Monitoring and Evaluation of Peace Operations

with the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs

Cedric de Coning and Paul Romita, rapporteurs
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Executive Summary

A number of institutions and experts are engaged in developing and applying monitoring and evaluation (M&E) methodologies and techniques to peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations. In recent years, these operations have been tasked with mandates that are more complex and ambitious than ever before and that strive for integration and system-wide coherence. Their scope and complexity have necessitated the development of a wide array of sophisticated M&E systems, many of which analyze the overall or system-wide impact of peace operations and attempt to provide greater clarity on what constitutes success and effectiveness in these operations over the short, medium, and long terms.

It is against this background that the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI) and the International Peace Institute (IPI) hosted a workshop on the “Monitoring and Evaluation of Peace Operations,” in New York on May 7-8, 2009. The workshop highlighted many of the theoretical, methodological, and institutional issues related to M&E processes. It was structured around case studies that represented a variety of real-time, mid-term, and end-of-phase M&E systems. These focused on a range of integrated strategic frameworks (Afghanistan, Burundi, and Liberia), which analyze the effects of the peace process as a whole, as well as mission- and campaign-specific frameworks (Chad/Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Haiti), which explore the contributions of these missions and campaigns in the context of wider peace processes.

Among the challenges in M&E processes highlighted at the workshop were the following:

- **Contribution vs. attribution**: It is particularly difficult to make causal linkages between particular inputs, outputs, outcomes, and impact because of the challenges of isolating the effect of one activity from other factors that may have led to a particular result in a peace operation. An alternative approach—albeit one that is less appealing to donor countries and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) that fund M&E processes—is to focus on the contributions particular activities or interventions make to a desired outcome, especially in the context of highly dynamic, conflict-affected environments where a variety of factors are at play.

- **Quantitative vs. qualitative methods**: Qualitative and quantitative methods in M&E processes should be used in a complementary fashion that maximizes their respective comparative advantages in relation to the particular context in which they are applied. Quantitative methods are generally useful in processing linear data, while qualitative approaches are helpful in analyzing higher-order considerations such as assessing theories of change and the relevance of a particular programmatic approach.

- **Evaluating DDR programs**: Evaluating disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) programs is especially difficult because sustainable DDR requires achievements in other benchmark areas. Thus evaluation across a variety of sectors is needed. Most DDR evaluations focus specifically on programmatic issues, but there is a greater need to consider the political dynamics that affect DDR processes.

- **System-wide evaluations**: Since they have such a broad scope, careful attention needs to be focused on what particular elements may be missing from system-wide evaluations. Such evaluations are particularly challenging because different actors bring different timeframes, planning assumptions, worldviews, and organizational cultures to the table during the course of an intervention.

- **Process and use of evaluations**: Working through the process of identifying benchmarks and indicators—especially when there are multiple actors involved in the context of system-wide evaluations—can forge common understandings of outcomes to be achieved in strategic decision-making processes. In practice, however, reconciling competing perspectives is very difficult. What is particularly important is that those who help to formulate M&E approaches also have a hand in applying them, thus helping to mitigate potential methodological and analytical misunderstandings during implementation.

The ability of organizations to adapt to fluid environments, learn from mistakes, and adjust course is an important element of how well they will fare in peace operations. The workshop focused on some of the ways that organizational learning can help to strengthen M&E approaches. First, even if they do not reach agreement on indicators, goals, and outcomes to be achieved, organizations can share knowledge more effectively, helping them to operate more efficiently
Introduction

WHY AN EMPHASIS ON MONITORING AND EVALUATING PEACE OPERATIONS?

Contemporary peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations have been tasked with more complex and ambitious mandates than ever before. While the unprecedented scale and scope of these missions have generated interest in whether they are efficient and effective, the field lacks a common approach to monitoring implementation, tracking progress, and evaluating impact. A number of institutions and experts are engaged in developing and applying monitoring and evaluation (M&E) methodologies and techniques to peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations. Yet current practice does not meet expectations: efforts are fragmented, limited, and uncoordinated, and do not yet significantly influence the institutional culture and operations of key actors, such as the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO).

There are multiple reasons for a greater emphasis on M&E. First, particularly in the context of the global financial crisis, those responsible for funding missions demand more information on their cost-effectiveness. Second, the record of past interventions is mixed, and those responsible for planning, managing, and implementing missions demand more clarity on what would constitute effectiveness and success. Finally, we need to better understand and minimize the risk of negative impacts and unintended consequences on host populations. Hence, monitoring impact and evaluating results should receive at least the same attention as oft-studied areas like planning, coordination, and integration.

To date, the most common form of evaluations are single donor end-of-term evaluations, where an attempt is made to appraise the added value of a specific contribution to an intervention on, for example, gender mainstreaming or the reintegration of ex-combatants. There have been a number of attempts over the last two decades to undertake joint donor evaluations, i.e., where a number of donors come together to assess the progress made in, for instance, the reform of the security sector in a given context. However, despite increasing emphasis on integration and system-wide coherence, there have been surprisingly few attempts to date at monitoring or evaluating the overall or system-wide impact of a peacekeeping or peacebuilding operation.

This may be changing: as joint programming and integrated frameworks become the norm in

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1 “Peace operations,” as used in the title and throughout this report, is an umbrella term that includes stabilization, peacekeeping, reconstruction, and peacebuilding operations, and is not meant to refer only to UN operations. The case studies covered at the workshop, and in this report, reflect some of the range of cases covered by the term.

2 The attached program and participant list provide a sample of some of these organizations, researchers, and practitioners.

peacekeeping and peacebuilding, there is increased focus on developing methodologies to assess the overall impact of system-wide or comprehensive approaches to given crisis situations. Such evaluations would have to be multinational, multiagency, and multidimensional (i.e., not only focusing on peace and security, but also on socioeconomic, rule of law, and human rights indicators). The need is both for real-time monitoring and long-term impact evaluation.

The UN Security Council has in recent years become increasingly interested in monitoring progress and measuring the impact of UN peacekeeping missions, and is now routinely asking for the development of benchmarks against which progress can be tracked. The interest of the Security Council in the monitoring and evaluation of peace operations has been informed by two considerations. On the one hand, there is a need to fine-tune and adjust mandates in response to the evolving situation on the ground. On the other hand, there is pressure to consolidate, draw down, and withdraw missions as soon as responsibly possible. Both of these drivers require a more systematic approach to the monitoring of progress against goals and objectives provided in Security Council mandates, and can be served by periodic objective evaluations of the overall progress made in a particular peace process. The UN Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) has shown the same interest in M&E, both in terms of monitoring progress against objectives agreed to in Integrated Strategic Frameworks, as well as in evaluating the effect and impact of those activities funded by the Peacebuilding Fund.

The emphasis on M&E is also driven by financial concerns about the cost-effectiveness of peace operations—concerns that have been heightened by the ballooning cost of peace operations in an era of scarce economic resources. The 2008–2009 annual budget for UN peacekeeping was approximately $7.1 billion, compared to $1.5 billion a decade ago. Under the UN’s assessed contribution system, the United States, Europe, and Japan together contribute approximately 88 percent of the UN peacekeeping budget. They also fund the bulk of the costs of the African Union (AU) peace operations, which amounted to approximately $1 billion over the last half decade in Burundi, Darfur, and Somalia. The combined cost of both UN and AU peace operations pales in comparison to the financial commitments of the USA for the interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq, where in 2008 American tax payers were footing a bill estimated at $12.5 billion a month for Iraq and $3.5 billion a month for Afghanistan.

From a financial perspective, it is thus understandable that states may want peace operations to be as small, limited, and short as is necessary to achieve their objectives; from a substantive perspective, however, they want to achieve meaningful and sustainable conflict-management goals. Over the last few decades we have learned that it is much cheaper, both in terms of human and financial costs, to invest in consolidating a peace process than to withdraw prematurely. Premature withdrawals in Haiti, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Timor Leste have had severe consequences. The development of reliable M&E tools to guide decision-making processes—such as benchmarks for peace consolidation—would thus make a significant contribution to the responsible management of peace operations.

THE WORKSHOP

Against this backdrop, the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI) and the International Peace Institute (IPI) hosted a workshop on the “Monitoring and Evaluation of Peace Operations,” in New York on May 7–8, 2009. The workshop brought together approximately sixty experts with experience, knowledge, or a special interest in the monitoring and evaluation of peace operations, representing a wide range of academic, governmental, nongovernmental, and international and regional institutions and organizations.

The workshop was designed to accomplish four objectives: (1) to create a forum to share information and experiences among those engaged in monitoring and evaluation; (2) to collect best practices and lessons learned from case studies; (3) to identify current gaps and challenges in methodologies and application of monitoring and evalua-

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tion; and (4) to develop ideas to strengthen research and practice in monitoring and evaluation.

The workshop agenda was conceptualized with three factors in mind. First, the focus on both peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations was intentional and reflects the growing recognition that peacekeeping and peacebuilding activities and goals are overlapping and mutually reinforcing. Second, in order to provide a broad overview of current monitoring and evaluation efforts in peace operations, the workshop focused on a range of M&E systems, including several case studies covering a wide geographic area. This was part of an effort to analyze the applicability of, and challenges to, M&E in a variety of contemporary conflict and postconflict environments, and was informed by the assumption that various innovations are underway in the field that may not yet have been absorbed by the policy and research communities. Third, the workshop agenda provided space for reflection on different methodological and research challenges to monitoring and evaluation, as well as some of the policy and institutional challenges for improving monitoring and evaluation in the peace operations context.

This report highlights the major themes that emerged from the workshop. It is divided into five parts. After this introduction, the second part focuses on different theoretical and methodological approaches, the third reflects on the case studies, the fourth section focuses on organizational learning, and the fifth offers conclusions and recommendations for next steps. The workshop was conducted under the Chatham House Rule and, thus, while this report serves as a summary of the highlights of the meeting, contributions are not attributed to specific participants.

Theoretical and Methodological Challenges

The workshop used the OECD-DAC definitions for monitoring and evaluation as a conceptual starting point. Monitoring was generally used in the context of an ongoing real-time measurement of effect by the executing agency, while evaluation was understood as considering the relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability of an ongoing (mid-term) or completed (end-of-term) activity by an external agent. When we evaluate activities we typically look at inputs, outputs, outcomes, and impact. In both M&E the assessment usually encompasses the products generated by the activity, the immediate effect achieved, and the overall impact the activity has had, or is likely to have in the future.

IDENTIFYING CAUSALITY: CONTRIBUTION VS. ATTRIBUTION

One of the main challenges in M&E is meaningfully determining outcomes and impact. There are many interlinked causal dynamics at play in these contexts, and observed outcomes have not come about necessarily only (or even primarily) as the result of the activities or intervention being evaluated. While this is an issue in program evaluation, it is even more of a dilemma in system-wide interventions where multiple actors are simultaneously undertaking a broad range of activities. It is difficult to make a clear causal link between inputs, outputs, outcomes, and impact because it is impossible, in most cases, to isolate the effect one activity may have had from all the other factors in any given context that may have contributed to an outcome.

An alternative approach would be to focus on contribution rather than attribution, i.e., to consider how a specific activity may have contributed to an outcome. This approach is less satisfactory to those undertaking or funding interventions, as they would prefer to be able to present clear results to their financial contributors or tax-paying public, and the organizational or parliamentary committees that approve their expenditure. It is, however, more realistic and honest, in that it acknowledges the complexity of tracking causality in the highly dynamic and nonlinear multiagency contexts within which peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations take place.

We follow a different methodology when our M&E process considers contribution rather than causality. When trying to determine causality we usually seek to identify outcomes and impact from the perspective of what the activity set out to achieve. When trying to determine contribution,
however, we have to identify the outcomes before trying to identify how an activity or intervention has contributed to generating those effects. The latter methodology lends itself to consider and compare the contribution of the activity being evaluated with the contribution of others. As these contexts are highly dynamic and nonlinear, it does not make sense to only monitor or evaluate progress against plans and objectives. Instead the monitoring or evaluation needs to take into account how the situation has changed during the life-cycle of the activity being assessed, and how those responsible have responded and adjusted to these changes.

Monitoring and evaluation are especially challenging in the context of UN peacekeeping operations. UN Security Council resolutions tend to articulate strategic goals that are vague, ambitious, wide-ranging, and long term. At the same time, they may authorize specific operations that have tasks limited to a specific phase of a peace process, with clear time-frames and limited resources. In other words, the strategic goals articulated in such mandates often fail to distinguish

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**Key M&E Concepts**

- **Activity**: the actions taken or work performed through which inputs, such as funds, technical assistance, and other types of resources are mobilized to produce specific outputs.
- **Benchmark**: reference point or standard against which performance or achievements can be assessed.
- **Effectiveness**: the extent to which an intervention's objectives were achieved, or are expected to be achieved, taking into account their relative importance.
- **Efficiency**: a measure of how economically resources and inputs (funds, expertise, time, etc.) are converted into results.
- **Evaluation**: the systematic and objective assessment of the design, implementation, and results of an ongoing or completed intervention. The aim is to determine the relevance and fulfillment of objectives, efficiency, effectiveness, impact, and sustainability.
- **Goal**: the higher-order objective to which an intervention is intended to contribute.
- **Impact**: the positive and negative, primary and secondary, short-, intermediate-, and long-term effects produced by an intervention, directly or indirectly, intended or unintended.
- **Indicator**: Quantitative or qualitative factor or variable that provides a simple and reliable means to measure achievement, to reflect the changes connected to an intervention, or to help assess the performance of an actor.
- **Inputs**: financial, human, and material resources used for the intervention.
- **Monitoring**: a continuous function that uses systematic collection of data on specific indicators to provide management and the main stakeholders of an ongoing intervention with indications of the extent of progress and achievement of objectives and progress.
- **Outcomes**: the likely or achieved short- and medium-term effects of an intervention's outputs.
- **Outputs**: the products, capital goods, and services which result from an intervention; may also include changes resulting from the intervention that are relevant to the achievement of outcomes.
- **Relevance**: the extent to which the objectives of an intervention are consistent with beneficiaries' requirements, country needs, global priorities, and partners' and donors' policies.
- **Sustainability**: the continuation of benefits from an intervention after it has been completed. The probability of continued long-term benefits, and the resilience to risk of the net benefit flows over time.

These concepts have been adapted from OECD-DAC, *Glossary of Key Terms in Evaluation and Results Based Monitoring* (Paris, 2002).
between the long-term goals and objectives of the peace process and the time-bound contribution of a specific UN peacekeeping operation. The combined efforts of many partners is required to bring about the strategic goals identified in such resolutions, but the M&E of UN peacekeeping operations is by definition limited to the specific timeframes and tasks assigned to it. While there is a link between the time-task specifics of a particular mission’s operational mandate, and the strategic goals of the longer-term peace process, an M&E process that is focused on the mandate and tasks of such a peacekeeping operation can at best speculate at progress made towards the potential achievements of the strategic longer-term aims.

UN peacekeeping operations would thus like to translate the strategic guidance provided in their mandates into realistic benchmarks that will ensure their progress can be monitored in the context of the operation’s contribution to the peace process at a specific point in time, and not against vague long-term strategic aims. DPKO would also like the Security Council to articulate more clearly which partners should be called upon to take responsibility for the various nonpeacekeeping goals set out in such mandates. Council mandates typically include humanitarian assistance, early recovery, and peacebuilding-related aims, and while these dimensions are the domain of other agencies within, and outside, the UN system, the Council has not, in the past, identified who should carry out these tasks, nor sought to hold anyone specifically responsible for their achievement.

There is thus a growing need, on the one hand, for more systematic M&E of peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations, and on the other, an increasing awareness of the complexities involved in trying to develop a credible picture of the outcomes and impact generated by these missions. If we accept that peace operations are highly sensitive political undertakings, and if we add to this mix overwhelming bureaucratic and political pressure to show progress, then we can start to appreciate the pressure M&E specialists are under to develop credible methodologies that are able to make objective, or at least qualified, claims of progress achieved, or setbacks identified. Such M&E methodologies will have to withstand the scrutiny of their own bureaucracies and clients, especially when they generate findings that contradict popular notions or perceptions of progress, or the lack thereof.

QUANTITATIVE VS. QUALITATIVE METHODS

There is a healthy tension between quantitative and qualitative approaches to M&E. Quantitative methods in the M&E contexts refer to statistical-type processes that rely on measurable data, while qualitative methods refer to verbal and narrative methods that rely on opinion, perception, and analysis. A quantitative approach would track the number of alleged crimes reported to the police over a specific time period, as well as a number of related indicators, in order to build-up a picture of the relationship between the police and the community. A qualitative approach would seek to do the same through interviews with the community and the police, focus group discussions, observation of police/community interactions, analysis and tracking of specific cases reported, etc. Quantitative methods tend to generate powerful and compelling images that communicate well, but quantification requires considerable abstraction, and thus simplification. Detractors question the usefulness of linear and two-dimensional representations of complex and highly dynamic nonlinear phenomena.

The workshop heard strong arguments in favor of both. Some participants argued that it is possible to apply rigorous experimental methods to complex phenomena. One example given was the use of control groups (groups that are similar in all respects to the groups that are chosen to host an activity) so that the evaluation can compare the effects on the treatment group with those where the activity did not take place. Another participant made the case for a participatory process that provides room for assessing the activity not only against its objectives and plans, but in the context of its dynamic environment, so that unintended consequences, adaptations and other unexpected effects can also be taken into account.

Both quantitative and qualitative methods can be

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meaningfully applied in the monitoring and evaluation of peace operations. What is important, however, is to use them appropriately, and to understand the comparative advantage of each approach. Quantitative methods are useful when processing linear data and for statistical analysis. Qualitative methods are useful when dealing with highly dynamic, nonlinear data and higher-order considerations, such as assessing theories of change and the relevance of a specific approach. Using both in a complementary fashion should yield a more comprehensive understanding of the situation.

EVALUATING DDR PROGRAMS

Evaluating the impact of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) programs is a particularly difficult enterprise as it necessitates grappling with much larger, unresolved issues pertaining to stabilization and peace consolidation. The realization of sustainable DDR requires achievements in other benchmark areas, demanding that results are collectively evaluated across sectors and actors, but this is rarely done. At the most basic level, robustness and utility of evaluation rest on the strength of program design. Unfortunately, examples of what is not working so well in DDR abound (often due to political reasons), while examples of what has worked well are context-specific and difficult to replicate. While many recognize that DDR is not merely a technocratic programmatic exercise, most evaluations concentrate on the programmatic aspects; there is insufficient focus on how to ensure political obstacles and issues are properly factored into DDR monitoring and evaluation.

SYSTEM-WIDE EVALUATION

System-wide evaluations pose particular challenges because the different actors involved in the intervention have different worldviews, mandates, theories of change, timeframes, organizational cultures, planning processes, methods of work, and approaches to measuring progress. Such evaluations need to be carefully framed, with special attention to what is being left out. The framing will be informed by the purpose of the evaluation and the perspective of the commissioning actor(s). This could be a group of donors, a key actor such as the host government, or a group of like-minded actors that have collaborated in the development of a common strategic framework, such as the Integrated Peacebuilding Framework in Burundi, the Poverty Reduction Strategy in Liberia, or the Afghanistan Compact (to name three cases that were discussed at the workshop).

Joint assessments have often been the first step in a more integrated phase in a peace operation, where a number of actors realize at a certain point in the peace process, typically after a stabilization and transition phase, and in the early part of a consolidation phase, that their interests are converging around the consolidation of the peace process. They then typically embark on a common initiative to assess progress to date as a first step in developing a common framework for future collaboration. Such a joint or common assessment provides a useful base-line assessment for joint planning, and assists the partners in the process of developing a common understanding of the risks to consolidating the peace process. Joint assessments and joint planning, for instance in the context of Integrated Strategic Frameworks, pave the way for joint M&E processes. In some cases the process has been reversed, in that partners first came together to do a joint evaluation, and flowing from that experience, embarked on a closer collaboration on assessments and planning.

CONDUCTING AND USING EVALUATIONS

The last point on evaluation theory and methodology relates to how evaluations are used, and the process by which they are conducted. Some of the drivers behind the current focus on M&E include a desire for more efficient (avoiding waste and overlap) and effective (achieving the objectives set out in the most professional manner possible) interventions. There is also pressure from the Security Council to reduce the number and scope of missions, especially in the context of the assessed contribution system and the overall cost of UN peacekeeping operations. To do so responsibly requires clear benchmarks against which progress can be measured and mission drawdown and withdrawal can be planned. Conversely, UN peacekeeping missions themselves often see benchmarking as a bulwark against unreasonable pressure to reduce their presence prematurely. From both perspectives, the M&E process is thus meant to provide a more objective tool against which progress (or lack thereof) can be measured and communicated in a way—using a common
vocabulary and a shared understanding of the M&E process—that makes sense for all stakeholders.

However, thus far the process of identifying suitable benchmarks has required practitioners and diplomats to make judgment calls on a range of complex questions, such as how much judicial, police, planning, legislative, and fiscal management capacity is good enough to consolidate a peace process and lay the foundation for self-sustaining peace? Some argue that the process of working through these issues—and in the context of system-wide evaluations, doing so across a broad range of actors—is more valuable than the benchmarks produced as a result. The very process of identifying benchmarks and indicators requires prioritization among competing goals, and can be a useful stage in a strategic decision-making process. However, while the negotiations that generate these choices may be very useful in shaping understanding among those involved, it is usually only the written product (for example, the set of benchmarks or indicators developed in the process) that survives. There is a danger that applying such benchmarks outside the group context within which they were formulated could result in serious methodological and analytical misunderstandings.

Each evaluation undertaken in a complex peace-operations context should thus ideally include its own process where key stakeholders agree on the process, methodology, benchmarks, and indicators. This should include prior agreement on how the M&E products will be utilized in terms of influencing the future planning of the peace operation in question. There are also generic lessons that can be identified and shared, especially regarding methodology. One of the presentations at the workshop, for instance, was about “The UN Practitioners Handbook for Peace Consolidation Benchmarking.” The UN Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO) and DPKO have embarked on a process to develop a benchmarking handbook that will provide guidance to officers, in the field and at headquarters, responsible for developing, monitoring, and reporting on benchmarks, and this guide should be available later in 2009.

A monitoring process or an evaluation study that is tied into a decision-making cycle (and presumably commissioned by key stakeholders) is much more likely to be meaningfully utilized than one that is generated on the sidelines, for instance by a third party. While the latter can be noted without necessarily having much consequence, the former ensures that the formal decision-making mechanisms have to consider and take decisions on the findings of the monitoring or evaluation reports. This also usually implies that the decision-making authorities will be much more involved in all stages of such a monitoring or evaluation process, because they are aware that they will have to deal with its consequences.

Ten Key Elements for Effective Peace Consolidation Benchmarking

1. Identify sound contextual benchmarks and indicators.
2. Engage host-country authorities and civil society.
3. Keep the focus on the core intentions of the benchmark system.
4. Establish direct relationships between benchmarks and indicators.
5. Balance the selection of indicators to reveal both positive and negative developments.
6. Be realistic when defining benchmarks.
7. Prepare for benchmarking early and, ideally, from the outset of an operation.
8. Map existing data sources.
9. Link-up with and share resources with other monitoring systems.
10. Report comprehensively, honestly, and in an unbiased manner.

Case Studies from the Field

A number of peacekeeping and peacebuilding M&E case studies were presented at the workshop, including Afghanistan, Burundi, Chad and the Central African Republic (CAR), the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Haiti, and Liberia. The case studies provided concrete examples of the kind of M&E processes that are already taking place in the field and provided the workshop with a range of examples of M&E processes with different lead agencies, mission phases, and methodological approaches. The presentation and discussions that followed generated a rich dialogue among the practitioners, policymakers, and researchers present. The cases represented a variety of real-time monitoring, mid-term, and end-of-phase evaluations. The workshop sought to divide the cases into two categories: one group that monitored and evaluated the implementation of integrated strategic frameworks (Liberia, Burundi, and Afghanistan), i.e., the peace process as a whole; and another that monitored or evaluated specific mission phases or specific campaigns within a larger mission or peace process context (Chad/CAR, eastern DRC, and Cité Soleil, Haiti).

MONITORING AND EVALUATION OF INTEGRATED STRATEGIC FRAMEWORKS

The monitoring and evaluation of Integrated Strategic Frameworks are particularly interesting because they present us with insights into the challenges and opportunities of system-wide M&E systems. Integrated Strategic Frameworks are multiyear strategic plans (typically three- to five-year cycles) that combine a broad range of interlinked dimensions, for instance, governance, security sector reform, economic growth, social services, human rights, reconciliation, and rule of law. In this way the Integrated Strategic Framework serves as macro-plan for the peace process as a whole. The M&E cases discussed at the workshop in this category included Afghanistan, Burundi, and Liberia. The M&E systems that underpin Strategic Frameworks are designed to measure implementation progress, as well as provide mid-term and end-of-phase evaluations. The Afghanistan case study highlights the challenges related to the alignment of external and internal interests, perspectives, and worldviews, as well as those related to the harmonization of competing external interests and priorities. The Burundi and Liberia cases demonstrate the challenges and opportunities for the promotion of local ownership and participation, as well as for building the capacity of local monitoring and evaluation systems.

Afghanistan

The case study of Afghanistan focused on the monitoring and evaluation of the Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS). At the London Conference on Afghanistan in early 2006, the international community and the government of Afghanistan agreed on the Afghanistan Compact, which identified a series of benchmarks and outcomes to be met in three sectors (security; governance, rule of law, and human rights; and economic and social development) within specific timeframes. The ANDS, which also serves as the country’s Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP), was subsequently developed as a five-year strategic framework (2008-2013) for achieving the goals and objectives formulated in the Afghanistan Compact. In addition, a Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board (JCMB), consisting of seven Afghan government representatives and twenty-one members of the international community, was established to “ensure greater coherence of efforts by the Afghan Government and international community to implement the Compact and provide regular and timely public reports on its execution.”

Ostensibly, the ANDS is an Afghan-owned strategy. However, external actors had considerable influence on the development of the Afghanistan Compact and the ANDS, and it is unclear how well these goals are aligned with the needs and priorities of the Afghan government and people. This tension between local ownership and international guidance is not unique to Afghanistan. Indeed it reappeared as an important tension in different forms in all the case studies considered at the workshop. The fact that Afghanistan is of such strategic importance, however, seems to have had a

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particularly harmful effect on strategic coordination in Afghanistan. For instance, the defense and intelligence agencies in the US were primarily concerned about countering the threat of international terrorism, and they were therefore committed to working with regional and ethnic leaders who were perceived to be in a better position to deliver security than the central government. This has undermined the ability of the central government to extend its authority, including its ability to control its borders and the revenue that is generated by cross-border movement of goods. Other parts of the US administration and other international actors were concerned about good governance, countering the production and trade in narcotics, and human rights. At times these interests were in direct conflict with each other, and when that happened, the security interests, which were better funded and had more resources, inevitably won out. The result is that despite the Afghanistan Compact and the ANDS, another realist, security-first international driven agenda was the dominant determining factor in Afghanistan. As a result, there are benchmarks in the ANDS that are unrealistic and hard to measure for political reasons, guided largely by external priorities rather than local needs. Additionally, many of the measures are output-rather than outcome-based, which further undermines efforts to determine progress towards building peace.

With so many actors and strong interests involved, the lack of coherence and coordination among key stakeholders in Afghanistan is a notable obstacle to progress in achieving the ANDS benchmarks and outcomes. In fact, the large number of external and internal actors engaged in the country—including the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA); the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF); the US-led Operation Enduring Freedom; several regional Provincial Reconstruction Teams led by individual NATO nations; powerful neighbors like Iran; India and Pakistan; international bilateral donors; UN agencies; international financial institutions; national and international NGOs; regional warlords; ethnic and tribal authorities; and the Afghanistan government—makes it difficult for stakeholders to have a solid grasp of what all the other actors are doing, let alone coordinate their efforts. As discussed at the workshop, while the JCMB is designed to promote coordination and coherence among the Afghanistan government and external actors, this will probably not happen unless there is the strong desire and effort among the parties to realign their interests around a common set of objectives. The M&E of the ANDS has thus been a dual process of, on the one hand, monitoring progress against the objectives set out, but on the other, evaluating overall performance and raising strategic questions about the viability of a framework that is being undermined by the competing interests of the same stakeholders that have agreed on the ANDS and the Afghanistan Compact.

Burundi

In 2007 the government of Burundi developed a Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding and an associated monitoring and tracking mechanism through consultations with a wide range of stakeholders and the active support and engagement of the PBC. The monitoring and tracking mechanism is a multidimensional tool that analyzes the peacebuilding activities of various internal and external stakeholders against the priorities set out in the Strategic Framework. Monitoring and tracking progress against the Strategic Framework is separate from the ongoing monitoring and evaluation process for the country’s PRSP, although there is a coordinating entity—the Strategic Forum of the Partners Coordination Group—that links the two processes. There has been some discussion of merging the two monitoring and evaluation tools to enhance strategic coherence, but this has yet to transpire.

Burundi was the first country that, in partnership with the new UN Peacebuilding Commission, negotiated an integrated peacebuilding strategy. This new framework was meant to complement the PRSP by focusing on peace consolidation. It strives to respond to the immediate peacebuilding needs of local stakeholders (including the government, political parties, civil society, the private sector, and

10 “Integrated peacebuilding strategy,” is the generic term used to refer to the documents that form the basis of the PBC’s engagement with the first four countries on its agenda. Each country adopts its own terminology to refer to its framework, hence “The Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding in Burundi.”
women's organizations, religious organizations, etc.), and it enumerates the commitments of the Burundian government and civil-society actors to specific reforms as well as the commitments of international actors to support those reforms. The Framework focuses on promoting good governance, political dialogue, security sector reform, justice, and the fight against impunity, land issues and socioeconomic recovery, and mobilization and coordination of international assistance. It also highlights the regional and gender dimensions.\(^\text{11}\)

The monitoring and tracking mechanism has a total of forty-two indicators, with a mix of twenty-two quantitative and twenty qualitative indicators. Twelve indicators are focused on process, while thirty are related to specific outcomes. The monitoring and tracking system is conducted by in-country stakeholders through a series of thematic working groups, which allows them to exploit linkages with the M&E system for the PRSP. The monitoring and tracking mechanism tracks progress and reports every half-year to a stakeholder meeting with the PBC in New York where challenges are discussed and specific initiatives are adjusted to respond to new developments and changes in the overall context. It has been noted that this system is too cumbersome and could do more to exploit linkages between the various priorities.

One of the key lessons learned from the Burundi experience is that the dialogue facilitated by the tool is more important than the tool itself. It creates momentum for the key stakeholders to review progress on a regular basis and to discuss challenges or changes in the context. In so doing, it facilitates greater coherence. For instance, the preparation of the first progress report in May 2008 provided the national and international partners with an alternative space to discuss peacebuilding issues and to identify key risks and priorities to be addressed. This highlights the fact that M&E processes are less about methodology and indicators and more about people and dynamics. Or, formulated differently, M&E are not just technical. Monitoring and evaluation can provide a tool for discussing progress, and this dialogue—the process—is what practitioners find most useful, because it fosters a common understanding and builds the linkages necessary for coherent action.

**Liberia**

The Liberia case study focused on the M&E system that has been developed to track Liberia’s Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS), the UN Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) and the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). The MDGs have been integrated into the PRS pillars, so that monitoring and evaluating the PRS will at the same time enable Liberia to report on its progress towards the MDG goals. The UNDAF has been designed to be the UN system’s support framework to the PRS. The UNDAF goals and objectives are thus aligned with the PRS and this has enabled the Liberian government and the UN system to develop an integrated M&E system that simultaneously tracks the UNDAF, PRS, and MDGs, thus saving valuable time and reducing transaction costs.

Liberia’s Ministry of Planning and Economic Affairs plays the primary coordinating role for the monitoring and evaluation system. It collaborates with the Liberia Institute of Statistics and Geoinformation Services (LISGIS) to generate reports on a periodic basis that measure progress towards indicators in the areas of security; economic revitalization; governance and the rule of law; and infrastructure and basic services—the four pillars that constitute the PRS. Data for the reports is collected at both the national and county levels through LISGIS and line-ministry staff, and includes surveys, field assessments, administrative records, and census information. The development of the PRS has involved extensive community consultations, and the M&E system has been developed in such a way as to continue this process. In addition to input from the Liberian population as part of data collection, the participation of a broad array of governmental actors is involved in the monitoring and evaluation process. This consultation process, facilitated by the M&E system, provides opportunities to foster national capacities and greater interagency coordination.

County progress reports, national PRS progress reports, a mid-term evaluation of the PRS, and a final evaluation of the PRS in 2011 are among the

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various outputs. Reports are reviewed by the Liberian cabinet and the Liberia Reconstruction and Development Committee (LRDC), a body that consists of working committees that represent each of the four pillar areas and are chaired by cabinet ministers. Shared publicly, these reports foster a sense of government accountability and transparency.

**MONITORING AND EVALUATION OF SPECIFIC MISSION PHASES OR CAMPAIGNS**

Another series of cases considered at the workshop looked at M&E in the context of specific mission phases and campaigns. The cases presented in this category were the EU mission in Chad and the Central African Republic, the UN mission’s stabilization strategy in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, and the US stabilization strategy in the Cité Soleil neighborhood of Port-au-Prince, Haiti. In sharp contrast to the system-wide M&E processes presented in the case studies in the previous section that attempted to measure progress of the peace process as a whole, the M&E processes developed for these specific missions were designed to address specific time-and-objective-limited campaigns or phases in the context of larger ongoing mission and/or peace processes. The M&E processes in this category are designed to provide real-time feedback that can result in short- to medium-term course adjustments, as well as longer-term strategy refinement, and have to be flexible in order to adapt to changes in strategy and context.

**Chad and the Central African Republic**

The EUFOR mission in Chad and the Central African Republic was authorized for one year (2008/2009) by UN Security Council Resolution 1778 to protect civilians (notably refugees and internally displaced persons), contribute to enhanced security to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid, and to help protect UN personnel, facilities, and equipment. The mission thus had very specific tasks to conduct within a limited timeframe, in an extremely dynamic environment in which internal and external stakeholders pursued divergent agendas and goals. Under such circumstances, there was a tension between monitoring progress against the mandate (which stressed “end dates, not end states”) and the need to reevaluate the operational assumptions that informed the mandate and planning of the mission against the highly dynamic and fast-changing situation in the field.

Operating in conjunction with the UN Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT), the EUFOR operation was meant to provide a security bridge until the security component of MINURCAT could be strengthened. But EUFOR’s mandate differed slightly from MINURCAT’s, which meant that the monitoring and evaluation of EUFOR’s operation would not be entirely consistent with that of the UN mission, even though the two organizations were meant to operate in a complementary fashion. As a result, MINURCAT and EUFOR Chad/CAR used different M&E systems for their respective missions.

EUFOR focused on several measures to improve monitoring and evaluation processes. Detailed mapping of external and internal stakeholders and their relationship to one another contributed to enhanced situational awareness. EUFOR met periodically with various stakeholders to get an assessment from them on progress it was making towards achieving mission goals and to forge common understanding of the security environment. Every month the EUFOR Force Commander was provided with a one-page summary designed to capture the different dynamics affecting the operation. While a one-page document may lack detail and nuance, such concise analysis on a monthly basis proved useful in providing timely and easily digestible information to inform decision making in a rapidly changing environment.

The EUFOR Chad/CAR experience highlighted the importance of having the right process and people in place for monitoring and evaluation to be effective. First, those who gather data should have a part in analyzing that data and a stake in the outcome. Secondly, effective M&E requires a diverse group of actors with a broad range of skills. A multidisciplinary team can translate specific, esoteric pieces of information—for example, a military liaison will be able to interpret certain types of data that are not easily understood by nonmilitary participants—and generate insights not otherwise possible. Finally, strong leadership is essential: if the Force Commander, or in the UN context, the Special Representative of the Secretary-
General (SRSG), indicates support for monitoring and evaluation, then it is more likely that efforts will focus more intensively on such activities.

**The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)**

The UN Security and Stabilization Support Strategy for Eastern DRC (UNSSSS) is a comprehensive multisectoral stabilization strategy that was developed in the aftermath of the country’s 2006 elections to consolidate the progress that had been made in the crisis-prone eastern region of the DRC. Given the recurring conflict and the volatile and unpredictable nature of events in eastern DRC, the UNSSSS focuses on various priority areas—security; politics; restoration of state authority; and return, reintegration, and recovery—relevant to promoting security and stabilization. The goal of the UNSSSS is to develop the state’s capacity to reestablish its authority in the region.

The UNSSSS uses a real-time monitoring and tracking system that does not employ a rigorous methodology. It is designed to give a “quick and dirty” analysis that can feed into programming in a rapidly changing, unstable environment. It prioritizes speed and flexibility in order to provide information fast enough to be incorporated into programming designed to prevent risks from deteriorating into unstable situations.

Accordingly, the UNSSSS monitoring and tracking system employs a straightforward stop-light matrix—red (no major progress or limited progress); yellow (some progress); and green (progress)—that offers a snapshot indicator on whether progress has been made towards goals. The monthly scorecard provides an update on progress achieved in implementing activities and developments within each of the components and subcomponents of the UNSSSS. The scorecard is primarily a strategic management tool designed to keep senior management abreast of developments.

Some of the challenges experienced with the M&E of the UNSSSS include limited institutional capacity and time for M&E; a highly volatile operating environment that necessitates constantly adapting plans, reprioritizing activities, and revising targets; and coordination among a multiplicity of actors and stakeholders with different interpretations of effectiveness and how to define and measure impact and success.

**Haiti**

The Measuring Progress in Conflict Environments (MPICE) framework is designed to measure progress towards stability and security in conflict and postconflict environments. MPICE is an interagency collaborative effort of the US government led by the Army Corps of Engineers (USACE). MPICE’s implementation in Haiti was the first full-scale use of the framework, although MPICE has also been used in Afghanistan, Sudan, and Kosovo. In Haiti, the framework was employed to gauge the effectiveness of the Haiti Stabilization Initiative, a program funded by the US Department of Defense to stabilize the Cité Soleil section of Port-au-Prince.

MPICE analyses two main variables—drivers of conflict and local institutional capacity—across five sectors, including political moderation and stable government; safe and secure environment; rule of law; sustainable economy; and social wellbeing. In each sector, the analysis is structured to link the goal, indicator, and measure hierarchically. Goals and measures are determined by different US government entities, including the Haiti Stabilization Initiative, USAID, and the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) in the US Department of State.

The MPICE is intended to produce a trend analysis. Trends in progress towards (or regressions from) stabilization in the relevant areas—political moderation and stable government; safe and secure environment; rule of law; sustainable economy; and social wellbeing—are measured by comparing a baseline assessment against subsequent assessments.

The MPICE framework employs a mix of quantitative (the number of roads or attacks) and qualitative data (including surveys, focus groups, and expert knowledge) that is tailored to the specific environment. Local individuals, who are trained for the task, conduct surveys and convene focus groups. This process helps to build local capacity, aside from helping to ensure that these activities are conducted in a culturally sensitive manner. The diversity of data sources employed aims for a richer analysis of the environment, and decreases the probability of inaccuracies or bias that can result from favoring one data-collection method over
Organizational Learning

A critical factor in determining how well a peace operation will fare is the ability of its stakeholders to adapt to rapidly changing circumstances, learn from their mistakes, and incorporate lessons learned into their activities. It is thus not surprising that among scholars of peacekeeping and peacebuilding, there is an increasing emphasis on organizational learning as a critical component of the success of peace operations. Organizational learning in peace operations can be divided into learning that occurs during the course of a mission (“learning while doing”), and that which occurs between missions, when organizations take stock of what they have done and apply lessons learned to future interventions. In the context of monitoring and evaluation, incorporating lessons learned into programming as a result of a real-time monitoring would be an example of “learning while doing,” while incorporating knowledge acquired from the evaluation of one mission to another would be an example of learning between missions.

There are fundamental tensions between the need for organizational learning in order to manage the complexities of conflict and postconflict environments and the distinct worldviews, agendas, and routines that drive organizational behavior. The complex environments in which peace operations work require flexible and creative responses. However, organizations frequently adhere to familiar rules and procedures, rather than adapting them to meet new circumstances. Moreover, organizations generally strive to show that they are doing effective work as a means of enhancing their legitimacy, yet true organizational learning often requires them to admit when they make mistakes and adjust their work accordingly. These tensions suggest the difficulties confronting monitoring and evaluation processes. First, to be effective, M&E systems need to be adaptable to various environments and circumstances, requiring flexibility on the part of organizations that may be married to certain rules, procedures, and beliefs. Second, even if M&E systems are effective, they will not be useful unless the lessons they teach are accepted by organizations and applied to programming.

The workshop discussions highlighted several ways that organizational learning can be promoted in peace operations (including in monitoring and evaluation processes), in spite of institutional and political barriers. First, organizations can develop fora for sharing knowledge that can be a springboard for more efficient use of time and resources and improved service delivery. Second, organizations (and their staff members) can become less risk-averse, willing to admit the shortcomings of their activities so that they can enhance the quality of their interventions. Third, M&E frameworks need to be viewed as dynamic instruments sensitive to local context. These points are discussed further below:

- **Knowledge sharing**: Given political and bureaucratic constraints, it may be unrealistic to assume that the multiple organizational actors involved in a peace operation can reach consensus on all, or even most, program benchmarks, goals, and envisioned outcomes. However, stakeholders should at the very least develop knowledge of what other organizations, agencies and programs in the field are doing and what their strategic vision is. One workshop participant referred to the notion of a “common trade space,” a cooperative environment in which knowledge can be shared on issues such as costs, resources, and provisioning. Sharing of knowledge can help organizations to operate more efficiently without duplicating efforts, and decrease the chances of working at cross-purposes.

- **Risk-taking**: Organizations must be willing to leave their comfort zones by accepting negative results and using this information to strengthen their

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15 For a discussion on linking activities to build peace, see Campbell, "When Process Matters."
engagements in peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations. Likewise, the people who work for them need to be provided with incentives to accept and report unfavorable findings. Since monitoring and evaluation frameworks are designed to focus on indicators of progress, they may not do a good job of capturing negative results. It is therefore important that unfavorable information be captured, channeled into the feedback loop, and used to adapt programming for the better.

- **M&E as a dynamic process:** The importance of operating with a nuanced understanding of the local context is frequently emphasized in donor circles. The mantra "one size does not fit all" was clearly reflected by the differences between the various monitoring and evaluation frameworks presented at the workshop. Elaborate monitoring and evaluation frameworks may be better suited to relatively stable postconflict environments (e.g., Liberia) where there is time to conduct in-depth surveys and consultations with local populations, whose results can inform national development strategies. On the other hand, in more volatile crisis environments (e.g., eastern DRC or eastern Chad) monitoring and evaluation systems need to be more adaptable to unpredictable circumstances in which timeframes, benchmarks, and planning assumptions may frequently be altered and programming needs to be revised accordingly. The ability of organizations to develop and employ context-appropriate M&E frameworks, adapt them to changing circumstances, and integrate their findings into programming is a reflection of their level of learning.

## Conclusions and Next Steps

The monitoring and evaluation of peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations is beginning to have an impact on the institutional culture and organizational learning of international and regional organizations, national governments, and research institutions. This is especially true in the context of Integrated Strategic Framework M&E systems, where it is now accepted best practice for internal and external stakeholders to collaboratively track the overall impact of their combined efforts to consolidate a peace process. It is also encouraging that the UN Security Council has begun focusing more systematically on benchmarks to measure the impact and effectiveness of the peacekeeping missions it has authorized. A number of monitoring and evaluation systems appear to be in the process of further development and refinement, and these multiple parallel processes are indicative of a nuanced understanding of the challenges confronting effective analysis and the drive to be sensitive to the local context and the complex dynamics at play.

In spite of these positive indications, the challenges ahead for developing more effective monitoring and evaluation systems are considerable. As this workshop report has tried to demonstrate, there are still many institutional, bureaucratic, and conceptual barriers that need to be overcome, or at least managed better, in order for significant progress to be made. In light of these opportunities and challenges, the final session of the workshop generated several recommendations for fostering best practices and more effective monitoring and evaluation techniques:

- A web-based database could be created on lessons learned in the M&E of peace operations that is easily accessible to researchers, practitioners, and policymakers. As part of an effort to share knowledge on monitoring and evaluation of peace operations, workshop presentations have been made available on the IPI and NUPI websites.

- A network of researchers, practitioners, and policymakers could be developed and serve as a resource for discussion and debate on issues related to monitoring and evaluation of peace operations.

- Policy-level discussions on monitoring and evaluation can be stimulated in high-profile decision-making fora in order to bring attention to the critical importance of M&E, and to assist in devising strategies for more effective approaches. For example, a debate on the issue in the Security Council or the General Assembly—with the participation of relevant regional organizations, member

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18 Dr. Sarah Meharg (smeharg@peaceoperations.org) of the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre has subsequently developed a portal where peacekeeping and peacebuilding M&E practitioners and researchers can share information. See the "Measuring, Monitoring, and Evaluating Applied Research Cluster" portal, available at www.huddle.net/.
states, and UN agencies, funds, programs, and Secretariat departments—would be a useful step.

- Monitoring and evaluation systems should be considered a necessary component of all peace operations and mechanisms should be developed to ensure that M&E results are incorporated into decision-making processes.

- Finally, monitoring and evaluation needs to feed into planning processes. This would help to ensure that different actors can come to agreement on shared outputs, outcomes, and goals—or at least share knowledge of what other organizations, agencies, and programs in the field are doing and what their strategic vision is. By integrating M&E into planning, there is less of a chance that strategic incoherence will undermine interventions.

One of the overriding conclusions from the workshop was that the M&E systems of the major stakeholders and disciplines still lack a common vocabulary and approach. Without it, the actors that undertake development, security, and political action find it difficult to develop a common understanding of the context within which they operate, and this has negative implications for their ability to develop coherent strategies, and for their ability to monitor and evaluate progress towards achieving such strategies. Some believe that the fact that different actors involved in these processes have different perspectives on what the goals, outcomes, timeframes, and ultimately, the success of a peacekeeping or peacebuilding process should be, can be resolved with better coordination. Others believe that these are inherent and fundamental differences that cannot be overcome, and that these tensions need to be continuously negotiated on a case-by-case basis. Both approaches require more interaction among the different actors, and as the deliberations at this workshop demonstrated, M&E is increasingly becoming one of the key stages or platforms where these issues are negotiated. M&E processes thus provide stakeholders with a useful vehicle that can be used to facilitate such a dialogue in a systematic and meaningful manner.
ANNEX I: Workshop Agenda

Thursday, May 7, 2009

08:45 – 09:15  Breakfast

09:15 – 09:30  Welcoming Remarks

Dr. Edward C. Luck, Senior Vice President and Director of Studies, IPI

09:30 – 10:15  Session 1: Framing the Issue

This session presents the program and objectives of the workshop, as well as introduces the issue of M&E in peace operations with an overview of the state of the art of the field. Participants will be encouraged to react to the presentation.

Moderator
Mr. Francesco Mancini, Deputy Director of Studies, IPI

Agenda and Objectives of the Workshop
Mr. Cedric de Coning, Research Fellow, NUPI

Evaluating Peace Operations: Theoretical Perspectives and Operational Challenges
Dr. Benjamin de Carvalho, Senior Research Fellow, NUPI

10:15 – 10:30  Coffee Break

10:30 – 12:30  Session 2: Monitoring and Tracking of Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding Frameworks

This session focuses on real-time monitoring or tracking of comprehensive and integrated strategic framework-type plans. Two cases are presented. For each case, the presenter is asked to focus on the following questions: What are the key features of this monitoring effort? What are its strengths and weaknesses? What challenges did you meet in its application? What lessons did you learn in applying this approach to monitoring and tracking, and are there best practices that could be useful for other cases?

Moderator
Mr. Carl Skau, First Secretary, Permanent Mission of Sweden to the United Nations

Case Presentations
1. Building Integrated M&E Tools and Structures in Liberia to Monitor and Evaluate Implementation and Impact of the PRS, County Development Agendas, and the UNDAF
   Mr. Eric Hubbard, Adviser to the Liberian Ministry of Planning and Economic Affairs
   Mr. Wilfred N. Gray-Johnson, Director, Liberia Peacebuilding Office

   Mr. Spyros Demetriou, Stabilization Team Leader, UN Security and Stabilization Support Strategy, MONUC
12:30 – 13:30 Lunch

Briefing on IPI project on Understanding Compliance with UN Security Council Resolutions Addressing Civil Wars
Mr. James Cockayne, Senior Associate, IPI
Mr. Christoph Mikulaschek, Senior Program Officer, IPI
Mr. Chris Perry, Program Officer, IPI


This session focuses on mid-term and final evaluations of peace operations. Three cases are presented. For each case, the presenter is asked to focus on the following questions: What are the key features of this evaluation system? What are its strengths and weaknesses? What challenges did you meet in its application? What lessons did you learn in applying this approach and are there best practices that can be useful for other cases?

Moderator
Dr. Efrat Elron, Senior Fellow, International Peace Institute

Case Presentations
1. MPICE Evaluation in Haiti
   Dr. Ghassan Al-Chaar and Mr. Rob Grossman-Vermaas, Measuring Progress in Conflict Environments (MPICE) Initiative, US Army Corps of Engineers, Research and Development

2. Evaluation of EUFOR Chad/CAR
   Lt. Colonel Jean-Michel Millet, Ministry of Defense, France

   Mr. Jake Sherman, Associate Director for Peacekeeping and Security Sector Reform, Center on International Cooperation, New York University

15:30 – 15:45 Coffee Break

15:45 – 17:15 Session 4: Monitoring and Evaluation of Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Programs

This session discusses the challenges of monitoring and evaluation of activities in a specific sector. The chosen cases refer to programs of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR). The presentations will focus on the following questions: What are the key features of the M&E models under discussion? What are its strengths and weaknesses? What specific challenges are presented in M&E of DDR programs? What lessons did you learn from your cases and what can be learned from these cases that may be applied to M&E efforts more broadly?

Moderator
Dr. David Matthews, Lead Analyst – Stabilization, UK Ministry of Defense
Case Presentations

1. Methodologies for Evaluating DDR
   Dr. Macartan Humphreys, Associate Professor, Columbia University

2. Evaluation of DDR in UN Peace Operations: Links to Transition Planning and Mission Exit
   Dr. Erin McCandless, Executive Editor, Journal of Peacebuilding and Development/Adjunct Faculty, New School, Graduate Program in International Affairs

3. Monitoring and Tracking of the Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding in Burundi
   Mr. Vincent Kayijuka, Peacebuilding Officer, Peacebuilding Support Office, United Nations

17:15 – 17:30

Wrap-up and Closing Day One
Francesco Mancini and Cedric de Coning

19:30
Cocktail Reception at IPI’s Trygve Lie Center

Friday, May 8, 2009

08:45 – 09:00
Breakfast

09:00 – 11:00
Session 5: Methodological and Research Challenges to Monitoring and Evaluation in Peace Operations

This session will address different approaches to M&E methodology and the research underpinning those approaches. Presenters will be asked to focus on the following questions: What are the major methodological challenges to M&E? What is the state of research in the field and where are gaps in research? How can we ensure that M&E efforts are underpinned by sound methodologies? What efforts are currently underway to address these challenges? How do we strengthen M&E research and methodological approaches?

Moderator
Mr. Graham Kessler, Joint Forces Command, US

Presentations

   Dr. Sarah Meharg, Senior Research Associate, Pearson Peacekeeping Centre

2. UN Practitioners Handbook for Peace Consolidation Benchmarking
   Mr. Matti Lehtonen, Policy Officer, Peacebuilding Support Office, United Nations
   Mr. Svein Erik Stave, Researcher, Fako Institute for Applied International Studies

3. The Challenges and Opportunities of System-wide Evaluations
   Mr. Emery Brusset, Executive Director, Channel Research Ltd.

11:00 – 11:15
Coffee Break
11:15 – 12:45  Session 6: Policy and Institutional Implications for Improved Monitoring and Evaluation in Peace Operations

Improving the practice of M&E carries both policy and institutional implications for the UN and other institutions. This session focuses on the organizational and policy challenges that need to be addressed to implement effective M&E systems in peace operations. What are the key political and institutional constraints for effective M&E of peace operations? How can these constraints be addressed and what are the policy and institutional implications for the UN? Are there lessons from other institutions or fields that can be useful for peace operations?

Moderator
Ms. Kristina Koch-Avan, IMPP Officer, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations

Presentations
1. Organizational Challenges to Improving Monitoring and Evaluation
   Ms. Susanna Campbell, Research Fellow, Centre on Conflict, Development, and Peacebuilding, The Graduate Institute

2. Institutional and Operational Issues in Improving Monitoring and Evaluation
   Dr. Michael Lipson, Visiting Scholar, Center on International Cooperation, New York University / Associate Professor, Concordia University

12:45 – 14:00  Working Lunch and Closing Session

Participants will be asked to exchange ideas for strengthening the research and practice of monitoring and evaluation and touch upon its broader policy implications.

Moderators
Francesco Mancini and Cedric de Coning
ANNEX II: Workshop Participants

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