IMPROVING SECURITY IN VIOLENT CONFLICT SETTINGS
SECURITY AND JUSTICE THEMATIC PAPER

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1. Introduction

Violent conflict is the multifaceted and cyclical problem that the international community is trying to grapple with. To date, there has been a clear hierarchy concerning what forms of violence are seen to matter most, with political violence that threatens the state (either through inter-state or intra-state conflict) taking pole position. The cessation of political violence has been the central aim of intervention and peace building activity of international actors in the post-Cold War period. The focus on political violence has been nearly exclusive and there has been little attention to the likely and subsequent mutations of violence, such as the emergence of armed gangs, violent economic predation, and gender based violence. Indeed, these were seen as prices worth paying for ending political violence.

However, as the WDR shows, the subsequent mutations of violence through the emergence of gangs, organized crime and violent economic predation are having significant negative impacts on communities around the world. It is therefore critical to think about these different forms to formulate appropriate responses either in states which are deemed stable but face rising levels of violence or to be tacked onto ‘post-conflict’ peace building in states affected by war.

The complicated – and hybridized – motives for violence that the international community is now confronting make it extremely unlikely that purely political solutions will be effective in lowering the levels of violence in fragile states. There is now an array of different approaches and instruments which are deployed to contend with violence, ranging from voluntary and involuntary disarmament, small arms control, security sector reform and criminal justice measures. We argue that such measures need to be combined with actions that address the economic, legal, social and psychological aspects of violent conflict as well, if these security instruments are to work at all.

In examining this argument, this paper sets out a number of issues relating to security and justice definitions (in reference to the security-justice framework paper). It will then examine some of the problems associated with placing conflict into a box-set typology: mass violence associated with war and genocide carries unique features but also spawns new challenges which are often being ignored. The paper will then examine in brief some of the measures used by communities, governmental actors and international partners in contending with violence before outlining some key conclusions and recommendations. In reading this paper two further points need be borne in mind: (i) this does not provide a comprehensive overview of violence and security – that is the role of the WDR itself and (ii) this paper does not present fresh research, but more an overview, along with the other papers in the security-justice series, of some of the key issues confronting policy makers in the domain of security and development.

2. Concepts and Definitions

In addressing these themes, care needs to be taken regarding definitions of security. Particularly since the first articulation of ‘human security’ in the groundbreaking UNDP report there have been

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2 UNDP Human Development Report 1994
contending sets of definitions. An important aspect of the problem is as to who is defining the term and the attendant variation in perceptions and interests. Local communities will have a completely different interpretation of security compared to outsiders associated with peace support missions and aid programs. Central to community perceptions is either the complete absence of the state or the identification of the state with predation and insecurity. Meanwhile, aid-workers, who have been subject to an extraordinary increase in fatalities in recent years, want either to remain as invisible or protected as possible reinforcing the sense of isolation and separation. Some commentators even argue that these divisions are mimicked on a more global scale in which ultimately most external security-development support is for donor-country interests rather than recipients.

For the purposes of the paper, the definitional focus on security as an outcome has two principal aspects: (i) ‘physical security’ as a description of protection of the individual from violence and abuse as distinct from the maximalist definition of human security incorporating economic and social well-being. Critical at the individual level is that safety and freedom from fear then allows for the conditions leading to individual wellbeing. Related and increasing in profile is group security. Most commonly this has been associated with ethnicity and identity and the set of issues which often continue after the formal cessation of hostilities (e.g. in Kosovo and Rwanda) such as discrimination and revenge. Historically ever present but only recently generating the attention it deserves is violence associated with gender. Rape and sexual violence has always been associated with war. More recently it has achieved a higher profile in the literature and security-development discourse. Evidence suggests also that not only is sexual violence a weapon of choice in war but that often it continues after war has formally ceased albeit in a more domestic and therefore ‘silent’ fashion.

The other important aspect of security is (ii) national security, although often derided in many commentaries as it has been prioritized over human security. However, national security is particularly important in ensuring the credibility and legitimacy of fragile political transitions while not being used as an excuse to protect elites against the interests of civilian populations. Practical examples can include the security of a capital city (the transition in Somalia has been markedly different from other so-called ‘failed states’ with large parts of ‘lawless’ territory such as Sierra Leone or Liberia in the 1990s or Afghanistan in the 2000s as the capital city Mogadishu has remained largely out of bounds). Other critical ‘national issues’ relate to the holding of credible/peaceful elections and the protection of key political figures. Examples of the latter include the importance of the Protection Force in the Arusha peace process due to the legacy of political assassination in Burundi’s recent past. The impact of the loss of John Garang upon the Sudanese peace process is another. Another aspect of national security that is often neglected, but has implications for the sustainability of peace, concerns the ability of the state to control its borders. These are often a crucial site of economic predation, trafficking in humans and illicit goods (including arms). Effective customs and controls can have a big impact on the revenue of the state as well as the security of local populations and hence is a key component of security sector reform.

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4 ODI, *Providing Aid in Insecure Environments*, Update (Humanitarian Policy Group, 2009)
5 Duffield, *Development, Security and Unending War*, (Polity, 2007)
6 Mazurana et al, *Gender, Conflict and Peacekeeping* (Boulder, 2005)
8 Fitzsimmons, Gender in Charles Call (ed)
3. Stresses and Blurred Boundaries

Context: Between Pre-Conflict, Conflict, and Post-Conflict

In many of the cases national and international actors are now confronting, the differentiation between the pre-conflict, conflict and the post-conflict phase is just not clear. There are a number of communities around the world where the “normal” level of violence is greater than that in areas defined as war-zones. For example, in Ciudad Juarez, Mexico, over the last two years more than 4,300 people have been killed by hit-men working for drug cartels. Given that the standard definition of a war is 1,000 battle deaths per year, Ciudad Juarez is a war-zone.

Shifting to the lack of differentiation between conflict and post-conflict, this has tripped up international actors in the past. For example, in 2001 after the international intervention into Afghanistan the country seemed to be in a post-conflict phase (and programs were initiated accordingly), but over the last five years it has reverted into a conflict in key areas of the country. A similar phenomenon was evident in Iraq in 2003 when the U.S. and its allies acted on the assumption that conflict was over, only to be thrown back into facing an insurgency which required an extensive counter-insurgency campaign to damp it down.

Measuring Context: National to the Local

A particularly important point about these blurring of boundaries is the necessity to strengthen our means of measuring violence, in order to assess internal and external interventions to achieve stability. The predominant unit of measurement has been the nation state – but as violence has become more localized we need to think how individual/ group security can be better assessed. Efforts are being made through victim surveys and other methodologies to assess crime and violence at the national level (e.g. UNODC and the Human Security Report). However, there remains an absence of a common approach to recording basic human security indicators – and this remains very contested. If definitions and perceptions vary according to the actor, national or local, we must strengthen ways of measurement to ensure that we are succeeding in our interventions. Recent additions to the measurement of violence include the ACLED project and the World Bank KDP project in Indonesia, using local press reports. Challenges remain. For example, to date, there has been a lack of precision as to whether demobilization and reintegration processes have resulted in reductions in violence at the local/ sub-national level. We should be able to begin to measure rates of return and reintegration of ex-combatants to particularly localities as well as concomitant rates of insecurity. In turn, as a matter of course, surveys at the household level (usually for poverty or humanitarian purposes) should start to include indices of actual/ perceived threats of violence as a more accurate method of measuring violence in fragile settings.

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10 X-ref two current debates over excess mortality related to war: (i) HSC, The Shrinking Costs of War, the Human Security Report 2009 and the IRC public health assessments for DRC and (ii) the Lancet vs Iraq Body Count.
11 See http://www.acleddata.com/ and www.conflictanddevelopment.org
12 See Muggah, Columbia chapter, an interesting example of where this has been done.
What is critical here is the reinforcement of local capacity, communities, municipalities and local governments themselves, to document human security indicators. The examples of crime and violence observatories and prevention centers in Somalia and Jamaica are just a few of an emerging trend which should be encouraged.  

**Coherence: Normative Challenges**

As outlined in the framework paper there are some challenges related to the increasing emphasis on the security-development nexus and coherence between security/military, diplomatic and development actors. There is no doubt that strengthening coordination between the different sectors is one of the main challenges in large-scale intervention and this is indeed a key emphasis of the WDR. The nexus now has a comfortable position in international discourse: ‘there will be no development without security and no security without development.’ However, there are a number of challenges inherent in the double-side of this operational coin and in particular the argument that increasingly security priorities have superseded justice and development ones and therefore security-related activity can be short-term and ultimately counter-productive. Conceptually this is articulated in the term stabilization. Security measures and instruments are deployed to contend with violence with very short- to medium-term time frames in order to achieve ‘quick-wins’ and an absence of armed conflict. Short-termism therefore supports negative peace; without a normative framework the structural conditions which give rise to violence are unaddressed (i.e. positive peace). As discussed below, insecurity does not follow a simple linear trajectory of short-medium-to-long. In fact, ‘short-term’ conditions and measures can last for years. During this time, little is being done to reinforce legitimacy of action and trust – which we argue can only be enlisted with a reinforcement of human rights and other norms relating to justice. Instead, justice and development instruments are being utilized for achieving a negative peace to the detriment of their intrinsic credibility and effectiveness in their own right.

**Timeframes: and Sequencing**

A further challenge is that implementation of peace building elements such as DDR and SSR are not going to be the linear, straightforward operations that are planned for. They tend to be messier and involve some phases being repeated several times over before the desired outcomes (or as near as they can be obtained) are achieved. Examples of multiple attempts include Sierra Leone, Liberia and Angola, and the policies and reversals of those policies on DDR instigated by the U.S. in Iraq. The problem of

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14 UNDP Somalia 2009 and the Violence Prevention Alliance, Jamaica
15 UN SG report In Larger Freedom 2005
16 See e.g. Joanna Macrae and Nicholas Leader, The Politics of Coherence: Humanitarianism and Foreign Policy in the post-Cold War Era, (Overseas Development Institute, London, 2000)
17 UK Government, Quick Guide to Stabilization 2007. i.e. “the process by which underlying tensions that might lead to resurgence in violence and a break-down in law and order are managed and reduced, whilst efforts are made to support the preconditions for successful longer-term development”. Whilst there is no internationally agreed definition, this interpretation is equivalent to the term “stabilization and transformation” used jointly by the UN and World Bank in their Post-Conflict Needs Assessment, and “stabilization, security, transition and reconstruction” used by the US Government.
non-linear DDR and SSR is that when elements are seen to “fail” it harms the credibility of both international actors and local authorities. This points to the need for expectation management of several different groups; the fighters, the local community, the implementing agents, but particularly the donor partners. Conflict operations are therefore not suited to traditional development instruments which require precise objectives, outputs and indicators and are normally within relatively tight 2-3 year timeframes. Financing is required to support dynamic processes which are regularly interrupted and in which specific aims are not necessarily the same as at the outset.

4. Capacities and Capabilities

The WDR lays emphasis on the essential role of institutions to mitigate and manage violence. Key to that role is obviously both the ability and the will for institutions to respond. In examining the role of institutions, rather than covering the entire panoply of security instruments this section highlights several areas that either present key challenges to capacity or have nonetheless demonstrated significant challenges on a variety of actors to contend with violence. The focus will be on security sector reform, interim stabilization measures and disarmament processes in a variety of settings, not simply armed conflict.

4.1 Security Sector Reform Processes

There has been over the last ten years much effort at the international level to develop the policy framework and outline good practice behind security sector reform or what traditionally has been called civil-military relations. Much of this work has been generated amongst key donor countries and articulated within the OECD DAC. The WDR shares the definition of security sector reform as outlined in the OECD DAC framework and its four key objectives: (i) establishment of effective governance, oversight and accountability in the security system; (ii) improved delivery of security and justice services; (ii) development of local leadership and ownership of the reform process; and (iv) sustainability of justice and security service delivery.

Such a framework incorporates a number of different state and non-state actors and institutions, and processes other than just the military. Hence within the WDR the security sector includes those components and institutions referred to in all the security-justice papers. In highlighting the holistic nature of sector, the WDR also emphasizes that ‘no single model of a security sector exists.’ This is particularly important as a recurrent theme in the WDR is that form is dominating function – and SSR is a good example of a doctrine and concept that is inevitably associated with Western/ OECD donors. Further, there is a critique that much of SSR remains somewhat of a paper-tiger and there remains a large ‘gap between SSR concept and implementation.’

Democratization, Reform and SSR

A more helpful starting point therefore is to look at the evolution of SSR (before it was an acronym) and see it as part of a political reform process intrinsically linked to state (re) formation [X-ref to Stephen Ndegwa’s papers on statebuilding]. This is helpful in highlighting that SSR is fundamental to all societies

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19 Alfred Stepan, Rethinking Military Politics, 1988
22 Alan Bryden, Understanding Security Sector Reform and Reconstruction, DCAF 2004
including Western democracies as well as emphasizing the indigenous nature of the reform process; this is not something that can be imposed from outside. Successful SSR has in fact been most closely associated with successful moves to democratization with civilian oversight the most important aspect of reform.\textsuperscript{23} Where that shift to democratization has been fully-fledged then security sector reform has followed suit, even if sometimes with difficulty (as in Chile, South Africa and Ghana). Where democracy remains contested, sector reform remains particularly uncertain (Nigeria, Peru, and Guatemala). Alternative transitions have been those managed by dominant elites over time with a control over both the military and politics (Malaysia, Botswana, Turkey and Indonesia). However, where politics is more or less completely militarized there is little scope for reform without a radical shift (e.g. Zimbabwe and Burma). With reference to the last group, an outmoded tool (for a while at least), the coup d’état, has certainly come back into fashion in Africa (Mauritania, Guinea, Madagascar, Niger). The interesting change since the post-colonial period up to the 1990s is the rigor with which regional institutions (notably the AU) and the sub-regional economic communities (notably ECOWAS) have responded in condemnation: military rule is no longer seen as a legitimate form of government.

When sector reform has been aligned with a successful political reform process there has been a concomitant decrease in violence and predation by state security actors. Where violence has not diminished, despite a successful democratic transition, other reforms have failed; such as the continuation of socio-economic inequality on an extraordinary scale (e.g. South Africa or Brazil).\textsuperscript{24}

**Prompting Reform during Transition**

With the arrival of a relatively new doctrine has come the aspiration that external actors can somehow influence its adoption by national governments. As referenced in the other papers, security-justice proposals from the outside confront sovereignty at its most robust. Only certain transitional moments allow for the kind of influence which permits reform processes to be financed and supported, including changes in government. Possible entry points and opportunities include: (i) peace agreements (army reform was a key component in the 2000 Arusha Peace Accords for Burundi); (ii) the pull of regional actors (e.g. Georgia, and the draw of NATO and the EU; Morocco, and rapprochement with the EU; and Columbia and the US) pushing for modernization including greater financial accountability and; (iii) domestic drivers – including fiscal constraints, levels of violence/ crime, civil society and move towards democracy (e.g. the democratic transitions in Latin America, transition power-sharing governments as Zimbabwe).

Such reforms take time and have to be managed incrementally; SSR is ultimately a political process and therefore has to correspond with other democratic reforms in the legislature judiciary and civil society at large. This can result in ‘reform-overload’ (and disputes over which reforms come first) and hence a massive failure of expectations on behalf of donors financing such reforms (from the political to the security and economic sectors) as they are not happening fast enough. Another challenge is locating reform within a normative legal framework. The focus on modernization and professionalization of the security and intelligence services to meet counter-terrorism standards of donor countries post-9/11 has resulted in some countries in an erosion of other critical aspects of SSR such as civilian/ legislative oversight (for example in Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan and Nigeria). Even in countries in which reform is far less contested, such as Sierra Leone, the evidence suggests that international partners are not very

\textsuperscript{23} Cawthra and Luckham, *Governing Insecurity*, 2003

\textsuperscript{24} Gavin Cawthra, *Security Transformation in Post-Apartheid South Africa*, ibid
effective in providing a coherent strategic framework to support reform. In this case either the components are not linked up or some override the priorities of others.25

Such reforms must be managed with a focus on political process rather than results – again not something geared toward donor instruments and funding cycles. A successful approach to managing such processes in contested environments is also to include ongoing mediation between all parties. The Burundi Leadership Training Project run by the Woodrow Wilson Centre from 2002-2006 is a good example of how incremental change is managed within a coherent strategy articulated by national leaders supported by outsiders.26

The other security-justice papers address ways in which sector reform processes address violence particularly in non-armed conflict settings, where the emphasis is upon criminal justice and justice measures as opposed to military ones. The remainder of this paper covers how SSR addresses the violence associated with armed conflict.

SSR and Post-conflict Peacebuilding

Extensive literature exists on the challenges of SSR in post-conflict settings.27 What this paper will do is highlight key features that remain particularly urgent in terms of implementation from a development perspective. Wars carry with them certain legacies most notably for SSR purposes the following: (i) destruction of institutions and human capital leaving very little capacity for reform; (ii) the state itself has been heavily involved in massive perpetration of violence and; therefore (iii) there is little or no trust between state and citizen.

Particular problems are therefore confronted depending on the type of war-to-peace transition. Where the military is associated with the dominant regime and a victory settlement (such as in Sri Lanka, Algeria, Angola, Rwanda, Ethiopia and Uganda) while the economy may be stable and even resurgent, there is little space for the necessary political reform associated with SSR. External partners are confronted by a wicked problem: either to nibble at the edges of reform with a risk of not being able to apply a coherent and legal framework (e.g. funding modernization of force and not parliamentary oversight) or simply to be stalled by domestic politics (as in the Uganda Defense Review process).28

The other challenge is working with governments which are formed out of negotiated agreements in which the monopoly of violence is almost impossible to achieve during a politically fragmented transition (e.g. DRC, Afghanistan). Given the challenges of these different contexts a number of problems are frequently recurring:

Partial SSR: There can be a tendency for a limited scope to SSR – focusing for example more or less exclusively on the military (e.g. Sri Lanka, Columbia, DRC, Burundi) to the detriment of other components such as comprehensive justice and judicial reform. In DRC for example there has been an uncoordinated approach to SSR and army reform in particular with little attention to sexual violence and

25 Nicole Ball et al, Evaluation of ACCP, 2008
26 Wolpe and McDonald, Burundi’s Transition: Training Leaders for Peace, January 2006.
its relationship with army conduct. This is symptomatic of policy decisions in which the more challenging elements of reform are ignored as being too difficult. Here there may be ‘a discrepancy between ideal-type SSR and SSR in practice.’ This certainly echoes the need for reform processes to be more prioritized and focused and in turn less based on necessarily western/ OECD models. However, this should not be to the detriment of an overall normative framework, otherwise key objectives such as the rule of law and accountability can be undermined. A professional modern army unchecked by democratic control can in turn result in (more efficiently perpetrated) violent conflict.

**Parliamentary oversight and civil society involvement:** Civil society engagement, particularly from a non-northern perspective, has been important both politically and in terms of provision of technical expertise. The work of the Centre for Defense and Security Management and the Institute for Security Studies in South Africa, the African Security Dialogue and Research in Ghana and the Centre for Democracy and Development in Nigeria has been critical in strengthening the policy dialogue in SSR on the African continent as well as supporting reform processes in those countries. Where political reform processes have worked in the sector it has been contingent on (i) very close contextual analysis; (ii) support to informal networks and (iii) a deliberate strategy of supporting pro-reformers inside and outside government (as occurred in Serbia during the pro-democracy period after the demise of Milosevic).

**Budgetary reform and Financial Management:** at the policy level there is an increasing recognition that the key questions relating to budgeting in the security sector rest more on accountability systems and procedures rather than the ‘guns versus butter’ trade off of military and social service spending. There is nevertheless a ‘which guns’ debate particularly where northern donors are encouraging the acceptance of a counter-terrorism agenda. Accountability and adequate procedures remain a key challenge in practice and often recipient governments are subject to mixed messages: from the international financial institutions concerned about fiscal stability and from advice given about the security sector which can lead to the need to sustain large current spending requirements, particularly in terms of military payroll, as a price for peace. Key lessons are that the financing issues should be treated very early on in the policy dialogue as this in turn begins the process of (i) greater accountability and transparency; (ii) oversight and mainstreaming security public financial management into the rest of government and (iii) starts the discussion around the hard numbers in particular with relation to questions around sustainability.

The World Bank has begun to undertake public expenditure and financial management reviews in the sector but these remain quite rare. Recent developments around emergency engagement and its operational policies have resulted the World Bank taking a more flexible approach although still prohibited from directly supporting the sector. Particular opportunities arose for Bank engagement where there has been extraordinary international contribution to the sector (e.g. Afghanistan and Sierra Leone) and a concomitant concern about sustainability of spending. Key lessons from a public financial management review in Afghanistan were: (i) that public financial management practices can take into

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29 Hans Born, *SSR In Challenging Circumstances*, DCAF, 2009
32 Michael Brzoska, *Development Donors and the Concept of SSR*, DCAF 2003
33 Ball and Hendrickson, ibid on the World Bank in West Bank and Gaza.
34 World Bank, Legal Opinion on Peacebuilding Security and Relief Issues, 2009
consideration the most complex and confidential issues without undermining the application of fundamental principles of accountability to elected civil authorities; (ii) there is no justification for treating the security sector as sacrosanct or separate and not subject to budgetary and fiduciary processes and; (iii) there is strong justification for analytical work in the security sector from the development and PFM perspectives.\footnote{World Bank \textit{Post-Conflict Security Sector and the PFM Lessons from Afghanistan}, July 2006} Lessons from elsewhere suggest that often these budget functions are outsourced to outsiders with little attention to building capacity (Sierra Leone\textsuperscript{36}) or they are in urgent need of training and putting in place of systems and procedures (CAR\textsuperscript{37}).

The WDR argues that in situations where there is considerable donor financing to the security sector (e.g. Afghanistan, DRC, Columbia, Iraq) that regular support to the public financial management aspects of the sector is critical as there is a danger that donors are supporting an unsustainable security apparatus. Further, such support should also become the norm in less strategically important countries as (i) the security sector is such a key component in terms of state-citizen legitimacy and (ii) it is the most prone to corruption and off-budget spending.\footnote{World Bank, Central Africa Republic Public Financial Management Review, 2009}

\textbf{Transitional justice measures:} different constituencies confront a series of challenges relating to past violence and sector reform. Notably local communities have little faith or trust in national institutions until they see concrete steps at reform; international partners often are faced with working with governments associated with past grave human rights abuses. Engaging in transitional justice is critical to the restoration of trust between state and citizen and in terms of launching the development process.\footnote{Transparency International, 2008, 'Addressing corruption and building integrity in defense establishments', TI Working Paper No. 02/2007, London, UK} This is treated as a separate issue in the security-justice set of papers, but it is important to note that there are very few good examples of international support to transitional justice in the security sector. This has resulted in many problems particularly those relating to split objectives around trying to push democratic reform as well as pursue military strategies against spoilers (e.g. Afghanistan and DRC). Peace agreements can represent an opportunity for engagement on some of these extremely tough issues, such as vetting. ‘The weakening or dislocation of state power that occurs when a state is forced to negotiate an end to war opens the door to institutional reform, especially the demilitarization of internal state institutions.’\footnote{Duthie, \textit{Transitional Justice and Security Sector Reform},} Setting aside the enormous problems associated with increasing crime and violence in subsequent years, the peace process in El Salvador represented one of the most successful vetting processes of modern times in which, between 1992 and 1994, 103 listed officers out of 2,500, including the minister and vice-minister of defense, were removed.

\subsection*{4.2 Involuntary and voluntary disarmament}

National governments and international partners have adopted a number of different measures to deal with regular and irregular armed groups. One such measure is disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programs, commonly known as DDR. This is an instrument that has increasingly been used in the post-Cold War period and is now seen as a fundamental feature of post-war peacebuilding; as the UN SG has stated ‘the process of DDR has repeatedly proved vital to stability in a post-conflict
situation.” Although there is no official data, it is estimated that there have been at least some 60 official DDR programs since the 1980s with an aggregate of DDR spending at some US$630 million per year in the late 2000s. The UN and the World Bank remain the two key multi-lateral institutions financing and managing these programs illustrating their international nature. The World Bank alone has invested over US$ 1 billion of IDA or trust funds in over 20 programs in Africa in the last 10 years.

Another recently re-adapted tool is counterinsurgency. Although very prominent in the 1950s and 1960s when colonial powers sought to hold on to their territories, counterinsurgency (or COIN as it is commonly known) had fallen out of favor due to some spectacular failures (Algeria and Vietnam) and to the decline in the number of anti-imperial insurgencies. However, COIN is back. Some of the new challenges which led to its revival have arisen out of international military interventions into ‘rogue’ states (Iraq, Afghanistan), and some are the result of state attempts to deal with secessionist movements and rebellions (Nepal, Burma, DRC, Uganda and the Philippines).

Both DDR and COIN have development/security aspects and both involve attempts at disarmament albeit one coercive and the other not. Results have been mixed in terms of contending with political violence; for DDR in a post-conflict context success has been measured with the survival of the transition. However, increasingly both instruments are being subject to critique for a variety of reasons and some of the key issues and assumptions about their use are addressed below.

**COIN, legitimacy and the use of aid**: in the prioritization of security/ military objectives there are increasing concerns that COIN is counter-productive particularly in terms of gaining legitimacy amongst civilian populations. Leaving aside the issue of its merits in military terms, it is clear that when there is significant damage inflicted upon civilian populations as a result of military strategies or in response to them by insurgents that any trust between the local populace and central state (or its partners) is going to be further undermined. For example, recent military operations against the FDLR in eastern Congo and the LRA in northern Congo have had negative repercussions without providing security answers in addressing the insurgents themselves. In turn, there is recent analysis which suggests that the aid provided in support of COIN operations is extremely costly, poorly executed and does not have sustainable results. Evidence coming out of Afghanistan and northern Kenya is that military provided aid does not secure community loyalty or sustainable maintenance and operation, particularly when compared with parallel community development projects which have been built over time with community participation.

**DDR operations: unfinished business**

DDR has had success in terms of addressing political violence particularly when associated with strong governments formed as part of a victory settlement after war (for example Angola, Rwanda, Uganda). Problems start occurring when that military power is diffuse – and subject to negotiated agreements

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41 UN, *The Role of UN Peacekeeping in Disarmament Demobilization and Reintegration* (2000)
43 Reference.
46 Andrew Wilder, *Losing Hearts and Minds in Afghanistan*, December 2009, Middle East Institute
47 See World Bank, MDRP Independent Evaluation, Country Implementation Completion Reports, 2010
and power-sharing governments - and also at the more granular level when DDR does not address other aspects of violence. The most startling example is Mozambique, one of the earliest DDR operations and considered a model for peace building and social reconciliation. There is evidence that in the decade since the peace settlement many ex-combatants who are now military officers in the new armed forces have been able to provide a new economic lifestyle for themselves in the illicit economy:

The ex-combatant-criminal nexus is more apparent...among middle and high ranking officers, who have the stature and connections to be caught up in such services. Their involvement is viewed as particularly significant in the trafficking of drugs and arms.\(^{48}\)

Ex-combatants who entered the new armed services have been implicated in protecting the Nigerian groups running the cocaine trade and the Pakistani-Mozambicans running the hashish and methaqualone trade.\(^{49}\) Given that this has happened in Mozambique, the prime example of a successful DDR process, but a country with limited lootable resources, it seems likely that this criminalization process has been – and will be – replicated in countries where the conflict was waged over economic resources.

Another example comes from post-conflict Cambodia, where the political and military elite are implicated in illegal logging.\(^{50}\) Just as timber was used to fund the civil war in the country, in the post-conflict period the illicit activity has continued, but with the involvement of corrupt government. Moreover,

Illegal logging in Cambodia not only fills the pockets of the political elite; it also funds the activities of a 6000-strong private army controlled by Hun Sen. The Brigade 70 unit runs a nationwide timber trafficking and smuggling service, catering to prominent tycoons, that generates profits of US$2 million to US$2.75 million per year. A large slice of these profits goes to commander of the prime minister's Bodyguard Unit Lieutenant-General Hing Bun Heang.\(^{51}\)

In both the conflict and the post-conflict eras, Cambodians operating illegally have been able to trade timber out of the region and into the global marketplace, facilitated by the enormous amount of regular trade in which illicit activity can be hidden.

The case of Colombia illustrates how an incomplete DDR program can lead to unanticipated consequences; the growth of youth gangs and increasing levels of violence associated with their activities. In 1990 after the DDR of the guerrilla movement M-19, some of its former members became hired killers for the Medellin drugs cartel, whilst others formed gangs. After the subsequent break-up of the Medellin

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\(^{50}\) Global Witness, Cambodia’s Family Trees: Illegal logging and the stripping of public assets by Cambodia’s elite (June 2007).

cartel, former combatants went on to form new criminal youth gangs. In response to this escalation of gang violence, defense militias were formed and subsequently came to use parallel levels of violence, creating an additional security problem.

Mutations of violence can cross generations. The example of El Salvador illustrates this well. The civil war in El Salvador led to the flight of refugees, some of whom ended up in the United States (some legally, some not). These refugees worked hard to support their families but were often relatively neglectful of their children and in some cases committed violence against them. When the children became teenagers they created or joined youth gangs. In particular, Mara Salvatrucha or MS 13 has its roots in the Salvadoran conflict and has ties to the El Salvadoran FMLN paramilitary group. A second wave of refugees joined the gang in the U.S. after the end of the conflict; many of these had been combatants in the war. Many of its members were jailed in the U.S. and then deported to El Salvador, though often they did not speak the language or have any support systems there. Once in country they joined up with other MS 13 exiles and carried on their violent predation against the local population. The reach of MS 13 extends across Central America. Consequently, law enforcement officials across the Americas are now struggling with what has become a transnational violent gang.

**DDR: Security Objectives or Social Welfare**

Various constituencies are aware that the majority of the funding available for peace building comes in the early stages and that often DDR is the key – and possibly the only – activity that gets early and significant financing. Everyone is therefore keen to ensure that their priorities, be they personal or altruistic, get funded while there is money available. As a consequence, the concept of DDR has been expanded beyond just fighters to include others who have been affected by the conflict (war brides, children involved as porters and fighters, communities, etc.) and into issues not strictly relevant to DDR from the wider sector agenda. Thus, in some instances a relatively small proportion of DDR money is spent on actual gun-wielding fighters, compared to that spent on other groups. The “front loading” of funding has the negative effect of actually moving focus away from the core group – fighters – who need to be drawn into a political economy of peace. A good example was the process in Liberia in 2004-2005. Some 1,000-2,000 fighters at most were estimated to have participated in the fighting in Monrovia leading up to the demise of the Charles Taylor government and the Accra Peace Agreement of June 2003. In December 2003, a DDR program was launched and 12 months later some 104,000 ‘ex-combatants’ had been processed. What this demonstrated was that: (i) numbers of rebel forces was extremely difficult to calculate; (ii) policies relating to women and children had widened the door to DDR programs so that they were increasingly seen as the only welfare program of note in post-conflict settings and; (iii) due to the above two factors DDR was open to the kinds of manipulation in which anyone could enter the process claiming to be an ex-combatant. This in turn reinforced elites associated with violence by allowing for a system of kick-backs from program beneficiaries.

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**DDR: Reintegration into non-existent economies**

A key issue influencing decisions that fighters make about entering a DDR program concerns the economic provisions made for former fighters and their support systems (military wives, porters etc.). Before they put down their guns, fighters want to know that their economic needs will be met. Successful DDR requires their confidence in the government, and its international partners, to ensure that their economic security will be guaranteed. DDR programs are therefore intimately connected to creating a political economy that favors peace. This is easier to do in the short-term than it is in the medium-to-long-term; ex-fighters are returning to their own communities which are extremely poor and without expectations of sustained livelihoods. Economic reintegration into a fragile economy is therefore extremely problematic. In Sierra Leone for example, five years after the end of the conflict unemployment rates were estimated to be 65%, with youth unemployment higher still. Although Sierra Leone is generally considered a success story, clearly there remained real limitations on creating a political economy of peace.

In poor economies there are very few legitimate economic opportunities for former fighters. One known source of employment for former fighters is in the private security industry, ranging from the benign (guards for buildings) to the dubious (mercenary groups). The private security sector is often booming in fragile states as the government lacks the means to protect the citizens, so individuals and companies fill the gap in the market. There are some real advantages to this; fighters get to utilize some of their skills legitimately and have some economic security. However, the privatization of security is also a challenge to attempts to empower the state and return to it the enforcement capacity considered a central element of sovereignty.

**Social Reintegration: Community Acceptance**

To switch it around, while ex-combatants are trying to ensure their economic livelihoods as they return to civilian life, communities are determining whether these individuals can be accepted back into the community. Much of this depends on context: in Eritrea after the conflict with Ethiopia ex-combatants were received back with open arms and beneficiary surveys indicated successful reintegration rates of over 97%. However, in civil wars or more local violence, fighters may be associated with human rights violations against civilians. This can be hugely detrimental to social reintegration and building peace. As outlined in the transitional justice paper one example of the asymmetry between ‘security’ and ‘justice’ is in the financing of DDR operations compared to reparations for victims. Of the 22 countries with ongoing DDR programs in a recent global study, programs involving 1.25 million beneficiaries and the expenditure of more than US$ 2 billion, only a few have discussed the possibility of establishing reparations programs, but none of these countries has implemented one.

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55 For example, in Sierra Leone fighters in the field had “war is my food” written on their guns. How then do we make peace their food? This is the task of effective DDR.

56 Peter Uvin, *Ex-Combatants in Burundi: Why they joined, why they left, how they fared*, MDRP October 2007


58 World Bank, ICR Eritrea EDRP, 2006

59 Escola de Cultura de Pau (ECP), “Analysis of the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Programs Existing in the World During 2006” (Barcelona, March 2007)
In response to these concerns, DDR programs are increasingly incorporating community elements. Specific examples including tying all ‘reintegration’ entitlements to the communities into which ex-combatants are returning, or splitting reintegration activities between individual support to ex-combatants tied in with community grants. Another option has been to simply not provide ex-combatants with reintegration entitlements and instead providing a counseling and referral system so that they have the chance to enter into employment or public works like any other member of the community.  

**Reintegration: Combatants as Gang Members**

Dealing with only political violence through traditional DDR will not be enough for long-term violence cessation. Conventional DDR has a limited role to play (and cannot be expected to do more) when dealing with non-political forms of violence. As stated above, a failure in socio-economic reintegration can result in ex-combatants rejoining or forming youth gangs. The comparison with gang members bears further analysis:

1. Gangs and combatant forces both have youthful demographic structures, being mainly composed of young, single men in the 20s.
2. Members of both gangs and combatant groups are more likely to belong to minority groups (gangs often begin with an ethnic or territorial identity).
3. Both groups often abuse alcohol or other substances.
4. Both have symbols of group cohesion (specific clothes, amulets, tattoos etc.) and common heroes (Tupac Shakur for many West African combatants and Jesus Malverde as the “patron saint” of Latin American drug gangs).
5. Old-style gangs and combatant groups were hierarchical and tributary. New-style groups are horizontally organized and cell-based.
6. Both are often engaged in profitable criminal activity.
7. A mix of grievance, greed and identity issues led to their involvement.
8. Both groups use violence (including sexual violence) to intimidate, protect, extort, create status and internally police the group.
9. Individuals in both groups are subject to intense peer pressure.

This suggests that there may be some useful cross-learning between experiences of gang member rehabilitation and DDR. There is a growing national concern about the effects of gang crime on civil society and concerted research and practical work is underway to try to reduce gang violence in jail and post-incarceration gang member recidivism. It seems that punitive approaches alone have not been a

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60 X-reference MDRP, World Bank, UNDP Sudan.
successful deterrent to gang activity before, during or after incarceration.\textsuperscript{63} However, a number of studies identify good outcomes from programs that take a psychotherapeutic approach.\textsuperscript{64}

A 2006 Canadian study reports positive findings from a program for gang members involving “high intensity cognitive-behavioral programs that follow the risk, need and responsivity principles.”\textsuperscript{65} This program placed emphasis on the mental health of individuals and included appropriate counseling over a ten-month period. One particularly interesting finding of the study was the recommendation of treating the individuals most at risk of recidivism, rather than focusing on the easier cases.\textsuperscript{66} This is an interesting contrast to standard approaches to DDR which tend to begin with lower risk groups. Also of interest was the study’s discussion of the “portability” of the program, in which they concluded that the program could be adapted and used elsewhere as long as five treatment conditions were met. One of these was “to use ecologically and culturally sensitive teaching and therapeutic approaches to address the offenders’ criminogenic needs.”\textsuperscript{67} Although this arises from the fact that some of the gangs they were studying had aboriginal roots, it is helpful when considering applicability to DDR processes.

An intensive program such as this is inevitably expensive; estimated at $150,000 per person per year in 2006. However, a study in 2009 put the cost of a life of crime by a juvenile in the U.S. at between $2.6 and $5.3 million, excluding any notion of the human costs of crime to victims.\textsuperscript{68} In light of this, a successful intervention with a youthful gang member seems like a sensible economic calculation. Although this level of resourcing is clearly not feasible for DDR operations, a stripped-down version might be appropriate and affordable, particularly if it utilized locally appropriate approaches to treatment. For example, one of the reasons for the success of societal reintegration in Mozambique was the adaptation of healing rituals to provide “fresh starts” to former combatants. Depending on the region undergoing DDR there may be appropriate and respected local approaches to healing and forgiveness that could be channeled into aiding effective individual reintegration into society.

4.3 Interim Measures

Often in the lull of armed hostilities, broken by a political event, such as a ceasefire agreement, there is an opportunity for large-scale political violence to be broken and defused. These opportunities represent enormous possibilities for governments and international partners in terms of ensuring that the lull becomes a cessation of hostility and in turn the absence of violence can lead to conditions for positive peace: the classic linear trajectory in the minds of all policy makers. Depending on context, international partners may have pushed for a UN mandated peacekeeping mission or there may be some other form of international armed intervention. Policy makers are presented at this time with a

\textsuperscript{64} Michelle Gaseau, “States that take a case by case approach to gang management”, online at \url{http://www.corrections.com/articles/9549}
\textsuperscript{66} Di Placido \textit{et al}, p. 95.
\textsuperscript{67} Di Placido \textit{et al}, p. 110.
deployment gap i.e. the necessary capacities to control ex-belligerents and spoilers (ceasefire monitoring, demarcation, stand-down, and protection of key commercial routes, infrastructure points as well as civilian populations). One immediate challenge, the need to keep public order with a degree of legitimacy and trust by forces often with military rather than policing capabilities is addressed in the criminal justice paper. The other challenge is what to do with the regular and irregular troops which comprise the parties to the political settlement.

Different measures have been adopted and adapted by governments and international actors in dealing with this problem. These measures lie as a half-way house between security sector reform and demobilization; a quick way to absorb fighters, but they do not necessarily represent the ingredients of a larger reform process. Such measures as those ‘that may be used to keep former combatants cohesiveness intact within a military or civilian structure, creating space and buying time for a political dialogue and the formation of an environment conducive to social and economic reintegration.’ These carry with them attendant risks. First, they can maintain existing military power structures which can be quickly mobilized in the resumption of armed conflict. Second, they can be very costly to the public purse and can result in a tension between fiscal constraints and peacebuilding ones. Third, they also require some normative standards in terms of participation (such as by way of vetting) which can be neglected in the rush to take advantage of the opportunity. Nevertheless they can be a good operational option if the conditions are not conducive for root and branch sector reform or the economy cannot sustain a DDR program. Examples of such measures include:

**Army Integration:** The most common method in situations of high unemployment is the channeling of large numbers into the new armed forces (Burundi, DRC and Afghanistan). This can be seen as a form of ‘cantonment’ of fighters that ensures their economic security and – to some degree - their loyalty. This can be very costly and does create fiscal tensions. However, it is a frequent component of power-sharing agreements and there is some evidence to suggest that it increases the chance of successful peace implementation.

**National Service Corps:** an alternative is a disarmament or partial disarmament of forces and the creation of a national service formed of combatants who undergo a period of training and counseling in preparation of civilian life. In addition, such a corps is used for various public works such as road-building, waste disposal and other environmental projects (South Africa, Kosovo and Côte d’Ivoire).

### 4.4 Local/ Indigenous Peacebuilding and Disarmament

A compelling theme emerging from the WDR security-justice set of papers is the critical importance of locally-led processes. There can be a dangerous irony, that although they have the same ultimate objectives – peace and security – local efforts at peacebuilding and non-violence are perceived as unorthodox and incidental to the grander strategies adopted by governments and international actors. Local, community-led negotiations and conflict management is often seen as associated with the soft

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instruments such as peacebuilding and mediation; in fact these processes can lead to some very hard security outcomes, such as disarmament of militia.

One of the key questions of the WDR is what are the key gaps in supplementary international capacity? The answer must be a continued failing to understand, cohere with and support local processes. Thus, the analysis and application gained from indigenous efforts at peacebuilding remains somewhat peripheral to mainstream work on conflict and fragility. However, at the ‘national’ level, the minimal engagement of international partners in the peace and disarmament processes in Somaliland, Mali and Papua New Guinea are highly illustrative of what can be achieved. The example of Somaliland, which remains a relatively stable polity despite intense political conflict, is a testament to an indigenous disarmament process in 1995-96 which still holds despite the ongoing violent conflict that has ebbed and flowed in southern Somalia since 1991.

At the more local level, there are numerous examples where grass-roots mediation, reconciliation, dispute resolution and non-violent resistance have served as telling counter-points to armed violence. Examples include the peace committees in Kenya, the peace zones in Columbia and the mapping of local peace processes in Sudan and Somalia. All these represent cogent examples where local communities and local formal and informal authorities have negotiated cease-fires, gun-free zones, disarmament and other local security-related initiatives without central state or international intervention. The challenge for central authorities and external actors is how to support those processes without undermining them.

What we do see is a gradual trend of international agencies and donors beginning to fund more initiatives at the local level. This has particularly been productive in building off successful home-grown municipal and national programs coming from Latin America and the Caribbean. Here here are some unique characteristics which distinguish for example Latin American society – stronger institutions and enlightened pro-reform social movements – compared to post-war societies (in Africa or Asia). Yet, it is clear that these second generation approaches tend to endorse evidence-led policies focusing on identifying risk factors, enhancing resilience at the municipal level and constructing realistic interventions based exclusively on the identification of needs.

Many of these approaches focus on existing capabilities. For example, in many fragile states effective law and order is managed by a local civil guard or self-defense militia, some more malign (e.g. the Black Eagles in Columbia) and others more benign (the Arrow Boys in northern Uganda). A key challenge confronting local and national government is not necessarily how these groups can be disbanded (with the danger of them reappearing in another possibly more criminal context) but how they can be trained

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72 Mark Bradbury, Becoming Somaliland (Oxford: James Currey, 2008)
73 General Henny van der Graaf, Flames of Peace: Disarmament and Post-Conflict Peace-building in Mali in Remnants of War, Bonn International Center for Conversion Dec 2000
74 Andy Carl et al, Weaving Consensus: The Papua New Guinea–Bougainville peace process (Conciliation Resources 2002)
75 See www.peacenetkenya.org
76 Mauricio Garcia-Dwan Non-Violent Movements for Peace in Columbia and International Solidarity (Coventry University, 2006)
77 Bradbury et al, Local Peace Processes in Sudan (Rift Valley Institute, 2006) and Bradbury, The Search for Peace (www.interpeace.org, 2009)
78 Muggah and Krause, 2009 ibid
regulated and licensed so in fact they start to incorporate state functions according to normative standards.

The UN approaches in Haiti are illuminating and indicative of the failure of more conventional DDR and the way in which local approaches have informed internationally-led programs. From 2004 onwards the United Nations Stabilization Mission (MINUSTAH) struggled to implement a comprehensive DDR program. Initially it did not sufficiently take into account the particularities of the Haitian case and sought to apply models that had been successful elsewhere (for example, Sierra Leone). Even after MINUSTAH sought to adapt to the Haitian context it met with very limited success. However, at the same time as these ‘top-down’ DDR measures were being tried, more local ‘bottom-up’ approaches were being developed that focused less on DDR than on a holistic approach to violence reduction in affected communities. The actors engaged in these efforts include the National Commission for Disarmament, Dismantlement and Reintegration (NCDDR), UNDP, and local NGOs. Amongst their context-specific programs ‘Some...also touch on the question of reconciliation, but because many funders situate these types of projects in the grey area between security and development, they tend to experienced difficulty attracting funding.’ One of the needs identified locally was to deal with gang violence and the paucity of economic opportunities for Haitian youths. After taking on the violent gangs and dismantling their territories the program has moved to providing professional training for former gang members. Another element of the program aimed to alleviate ‘...the political and social exclusion and disenfranchisement suffered by Haiti’s poor, the slum dwellers and shantytown inhabitants.’ Any evaluation of the success of this local initiative is now likely impossible, following the devastating earthquake, but the journey from traditional DDR to a local focus on a holistic approach to violence reduction is instructive of what is possible.

There is therefore a welcome shift, still small and gradual, which is beginning to be informed by local capacities and capabilities and putting an accent on multi-sectoral responses to needs rather than necessarily hard security instruments. Such programs are trying to be more sophisticated in terms of focusing on key individuals implicated, such as commanders (in Afghanistan), or the sustaining of public works which generate sufficient employment opportunities and at the same time benefit the community (DPKO/ World Bank infrastructure programs in Liberia). The challenge will be how to scale this up.

Conclusion

From our analysis of both security reform and attempts at disarmament we argue that there is an inherent political (and financing) weakness in top-down state centric approaches to the implementation of security measures. In relation to security sector reform, we agree that most strategies bear two fundamental mistakes: ‘the first fallacy is that the nature and resources of the post-conflict and fragile
state are capable of delivering the reforms proposed. The second is that the post-conflict and fragile state is in practice the main actor in security and justice.  

Further, DDR cannot be seen as the catch-all instrument to solve all peacebuilding challenges – including social welfare, security and human rights objectives. The reason it has been subject to such a critique is that it is failing to address all these different challenges as it cannot be expected to. Key questions around social and economic violence can only be answered by multifaceted programming that supports reparations, and community economic recovery. In parallel, we argue that more individualized, security-oriented and sophisticated programs should be targeted at those involved in perpetrating and commanding violence akin to the kinds of approaches used increasingly in the west richer nations to deal with gang violence.

Aligned with the recognition that there are strong interconnections between political violence such as armed conflict and socio-economic violence such as organized crime, there should be a concomitant link between the study of armed conflict and criminology which has been absent to date. For example the work examining the dramatic increases in violent crime in wealthy countries attributes similar issues as raised in conflict studies around trust in government and levels of socio-economic equality. With regard to the increase in homicide in particular four correlates have been identified: (i) faith that government is stable and capable of enforcing just laws; (ii) trust in the integrity of legitimately elected officials; (iii) solidarity among social groups based on race, religion or political affiliation; and (iv) confidence that the social hierarchy allows for respect to be earned without recourse to violence. Our finding is that there is largely absent a normative framework in many violent settings which undermines legitimacy of institutions. Citizens in violent and war-affected situations simply do not hold trust in formal national institutions to serve and provide peace security and justice.

In conclusion it is clear that to begin to be successful in contending with violence, in post-conflict situations and elsewhere, the international community needs to draw upon a range of tools and approaches beyond purely political solutions. This has clearly been happening, for example, through the use of DDR and SSR strategies in both traditional post-conflict missions and in stability, security, transformation and reconstruction missions, through international, regional and local attempts to limit the availability of illicit small arms and light weapons, and through various grass-roots movements to mediate conflict and peacefully resolve violent conflicts. Another element of this is the increasing deployment of development as a tool for violence cessation. Our argument is that development in such circumstances can only be useful coming behind a political platform such as institutions or processes which have legitimacy and capacity. Could development projects have been useful say during the Nazi pogroms in the Warsaw Ghetto? Why would livelihood programs in our current conflicts or urban settings work any better? The security-development nexus therefore has contributed to considerable confusion and possible scape-goating: the idea that reintegration incentives can prevent ex-combatants give up lucrative extortion rackets is ludicrous. However, what we can say is that the range of tools available to the international community for violence cessation is improving. More could be done, particularly in terms of “reintegration” processes for former fighters being re-tooled to pay explicit attention to pre-empting mutations of violence. At the same time, the security sector reform is central to building trust between state and citizen; what is required is a more nuanced and bottom-up approach to supporting existing formal and informal security structures.

Baker and Scheye, Multi-layered justice and security delivery in post-conflict and fragile states (Conflict security and development, December 2007)

Key Recommendations

(i) Focus on sustainable and localized programming supporting local and national capabilities, formal and informal structures, including peacebuilding and mediation, to achieve hard security goals;

(ii) DDR as a specific project should be more focused on security objectives around key individuals involved in violence, akin to armed gangs, accompanied by more multi-faceted programs addressing reparations, human rights and community recovery;

(iii) Programming should be flexible: conflict-oriented operations are not development operations – we should re-examine our instruments down to results-tables; sustainable outcomes for example are very questionable in the kinds of contexts we are discussing.

(iv) Public financial management should be one key and regular entry point for government engagement in security sector reform.