible and invisible barriers to a veteran's reintegration. Transition and reintegration following demobilization are, thus, issues too complex to predict and plan, differing due to variations in local conditions and historic experiences.

Not surprisingly, NRA veterans from the civil war were warmly welcomed where the National Resistance Movement had received strongest support. This especially pertains to the central and western regions. In some of the eastern and northern districts, on the other hand, these veterans faced considerable resentment from the community against whose faction they had fought.

In many ways, the DVPO can help or hinder acceptance. Frequently, DVPOs were judged inefficient and unhelpful because, among other things, they could not resolve the most pressing problems of veterans or had never visited many of them. The efficiency of DVRs was undermined by the fact that they did not have an official mandate to mediate in conflicts between veterans and communities or RC officials. In other cases, DVPOs actively sought to reduce fear through regular and open discussions with the community members.
Antagonism and Mistrust

Despite sensitization tours that UVAB and government officials undertook throughout the country, political leaders and community members alike had misconceptions regarding the returning veterans. Because of these misconceptions, mistrust and suspicion—and sometimes outright hostility—were common at the initial stages of resettlement.

The cash payments a veteran received were often viewed by communities with envy. Misconceptions arose as they thought the package the veteran received would ultimately benefit the extended family or community. Veterans were, therefore, accused of 'eating it alone'; however, resentments are mutual. While a veteran is often viewed as an undisciplined member of society by the community, veterans complained that the 'cowards who had stayed home to loot during the war' were prospering while 'we who fought cannot cope with demands of civilian life.'

Phase II veterans felt the burden of having to prove that they were different than phase I veterans who—without proper predischarge orientation—often showed the wrong behavior toward civilians. This led many civilian employers to shy away from employing veterans. Many phase II veterans, therefore, suffered constant scrutiny and silent challenges by the community; that actually motivated them to work hard.

Political reintegration is often harder to achieve. Many officials are biased against veterans, pass unjustified judgments in the RC courts, or refuse to have jurisdiction over veterans. Evidently, the further away a veteran lives, the less help he/she can expect from the DVPO and the more vulnerable he/she is to abuse. This lack of support from the RC system has in many cases been a major constraining factor for peaceful integration.

The communities are usually aware of their negative perceptions toward veterans, the abuse, marginalization, and economic hardship they inflict on them, and the isolation when they worry that sick veterans could infect the whole community. After all, after years of suffering by various occupying armies, it seems understandable that trust is extremely low. Still, many communities prefer to pretend not to be part of the problem and, thus, decline to honor in full their civic obligations.

Acceptance

As only few veterans actually committed a crime or behaved unsocially, mistrust slowly receded and often turned into advice, assistance, or pity if the community could not or did not want to assist the veteran. After a somewhat slow start, veterans, thus, have generally been well received by their communities in the long run. Veterans themselves accelerated this process by displaying willpower, discipline, and submission, for example, by accepting any job or task in the community, no matter how demeaning or menial it seemed.

In many instances, social and economic reintegration have proceeded in a friendly atmosphere without any upheavals. In such cases, RC officials and communities actively sought to establish normal relationships by holding open meetings with veterans and ensuring that any problems were settled at the local community level. Indeed, the process of social reintegration has been faster and easier than anticipated at the beginning of the program. Evidence suggests that up to 90 percent have already achieved social reintegration as assessed by the community, judged on the basis of the absence of antisocial behavior. Some have acquired a respected position in the community and are seen as a stabilizing force actually adding to the security of the community. Two veterans are now Members of Parliament.
Community Perceptions on Impact

The poorer a family or community, the more limited the resources that can be shared with returning veterans. In this environment of scarcity, the veterans found reintegration more difficult. A clear example is the acute food shortage experienced in parts of the country at the time of the phase I demobilization. Many families and communities had nothing to spare and veterans and their families were just more people to be fed. Not yet having fully reached economic reintegration, veterans were, thus, in many cases seen as a liability and a burden to their extended family and the wider community.

Apart from this mix of negative and positive attitudes toward veterans, communities identify a number of factors that negatively or positively impact on the local society and economy. The financial packages designed for a six-month reinsertion period were considered too small to cover all necessary expenditures, especially when the environment to which the veterans return, that is, rural Uganda, is generally poor. Moreover, veterans lack skills to participate gainfully in and to benefit the local economy. They are also perceived as posing a health threat to communities.

In part, the perceptions about positive impact counter the negative ones. Veterans are a source of additional labor in a subsistence economy where there is a shortage of labor during various phases of the crop cycle. Many also boost the rural economy by starting successful business activities. Socially, to many civilians, veterans serve as role models for discipline, hard work, and obedience. Such contradictory observations confirm the finding that local community conditions as much as personal attitudes ultimately determine successful social, political, and economic reintegration.

Social Organization And Individual Endowments

The experiences of veterans to date point to a number of individual elements that are key ingredients of successful long-term economic reintegration. These are:

• Access to land, either of his/her family or one's own

• Access to credit, either through a formal institution or a credit project

• Access to information about income-earning opportunities

• Development of marketable skills.

In one way or another, UVAP assisted the veterans in fulfilling these personal conditions. As the reactions of communities to veterans show, however, even the best-intended support component ultimately depends on whether a receiving community offers to its veterans an enabling or hostile environment. Two aspects need differentiation here: A community cannot offer an enabling environment unless it is based on an enabling environment. The issue of supporting a veteran's social and economic reintegration then essentially is whether the seeds of community sensitization fall on fertile or barren soil; only in the former case will they grow.

Affecting society as a whole, the creation of an enabling environment is far beyond UVAP's intervention spectrum. It, nonetheless, provides a key message for the general ease or difficulty of implementing a demobilization and reintegration program. It is the interplay of a community's physical and social capital and a veteran's financial and human capital that determines the eventual outcome.

A community's social capital is reflected in "features of its social organization, such as networks, norms, and trust, that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit" (Putman 1993, p. 35). A community whose social
organization is strong is, other things being equal, more likely actively to welcome a veteran, unless inhibited by ideological factors (e.g. the veteran had fought for the ‘other’ side). The desire of many communities to help veterans to integrate is clear testimony of such enabling community organization. And only in such an environment are veterans able to display their talents, knowledge, and skills.

A community where suspicion reigns will welcome a returning veteran with suspicion. It will find many ways to disgrace veterans, from accusing them of crimes to confiscating their investment goods. The program indeed provides ample evidence and counterevidence to the observation that "social capital enhances the benefits of investment in physical and human capital" (Putnam 1993, p. 36). And a community with a low level of social activity or civic participation (e.g., in school or health committees) will, justifiably or not, see in a veteran a heavy burden on scarce community resources, even more so as its level of economic activity is likely to be lower than in a wellfunctioning community.

That—despite long years of internal strife and civil war, of hatred, brutality, and mistrust—most of the NRA's veterans are integrating into civilian life without much friction bears testimony to the fact that, on the community level, Uganda has reached a remarkable degree of reconciliation and social organization and that the wounds of even disastrous social conflict can heal.

7— Institutional Structure

Managing an operation as distinct and unprecedented as the phase I demobilization of 23,000 soldiers is a formidable task, even more so when the time available for preparations is limited to a few months. Before any discharge could occur, a daunting number of activities had to be completed. Among these were:

• Establishing a legal basis for the operation

• Staffing the implementation unit

• Training headquarters and district–level staff

• Operationalizing the financial management and control systems, including banking arrangements for making payments to veterans and the appointment of an accountant and an external auditor

• Detailed planning for administering and monitoring the provision of entitlements to veterans at the district level

• Finalizing the transportation plan

• Creating an authentic and nonnegotiable identity document for each veteran

• Employing immediate and long–term assistance for the implementation unit

• Making special efforts to ensure land availability

• Contracting out the capacity strengthening of existing community social services.

These and other implementation–related activities were undertaken by UVAB, a civilian entity created by the National Resistance Council in October 1992 as one of the conditions for Bank support. This entity is also expected to be dissolved on completion of the last phase of demobilization. The rationale for this condition was
not to contradict the policy of bureaucratic reductions by building yet another bureaucratic agent. As developed by the government, the formal institutional structure of this civilian entity consisted of the following:

• The Uganda Veterans Assistance Board

• The Executive Secretariat of the Board

• District Veterans Program Offices

• District Veterans Advisory Committees.

These formal bodies were complemented by three quasi–formal and informal beneficiary groups:

• District Veterans Representatives

• Sub–County Veterans Representatives

• Veterans Associations.

UVAP, thus, operated on three levels: the Board and Executive Secretariat at the central level, DVPOs and DVACs (as well as DVRs) at the district level, and SVRs and veterans associations at the community level. On all levels, institutional links were developed to pertinent entities and groups: at the national level, the NRA and Ministry of Defense; at the district level, the district administration, especially DEOs and DMOs; and at the community level, NGOs as project promoters. The institutional setup culminated in the veteran as the primary and his/her family as the secondary target groups (Table 7.1).

| Table 7.1 UVAB Institutional Structure |
|---|---|---|
| **Level** | Uganda Veterans Assistance Program | Institutional Links |
| National | Uganda Veterans Assistance Board Executive Secretariat | National Resistance Army |
| | | Ministry of Defense |
| | | Donor agencies |
| District | District Veterans Program Officers | RC system |
| | District Veterans Advisory Committees | District Education Officer |
| | District Veterans Representatives (nonformalized) | District Medical Officer |
The strengths and weaknesses of UVAP in reaching the target groups are closely mirrored in the way horizontal and vertical communication was conducted and responsibilities perceived. Cases in point are shortcomings in the monitoring system, the education and health funds, the postdischarge orientation, the efficiency and professionalism in effecting payments, and the distribution of iron sheets.

UVAB became active at the beginning of December 1992. At its inception, it consisted of headquarters and initially twenty and later thirty-eight district offices. Over the three phases, project staff have been added at both central and district levels to cope with the growing number of veterans. For instance, in July 1993, UVAB and DVP offices comprised of 139 staff, in September 1994 the number has increased to 207, of which 158 (or 76 percent) were district based.

Each of UVAB's entities has a distinct set of responsibilities, complementing each other to ensure the successful implementation of the program. These entities are linked within a hierarchical system from the central level down to the district. Although hierarchically structured, the district level commands a substantial degree of autonomy as evidenced in the allocations of the education and health funds. In many instances, therefore, UVAB as the central authority performs a supporting role for its outreach staff.

Overall, the institutional arrangements were adequate and afforded management the flexibility required in managing the program. This adequacy is reflected by the fact that, throughout the program, most program components continuously underwent minor and/or major modifications while the institutional structure remained unaltered and administration components experienced only minor adjustments.

Uganda Veterans Assistance Board

The Board is the policymaking organ for UVAP, consisting of seven members and two co-opted members. Members are appointed by the Prime Minister and include representatives from the NRC, the government, and the NRA. Their functions are:

• Policy review of UVAP

• Provision of necessary guidance to all concerned and promotion of effective coordination among ministries and the NRA

• Identification of special transitional problems affecting veterans and ensuring that problems are tackled expeditiously and effectively

• Ensuring that all planned programs and projects are properly administered

• Taking necessary steps to minimize frustration on the part of veterans
• Ensuring that the financial and other arrangements provided under UVAP are administered in a way that will permit veterans to enjoy a reasonable standard of life

• Supervision and monitoring of any special schemes of assistance to veterans, which may be placed by the Prime Minister under the direct management of the Board

• Supervision and monitoring of the work performance of the DVACs

• Carrying out such activities as may be conducive or incidental to the attainment of the program's objectives.

The Board convenes regularly (once or twice a month) and in addition for special meetings as the situation demands. To stay abreast of developments at the grassroots, Board members also undertake repeated field trips, meeting with DVPOs, DVRs, district officials as well as with veterans and their spouses to discuss the program, its progress, and possible modifications of its implementation.

Board members took a strong interest in the implementation of the program and received up-to-date information on all aspects pertaining to the program. One of the Board's major achievements was the improvement in relations with government ministries and the NRA. During this process, the Board provided substantial guidance and support to the operation.

**The Executive Secretariat**

**Organigram**

The departmental organization of UVAB is in consonance with the tasks as well as statutes. At the end of phase II, the Executive Secretariat (or UVAB) was headed by an Executive Secretary and consisted of three departments: finance, administration, and operations. Since late 1993 and early 1994, UVAB also contains a monitoring and evaluation unit and a reintegration unit, respectively (see Chart 7.1 in the Appendix to this chapter).

The Executive Secretary is responsible for the day-to-day management of the program and the effective coordination of the departments and units. The Administration Manager deals with the day-to-day administrative matters relating both to UVAB and the district offices, including the transport of veterans and iron sheets. The Inspector of Operations acts as a link between UVAB and the DVPOs on all matters relating to the implementation of the program, including inspecting and auditing. The Financial Controller provides oversight of financial resources available for the program, keeps proper accounting records, and produces annual accounts.

The task of the Reintegration Manager is to identify ways in which UVAB can cooperate with existing project initiatives to facilitate the economic reintegration of veterans and their families. The Monitoring Manager is responsible for monitoring UVAB's operations, both at headquarters and in the districts, and providing feedback to management on the program's implementation. Until the end of phase II, UVAB received technical assistance from GTZ and DANIDA in the form of one adviser each for central operations, field operations, and monitoring and evaluation.

**Internal Management**

Because of the short preparation period, UVAB was able to streamline its internal organization and establish essential structures and procedures only after the first discharge wave. UVAB currently employs a variety of
management tools, for example, the preparation by each department of monthly programs that are reviewed among the department heads at the end of each month. Moreover, several specific training courses were offered to UVAB and district–based staff; however, the preparation of a handbook on implementation procedures has repeatedly been delayed, leading to persistent gaps in the coordination and cooperation among the departments and between headquarters and district offices.

To improve UVAB's operations and adapt them to the changing environment, two UVAB/GTZ planning workshops were held in October 1993 and July 1994. These workshops used the ZOPP approach (objective–oriented project planning) as a highly participatory mechanism that effectively built ownership of the program by the Ugandan authorities. A large range of issues have been addressed during these workshops, linking UVAP's objectives and activities to performance indicators and assumptions about the external environment. The second workshop, having been necessitated by the unexpected delay in starting phase II operations, also saw the shifting of accents and priorities toward more strategic and long–term objectives.

Despite the application of these sophisticated management tools, operations in one particular area remained weak: the link between headquarters to district offices and beyond, that is, to veterans. The operations department consists of four units, headed by a Regional Officer and covering each of the four regions: center, southwest, north, and east. Each Regional Officer undertakes (irregular and infrequent) trips to each of the districts in his region. The objectives of these field visits are to (a) receive and update information about the situation in the district, including the validation of information sent by the DVPO to UVAB, (b) discuss issues requiring attention with the DVPO and district officials, if necessary, and (c) meet with veterans to learn from their experiences and help solve their problems.

The mobility of operations staff was severely hampered by lack of transport in both phases: four officers had to share one vehicle for outreach activities, whereas vehicles of other departments often lay idle in Kampala. The underlying causes of the infrequent visits were inadequate fuel and per diem funds for the Regional Officers. Supervision of the DVPOs could, thus, not be undertaken in spite of the apparent inefficiency of many a DVPO. Also, veterans, who appreciated being visited by district–based and UVAB staff, complained about the apparent lack of commitment on the part of Kampala–based staff. For phase III, the budgetary constraints could not be eased satisfactorily.

**District Veterans Program Offices**

At the outset it was clear that the program had to offer district–based support to facilitate veterans' reintegration for the first few years after demobilization; thus, District Veterans Program offices have been established as part of phase I preparations, starting in the twenty districts with the highest number of returning veterans. During phase I, the number of offices was increased to thirty–seven and later thirty–eight. There is a UVAB office in every district.

The district office is headed by a District Veterans Program Officer (DVPO) who reports to the Executive Secretary through the Regional Officers. From the program's perspective, the DVPO is the immediate contact point to the target group. To counter the unequal distribution of veterans between districts, DVP offices in districts with more than 1,000 veterans receive an Assistant DVPO. Where the number of veterans exceeds 1,500, a second Assistant DVPO will be provided by UVAB. In addition, DVP offices are staffed with a bookkeeper (during phase I accountants clerks with lower qualifications) and clerical staff (secretary and messenger).

**Organizational Matters**

To tie the district offices closer to the existing administrative structure, the Board took the deliberate decision of hiring regular district administration staff as part–timers to head DVP offices. This decision had distinct
advantages and disadvantages. On the one hand, a Deputy or Assistant District Executive Secretary is known by officials and the community, familiar with the social, political, and economic environment and commands authority. This in general facilitates the solving of problems that veterans and their spouses experience.

On the other hand, the DVPO/district official is under additional work pressure. Often, he/she is not able to cope with the requirements of two jobs and concentrates on one of the two. More often than not, the regular district responsibilities receive preference as these are—rightfully or not—seen as ensuring career development and job security when the assignment as a DVPO will be terminated.

Another factor complicating or simplifying the work of a DVPO is the attitude of the District Executive Secretary (DES) as supervisor of the DVPO as Deputy or Assistant DES. A supportive DES can approve a DVPO's access to district funds for, for example, field visits and advances. A DES skeptical of the program and/or veterans can make a DVPO's work environment much more difficult.

**Implementation Support**

The DVPO is responsible for the day-to-day implementation of the program in the district. To enable DVPOs to carry out these responsibilities in an effective and efficient manner, they (as well as their assistants) underwent several special training sessions during all three phases. These training sessions focused on issues such as implementation and counseling, gender, and monitoring. Despite these appropriate intentions, the training did not address all pertinent issues as planned.

Mobility of district-based staff is one of the crucial elements for an operation with a target group as dispersed as under the demobilization exercise. To this end, each DVPO received a motorcycle and a monthly fuel allowance; however, the provision of motorcycles faced several delays in procurement and, thus, hampered initial program implementation; they have only become available toward the end of phase I. Moreover, the budget provisions for per diems and fuel are barely adequate for frequent district tours.

**Responsibilities**

The DVPOs are the key element in delivering the demobilization program to veterans. Their responsibilities are manifold and demanding and include:

- Registration of veterans as they arrive in the district
- Provision and monitoring of the basic and enhanced benefits to the veterans
- Counseling and career guidance to veterans
- Keeping proper records of accounts and preparing a monthly financial statement in respect of funds received and expended
- Preparation of monthly reports covering all aspects of the veterans' support scheme
- Arrangement of sensitization programs to enlist public support to the smooth reintegration of veterans into civilian life
- Arrangement of regular meetings with veterans to explain payment procedures
- Facilitation of veterans to elect representatives to the DVACs.

**Implementation Support**
Although theoretically limited to the six-month reinsertion period, a DVPO provides assistance to any veteran from any phase at any time on request. This implies that the workload of a DVPO progressively increases during the course of the program.

**Constraints: Implementation, Administration, and Personality**

One of the DVPO's crucial activities is close and constant contact with veterans who often live in areas far away from the district headquarters. With the late delivery of motorcycles, contact with veterans during phase I was restricted to occasions when the veteran visited the DVPO. The situation in phase II did not improve noticeably as the workload of the DVPO, that is, his/her time constraint, increased as well.

Not surprisingly, given their workload, most of the DVPOs concentrated their efforts on the core tasks of paying veterans and distributing the iron sheets. Areas of equally critical importance, such as maintaining proper and complete records, administering the health, PTA, and education funds, counseling, and submission of reports, were consequently neglected.

The link between DVP offices and UVAB—visits from Regional Officers—did not function properly during phases I and II. This deficiency in vertical coordination gave rise to two major weaknesses of the district-based approach: (a) the administration of decentralized benefits of education and health and (b) monitoring and reporting.

Funds for the health and education funds were only made available late in phase II. DVPOs had to respond to this delay by constantly calming any veteran dissatisfaction. When the funds finally arrived and it became clear that they were not sufficient to cover the needs, many DVPOs stopped forwarding applications to UVAB. Disappointment over the lack of support from headquarters ultimately led to a lack of accountability from the districts.

The design of the monitoring system placed a burden on DVPOs and their assistants or bookkeepers with regard to collecting information from the veteran at specific points in time. Although DVPOs received special training on monitoring and reporting, many did not respond. In several instances, monthly reports have not been provided for up to eleven months. (Some DVPOs with comparable numbers of veterans, on the other hand, reported regularly.) A lack of feedback on their work in the district and on the operation in general contributed to this indifference.

The effectiveness of a DVPO depends to large degree on his/her personality, experience, and engagement. Those who are able to solve problems or otherwise assist veterans in the reintegration process, are well respected by veterans and the community. The personality of the DVPO is also reflected in his/her perception of the workload. Some have a high opinion of 'their' veterans and consider the workload within tolerable limits while others—with a similar number of veterans—complain about the multitude of responsibilities, lack task orientation, and appear disinterested nonperformers. As a result, many veterans complained that the local political system marginalized them because RC officials knew that they did not receive sufficient support from DVPOs.

It is amply clear that the demobilization program could not have been undertaken without districtlevel representation. Despite these many weaknesses, the system as designed for UVAP proved the most appropriate means of reaching out to the target group. To expand this contact, more funds have been made available under phases II and III to encourage the participation of communities, district officials, and the veterans themselves.
District Veterans Advisory Committees

As part of the government's preparations on the local level and prompted by the UVAB bill, District Veterans Advisory Committees were installed in all districts prior to phase I discharge. The DVAC is a cross-sectoral community advisory and coordinating mechanism to assist the DVPO as and when required. It consists of high-level district officials: the District Administrator (chairperson), the RC 5 Chairperson, the RC 5 Secretary for Defense, a district national executive committee member, the District Internal Security Officer, the District Police Commander, the District Executive Secretary, the DVPO (secretary) and other co-opted members whose participation is vital to the success of the program, especially the DEO and DMO.

Its main role is to oversee the implementation of the program at the district level and to contribute to solving local implementation-related problems as they arise. DVACs were accorded an important role in the allocation of assistance under the health care fund when the initial procedure became ineffective because of excess demand. DVACs will also be involved more actively and directly in the postdischarge orientation of phase III.

A major point of intervention during the whole program is related to the question of land. In those instances in which a veteran did not find access to land, the DVAC, through the DVPO, attempted to find local solutions wherever possible. Unsuccessful cases were referred to UVAB and dealt with at the government level. The DVAC is also charged with overseeing the veterans' social and political reintegration and initiating corrective measures as and when required.

To sensitize DVAC members about their functions, especially their role of supervising the work of the DVPO and counseling veterans, phase I included a specific DVAC training module. Thereafter, DVACs held more or less regular meetings that served as briefing sessions from the DVPO to inform the DVAC members of recent developments and problems. To also reach out to the target group, the Board facilitated tours by DVAC members in various districts. Such tours were effective means to link DVAC members to veterans and local village communities. They attended rallies to discuss topical issues and provided counseling and advice to both veterans and communities.

The number of meetings and tours, however, varied from district to district. Often, regular meetings could not be held because of the busy schedule of its members. In several cases, DVAC members were fully convinced of neither the demobilization exercise nor of their role. In such instances, the main problem was the lack of guidance on what the DVAC's role and responsibilities were; members were, thus, following the process passively rather than actively guiding it. It is important to note that these DVACs undertook few efforts toward the grassroots mobilization of the veteran, his/her family, and the community.

Due to the low profile of many DVACs, they were at times judged ineffective and of limited value to the program by veterans and communities alike. On the other hand, many veterans are often more comfortable working with the DVAC than with NGOs. To them, DVAC members know their problems better and can, therefore, respond better. This attitude reflects well on the nature and composition of the DVAC. Indeed, some DVACs demonstrated a clear understanding of the plight of the veterans. In some instances, veterans were given an extended personal tax exemption. As a measure of economic reintegration, some DVACs in collaboration with district administrations provided microprojects/contracts such as rural feeder roads maintenance as a means of earning income from their labor.

Veterans Representatives

As a means to organize veterans, facilitate group integration, and foster the spirit of mutual help, UVAB encouraged the formation of loose veterans associations under elected District Veterans Representatives (DVRs) and—less formalized—Sub-County Veterans Representatives (SVRs). DVRs and SVRs perform their tasks on an
honorary basis besides their normal economic activities. The first elections were held in May 1993 for phase I veterans. General elections are planned for veterans' representatives at various levels after phase III demobilization to reflect the change in number and profile of veterans.

DVRs and SVRs play important roles for a veteran's reintegration. As much as possible, they keep contact with veterans (one of the veterans' major concerns), know where they live and what problems they face, and provide information acquired in special training sessions to veterans and their wives. Apart from such vertical interaction, veterans representatives meet infrequently to discuss on how to support veterans and their families best, for example, counseling on income-generating activities in mixed groups.

Veterans usually trust DVRs and SVRs and see them as an important link to the program. In fact, DVRs are in close contact and cooperation with DVPOs for implementing a number of UVAP's components, for example, allocations under the education and health funds or counseling of

veterans. To the DVPO, the DVR is an important source of information, providing feedback on veterans' reintegration experiences. DVPOs also use DVRs and SVRs to relay information about recent program developments to veterans, especially when entitlements are ready to be accessed. The representatives' task is facilitated by the close web that connects veterans.

The veterans representatives' major handicap is their nonformalized status. While DVRs and SVRs receive extended training under phase III, they continue to perform their duties outside the realm of UVAB. This puts them in a doubly disadvantageous position. On the one hand, DVRs and SVRs lack authority in instances where they try to defend a veteran's rights against the community. On the other hand, they do not receive funding support, although—quite evidently—their activities required a substantial amount of traveling.

Whatever costs DVRs and SVRs incur are borne by themselves. Their movement within both subcounties and the district is, therefore, severely limited. Due to the lack of financial support, especially transport allowances and per diems—support that a DVPO receives—many DVRs and SVRs have lost interest after a substantial amount of initial enthusiasm. This exclusion is, however, a deliberate decision by UVAB, first, because of funding constraints, second, to keep this system of veterans' representation a grassroots initiative, and third, to observe its activities, value, and development for possible future integration.

Institutional Development: From Logistics to Development Agent

UVAB has been established by the NRC as a civilian body with, as perceived by donors, a fixed life or 'sunset clause' at the end of the third phase of demobilization. Phase III was completed as planned by the end of 1995 but, clearly, the reintegration process of veterans into established civil identities will continue for many years to come. Recent donor interest in supporting long-term reintegration projects is a direct result of this recognition. These circumstances justify an assessment of possible institutional arrangements for 1996 and beyond.

Veterans too are concerned about long-term institutional support. Many see the need for a joint venture of all demobilized soldiers in Uganda to exchange experiences and information. Others see a role for UVAB to provide information and guidance up to the year 2000. Veterans are well aware of the financial implications of extending any institutional arrangement. Although some believe UVAB could be turned into an independent NGO, others are worried that it would collapse when resources dwindle, and they would, therefore, like to see UVAB attached to the government in one way or another.

To the extent that UVAB enters the realm of reintegration programming, it would have to shift its mandate and skill mix from administering the benefits of a transitory safety net to that of facilitator and/or implementor of development programs. This transition from a logistics agent to a development agent would represent a
substantial shift. The degree to which the few reintegration components of education and health are impacting on resource allocation and administrative burden is already evident. Still, it can be expected that a continued need for the minimal services of information and regulation from government will exist.

20 For instance, the provision of a bicycle to each of the approximately 830 subcounty representatives would have added an estimated USh 83 million to program costs, equivalent to almost 20 percent of phase III nonpersonnel operating costs.

There are many options available to provide such services. In the United States, at the national level, for example, there exists a combination of the government’s Department of Veterans Affairs for delivering benefits and the nongovernmental National Veterans Association for advocacy and accountability. These are complemented by community–supported (local) organizations of past veterans such as the American Legion, which are a mixture of local government and NGOs.

In cooperation with veterans, district–level staff, and district officials, the Board and UVAB will, therefore—prior to the end of phase III—identify future needs that will require continuous centralized or decentralized support and design institutional approaches to meeting these needs. They will also look into the possible uses of UVAB’s massive data base after phase III. Ultimately, it will be up to the government and the veterans themselves to clearly define UVAB’s future role, if any.

Appendix Chart 7.1
UVAB Organigram
8—  Management Issues

Following the discussion of the institutional setup and the responsibilities of each part, this chapter addresses several distinct management issues: staff training, monitoring and evaluation, and auditing and accounting. Moreover, UVAB does not operate in an institutional vacuum or commands all the necessary skills to fulfill its responsibilities; therefore, implementation support received by UVAB during the course of this program will also be documented briefly.

Administrative Components

Staff training, monitoring and evaluation, and auditing and accounting have from the beginning been perceived as central elements of the demobilization program. Each of these components has direct relevance to every operational component and, consequently, can substantially contribute to the success or failure of this endeavor. While by and large, the planned design of each administrative component has been fulfilled during operations, the degree of achievement varies, pointing to some major weakness in implementation.

Staff Training

Phase I placed particular emphasis on training and orientation for Board members, headquarters staff, and—especially—district–based staff on program components and implementation. Nevertheless, district officials, DVAC members, DVRs and other veterans associations' representatives were also among the phase I target group. In later phases, training was mostly confined to DVPOs and DVRs, having been identified as the level most in need of skills improvement.

The overall objective of UVAP's training activities was to improve the skills and knowledge of staff and other officials concerned to enable them to effectively contribute to the program's implementation and to identify and respond to the economic and social needs of veterans and their spouses. Phase I training emphasized the common understanding of program objectives and implementation plans, including the roles and functions of each of the participants.

During phases I and II, UVAB organized a substantial number of training sessions for DVPOs and DVRs covering a wide range of topics, such as:

• Administrative management (e.g., payments and PTA fees)
• Program components and implementation of individual components
• Counseling and referral (especially for health and education)
• Teaching veterans and veterans' groups in project identification skills
• Identifying district resources for assistance to veterans
• Problem identification and solving
• Counseling on microproject application procedures, project formulation and management, and basic matters of business administration
• Record keeping
• Monitoring and evaluation.

In many cases, UVAB identified NGOs or private sector consultants with specialized experience in the respective field and in training of trainers to undertake the training activities. Several training courses, especially for district-based staff and district officials, were undertaken in the form of workshops organized on a regional basis. UVAB encouraged these training instructors to cooperate with DVPOs and DVRs to adapt the training to the needs of the local economy. Most central training activities lasted for short periods of one to three days; district-level training sessions lasted for up to a week.

Ideally, all training sessions would have been undertaken before the veterans of the respective phase were assembled at the discharge centers. The initial orientation activities were indeed undertaken prior to or with the inception of phase I; however, during the remainder of phase I, when 'getting the job done' became the overriding priority, training was relegated on the priority list; it had to be fitted into a tight implementation schedule. For instance, the first substantial training of DVPOs on monitoring and evaluation, project management techniques, and contracts was not undertaken before May 1993, after more than 20,000 soldiers had been demobilized and almost half a year after the commencement of phase I.

The seminars and workshops often lacked adequate preparation and proper orientation. They used modules that lacked focus, were not necessarily oriented toward implementation issues, were of a theoretical nature, and did not—as planned—deal with problem solving or counseling. Lessons learned have also not been documented as take-away materials for future reference. During phase II, this approach has partially been continued, with insufficient emphasis placed on counseling, project identification, and resource identification.

A severe hindrance for effective phase I management was that DVPOs had a poor understanding of monitoring and reporting, topics inadequately covered during training. Many DVPOs had not kept accurate records. A special workshop was then organized by UVAB to determine the level of data gaps and how these could be filled. Nevertheless, on return to their offices, not all DVPOs actually improved their monitoring and reporting procedures. Phase II placed strong emphasis on training in this area and, subsequently, the DVPOs' activities improved in quality and quantity.

The training programs should have turned the DVPOs and DVRs into knowledgeable resource persons in all areas of reintegration. Although several training sessions were organized for them, they focused on administrative procedures and touched on reintegration issues in only a cursory manner. Gender and counseling issues were neglected. Nevertheless, training was an invaluable component of the program, greatly assisting UVAB and district staff in their duties and enabling them to provide more comprehensive information to veterans and their spouses. Without training the program could not have been implemented as efficiently.

**Monitoring, Reporting, and Evaluation**

An information system that would continuously monitor the ongoing operations was one of UVAP's major components from the outset; however, despite the heavy emphasis in the design of phase I, monitoring, reporting, and evaluation got off to a slow start. After this quite disappointing experience, the component was redesigned for phase II and received valuable technical assistance. Monitoring and reporting improved substantially and the first genuine field evaluation provided many helpful insights on the program's impact on the ground. Still, several weaknesses persisted in continue

the use of the information provided for management purposes, an area that phase III will attempt to correct.
Phase I—Failed Endeavors

Phase I envisaged the employment of an independent consultant to undertake the monitoring and evaluation activities, in particular monitoring progress on the ongoing operations, providing timely feedback (including a profile of demobilized soldiers) to enable management to improve ongoing operations, and analyzing the impact of the program on the veterans, their families, and the communities of settlement. The instruments for data collection were to include administrative records and short (one−page) questionnaires for monitoring purposes and a qualitative beneficiary assessment for program evaluation.

DVPOs or their staff were charged with gathering district−level data. To this end, the instruments of data collection were designed to be as simple to fill in as possible, requiring only limited effort if undertaken regularly. The consultant was, then, expected to prepare monthly reports on the basis of the DVPOs' monitoring data. The beneficiary assessment was to employ participant observation and conversational interviews, It should have provided sufficient information to redirect, if necessary, community awareness and community work by the DVPOs and DVACs for the following phases.

Substantial delays occurred in the hiring process because of bureaucratic hurdles within PAPSCA's implementation unit and the Central Tender Board. It was, thus, not before April 1993, four months into phase I, that the contract with the consultant firm was finally signed. This delay, which was outside UVAB's sphere of influence, necessitated significant changes of the consultant's terms of reference. In effect, monitoring and reporting had to be redesigned in the middle of the operation, leading to changes in the report format and—inevitably—to great confusion among DVPOs.

As no consultant had been hired at phase I commencement, UVAB had to design all monitoring forms with only limited technical expertise. Furthermore, DVPOs were charged with preparing reports on their own without proper orientation; thus, only after the first 20,000 soldiers had been demobilized, and after a new standard report format had been introduced by UVAB, did DVPOs start submitting reports. The consultants then attempted to extract information on the veterans from the records in DVP offices. But the problems encountered during this exercise reflect on the poor implementation of the monitoring component under phase I.

• In quite a few districts, the forms were not filled in during payment of either the second or the third installment.

• In many cases, only part of the form was filled in, leaving out vital information. An accurate profile of phase I veterans could, thus, not be established.

• Information was often copied from the discharge certificate although it contained incorrect records, for example, misspelling of names and districts.

21 PAPSCA's implementation unit was approached for assistance due to its established experience in selecting and contracting consultants.

• Sometimes, the monitoring forms were given to the veteran to fill in him/herself, even if illiterate. In other cases, several members of the DVP office would fill in the forms using different methods.

• In a number of DVP offices, the files were not ordered and sorted, making retrieval of information cumbersome. Record keeping and storage by DVPOs was certainly below expectations in many cases.

• While many DVPOs did not have enough forms, and several improvised, many did not.
• Several DVPOs got confused by the multitude of monitoring forms supplied by UVAB. DVPOs simply did not understand what was expected from them.

DVPOs would usually blame lack of time and a heavy workload for their poor performance, claiming that filling in forms with veterans would take up to thirty minutes. Many also expressed disappointment over the slow or nonresponse from UVAB to their queries and other urgent matters; thus, records remained incomplete, standard formats were not followed, and reports submitted became less regular and less comprehensive as time went by, even though DVPOs had received more specific training toward the end of phase I.

Poor supervision by UVAB Regional Officers explains, in part, the laxity of DVPOs in filling in and submitting monitoring and reporting forms. Most districts were visited by UVAB staff at the time of demobilization and, subsequently, twice more when they were delivering payment documents for the second and third installments. Inadequate time was spared in between these visits to attend to other issues or problems related to implementation or inform DVPOs about the process in general.

The consultant firm also undertook a field assessment toward the end of phase I demobilization, but its mixed approach of quantitative and qualitative methods as well as its sampling techniques seriously jeopardized its findings. The firm was also not properly briefed or supervised due to lack of expertise at UVAB. In the end, little reliable information was available on the program's impact on the veteran, his/her family, and the community.

Phase II— Improvements Through Redesign and Technical Assistance

The objectives and methodology remained virtually unchanged during phase II; however, the administration and organization of this component were substantially modified. Among the major changes were:

• Monitoring and evaluation were separated. Monitoring was undertaken in–house while evaluation was contracted out to consultants.

• The evaluation of the program covered (a) administrative records and (b) collection of qualitative data.

• The reporting system was streamlined and, thus, simplified to reduce the workload for the DVPOs.

• Capacity building was an essential feature of phase II. More emphasis was devoted to training UVAB staff and DVPOs to enable them to use statistical information.

• Information management was improved through organizing and presenting data in an integrated manner and in forms appropriate to various administrative and planning tasks.

In these endeavors, UVAB was supported by a monitoring expert and necessary hardware and software, all funded by DANIDA. The expert cooperated closely with his counterpart, the head of UVAB's monitoring and evaluation unit. This technical assistance proved crucial for the success in realizing the monitoring component in phase II.

The collection of monitoring data started at the discharge centers and was continued when the veteran reported to receive the second payment as well as his/her iron sheets. Information covered the following areas: identity, settlement and migration, health, land issues, family demography, children, education and skills, economic activities, and spouses. At all three encounters, veterans were asked particulars about their spouse(s) and child(ren). Additional information was collected for subgroups of veterans, that is, those who were entitled for PTA contributions or benefits under the education and health funds.
UVAB also provided DVPOs with standardized copies of district monthly reports and reporting formats for cases of death, crime, and migration. The monthly reports included the following information: petty cash, activities (meetings, field visits, training courses attended, and visitors), overview of changes in the number of veterans in the district, problems, complaints, and proposals, as well as reports on the implementation of the basic and enhanced benefits. DVPOs were expected to submit such reports regularly to Kampala. UVAB organized a two–and–a–half day workshop for Regional Officers and district–based staff to familiarize them with objectives, procedures, and responsibilities.

Again, supervision of and follow–up to DVPOs by the Regional Officers was not forthcoming as required. They were to be given preferential access to UVAB's four–wheel–drive vehicles to increase their mobility and, thus, improve the quality and effectiveness of the monitoring system. They were to collect district–level information regularly to update UVAB's central data base and develop district profiles. Still, all four officers combined had access to only one vehicle and, consequently, rarely visited the district offices.

In the absence of efficient supervision and clear directions, the reporting habits of several DVPOs were unsatisfactory to such an extent that disciplinary action had to be taken. For instance, between January and July 1994, fourteen out of thirty–seven DVPOs failed to submit a single monthly report, failures that have to quite some extent been carried over to 1995. The other problem has been timeliness, because most of those districts that submitted monthly reports did not do so in due time.

22 Initially, DANIDA also intended to design special studies of issues of social reintegration, namely AIDS/HIV, women, grassroots organizations of veterans, and chronically ill and disabled veterans; however, the research component was scaled down because of (a) UVAB's limited capacity to absorb findings and react on recommendations, (b) partly already existing information, and (c) DANIDA's expected lower profile in phase III. Instead of commissioning a gender study, DANIDA funded a Women Issues Specialist to assist UVAB in incorporating gender aspects in its planning and reintegration activities.

23 Veterans at assembly points were eager to be interviewed. Many apparently appreciated the opportunity to 'tell their story.' In a mass exercise with little room for individual worries and interests, the chance to talk about personal problems, for example, access to land, was obviously welcomed.

24 While the shortcomings of using the mainly male veteran population to provide data on their families were well understood, the scope of the operation did not permit the interviewing of spouses.

DVPOs rarely received feedback from headquarters, even if they did report properly and highlight various problems in the district, and did not know how they and their districts were performing in comparison to their colleagues. As in phase I, DVPOs were a major bottleneck in monitoring operations, this time, however, mainly because of a lack of incentives and, thus, frustration with UVAB staff and activities.

As district information was not regularly updated in the central data base, information at UVAB more often than not lagged behind. As a complicating factor, the financial department and the inspectorate of operations provided regular but often conflicting information on the status of the operation. To make matters worse, internal responsibilities were not clearly assigned and various units within UVAB did not fully share relevant information; thus, even with a substantially improved information flow, systematic and comprehensive reporting remained elusive.

The evaluation of operations and program effects has been undertaken much more thoroughly than in phase I. The beneficiary assessment especially provided a new perspective of the program and its impact at the grassroots. Overall, UVAB has been remarkably successful in data collection and analysis. Despite the shortcomings, the phase II monitoring and evaluation system has seen one of the most substantial improvements of all components.

Phase II— Improvements Through Redesign and Technical Assistance
over phase I.

Closing the Gap: The Management Information System of Phase III

The monitoring and evaluation structure and instruments as developed under phase II are appropriate and will remain unchanged under phase III. Also, after substantial efforts under phases I and II, DVPOs and their staff as well as Regional Officers have been adequately trained in monitoring and reporting; therefore, only refresher courses will be undertaken as part of the general training for phase III.

Modifications and reinforcements include the undertaking of more detailed statistical analysis to provide further quantitative evidence about the target group and—again—improved access to more four-wheel-drive vehicles by Regional Officers to enable them to spend between two to three weeks every month in the districts. Their monitoring-related duties will finally be centered on data collection from and feeding back information to DVPOs.

With monitoring and evaluation performing at acceptable levels of quality, the focus in phase III shifts to strengthening UVAB's data management. Phase III, thus, includes the development of a Management Information System (MIS) to increase overall management decisionmaking efficiency. The MIS will assign responsibilities, set procedures for the internal flow of information, facilitate comprehensive analysis, and improve regular reporting.

Phase III also provides UVAB with the possibility of venturing outside of the agencies immediately involved to address—for example, with quarterly newsletters—other donors, NGOs, or the general public. Such activities may enable UVAB to raise funds for reintegration programs while at the same time provide an incentive to DVPOs to perform their monitoring and reporting responsibilities systematically and efficiently.

In a sense, phase III will be more challenging than before. The contract with the DANIDA adviser, although extended for a short period of time, expired at the beginning of 1995. Simultaneously, his former counterpart, the head of the monitoring and evaluation unit, has already assumed other duties within UVAB. The new head received training for one month from the outgoing monitoring expert, a time too short to familiarize him with all his new responsibilities. Phase III, therefore, envisages technical assistance to UVAB on a short-term basis to back up the technically wellqualified staff with data analysis and information management support.

Auditing and Accounting

Special preparations for channeling huge amounts of funds to a vast number of beneficiaries had to be undertaken in a short period of time prior to phase I commencement. Among the accomplished tasks were:

- Drafting a manual of procedures and formats for accounting records and returns
- Identifying staffing needs and organizational arrangements as well as requirements for office facilities
- Proposing staff training and assistance to introduce procedures and systems designed
- Proposing banking arrangements, including procedures for payments to veterans
- Drafting terms of reference for the financial controller and program auditors
Designing a computer-based system of accounts.

To undertake these activities, the Board employed a management consultant and a systems analyst. The consultants trained staff in the procedures and also supported the startup of operations for several months on a short-term basis. The procedures they developed essentially remained unchanged during subsequent phases. UVAB has also employed an external Financial Controller as head of the finance department and an Internal Auditor to ensure that proper accounting and auditing procedures are followed.

As a prerequisite for the release of donor funds, the Board employed the services of an internationally certified external auditing firm to ensure that financial management and accounting were in accordance with established procedures. Under the guidance of the Board, the external auditor audited UVAB's monthly accounts for the first two phases. Its monthly audit reports were presented to the Board and copied to the Bank and the funding donor agencies within one week of the end of each audit period. The external auditor also certified the final statements of accounts on completion of each phase.

For phase III, monthly external audits will only be undertaken until the payment of cash benefits to veterans is concluded. Thereafter, a final audit will be carried out on completion of the program, that is, following the distribution of iron sheets and the payment of enhanced benefits.

Funds Management

Donor funding for the program came from two main sources: a 'Special Account' under the umbrella of the PAPSCA project and later the ongoing adjustment operation for the Bank's contributions, and a 'Pool Account' for the contributions of other donors. For this pooled trust fund established at the Bank, the customary 1 percent handling fee was charged from donors. The special account was in U.S. dollars, the pool account in both U.S. dollars and Ugandan shillings.

Funds from both accounts were then transferred to UVAB's Project Account. Initially, donors deposited US$2 million to cover two months' expenditure requirements; this was subsequently replenished against monthly audited statements of expenses.

Performance

At the start of phase I operations, accounting lagged behind due to the demands of the rapid pace of demobilization. By February 1993, however, the backlog was cleared and accounting proceeded in tandem with operational activities. Still, communications with district offices were quite inefficient because districts could not be visited regularly by UVAB staff and postal services were not entirely reliable. This contributed to several delays in the submission of accountability reports by DVPOs.

But, as the monthly auditing reports attest, financial management systems and controls have been meticulously followed by UVAB throughout the demobilization exercise with only minor discrepancies. All funds received by UVAB have been properly accounted for. This impressive performance from a financial management perspective prompted donors to continue funding of later phases at considerable levels.

Implementation Support

Even prior to the beginning of phase I, UVAB had cooperated with and/or received support from a number of institutions and this was decisive for successful program design and implementation. The closest links had been established with the NRA and the Ministry of Defense, at UVAP's 'point of reception' of soldiers. At the 'point of delivery' of veterans, the district level, there existed a sizable number of players that in one way or another were
part of the program. Lastly, the implementation of UVAP would not have been possible without the concerted efforts of external and local consultants in fields requiring special expertise.

**National Resistance Army and Ministry of Defense**

The major responsibility of the NRA was to disarm, assemble, and discharge the soldiers at various designated points (cantonments) located throughout the country. For this purpose, the NRA established a Reduction−in−Force Committee under the Army Commander to act as a consultative forum and facilitate coordination among the army units and staff, the MOD, and UVAB.

Supplementary activities included the provision to UVAB of lists of names of those to be demobilized, the compilation of health records and other essential data of those to be demobilized, continue

25 This transfer of funds entailed the sale of foreign currency to realize the required funds in local currency. Foreign currency was sold to the Bank of Uganda, which utilized it within the framework of the cash flow associated with the government's IMF program. The inflationary impact, initially feared by the IMF, was judged limited as (a ) many donor funds were redirected from other projects and, thus, had already been in the country, (b ) the individual cash benefits were relatively small, and (c ) the cash injections were rather thinly spread around the country.

26 As a result, UVAB later chose more expensive but also more reliable express mail services once per week for communication to each DVP office.

the preparation and printing of discharge certificates, the development of a detailed plan for the demobilization exercise, and liaising with UVAB on the dates and locations of discharge.

Close coordination and cooperation between UVAB and the NRA was essential for the success of the operation; thus, the Chief of Personnel and Administration and the Director of Records of the NRA were in constant coordination with UVAB in the preparation and implementation of each discharge exercise. Still, UVAB−NRA cooperation during phase I was not without problems. Initially, the NRA dealt with UVAB as another army department; only later did the NRA come to recognize UVAB as an equal partner, due to repeated efforts by the Board and the MOD.

Initially, UVAB also encountered major problems with the timeliness and accuracy of the NRA's records of soldiers to be demobilized. The NRA's computer department provided a computer list to UVAB before each discharge exercise, including the names of soldiers to be discharged sorted according to the district of destination. These were the officially certified lists of soldiers provided by the army. They were, however, often provided late and had at times been updated without proper communication to the barracks before discharge. This meant that soldiers who were to be demobilized were not assembled or, likewise, soldiers who had been deselected appeared for discharge. This placed an additional burden on UVAB's predischarge activities.

On the other hand, cooperation with the NRA functioned well during phase II. UVAB received the computer lists of every discharge well ahead of time. This enabled UVAB to prepare its own computerized documents such as paysheets and transport manifestos, to liaise with money transporters, contract transport companies, and install the necessary payout facilities at the centers in time.

The mobilization of soldiers by the NRA also improved, and shelter and infrastructure for payment in the discharge centers were better organized in phase II. The respective divisional commanders cooperated closely with UVAB's advance group to prepare the payout facilities, which sometimes included erecting makeshift constructions or temporarily acquiring furniture from nearby schools.
Overall, civilian–military cooperation successfully contributed to the smooth operations. It was facilitated by the fact that several Board members were senior NRA officers and that many of UVAB's senior staff, including the Executive Secretary, are former officers. UVAB staff was, therefore, familiar with the functioning of an army while still fulfilling their civilian mandate.

**Community Support Structures**

At the district level, an intricate web of major and minor responsibilities was woven by UVAP. Although not always successful, this endeavor proved helpful in turning many communities and community leaders into active players, thereby giving the program a solid base. Examples of such outreach activities, which varied from district to district, depending on the efforts and initiatives of the respective DVPO, were as follows:

- RC 3 and RC 4 chairmen were used to disseminate information in their constituencies as DVPOs lacked transport means.
- The DEO was the link between the DVPO and school headmasters/headmistresses for the execution of the PTA fund.
- The DMO examined veterans applying for support under the enhanced health care fund and recommended treatment.
- Headmasters/headmistresses received financial support when enrolling children of veterans.
- Directors of training institutes received financial support when enrolling veterans in vocational training courses.
- RC executives as well as local magistrates issued letters of administration to next–of–kin of deceased veterans.
- RC 1 chairmen provided letters of introduction to veterans to be presented to the DVPO.

Together with the formal role of the DVAC, district officials of all layers were closely integrated into program implementation, in many instances positively contributing to the acceptance of the program and of the veterans and their families.

**Consultant and Other Services**

Throughout this report, mention has been made of the services of third parties that helped in the execution of the program. The most pertinent of those are listed here to reflect the magnitude of the task with which UVAB was confronted.

- NGOs were hired to train UVAB and district–based staff and prepare and undertake predischarge orientation.
- UCOBAC executed a program for the supporting economic activities of women groups under phase I.
- An NGO specializing in providing services to the disabled will carry out the component for the severely disabled veterans under phase III.
- A lecturer for Mass Communication (Makerere University) was hired to train staff and NGOs undertaking predischarge orientation in addressing the public.
- Private transport companies executed the transportation of over 140,000 veterans and dependents.
UCB has been the banker to UVAB, transferring funds to the veterans' accounts at its local branches.

- A consultant was charged with undertaking the monitoring and evaluation of phase I.

- Two consultants were hired to undertake administrative and field evaluations of phase II. This arrangement will be repeated in phase III.

- A financial management consultant and a systems analyst set up UVAB's auditing and accounting system.

- An external financial controller is employed as head of the finance department.

- A consultant in management information systems will be hired to improve the analysis and utilization of data in phase III.

- An External Auditor has been auditing UVAB's monthly accounts on a monthly basis since phase I.

**Technical Assistance**

Apart from these services, the intervention of three donors is especially noteworthy: GTZ, DANIDA, and UNDP. UNDP's contribution in the form of three logistics officers proved a valuable intervention at the inception of the UVAP. DANIDA sponsored a monitoring expert for a period of one year to institutionalize the monitoring and evaluation system and train counterpart staff. Toward the end of phase II, DANIDA also funded a women's issues specialist to sensitize UVAB staff and program design to gender issues.

GTZ provided support in the form of two experts on organizational development and project management, and logistics, respectively. Their interventions ranged from setting up an organizational development system to project planning using the ZOPP approach, to assisting in the finalization of the transportation plan and facilitating adequate human resource development measures.

After more than two–and–a–half years, GTZ phased out its technical assistance by mid–1995. DANIDA has already terminated its long–term technical assistance. Due to the substantial support received, local capacity should be developed enough to enable UVAB to undertake phase III activities independently. Notwithstanding these capacity–building efforts, capacity might still be too weak in technical areas such as monitoring and evaluation for such a complex operation. Donors are, therefore, on stand–by for possible short–term assistance for phase III operations.

9—**Donor Involvement**

The UVAP budget amounted to an estimated US$42.3 million, implemented over a period of less than four years. This massive intervention could not be financed by the Ugandan government on its own. It was, therefore, clear from the beginning that donor support was necessary regarding both financial and human resources to design and fund the program; thus, almost 90 percent of program expenses have been covered by donors while all program phases were developed jointly by the government through UVAB and Bank–led donor missions.

Three multilateral and seven bilateral donors contributed to UVAP in one way or another. Most of this support
was in form of cofunding the program. DANIDA and GTZ, as well as UNDP in the start–up phase, provided much–needed technical assistance. Reflecting their substantial financial involvement, DANIDA, GTZ,27 the Netherlands, ODA, and SIDA also participated technically in the main appraisal missions.28 USAID, the European Union, Italy, France, UNDP, and UNICEF were participant observers attending the main meetings.

Donor Participation

For each phase, the government invited the Bank to lead a multidonor mission to evaluate progress to date and appraise the subsequent phase together with UVAB. During these appraisal missions, the government's proposed program of the next phase was discussed and amended or modified where necessary. Although only a small number of donors actively participated in any of the phases, all interested donors were kept informed about the mission's activities through regular briefing meetings. During these meetings, they repeatedly raised issues that were later on incorporated into program design.

On various occasions, donors participated in field visits to discharge centers to assure themselves that the necessary arrangements were in place and the process was functioning well. During phases II and III appraisals, mission members also visited all regions of the country to discuss the program and its impact with DVPOs, district officials, and veterans.

This approach of having donors participate actively or passively in appraisal missions proved a valuable means of fostering donor interest and support. Because donors felt included in the design of the program, they were sympathetic when it came to funding. At the end of each mission, the government organized donor conferences where government officials, led by the Prime Minister or the Minister of Finance, met with donors to discuss the final program of the subsequent phase.29 During or after these conferences, donors pledged the support necessary to start operations.

27 Although not directly funding the demobilization exercise, apart from the provision of long–term advisers, Germany showed strong interest in reintegration measures right from the beginning of the process.

28 During phase I appraisal, Catholic Relief Services provided critical input in the area of staff development and training. No NGOs, however, participated in later phases.

29 During these meetings, high–ranking NRA officers, usually the Army Commander and Chief of Personnel and Administration, were also present.

Purpose of Donor Contributions

Several donors expressed preferences for the use of their contribution, others provided support to the program in general. The Bank, for example, favored funding of administration expenditures, technical assistance, and selected in–kind provisions (vehicles and equipment). UNICEF allocated its contribution entirely to UCOBAC, and UNDP supported, among other things, technical assistance during phase I and training activities as well as predischarge orientation during phases II and III. USAID's preference to provide iron sheets and ridges in phase I was worth some US$5 million.

Timing of Resource Availability

Donors expressed concerns prior to the beginning of phase I that the time horizon envisaged would prove too tight for them to release the pledged funds in time. Nevertheless, on the government's request, the schedule was initially followed. To expedite procedures, donors diverted funds from ongoing projects to UVAP. Nevertheless, it soon became clear that donors, in fact, could not respond to funding needs in the required time. This led to
postponements of further discharges as well as delays in providing benefits to veterans.

The most severe case of delay occurred with the delivery of iron sheets and ridges by USAID. Pledged in the autumn of 1992, they were finally distributed between December 1993 and February 1994. Funds also came late for phase II; the first discharge was not undertaken before April 1994, five months after the initially planned starting date. On several occasions, therefore, the unfavorable level and timing of releases of funds had a disruptive impact on UVAP's implementation schedule.

**UVAB–Donor Coordination**

With so many parties involved in the program, coordination between UVAB and donors became a key factor. This coordination was undertaken in various forms at the request of either party. For instance, MOD and UVAB were regularly invited to attend donor meetings organized by the Bank. On these occasions, UVAB and MOD briefed participating donors about the program's progress and problems. In addition, UVAB and MOD undertook close consultations with donors on request.

Moreover, UVAB presented monthly reports (management letters) to the donor community, carrying the standard breakdown of statement of sources and applications of funds and monthly management reports. These also contained observations and comments on and corrective actions taken in response to the External Auditor's monthly auditing report.

The closest and—at the same time—most important period of coordination was during appraisal missions. The Bank and participating donors cooperated in every activity with UVAB, from designing and costing enhanced entitlements to discussing increases in staff salaries or improving supervision of and providing feedback to DVPOs.

Donor agencies have shown a considerable degree of interest in the demobilization exercise, both financially and politically. Their interest and commitment has been substantially vindicated by continue

UVAB's professional level of operations. Despite repeated donor concerns about UVAP's political environment (rehiring of local defense units, increasing defense expenditures) UVAB–donor relations have been exceptionally good throughout the program.

**Significance of Donor Involvement**

Without donor financial and technical assistance, UVAP could not have been launched. While individual support has at times had a disruptive impact on operations, overall donor involvement was successful. Certain program components substantially benefited from explicit donor participation, especially headquarters operations from technical assistance provided by GTZ and DANIDA.

Despite the concerns raised during appraisal missions, donors generally responded positively when it came to funding the individual phases. This does not imply, however, that this support was always easily forthcoming. The longer the demobilization process, the more donor fatigue became a factor because (a) their aid budget was curtailed, (b) the objectives of reduction in force and government defense expenditure were not met to their full satisfaction, and/or (c) their priorities shifted to higher payoff projects of reintegration. Anticipating the donors' desire to continue onward to reintegration initiatives, subsequent phases had to be carefully balanced between essential program objectives and concerns for underfunding. Still, such donor fatigue delays and possibly threatens the implementation of phase III as agreed between donors and government.
The Bank coordinated donor activities and support, administering the funds provided by donors and holding regular meetings on the progress of operations. Essentially, being a Bank project with donor cofunding, the Bank also provided the task management for the program from Washington D.C. and Kampala. The government has appreciated the catalytic role of the Bank in assisting in designing the program and soliciting donor funding. Donors, in turn, have commented favorably on the extent and nature of the Bank's involvement. To them, the Bank is an efficient means to ensure that the program is implemented well and with high accountability standards.

10— Program Financing and Costs

Program Financing

Donor Contributions

The total expenditures are estimated at USh 42.3 billion (USh 1,000 to US$1; Table 10.1). Bilateral donors provided an estimated USh 34.1 billion (79.0 percent), multilateral donors contributed another USh 4.2 billion (9.7 percent). The government's financial support amounted to USh 4.9 billion (or 11.3 percent), reflecting its commitment to the program.

In all, ten donors contributed to the funding of the program. In some cases, receipts by UVAB differed from donors' pledges. The major reason for such discrepancies was the fluctuations in the exchange rates among the Uganda shilling, the U.S. dollar, and the national currencies of donors. Rarely did donors reduce or redirect their initial pledges. Overall, donors provided approximately USh 38.3 billion, 89 percent of which came from bilateral sources.

Based on the pledges for all phases, ODA, USAID (with its in–kind contribution of iron sheets worth US$5.0 million), and DANIDA were the biggest donors with close to US$7 million each. Other significant contributors were the Netherlands and SIDA with almost US$6 million each. IDA contributed US$3.1 million, and UNDP and UNICEF provided technical assistance and additional program funds.

Following the donor conferences at the end of each appraisal mission, UVAB started preparations of the subsequent phase on the basis of pledges made. In various instances, however, problems arose with the extent and availability of donor funds. Not infrequently, a donor's internal funds disbursement mechanism worked too slowly in relation to the required speed of implementation. Furthermore, in not all cases were all pledges honored. On the positive side, some donors increased their contributions during operations.

Delays were particularly limiting in two aspects. First, operations could not start or had to be suspended when funds were not provided as planned. For instance, phase II demobilization had to be interrupted for the period from May to July 1994 for want of funds. Second, funds for enhanced benefits were disbursed long after operations had started, leading to unwelcome delays for veterans to access these entitlements.

Before phase II demobilization started, the Uganda shilling substantially appreciated against the U.S. dollar from USh 1,140 to US$1 at phase II appraisal to USh 900 to US$1 at phase III appraisal. Donors responded unbureaucratically to cover the shortfall of around 10 percent–hard

30 The tables and charts are presented in the Appendix to this chapter.

31 Phase II has only recently been completed and phase III is ongoing; therefore, actual receipts from donors

10— Program Financing and Costs
cannot yet be calculated in detail; neither can actual expenses be determined.

caus...—that arose from the appreciation of the Uganda shilling.

**Government Contributions**

The government was a significant contributor to UVAP. Its financial support for phases I and II amounted to US$3.8 million (or 11 percent of actual receipts). To cover a shortfall in phase I, government actually increased its pledge of US$0.4 million to a total of US$2.4 million. For phase III, it pledged another US$ 1.1 million (12.1 percent of phase III pledges).

Up to September 1994, government had allocated another USh 455.8 million to complementary reintegration initiatives that the Board intends to use for supplementing donor–funded components, namely vocational training, income–generating activities, assistance to the disabled, and counseling as well as covering overhead costs of overseeing reintegration activities.

**Balances**

For several components, the level of unspent resources by the end of the phase II budget period was quite high. This pertained to DVPO training, predischarge orientation, monitoring and evaluation, and education and health funds. The main reason is that the resources for these project components were received close to the end of phase II; thus, many activities under these programs could not be implemented in time. The implication of this situation is that the implementation schedule of UVAP and the available donor funds have been quite disjointed.

**Program Costs**

**Comparisons Among the Phases**

UVAP can be divided into four expenditure categories of demobilization, reinsertion, and reintegration as well as administration. Their share in the overall budget as well as allocations on a per veteran basis have changed over the phases (Tables 10.2, 10.3, and 10.4, and Chart 10.1).32 Overall, the phase I budget amounted to USh 20.2 billion, covering 22,903 soldiers whereas phase II reached USh 11.4 billion for 9,308 soldiers. The budget for phase III reached USh 8.9 billion for 4,147 soldiers. Per veteran costs increased from USh 0.9 million (phase I) to USh 1.2 million (phase II) to USh 2.1 million (phase III).

The per capita demobilization benefits (transport and orientation) increased from USh 63,300 in phase I to USh 112,900 in phase II. In phase III, the demobilization costs amounted to on average USh 187,600. The reinsertion entitlements increased from USh 737,700 (phase I) to USh 916,300 (phase II), largely because of cost increases in the program's in–kind contribution, that is, GCI sheets. In addition, several indirect costs have not been budgeted in the initial phase, for example, bank charges for the transfer of the second and third installments, insurance charges, escorts, and continue

32 For reasons of comparability and data availability, phases I and II are based on the budgeted amounts rather than expenses. Phase III, which is ongoing, was initially budgeted on the assumption of a demobilization of 12,000 rather than the actual 4,147 soldiers. Although the amounts have been adjusted, the breakdown by expenditure category is preliminary.
for school fees and the health care fund.

The reintegration benefits per veteran reached a meager USh 10,000 in phase I and increased threefold to USh 31,700 in phase II. For phase III, the average reintegration benefits multiplied to USh 426,700, mainly due to a substantial increase in the training fund. The importance of reintegration components is mirrored in the percentage share in the respective budget. During phase I, reintegration benefits received just 1.1 percent of the budget. This share more than doubled to 2.6 percent in phase II, and reached an impressive 19.9 percent in phase III.

Administration expenditures decreased from USh 1.6 billion to USh 1.0 billion from phase I to phase II; however, their budget share increased from 7.9 percent in phase I to 9.0 percent in phase II. Phase I administrative costs reflect the need to incur startup costs for establishing the institutional structure, relating in particular to vehicles and office equipment. Administrative costs increased to USh 1.3 billion in phase III or 14.3 percent of the budget. The increase in phase III is due to the fact that maintaining UVAB as an entity implied fixed costs irrespective of the number of veterans demobilized. Moreover, additional staff in DVP offices had to be hired, the higher operation and maintenance costs for DVPO motorcycles and UVAB vehicles were higher, and more field visits were undertaken by UVAB staff.

The initially envisaged program period of six months for each of the first two phases proved too short and UVAB, as an established entity, had to continue operations. Unallocated balances available at the end of phases I and II were then used to cover UVAB's administrative expenses until the next phase commenced. This shortcoming has been corrected with the obvious result that personnel expenses (in particular in the field offices) are substantially higher in phase III than hitherto. Factors contributing to this increased wage bill are the hiring of nine additional Assistant DVPOs and an increase in all basic salaries by 15 percent to offset the loss in real incomes during the first two phases.

**Total Program Costs**

Overall, the UVAP costs are estimated at USh 40.5 billion in a period of less than four years. Of these, USh 3.3 billion were required for demobilization, USh 30.3 billion for reinsertion, and USh 2.3 billion for reintegration. Total administration costs have been kept at USh 3.9 billion and account for 9.6 percent of the overall cost.

The major share of UVAP's expenses (74.8 percent) was incurred by reinsertion entitlements, another 8.1 percent were incurred on demobilization benefits and 5.7 percent were used for reintegration; thus, close to 90.0 percent of UVAP costs have in one form or another been used for the program's beneficiaries. On average, each veteran received USh 90,200, USh 832,600, and USh 63,100 for demobilization, reinsertion, and reintegration, respectively, thus, a total of USh 985,800. Calculated at an average exchange rate of USh 1,000 to US$1 over the course of the program, each veteran received US$986 or over five times the per capita GNP of US$180 in 1993. The cash benefit is, thus, roughly equivalent to an average yearly income of a family of five, which, given the number of spouses, children, and dependents (especially orphans) points to a cash and in-kind support by UVAP to the veteran and his/her family roughly commensurate with the yearly income of an average Ugandan household.

The package definitely facilitated a veteran's transition to civilian life. Indeed, the ability to invest the money received in two big installments was a major facilitating factor. There were, nevertheless, those who considered the package barely adequate—only 'pocket money' for serving the nation—for enabling them to settle in a civilian environment. Considering the magnitude of needs, the entitlements might indeed have been 'nothing but a drop in the bucket,' as some argued. Considering the scope of the program, however, the entitlements were as much as could be provided to 36,358 soldiers.
**Appendix**

**Table 10.1**  
Program Funds (in US$) a/

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Phase I Pledges</th>
<th>Phase I Receipts b/</th>
<th>Phase II Pledges</th>
<th>Phases II Receipts c/</th>
<th>Phases I and II Pledges (%)</th>
<th>Phase I and II Receipts (%)</th>
<th>Phasedland II Pledges</th>
<th>Phasedland II Receipts (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Multilateral contributions</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDA</td>
<td>2,100,000</td>
<td>2,100,000</td>
<td>1,000,000</td>
<td>1,000,000</td>
<td>3,100,000</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>3,100,000</td>
<td>9.1</td>
</tr>
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<td>UNDP</td>
<td>300,000</td>
<td>261,150</td>
<td>185,000</td>
<td>185,000</td>
<td>485,000</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>446,150</td>
<td>1.3</td>
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<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>250,000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>250,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>250,000</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total multilateral</td>
<td>2,650,000</td>
<td>2,361,150</td>
<td>1,185,000</td>
<td>1,185,000</td>
<td>3,835,000</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>3,546,150</td>
<td>10.4</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Bilateral contributions</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DANIDA</td>
<td>2,900,000</td>
<td>2,500,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Union</td>
<td>2,910,000</td>
<td>2,910,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GIZ c/</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>2,800,000</td>
<td>1,400,000</td>
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<td>ODA</td>
<td>1,500,000</td>
<td>3,000,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIDA</td>
<td>1,500,000</td>
<td>2,500,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAIDf/</td>
<td>5,457,500</td>
<td>5,457,500</td>
<td>1,555,555</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total bilateral</td>
<td>17,067,500</td>
<td>16,617,500</td>
<td>10,956,888</td>
<td>10,101,156</td>
<td>28,024,388</td>
<td>83.3</td>
<td>26,718,656</td>
<td>78.5</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Government of Uganda</strong></td>
<td>442,477</td>
<td>2,401,615</td>
<td>1,356,665</td>
<td>1,356,665</td>
<td>1,799,142</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>3,758,280</td>
<td>11.0</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Grand Total</strong></td>
<td>20,159,977</td>
<td>21,380,265</td>
<td>13,498,553</td>
<td>12,642,821</td>
<td>33,658,530</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>34,023,086</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Expenditurs (estimated).

Balance cared forward to phase III.  

Estimated balance. g/

a/ Exchange rate of USh 1,000 to 1 USS.

b/ UNDP revised its pledge; UNICEF funds never passed through UVAB; bilateral contributions were subject to exchange; government released additional funds.

c/ Difference of US$ 855,732 with World Bank and carried forward to phase III. Full details cannot yet be worked out.
d/ Receipts for phases I and II, pledges for phase III. Details on individual receipts from bilateral donors not available.

e/ GTZ provided two long–term advisers to UVAB with support technology, these expenses are not included in this contribution. In-kind contribution of iron sheets worth US$ 5 million.

g/ The estimated balance of US$ 1,437,884 covers program costs from January 1996 to completion.

Source: Uganda Veterans Assistance Board.

Table 10.2
Estimated Program Costs (in '000 USh)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Veterans demobilized</th>
<th>Phase I</th>
<th>Phase II</th>
<th>Phase III</th>
<th>UVAP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>22,903</td>
<td>9,308</td>
<td>4,147</td>
<td>36,358</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Demobilization

| Transport (total) | 1,449,958 | 947,000 | 418,000 | 2,814,958 |
| Pre–/post–disch. orient. | 104,200   | 360,000 | 464,200 |
| Sub–total          | 1,449,958 | 1,051,200 | 778,000 | 3,279,158 |

Reinsertion

| Cash entitlements | 12,771,408 | 5,589,350 | 2,317,904 | 20,678,662 |
| In–kind entitlements | 3,666,738  | 2,282,000 | 1,162,010 | 7,110,748 |
| PTA fees           | 457,422    | 550,000   | 618,636   | 1,626,058 |
| Health care fund   | 107,200    | 747,760   | 854,960   |           |
| Sub–total          | 16,895,568 | 8,528,550 | 4,846,310 | 30,270,428 |

Reintegration

| Severely disabled | 228,000    | 69,627    | 297,627   | |
| Training fund     | 295,000    | 1,290,987 | 1,585,987 | |
| Social communication |            | 144,400   | 144,400   | |
| Counseling and information | 264,638    | 264,638   |           | |
| Sub–total          | 228,000    | 295,000   | 1,769,652 | 2,292,652 |

Administration

| UVAB personnel | 35,235    | 223,659   | 210,958   | 469,852 |
| UVAB non–personnel | 521,872   | 208,532   | 295,600   | 1,026,004 |
| DVPOs personnel  | 109,200   | 106,496   | 284,048   | 499,744 |
| DVPOs non–personnel | 719,150   | 267,964   | 239,056   | 1,226,170 |

Appendix 282
Case Studies in War–to–Peace Transition

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Monitoring and evaluation</th>
<th>97,744</th>
<th>82,095</th>
<th>84,402</th>
<th>264,241</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Auditing and accounting</td>
<td>114,000</td>
<td>145,000</td>
<td>152,400</td>
<td>411,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub–total</td>
<td>1,597,201</td>
<td>1,033,746</td>
<td>1,266,464</td>
<td>3,897,411</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>20,170,727</td>
<td>10,908,496</td>
<td>8,660,426</td>
<td>39,739,649</td>
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<tr>
<td>Contingencies</td>
<td>540,700</td>
<td>214,441</td>
<td>755,141</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grand total</td>
<td>20,170,727</td>
<td>11,449,196</td>
<td>8,874,867</td>
<td>40,494,790</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source:* Uganda Veterans Assistance Board.

**Table 10.3**

*Estimated Program Costs per Veteran (in USh)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Veterans demobilized</th>
<th>Phase I</th>
<th>Phase II</th>
<th>Phase III</th>
<th>UVAP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Demobilization</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport (total)</td>
<td>63,309</td>
<td>101,740</td>
<td>100,796</td>
<td>77,423</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pre–discharge orientation</td>
<td>11,195</td>
<td>86,810</td>
<td>12,767</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub–total</td>
<td>63,309</td>
<td>112,935</td>
<td>187,605</td>
<td>90,191</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Reinsertion          |         |          |           |      |
| Cash entitlements    | 557,630 | 600,489  | 558,935   | 568,751|
| In–kind entitlements | 160,099 | 245,165  | 280,205   | 195,576|
| PTA fees             | 19,972  | 59,089   | 149,177   | 44,724|
| Health care fund     | 11,517  | 180,313  | 23,515    |      |
| Sub–total            | 737,701 | 916,260  | 1,168,630 | 832,566|

| Reintegration        |         |          |           |      |
| Severely disabled    | 9,955   | 16,790   | 8,186     |      |
| Training fund        | 31,693  | 311,306  | 43,621    |      |
| Social communication | 34,820  | 3,972    |          |      |
| Counseling and information | 63,814 | 7,279    |          |      |
| Sub–total            | 9,955   | 31,693   | 426,731   | 63,058|

| Administration       |         |          |           |      |
| UVAB personnel       | 1,538   | 24,029   | 50,870    | 12,923|
| UVAB non–personnel   | 22,786  | 22,404   | 71,280    | 28,219|
| DVPOs personnel      | 4,768   | 11,441   | 68,495    | 13,745|
| DVPOs non–personnel  | 31,400  | 28,789   | 57,646    | 33,725|
| Monitoring and evaluation | 4,268 | 8,820    | 20,353    | 7,268|
### Table 10.4
**Estimated Program Costs – Budget Shares (in %)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Veterans demobilized</th>
<th>Phase I</th>
<th>Phase II</th>
<th>Phase III</th>
<th>UVAP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Demobilization</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Transport (total)</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>4.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pre–discharge orientation</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Sub–total</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>8.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Reinsertion</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>Cash entitlements</td>
<td>63.3</td>
<td>48.8</td>
<td>26.1</td>
<td>51.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>In–kind entitlements</td>
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<td>19.9</td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>17.6</td>
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<td>PTA fees</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>4.0</td>
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<td>Health care fund</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>2.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sub–total</td>
<td>83.8</td>
<td>74.5</td>
<td>54.6</td>
<td>74.8</td>
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<td>Reintegration</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>Severely disabled</td>
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<td>Social communication</td>
<td>1.6</td>
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<td>Counseling and information</td>
<td>3.0</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub–total</td>
<td>1.1</td>
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<td>19.9</td>
<td>5.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>Administration</td>
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<tr>
<td>UVAB personnel</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>2.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>UVAB non–personnel</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DVPOs personnel</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DVPOs non–personnel</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monitoring and evaluation</td>
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<td>0.7</td>
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</table>

*Source: Uganda Veterans Assistance Board.*

**Table 10.4**

**Auditing and accounting**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phase</th>
<th>4,978</th>
<th>15,578</th>
<th>36,749</th>
<th>11,315</th>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>69,738</td>
<td>111,060</td>
<td>305,393</td>
<td>107,195</td>
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<td>Contingencies</td>
<td>58,090</td>
<td>51,710</td>
<td>20,770</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grand total</td>
<td>880,702</td>
<td>1,171,948</td>
<td>2,088,359</td>
<td>1,113,779</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Uganda Veterans Assistance Board.
### Chart 10.1

Program Components (in %)

*Source: Uganda Veterans Assistance Board.*
11—

Returns to Demobilization

The costs of war to Uganda in terms of economic development were quite substantial.33 Between 198283 and 198586, the GDP growth rate was a modest 1.6 percent; however, in the following four years, growth accelerated and averaged 5.8 percent per year. In the decade since the cessation of civil strife, annual GDP growth reached an impressive 6.1 percent. If the economy had grown at the four-year postwar average during the war, output would have been an estimated USh 495 billion higher, corresponding to 8.1 percent of GDP at factor cost.

Once in power in 1986, the NRM government did not demobilize but instead—as a sign of national reconciliation—invited members of other armies to join the NRA. Not surprisingly, therefore, the army grew in size and financial importance even though the country was 'at peace.' In fact, occasional guerrilla fighting continued up until 1991, and only then did government feel secure enough to initiate the demobilization process; thus, demobilization in Uganda was a peace–time exercise that allowed for proper planning and phased implementation. For these reasons, the calculations of economic, financial, and social returns are relatively easy, even more so as information on the target group has been regularly updated throughout the process.

Financial Returns

Although government is—even after demobilization and civil service reform—the major employer in the formal sector, its overall share in GDP at market prices is small, reaching its peak in 199192 at 7.5 percent. In 199394, the share of government spending in GDP was an estimated 6.4 percent. Not surprisingly, then, Uganda's resources devoted to military spending were overall quite small, peaking at 2.5 percent in 198990 and falling to 1.7 percent in 199394 as a result of demobilization.

While the defense budget might have been comparatively low compared to the country's GDP, its importance in government spending was immense; it peaked in 198990 at USh 51,752 million or 39.3 percent of the recurrent budget (Tables 11.1 to 11.3, Charts 11.1 and 11.2).34 But even before the first phase of demobilization started in December 1992, that is, in the middle of the government's fiscal year 199293, military spending decreased; it fell to 29.8 percent in 199192. Thereafter, its share further declined to 26.1 percent in 199394 as a result of demobilization, a reduction of 33.7 percent over 198990 and 12.5 percent over 199192. In absolute terms, real military spending reached its lowest level in 199293 at USh 36,378 million.


33 It is beyond the scope of this study to assess the potential output on the basis of the damage inflicted on the population (labor), infrastructure (capital), and the knowledge base.

34 The tables and charts are presented in the Appendix to this chapter.
occurring violent outbreaks. Moreover, other security forces had been brought under MOD's budget.

The financial returns to demobilization, that is, the budgetary savings from reduced defense expenditures, were nevertheless impressive. Compared to the three years prior to demobilization (198990 to 199192), government's defense spending was USh 28,976 million lower after demobilization (199293 to 199495), amounting to an average yearly budget savings of USh 9,659 million or 10 percent of government recurrent expenditure. The yearly savings amount to 19.9 percent of the predemobilization average of defense expenditures.

The savings of USh 28,976 million compare well with UVAP's budget of USh 32,478 million for phases I and II. Already at the end of phase II implementation, thus, government funds equivalent to almost 90 percent of the program budget have been released for other purposes.

By the Ministry's of Defense own accounts, it saved USh 58,398 million between February 1993 and June 1995 as a result of demobilization. This calculation is based on actual savings from not having to pay for salaries, ration cash allowances, and uniforms for 22,904 soldiers in 199293 and 199394 and 32,211 soldiers in 199495. A comparison between this calculation and the government's budget savings (USh 28,976 million) suggests that a substantial percentage of actual savings was used to improve the standards of the now leaner NRA.

During the predemobilization period, defense received more financial support than the social sectors (including education, health, and other social services). The ratio of social to defense spending reached its lowest level at the height of conflict in 198990 with 0.6. Thereafter, the ratio improved consistently, and in 199293, the year demobilization started, social expenditures surpassed defense spending for the first time in many years; the ratio reached 1.1. Because of the above-mentioned increase in defense spending, the ratio fell to 1.0 in the following year. Overall, the three-year ratio of social to defense expenditures before and after demobilization increased from 0.7 to 1.1 or by 47 percent.

The characteristics of the Ugandan demobilization exercise—prior planning and the peace-time effort—are clearly reflected in its financial returns. The NRA has been reduced in size and has become more professional (due to the categories selected for discharge) and better motivated (due to wage increases). Consequently, while overall defense spending is substantially lower than before demobilization, it remains an important category in the government's budget.

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35 These are the Presidential guard and the offices for external and internal security.

36 Expenses for movement of troops, drugs, training, and other field support requirements are not included in this calculation.

**Economic Returns**

With its well-developed monitoring and evaluation system, UVAB has collected a wealth of data at the microlevel, especially on phase II veterans. The calculation of economic returns for the first two phases, that is, the veterans' contribution to national income, can, therefore, be undertaken with relative accuracy. It is based on several assumptions:

- Comparative data for wages and earnings are for employment categories and skills similar to those of veterans. They have been collected in 1992 and are adjusted by the increase in consumer prices for subsequent years.

- The employment pattern of veterans in phase I is estimated on the basis of phase II findings, taking into account the fact that they were more likely to return to agriculture than to start informal businesses. For both phases, most veterans are engaged in agriculture, either selfemployed or as family or day laborers. Only a small number of
veterans are self-employed in commerce and production.

- None of the veterans is effectively unemployed, that is, all are economically active and receive a remuneration.
- Phase I veterans have invested 2.2 percent of the cash benefits (half the ratio for phase II) in gainful activities.
- All veterans engaged in economic activities immediately after returning to their homes.38

With these assumptions, the estimated income generated by each veteran, compared to the GDP per capita as well as to his/her average cash benefit, is calculated to provide some information on the economic contributions that veterans have made to Uganda's economy.

The 22,904 phase I veterans together have earned USh 9,997 million and invested some USh 281 million since their demobilization early 1993.39 Their contribution to GDP at factor cost is, therefore, USh 10,278 million. Phase II veterans earned and invested an estimated USh 2,136 million in 199495. All phase I and II veterans together, representing some 0.18 percent of the total labor force, contributed an estimated USh 12,414 million or 0.13 percent to GDP at factor cost between 199293 and 199495.

In comparison to the average post-demobilization GDP at factor cost for the economically active population, phase I veterans only earned 34.4 percent over the two-and-a-half year period since demobilization, and phase II veterans earned 41.0 percent in their first year of civil life. With the above assumptions, it is clear that veterans earned less than half the average Ugandan did, thus reflecting on short-term problems of economic reintegration.

Although a cost-intensive program, UVAP has created immediate returns on the donor's and government's investment. In relation to program and budget indicators, phase I and II veterans earned and invested close to 40 percent of the UVAP's budget (or 7.4 percent of the government's budget) between 199293 and 199495. Added to the financial savings of USh 28,976 million, the economic and financial returns surpassed UVAP's cost by a factor of 1.3 at completion of phases I and II. In addition, veterans of phases I and II earned and invested the equivalent of 67.2 percent of their cash benefits since demobilization.

At least part of this outcome can be attributed to the start-up capital for civilian life: phase I veterans received cash benefits in the amount of 1.2 times per capita GDP at factor cost for the economically active population; for phase II, the amount was 1.1 times; thus, veterans have—despite the many stumbling blocks—turned the program into impressive returns on the microeconomic level.

Social Returns

Although calculating quantitative indicators for social returns to demobilization is inherently difficult, UVAP's monitoring and evaluation system provides measurements for several positive and negative social effects on the
veteran, his/her family, and the community. They are summarized in Table 11.6.

These indicators confirm that—in relation to community life—veterans pose few social problems. Veterans and/or their wives experience sometimes severe social effects that limit their active participation in community life, but their spontaneous formation of groups for mutual support and income generation helps them overcome these personal constraints. Overall, the positive social returns seem to outweigh the negative social returns, even after a relatively short time period.

Appendix

Table 11.1
(Millions of USh, 1991=100)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Public administration</td>
<td>24,284</td>
<td>35,019</td>
<td>26,937</td>
<td>45,457</td>
<td>34,540</td>
<td>52,888</td>
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<td>Defense a/</td>
<td>38,427</td>
<td>51,752</td>
<td>44,760</td>
<td>49,423</td>
<td>36,378</td>
<td>40,698</td>
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<td>Education</td>
<td>20,905</td>
<td>19,999</td>
<td>22,679</td>
<td>34,470</td>
<td>28,218</td>
<td>26,762</td>
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<td>Health</td>
<td>5,160</td>
<td>6,684</td>
<td>7,536</td>
<td>10,465</td>
<td>10,180</td>
<td>11,042</td>
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<tr>
<td>Other social services</td>
<td>5,645</td>
<td>3,593</td>
<td>2,019</td>
<td>1,872</td>
<td>1,127</td>
<td>2,551</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local government</td>
<td>3,428</td>
<td>2,698</td>
<td>4,200</td>
<td>8,958</td>
<td>8,632</td>
<td>7,933</td>
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<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>3,742</td>
<td>3,542</td>
<td>3,840</td>
<td>4,876</td>
<td>3,980</td>
<td>3,651</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infrastructure</td>
<td>4,424</td>
<td>4,931</td>
<td>4,154</td>
<td>6,487</td>
<td>5,812</td>
<td>7,432</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other economic services</td>
<td>2,319</td>
<td>3,419</td>
<td>4,239</td>
<td>3,976</td>
<td>2,495</td>
<td>3,170</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>108,334</td>
<td>131,637</td>
<td>120,364</td>
<td>165,984</td>
<td>131,362</td>
<td>156,127</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total social services b/</td>
<td>31,709</td>
<td>30,277</td>
<td>32,234</td>
<td>46,808</td>
<td>39,525</td>
<td>40,355</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Fiscal year from July 1 to June 30.

a/ Excludes section 1 from Ministry of Defense.

b/ Includes education, health, and other social services.

### Table 11.2
Government Expenditures by Functional Category, 1988/891993/94 (% of GDP at market prices)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Public administration</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defense a/</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other social services</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local government</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infrastructure</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other economic services</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>6.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total social services b/</strong></td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Fiscal year from July 1 to June 30.

a/ Excludes section 1 from Ministry of Defense.

b/ Includes education, health, and other social services.


### Table 11.3
Government Expenditures by Functional Category, 1988/891993/94 (% of total government expenditures)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Public administration</td>
<td>22.4</td>
<td>26.6</td>
<td>22.4</td>
<td>27.4</td>
<td>26.3</td>
<td>33.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defense a/</td>
<td>35.5</td>
<td>39.3</td>
<td>37.2</td>
<td>29.8</td>
<td>27.7</td>
<td>26.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>19.3</td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td>18.8</td>
<td>20.8</td>
<td>21.5</td>
<td>17.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>7.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other social services</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local government</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>5.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infrastructure</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>4.8</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Other economic services

<table>
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<th>2.6</th>
<th>3.5</th>
<th>2.4</th>
<th>1.9</th>
<th>2.0</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total social services b/  

|          | 29.3 | 23.0 | 26.8 | 28.2 | 30.1 | 25.8 |

Fiscal year from July 1 to June 30.

a/ Excludes section 1 from Ministry of Defense.

b/ Includes education, health, and other social services.


Table 11.4  
Financial Returns to Demobilization

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Returns</th>
<th>Amounts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Three–year budget savings</td>
<td>USh 28,976 million; 59.6 percent of pre–demobilization average of defense spending.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yearly budget savings</td>
<td>USh 9,659 million; 10 percent of recurrent expenditures; 19.9 percent of predemobilization average of defense spending.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Three–year social–defense ratio</td>
<td>Ex–ante 0.7 to 1.1 ex–post; an increase of 47 percent.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Staff estimates.

Table 11.5  
Economic Returns to Demobilization

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Returns</th>
<th>Amounts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Income of phase I veterans</td>
<td>USh 10,278 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income of phase II veterans</td>
<td>USh 2,136 million.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income of phases I and II veterans</td>
<td>USh 12,340 million; 0.13 percent of GDP at factor cost between 1992/93 and 1994/95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of per capita GDP for phase I (phase II) veterans</td>
<td>36.6 percent (41.0 percent).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cash benefits in relation to per capita GDP for phase I (II) veterans</td>
<td>1.2 (1.1).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total income and budgetary savings compared to UVAP costs (ratio)</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Staff estimates.
Table 11.6
Social Returns to Demobilization

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Measurement (positive; negative)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Crime rate and anti-social behavior</td>
<td>Until mid-June 1995, only 159 veterans have been found guilty of some criminal act, i.e. 0.5 percent of all veterans discharged under phases I and II; veterans are also seen by communities as a deterrence to crime; veterans have been hired as local security guards; some 10 percent of veterans are considered undisciplined trouble-makers, drug abusers, or thieves.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Divorce and marriage rates</td>
<td>Up to 50 percent of veterans divorced after returning to their home village; a substantial number of veterans married after returning to their home village, either a first wife, a second wife, or after having been divorced.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Landlessness and housing</td>
<td>9 percent of phase II veterans were effectively landless; overall, the rate may be as low as 3 percent; 40 percent of veterans did not have a house upon their return to their home community.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mutual support</td>
<td>Veterans have formed a large number of groups and have jointly entered into a substantial number of economic projects; veterans informally support each other with information and counseling.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women's isolation</td>
<td>17 percent of marriages had not been formalized at discharge; 16 percent of wives do not speak the local language of the place of settlement.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Uganda Veterans Assistance Board.

Source: Uganda Veterans Assistance Board and staff estimates.
Chart 11.1
Government Recurrent Expenditures by Functional Category (in % of total expenditures)

UVAP provides manifold lessons about the design and implementation of such a massive program intervention. These lessons are enumerated not in the report's chronological order but sorted according to pertinent program topics. This list, thus, serves as a quick reference for the comparison with and the design of other programs.

**Political Context**

- A fragile regional security situation threatens to derail the demobilization and reintegration of fighters. Political stability and security are prerequisites to safeguard the gains of successful programs.
- Strong government commitment and cooperation from the army are necessary conditions for the successful implementation of a demobilization and reintegration program.

**Conceptual Issues**

- Reinsertion and reintegration are not distinct phases after demobilization but rather a continuum of transition from military to civilian life without a clear beginning or end.
- Utilizing existing organizational structures, preferably with a countrywide network, for a (quasi-)emergency response uses available expertise and avoids the problem of dismantling an additional bureaucracy once the emergency operation is completed. Such institutions should be tasked early at the design stage.
- An emergency program cannot meaningfully endeavor to build institutions or infrastructure when the immediate needs for direct service are so pressing. The monopoly situation allowed the implementing NGO to continue with its program undisturbed even though serious weaknesses were becoming apparent.

**Preparations**

- A detailed data base on the soldiers' socioeconomic profile, undertaken in advance of program appraisal, improves the relevance and design of program interventions.
- An ex ante analysis of the relationship between veterans and availability of arable land allows time to inform local officials of the pertinent problems and to seek early solutions by identifying alternative sources of land or employment.
- A trial run, that is, a small-scale demobilization prior to the full-scale exercise, provides valuable insights into actual operations and allows for the fine-tuning of procedures.

- An authentic, nontransferable, and noncorruptible identification system is of paramount importance and needs to be developed well ahead of time. The three keys to such a system are (a) the discharge card with photograph, (b) a benefits section, and (c) the specified next-of-kin.
Discharge certificates are frequently lost or stolen. There is, therefore, the need to plan for the swift replacement and nullification of such certificates.

A prior assessment of the banking system's capacity (especially in rural areas) and establishing ways physically to transfer liquid assets within a short period of time is vital to the smooth delivery of cash benefits.

An ex ante evaluation of existing health, education, and other community facilities and of their capacity to cater to the needs of the veterans and their families enhances the relevance of program interventions.

An analysis of the civilian population's views regarding returning veterans should be undertaken prior to the program to identify areas of special community support. A program awareness campaign of local leaders is an important contributing factor.

A comparative analysis of the household expenditure pattern of that part of the civilian population with similar economic characteristics to that of the veterans is essential in understanding the future demands on a veteran's resources and, thus, helps determine the design of the transitional safety net.

Design

A phased approach, whereby batches of soldiers are demobilized in consecutive phases, permits the continuous learning and improvement of both administrative arrangements and program design.

When veterans intend to take up agricultural production, the demobilization exercise should be linked to the crop cycle to maximize the income-earning potential.

The duration of the transitional safety net required by veterans returning to rural areas mainly depends on the crop cycle in the particular location. Urban returnees need different and—possibly—longer assistance, for example, in the form of specific training and employment schemes.

The composition of the entitlements package should—to the extent possible—reflect the needs of veterans in different socioeconomic environments.

Target Groups

Program support to the target group needs to attend to the veterans' special needs and expectations, especially differentiated by (a) rank (officers), (b) age (child soldiers), and (c) gender (female soldiers).

The support to a veteran's dependents needs to be adjusted to the particular definition of the family in the local context; thus, spouses and companions as well as biological and adopted children (especially orphans) warrant attention for assistance.

The severely disabled and chronically ill should be treated as a specially disadvantaged group. Special reintegration projects should be designed for them to ensure that their special needs are catered to.

Discharge

The trade-off of prolonged assembly and encampment (predischarge orientation against discipline and motivation) needs to be carefully balanced. Prominent considerations are security issues and cost implications. The risks of epidemics breaking out in such camps holding a large population should be borne in mind.
• Encampment can be used to gather specific data on the veterans and their dependents. Simultaneously, veterans form a captive audience for the efficient provision of information on military–civilian transition.

• The importance and usefulness of information prior to entering the new environment is strongly expressed by veterans. The best preparation for a local environment is by veterans already residing in the particular village or district; thus, ‘senior’ veterans can serve as instructors for ‘junior’ veterans during predischARGE orientation.

• Every precaution should be taken to ensure the safety of persons and property during transport. Special insurance policies should be taken out to this end.

• For postdischarge orientation to reach all returning veterans, proper arrangements have to be made for their arrival in the place of resettlement.

Cash Payments

• The use of bank accounts to transfer later installments provides veterans with simple education on money handling and banking and can contribute to rural capital formation.

Reintegration Support

• A demobilization and reintegration program is only a highly targeted, short–term, special policy intervention. It can and should ameliorate short–term immediate needs, but it cannot address long–term development needs. From the outset, therefore, links to the respective line ministries should be established to (a) take over specific problems on termination of the program and (b) embed these initiatives into the general development policies.

• When program beneficiaries (veterans, spouses, and children) receive support to participate in general programs (e.g., schooling), pertinent information needs to be shared and close cooperation sought with local officials to avoid misunderstandings and tension.

• Parallel programs need not be included in one uniform reintegration program or project. Clearly, however, information needs to be efficiently shared, for the promoters to identify the needs of the target group, and for the veterans to access the services.

Education and Training Support

• Imparting skills to veterans is not enough for economic reintegration. Just as important is information on how to access such services or apply them in gainful employment, irrespective of the sector.

• The demand–driven approach is an effective instrument for enhancing the relevance and efficiency of the training provided to veterans. Its effectiveness is, however, limited when the spatial distance between veteran and training provider/DVPO inhibits contact or communication.

• Formal administration requirements for entry into training institutes are a constraint to veterans without formal education. Specially designed, short–term courses with practical orientation appear most effective for creating skills for the local economy.

• If training is a central element of support, then the technical capacity of training providers will need to be identified and, if necessary, improved. Infrastructure investment lies beyond the demobilization program for its costs and implementation period.

Cash Payments
• Affirmative action often appears the only avenue to enable female veterans (or wives) to access program components. The degree of acceptance of affirmative action by male veterans is, however, not yet known.

**Community Preparation and Support**

• Although from the inception, UVAB was aware of the need to rebuild the community social fabric and engender the understanding necessary to form the basis of a new trust, it somehow got lost in the press to meet individual veteran needs. An information campaign should precede the demobilization program, for the plant will only grow to the extent to which the soil is prepared.

• A community support program is a critical component of any demobilization program but must provide visible benefits to the community to make them a part of it effectively. Community sensitization and political awareness is paramount in this effort.

• The ease with which a support network of trust can be rekindled around the veteran depends on the degree to which the social fabric of the society, that is, family and community groups, remained intact in the postconflict era.

• It is the interplay of a community's physical and social capital and the veteran's financial and human capital that ultimately determines the ease and success of reintegration. This further enhances community understanding and appreciation of the veterans' contribution socially and economically to the community.

• At least in the short term when it is most critical, the participation of communities, district officials, and veterans can only be elicited when funds are made available to cover the expenses they incur, most notably for transport and allowances.

• A DVAC is necessary to convince local elite to support the program, not so much to turn them into a part of the solution but to prevent them from becoming part of the problem.

**Administrative Arrangements**

• When a component is administered at the local level, a trade–off arises between the need for accountability and the need for simplification, given a high number of clientele.

• Too much intervention from above can strangle initiatives from below, such as veterans' grassroots initiatives. Still the program can nurture them by using them for the implementation of specific components.

• The use of retired officers in the implementation of demobilization and reintegration programs can have the double advantage of (a) knowledge about army procedures and (b) trust by the army in the implementation unit. These advantages possibly have to be balanced against (a) conflicts of interest and (b) lower qualifications for undertaking such an operation.

**Outreach Activities**

• Outreach activities by headquarters and district staff are one of the crucial implementation activities. Staff need sufficient means to undertake them on a regular and evenhanded basis.

• DVPOs and DVRs perform three crucial roles for facilitating the veterans' social reintegration: (a) they are a lightning rod for a multitude of different problems, (b) they are a point of conflict resolution between veterans and communities, and (c) they are the link for the veteran to tap the existing social capital of the communities and...
subsequently to gain access to local development institutions.

• To combine the functions of information provider and human relations counselor using the existing bureaucracy proved difficult; however, one of the program's basic concepts was not to create a new bureaucratic layer. The experiences show that more training for the district-level staff on the one hand, a systematic referral service to church and social workers on the other was required.

**Staff Training**

• Staff training is necessary for efficient program implementation, but the method employed is key. Training needs to rest on more simulations of real problem solving using a case approach as in the Harvard Business School program or a clinical counseling training program. Training also needs to be completed before the actual start of program implementation.

**Monitoring, Evaluation, and Auditing**

• A crucial link exists between monitoring and evaluation on the one hand and support components on the other. The major value of a monitoring and evaluation system lies in consistently improving ongoing operations by regularly reporting and advising the secretariat and keeping abreast with major trends of events in the program.

• A monitoring and evaluation system is a complex component for an implementing agency like UVAB. Unless a donor provides technical in-house assistance, local capacity first needs to be evaluated and the monitoring and evaluation system designed accordingly. If consultants are employed, their work will have to be continuously scrutinized.

• The monitoring and reporting system can only be as strong as its weakest element. The apparent disinterest of many DVPOs and some headquarters staff was a continuously negative factor limiting its full potential to unfold. Systematic and regular field visits by the monitoring unit are one of the ways to contain such situations.

• The use of an external auditor can effectively improve funds management, especially in an operation such as a demobilization program in which large amounts of money are handled within short periods of time. The external auditor, in addition to ensuring control of program resources and transparency, also instills confidence in the donors as well as the beneficiaries.

**Implementation Support**

• The staff of those bank branches that are used to transfer funds need specific training on how to deal with this special group of clients. This will ease pressure on the bureaucracies normally existing in banking institutions, especially in rural areas.

**Funding and Funding Arrangements**

• The implementation of an emergency operation like the demobilization of soldiers can be substantially expedited by modifying an existing program or project rather than by creating a new one.

• The timely availability of resources is a primary factor in enabling smooth operations. Delays in transferring financial resources can cause severe interruptions, thus necessitating extensions of implementation periods.
The trade-off between cash and in-kind provision of benefits has become amply clear with the veterans' access to iron sheets. Efficiency and cost considerations have to be balanced with donor interests and modalities. To the extent possible, donor preferences should be secondary to program needs.

**Donor Involvement**

- Donor involvement is as crucial to the program's success as government involvement. The active participation of both players enables them to see the program as 'theirs' regarding its funding and implementation, respectively. Close coordination between the government and donors is central to achieving long-term ownership.

- A phased approach has the advantage of continuously improving operations; however, donor support can dwindle. If a phased approach is chosen to demobilize soldiers, some form of agreement should be developed to solicit donor funding support from the first through the last phase.

- The donors' budget cycles and funding releases need to be matched with the program's implementation schedule to avoid unnecessarily high positive or negative cash balances.

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