COMING HOME

A CASE STUDY OF COMMUNITY LED DISARMAMENT, DEMOBILISATION AND REINTEGRATION IN D.R.CONGO
Coming Home

SUMMARY

This case study describes a community led disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) project carried out by the Congolese NGO Centre Résolution Conflits (CRC) in Nord Kivu, eastern Democratic Republic of Congo, from 2008 to 2011.

This programme was ‘locally led’ – in other words, conceived of and designed by CRC, drawing on 15 years’ experience of work in the Kivus – and funded by two British foundations, the Baring Foundation and John Ellerman Foundation, and by DFID, via the British NGO Peace Direct. Preliminary evaluation data, admittedly from a small sample, suggests that this approach may be significantly more effective and less expensive than DDR programmes led by external agencies and that a better combination of local, national and international resources is needed.

This case study draws on external evaluations of CRC’s work and an ongoing internal evaluation looking at where CRC – and other local NGOs (LNGOs) – can most effectively add value to the DDR process. The findings cast light on some of the challenges recognised by international policy makers1 and this paper provides field-based advice on how some of these challenges may be overcome. In particular, it seeks to offer advice on divisions of responsibility and labour, and contribute to the debate on ‘second generation DDR’, recognising that its methodology still needs to be refined.2

The findings of this case study are as follows:

1. The optimum approach to DDR in Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has not yet been achieved, but the essential components do exist, if resources and expertise are combined from international, national and local organisations. Organisations should be selected to fulfil particular roles based on cost-effectiveness, sustainability and contextual awareness.

2. Local capacity for supporting DDR tends to be underestimated, although LNGOs can most effectively add value to the DDR process. The findings cast light on some of the challenges recognised by international policy makers1 and this paper provides field-based advice on how some of these challenges may be overcome. In particular, it seeks to offer advice on divisions of responsibility and labour, and contribute to the debate on ‘second generation DDR’, recognising that its methodology still needs to be refined.2

3. In order to make full use of local capacity, an exercise mapping local organisations will need to be carried out at the start of the planning phase. Insight on Conflict (www.insightonconflict.org) has been designed to support this.

4. DDR must be planned as an integrated programme, and
disarmament and demobilisation should not be initiated until a reintegration plan has been developed.

5. Reintegration should be seen as an opportunity to further the development of entire communities, including the embedding of local peacebuilding mechanisms.

6. Local peacebuilders are uniquely able to build and deploy the relationships that are vital for social reintegration.

7. While funding for a DDR programme may come from different sources, it is essential that the funding for a programme is planned as a single system.

8. DDR needs to be evaluated over a long period of time, with different models and institutions sharing a common evaluation approach, and ideally with follow up of individual participants to assess the long term effectiveness of the programme.

**CONTEXT**

The Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo is, paradoxically, an area of great wealth and great poverty, caught up in a cycle of conflict since 1998 that has enriched armed militias and neighbouring countries, while reawakening old local conflicts and impoverishing its people. Called the first African World War, because of its death toll (estimated at 5.5 million) and the extent of international involvement, the conflict effectively became self-sustaining as armed groups supported their activities by exploiting the region’s natural resources wealth.

Various insurgencies formed, often initially for reasons of community defence, but later as a durable or last-gasp means to secure a livelihood in the midst of the insecurity. This process only served to create yet more counter-insurgencies and self-defence groups.

The Security Council established the United Nations Organisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC), in 1999, after 50,000 people had been killed and 500,000 people had been displaced in Ituri. However, while MONUC established bases in Bunia, Beni and Butembo, it could do little about the many local conflicts raging in the area. These have continued to create havoc up to the present day, although in Nord Kivu the work described in this case study has contributed to a reduction in the number of armed groups. Further progress will depend on political will – locally and nationally – an area where pressure from international donors would be appreciated by local groups.

The task of MONUC – now MONUSCO – was vast: to police the implementation of the 1999 Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement and the Pretoria Agreement of 2002, as well as working closely on the process of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR – or in the case of foreign combatants, DDRRR, encompassing also return and resettlement) as part of the World Bank led Multi-Country Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme (MDRP).

Within DRC, the main responsibility under the MDRP was given to the Congolese government, through the Programme National de Desarmement, Demobilisation et Reinsertion (PNDDR) – often referred to locally as the ‘CONADER’ programme. The sheer scale of the PNDDR process – reintegrating over 100,000 ex-combatants – made it an overwhelming task for any organisation or institution. It is unclear from the information available how many implementing partners were involved in the programme, but speaking to participants on the ground in North Kivu, it would seem that there were not many. During this time, however, there were local partners informally engaged in various components of the DDR process, bringing with them skills, knowledge and contextually relevant characteristics that could assist in such an ambitious undertaking (see www.insightonconflict.org).

The following section outlines the work of one of these local organisations, Centre Résolution Conflits (CRC), which has been supported by Peace Direct since 2004. For further information on the different DDR approaches implemented by other agencies, see Annex 2.

**CRC’S MODEL OF REINTEGRATION LED DISARMAMENT AND DEMOBILISATION (RDD)**

**Background**

CRC is a Congolese NGO, founded in 1993 and formalised in 1997. It worked in eastern DRC throughout the DRC conflict, first in Nyankunde, then in Bunia and finally in Beni from 2004.
CRC has experienced the horrors of the conflict – its Deputy Director and his family were murdered in 2002 and the office ransacked in 2004. When CRC arrived in Beni, its members were experiencing the same displacement as the population of IDPs with whom they work.

Through a relationship with CRC which began in late 2004, Peace Direct has seen CRC develop from an organisation focused on training around 500 displaced people each year in its immediate environment in peaceful coexistence with members of other tribes, to an organisation whose mediation skills are called upon by local communities, international NGOs, multilaterals and local government officials right across Nord Kivu and which is now a member of the UNOCHA protection cluster, in North Kivu.

In 2010, in addition to the DDR work described in this case study, CRC educated and assisted 20,000 people across two provinces: helping 14,400 displaced persons to return safely home, rescuing 650 child soldiers, educating 2,600 children about their fundamental human rights, and mobilising former enemies to resolve conflicts via mediation and negotiation.

As well as being involved at the sensitisation stage, persuading ex-combatants to leave the bush and communities to accept them back, CRC runs a reintegration programme which includes these elements:

- The provision of a range of livelihood options, some of which are also open to non-combatant members of the community.
- Intensive work to persuade communities to receive back former militia members, with in some cases reparation programmes whereby the militia members build roads or other facilities to benefit the community.
- Building social networks based largely on voluntary effort, which sustain the DDR process at a micro level over time.
- Indicators which measure success over the long term, not just at the point where someone exits from the bush and disarms.

**Reversing the acronym – RDD not DDR**

DDR can mean many things – from the simple exchange of a weapon for cash, to the integration of former combatants into the army or police force, to the kind of holistic and extended process described in this case study. All three approaches have been tried in the DRC in recent years. However, at the time of writing, the DRC government has put a stop to simple ‘cash for weapons’ programmes, on the grounds that they do not deliver long term results. The Congolese army, FARDC, has no room for further recruits (and is in fact dismissing 30-40% of its least effective members, thereby creating a new security challenge in the form of ‘the residuals’). And mass reintegration into the army and police also has the limitation that it offers nothing for female ex-combatants. It is estimated that 30% of militia members in eastern DRC are female, though only 2,610, or 2.6% of the combatants dealt with by the MDRP were female, at the time that evaluation was conducted.

An evaluation of the MDRP makes the point that, on the one hand, ‘sustainable reintegration is one that inculcates in ex-combatants a sense of social belonging and provides them with a long term stake in national economic development, thereby providing powerful incentives for ex-combatants to continue their civilian lives.’

But it also notes: ‘Experience shows that the design of reintegration programmes should, as a matter of priority, include a clear understanding of the social, cultural, economic and political dynamics of both ex-combatants and the recipient communities. An understanding of these aspects should inform the planning of a reintegration programme and hence its sustainability. More often, however, DDR programmes have been designed with little or no consideration for either ex-combatants or the communities they are to be reintegrated into.’

This neglect for reintegration continues: for example, in May 2011, there appeared to be ample funding for ‘sensitisation’ (i.e. persuading people to leave the bush), but no funding for reintegration.

Clearly bringing militia members out of the bush without a programme of reintegration is asking for trouble and an over-dependency on integration to armed forces is not an option anymore for DRC.

In contrast, CRC’s approach is conceived, not as DDR, but rather as RDD – in other words, the whole programme design works backwards from the reintegration process. It is the effectiveness of the community reintegration process that influences militia members to want to disarm, as well as securing their long term demobilisation. The programme also creates and sustains social networks, which supplement the work of the paid staff within CRC. These social networks and the design of the reintegration support, contribute beyond the DDR process, providing wider community development support, long after the DDR programme has ended.
**CRC’s theory of change**

CRC’s theory of change is that by reducing the number of active combatants and sustainably reintegrating them, the level of violence in communities will reduce, allowing for greater community development which is needed for sustainable peace.

Significantly, CRC provides an inbuilt catalyst to the theory of change by seeing the reintegration phase as an opportunity for wider community development, a priority recognised by Jennings (2008). This provides positive feedback measures within the process which makes the reintegration process more successful. The more successful the reintegration process is known to be, the more likely this will encourage further disarmament and demobilisation:

CRC recognises that this process is fragile and that any stability seen in DRC needs to be carefully nurtured. One of the biggest problems associated with the success of this process is the encouragement of IDP and refugee return. This can lead to new types of conflict that threaten to destabilise the recovery of an area and jeopardise sustainable peace. For this reason, CRC uses its network of volunteers working on the DDR to also address these issues later in the process, creating community-based conflict resolution mechanisms – in the case of returnees, focusing mostly on land conflict:

**AN OUTLINE OF CRC’S RDD MODEL**

CRC has combined a number of approaches to achieve its RDD/DDR programme, from the network it has created to the design of the reintegration support and wider community development. It also recognises the importance of co-ordinating with and complementing the work of the international community and government. Strengthening this collaboration is key to the success of DDR.

Examples of CRC’s working relationship with other agencies are:

- **FAO** – who provided seeds and agriculture kits and training in agriculture.
- **Handicap International** – who provided transportation support.
- **MONUSCO** – joint work on sensitisation of combatants, transport to make contact with militia leaders.
- **UNDP** – joint training, sharing of information, joint projects on road rehabilitation.
- **Save the Children/UNICEF** – joint missions to rescue children from the bush.
- **UNHCR** – CRC provided training to over 500 combatants in human rights and conflict resolution.
The CRC network

Key to CRC’s success has been the mobilisation of the latent potential for social change that exists at a local level. CRC has created two main sources of social capital:

Task Forces
CRC has six Task Forces, with each made up of approximately 12 people. The members range from community and religious leaders to former child soldiers and even former militia commanders. The Task Forces utilise the connections that militia have with the communities to engage the militia in dialogue with CRC and negotiate the demobilisation and reintegration of combatants. In particular, the Task Forces seek to include the middle men or spokespersons that the militia depend upon for contact with the outside world.

Starting in 2009, CRC has put in place Task Forces in Beni, Butembo, Bunia, Aveba, Mambasa, and Kasenyi-Tchomia. Training was provided to the Task Forces by a three-person team from CRC that included the heads of the human rights and ex-combatants programs as well as the CRC Coordinator. The Butembo Task Force has met weekly on Fridays since July 24, 2009; most other Task Forces meet together on a monthly basis. All of the Task Forces meet with CRC at regular intervals throughout the year, usually on a quarterly basis, and submit regular reports of their activities to CRC.

While the Task Forces were created primarily to assist in negotiating with militia, they have taken on a wider role, acting as an early warning system with CRC and local level conflict resolution. As such, they have evolved into important groups that support the recovery of communities emerging from conflict as well as serving a valuable role to reduce the violence and make development possible.

Each Task Force costs approximately $1,500 to set up, with annual running costs thereafter of $500. Task Force members contribute a minimum of 4,400 hours of voluntary time per year to serving their communities and working with CRC, which pays only for their travel expenses.14

Radio clubs
Radio is an important means of communication for CRC in an area in which communication and transportation services are limited. It is an especially crucial form of communication with armed groups who are in the bush and the forest. CRC has been using radio intensively and effectively since 2009 to encourage combatants to leave armed groups. During the past two years, 156 programs have been broadcast through three local radio stations – Radio Moto in Butembo, RTEB in Beni, and Radio Candip in Bunia.

In 2010, CRC decided to move beyond simply using radio as a one-way flow of information and instead decided to revive a previous programme (not under CRC) that had created Radio Clubs. Initially, CRC intended these Radio Clubs to be peacebuilding mechanisms, allowing communities in conflict with each other to communicate remotely. Quickly, these clubs evolved into proactive development and self-help initiatives at the community level. Through phone and texts, the communities share knowledge and development ideas and

BOX 1: EXAMPLE OF A TASK FORCE LAND CONFLICT INTERVENTION

In March 2011, a conflict over land began within a community in North Kivu, affecting 3,000 people, after the authorities sold land to the Catholic Church without informing or consulting the community members. As the Church tried to lay the foundations for building a new church, the community attacked the builders and those responsible. One person was arrested and every week there were outbreaks of violence. Despite attempted mediation by the police, the local community has asked a local Mai-Mai group to help them. There was a real danger that the police and the Mai-Mai would clash violently, which would significantly escalate the conflict.

In response, the Task Force organised mediation sessions between the church, authorities and local people and appointed a local NGO to maintain negotiations. For now, the violence has stopped but the root problems are not resolved. The Task Force will continue to seek a solution that involves the local authorities, church and local people.

To date, the intervention by the Task Force has cost the equivalent of $600, which has been contributed in kind by the local populace.
discuss local issues—such as insecurity and militia—with each other every weekend. During the two-hour Saturday morning call-in show at Radio Moto, an average of 30 callers phone or text per broadcast. The programs are also very cost-effective—the transmission time is hired from an existing station at $30/hour, and the radios given to each community cost around $15 each.

An extensive network of Radio Clubs has grown up in response to these broadcasts. Residents now gather in 119 communities on weekends to listen to the CRC broadcast. This innovative use of radio stations, mobile phones, radios and Radio Clubs has effectively created a low-cost, two-way communications network in an area where such communication has not existed. This network has made it possible for local communities to share information about security issues and local developments with CRC, ensuring that CRC has accurate and comprehensive information about the situation throughout the region.

Use of radio to make contact with militia members still in the bush is, of course, not a new approach. However, what is interesting about CRC’s network of radio clubs is the extent to which they have become focal points for village-level planning and development. Clubs with names like ‘Let us be together’ have created an enormously wide range of community development projects—some social services and some income generating. In the former case, one small village built an eight-bed clinic with three staff, and persuaded technicians from Butembo to provide a weekly test service. Income-generating activities are varied and extensive and include such activities as micro-finance, agriculture, hairdressing, bicycle repair, construction of hydro-electric power plants, and propagating seedlings for reforestation.

By using radio in this way, CRC’s trust and respect within communities has grown significantly. This makes them much more effective at sensitising communities to returning ex-combatants and lessens resentment from the communities when CRC assists ex-combatants. This harmonisation of communities and the mobilisation for self-help are important factors for peacebuilding and resisting violence. As the section on impacts below shows, community engagement and organisation is also an important factor for ex-combatant reintegration.

BOX 2: RADIO CLUB KIBASHA

In January 2009, the Radio Club in Kabasha decided to start a micro-finance scheme after hearing the idea through one of CRC’s radio broadcasts. The scheme started with small contributions from the Radio Club members and later from other community associations. The scheme provides a maximum $100 for individuals and $300 for associations, charging 2.5% per month, with a payback time of 4-6 months. To date, the Radio Club has had 25 clients, all of whom have re-paid the money. Through interest and continued donations of $10 per month from other community associations, the Radio Club had expanded its available credit to $3,250 in July 2011.

At the same time, the Radio Club has used labour contributions (20 men every Tuesday and Friday for seven months) to dig a one-kilometre trench as the start of a mini hydro-electric plant to electrify the community. The technical expertise was provided by an engineer who had implemented a similar scheme for another Radio Club. His $300 fee was provided by the community.

Building credibility with armed groups

A third vital component, and largely a consequence of the Task Force network, is CRC’s credibility with armed groups. In many situations CRC has been able to win the confidence of armed groups which have increasingly grown wary of the FARDC, UN and MONUSCO. In fact, many armed groups refuse to engage in any UN or government related activity, often believing that they are both in allegiance with other militia or simply fearing for their safety as they have been under attack in the past from government and MONUSCO troops. Hence, often the militia see CRC as their only option. Much of this trust and respect is due to CRC being a local organisation that has proved its commitment to local peace:

‘CRC’s long term commitment, visibility, local knowledge, first hand awareness of the impacts of conflict at a personal and community level, networks of contacts and strong staff commitment and work ethic have given CRC great credibility with armed groups, with communities and with partners.’ 16
This credibility depends crucially on CRC’s ability to take a very long-term approach. Journalist Edouard Pacifique, a member of the Butembo Task Force and record keeper for CRC, notes: “CRC’s goal is peace and development, unlike other organisations that just came and made a broadcast twice or three times and then say, no, the project is over, we go, without reporting how many demobilised people they have and what they have done to demobilise them.”

Understanding the importance of this long-term process is vital to understanding how best the international, national and local efforts can work together. Annex 1 compares peacebuilding to an iceberg, where a huge amount of work goes on under the surface before anything is visible at the top. In other words, getting to the point where you can implement a good reintegration project, requires a lot of groundwork. Hence, it is difficult for centrally controlled DDR processes to be successful without utilising the positive characteristics of local organisations which are embedded within the conflict areas.

**Sensitisation and negotiation**

Sensitisation is the process of reaching out to communicate with combatants and persuading them to leave the bush, disarm and return to civilian life. MONUSCO (and its previous incarnation MONUC), the UN Peacekeeping Mission in DRC, worked closely with CRC to accomplish this.

Communication was established in a number of different ways, for example, MONUC helicopters dropped leaflets with the mobile phone number of the Director of CRC, inviting combatants to call him to discuss re-entry into civilian life. CRC staff would then travel deep into the bush to negotiate with militia commanders, either for them to return with their men, or to release child soldiers. This approach required considerable courage, and patience – CRC staff might need to wait for several days in the bush, far from any protection, before the discussions began. The risks can be heightened by poor co-ordination with others, or failure to deliver, and this needs to be recognised in planning the international and government support for the sensitisation phase.

As the programme developed, the Radio Clubs became an important mechanism for dialogue with those still in the bush. Through radio programmes broadcast by the three main networks, and the responses by mobile phone of those taking part in the radio clubs,
militia members could hear directly from former colleagues, whom they trusted to give an honest answer to questions about conditions in civilian life and how they would be received by their communities. Radio broadcasts, especially through the Radio Clubs, also address the sensitisation of communities which is essential to acceptance of, and hence reintegration by, ex-combatants. As the evaluation shows, the presence of CRC in communities can lead to improved sustainability of reintegration under different DDR models.

Disarmament and demobilisation accompaniment

Almost universally, the act of taking away weapons (disarmament) and moving former combatants into camps (demobilisation) are carried out either by the national government or by the UN – though a rare counter example from Mozambique is described in Peace Direct’s Ripples into Waves. Typically CRC will negotiate with the militia to leave the bush then transport and accompany them to ensure safe passage to the PNDDR programme, where camps are often run by MONUSCO or FARDC: between 2008 and 2011 CRC accompanied 4,300 ex-combatants in this way. However, due to the mistrust of MONUSCO by militia, persuading them to enter UN camps is, in itself, an entire process of negotiation. The role of MONUSCO and FARDC is to remove any weapons, uniform and other military equipment and identify the combatants and record them.

This is a quick process and normally will take a few hours or a day if there is a larger group (say 20). CRC then returns the combatant to the village, and it is CRC who will provide the transport. This ensures that people are not lost to the programme, as can happen with direct releases from the UN.

CRC’s reintegration model

Joint civilian and ex-combatant co-operatives

The project assisted the demobilisation and disarmament of 4,276 ex-combatants (3,532 men, 270 women, 474 children), of whom 1,334 were reintegrated into co-operatives, 1,078 into the police, 1,120 into the army and 774 given other kinds of reintegration assistance.

Key to CRC’s success has been the creation of co-operatives that combine civilian and ex-combatants together. This has meant that the ex-combatants are provided with livelihood support but civilians are included to avoid alienation and frustration on their part. It also makes the ex-combatants and civilians work together which reduces prejudice on the civilian side whilst surrounding the ex-combatants with social guidance and reaffirming of acceptable moral behaviour.

The selection of the members for the co-operative is by the communities themselves. Initially, the co-operative will have 30 members and be given assistance by CRC (to the value of $2,000). It is up to the co-operative members if they wish to include new members and in all cases they have. This has led to a huge demand and the co-operatives have become difficult to manage with 200 members in some cases.

CRC is addressing this issue by limiting co-operative core members but extending inclusion through a micro-finance scheme. In its new model, CRC is also taking the role of ex-combatants as community developers a step further, using them to rehabilitate local infrastructure of roads and markets by asking them to provide short-term labour in return for co-operative membership. The public use of ex-combatants for community work is expected to strengthen the reintegration and sensitisation process of the CRC model.

Community level conflict resolution

In areas where there is DDR of combatants, the security situation can improve. Whether this is a cause or consequence of DDR, the improved security is often very fragile. It is necessary, therefore, for CRC and its network of Task Forces to also respond to community level conflicts. Often these may be rumours started by one community about another, or may be the result of increased IDP and refugee return which leads to land conflict. Although these conflicts may be less violent than armed militia, they are none the less destabilising, fostering vulnerability and holding back development. For this reason, CRC and the Task Forces also perform a role of mediation at a community level as well as providing peace education as a core peacebuilding activity. See Box 1 for an example of a conflict that a CRC Task Force has intervened.

In response to the rise in IDP and refugee return, CRC’s new model puts more emphasis on land conflict resolution.
EVALUATING IMPACT

The following results are preliminary findings of a CRC and Peace Direct evaluation of CRC’s community led DDR programme, implemented from 2008-2011. Peace Direct and CRC wanted to evaluate this work and learn lessons for the future. We also wanted to begin to gather evidence on how CRC’s approach compares with others. The findings are only preliminary, based on a small sample of semi-structured interviews carried out by CRC staff. A larger scale external evaluation is desirable, and as additional data is collected the version of this paper on Peace Direct’s website will be updated.

Methodology and limitations

CRC interviewed 96 ex-combatants and 106 civilians in North Kivu from 13 different communities. Seven communities were selected where CRC had provided DDR support and five similar communities in neighbouring areas (and hence comparative) were selected where CRC had not worked. In each community, ex-combatants, civilians and the community leader were interviewed. The purpose of the interviews was to gain an understanding of how successful the CRC approach had been, how it compares to other approaches and whether it has led to a reduction in violence – i.e. does it support CRC’s theory of change?

It should be noted that the interviews were conducted by CRC staff with obvious limitations but the questionnaire format was designed to limit bias or influence of answers. Over time, CRC will increase the number of interviewees to enlarge the sample as currently it is too small to be conclusive. However, Peace Direct and CRC believe that evaluation is needed at this micro scale in order to gain a true picture of the long term effectiveness, or otherwise, of a DDR programme.

CRC’s theory of change is: by reducing the number of active combatants and sustainably reintegrating them, the level of violence in communities will reduce, allowing for greater community development which is needed for sustainable peace.

The following investigates whether the theory of change is being realised and how it compares to other approaches.

Background on the sample groups

Initially the purpose of this evaluation was to evaluate the work of CRC and try to compare whether their approach is worthy of support over other approaches. Due to a lack of information on other DDR programmes, it was necessary to look at where CRC has worked and where it has not worked in order to assess the comparative benefits of CRC. The survey used semi-structured questionnaires to interview 96 ex-combatants, 106 civilians and 12 community leaders. Due to funding and time available for training, the questions were kept simple and the evaluation brief, but inspired by Humphreys and Weinstein.20

The survey participants can be divided into three groups:

CRC assisted

The CRC assisted group is any ex-combatant who has been assisted by CRC. In some cases, these ex-combatants have also been assisted by others. Those who have been assisted by others have been included in the CRC assisted group as the purpose of this study is to look at the added value of CRC’s approach as part of a larger process. The total number of ex-combatants interviewed was 47 men and three women, where 11 have been assisted by another group (see chart).

Non-CRC assisted

In order to assess the added value of CRC’s approach, it is necessary to compare their work with other DDR programmes. The non-CRC assisted group, therefore, is ex-combatants who have received DDR assistance but not from CRC. The total number of ex-combatants interviewed was 19 men. (See chart.)
A third group has been identified as ex-combatants who have not received any assistance at all and act as a control group. These are from the same communities as the non-CRC assisted group. The total number of ex-combatants interviewed was 25 men and two women.

In addition to the ex-combatants surveyed, civilians and community leaders were also surveyed in the communities. These have been divided into two groups:

1. CRC assisted communities – this group includes respondents from communities where CRC has worked.
2. Non-CRC assisted communities – this group includes respondents from communities where CRC has not worked. However, in order to keep the survey groups comparable, the CRC and non-CRC communities are in close proximity with each other. Hence, it is possible that CRC has influenced these communities and/or they are aware of CRC’s work.

Control group

Civilian groups

More data is available than is presented here but requires further analysis. The following separates the components of CRC’s theory of change to establish whether the DDR model is based on a solid rationale and what we can learn from the CRC approach.

Theory of change component 1: reducing the number of active combatants

A challenge for any DDR programme is identifying the genuine ex-combatants and reaching those that are most likely to cause violence or return to the bush. The government of DRC has rightly highlighted that DDR programmes can encourage people to join militia or falsely claim to be from a militia. Hence, one of the first things we want to know is, has CRC worked with genuine ex-combatants? CRC, at the time of the programme, did not use screening forms but instead relied upon local knowledge to identify the target ex-combatants. The findings are as follows:

The CRC sample group had an average of 7.1 years in the militia, the non-CRC assisted sample group averaged 4.9 years and the control group averaged 4.6 years.
with a longer than average time spent with the militia.

The charts below indicate the number of ex-combatants that have been injured during the conflict. The higher the number of injuries, the more likely the combatant was involved in active combat and hence their reintegra-
tion is likely to have a greater impact on violence reduction. The charts indicate that those provided with assistance through the different DDR programmes have been well selected, with the control group (those that received no assistance) appearing to be the least active combatants. The CRC selected combatants had the highest, suggesting their selection process is the better. Potentially, this suggests that the CRC reliance on community identification of ex-combatants is more effective than other approaches.

When looking at the role of the ex-combatants, CRC has tended to select a greater variety of ex-combatants, with a lower proportion of camp workers than the non-CRC assisted group. It is difficult to draw conclusions from this, but it may suggest that CRC’s selection process has identified those that were more active in the bush — these involved espionage and intelligence gathering, rather than camp workers. This would be substantiated by the greater number of injuries suffered within the CRC assisted group. With further analysis, there may also be lessons to be learnt from how different programmes perceive those who are most eligible for assistance.

The above data would suggest that CRC has targeted active combatants and that their community led selection process has been good, typically identifying combatants who have been particularly active or have stayed for longer in militia groups.

**Theory of change component 2: sustainability of reintegration**

Having established that CRC has been targeting genuine combatants, it is important now to look at whether those ex-combatants have or have not returned to the bush. In other words, we need to look at the sustainability of reintegration. At an early stage, CRC developed its own indicators in collaboration with the communities and ex-combatants themselves. These indicators have been used to monitor the status of the ex-combatants which CRC has considered in its follow-up work with the ex-combatants.

The above chart shows that consistently, ex-combatants involved in CRC programmes have fared much better than other programmes, with those receiving no assistance as the most vulnerable to being re-recruited. In particular, 81% of those not assisted would consider returning to a militia group, 58% of those assisted but not by CRC would, and 10% of those assisted by CRC would.

However, no approach has achieved high levels of livelihood success, with at best 36% feeling their basic needs are met, fewer than 50% owning land and less than 40% building a house. A significant
proportion also continue to believe in black magic which has been identified by CRC as an indication that reintegration is incomplete. What seems to be true, is that the co-operatives model implemented by CRC may be better than others, but it is not enough. CRC attributes some of the problems to poor involvement of women in the management of the co-operatives and a high demand – designed for 30 members they can grow to over 100. CRC has responded to this in its new approach by complementing the co-operatives with a micro-credit scheme to include more people.

This data is substantiated by the interviews with community leaders who estimated how many ex-combatants under each assistance programme had returned to the bush. Originally, the ex-combatants and civilians were also asked this question but there was not enough knowledge of the overall picture at a community level to be reliable. The sample group for this analysis is therefore very small (only 13 interviews) and a larger sample group is needed. Whilst this analysis does have serious limitations, the findings warrant further investigation, demonstrating the rate of return under CRC programmes are significantly less and that, no matter which DDR programme, CRC’s presence in a community leads to a lower rate of return to the bush.

Anecdotal evidence points towards community reaction as one of the main reasons why ex-combatants return to the bush. It is also important for the community development aspect of the CRC DDR approach that there is harmony between ex-combatants and civilians. The survey looked at trends in how many ex-combatants had problems with the communities when they returned compared to now,
Coming Home

and whether the type of assistance they received had an impact on any change. The findings indicate that those that were assisted had better relationships with the communities, with the most significant change under the CRC programme.

Theory of change component 3: reduction of violence in communities

A consequence of sustainable reintegration was expected to be a reduction of violence at a community level. Due to a lack of knowledge and records of violent incidences, the evidence below has relied on perceptions of security from civilians. Unfortunately, it is not possible to compare this to a control group as no communities where no DDR had occurred at all were included in the survey. As there are many complex reasons why violence may have reduced in the communities, it is not possible to draw any correlation to DDR programmes. However, there is reason to look in more detail to investigate what does contribute to reduced violence and why CRC groups perceived a greater improvement in security than others.

What is less ambiguous is that CRC’s approach has led to significantly less fear of ex-combatants than in areas where CRC has not worked. This supports anecdotal evidence where joint civilian/ex-combatant co-operatives have led to more successful relationships.
The civilians were asked, if the situation has improved, what, if any, outside agents influenced that improvement. The findings are below and show that, besides CRC, there are many other organisations that have contributed to improved security. This lends support to the idea that a combination of efforts will most successfully lead to a reduction in violence and that the optimum combination of international, national and local needs to be found.

Theory of change component 4: greater community development

An evaluation of development at a community level has not been conducted yet, but looking at issues of community engagement of individual ex-combatants, it would appear that the CRC approach has led to a significant increase in community engagement by ex-combatants. In this survey, community engagement was viewed as a positive sign of reintegration – an indicator chosen by CRC, ex-combatants and communities.

Of the non-CRC group, 0% of ex-combatants said they were part of a community group. In the CRC group, 96% were a member of the CRC joint civilian/ex-combatant co-operative and, of those 96%, 59% were a member of another community group. This suggests the co-operatives play an important role for community engagement but also seem to have a knock-on effect where ex-combatants become involved of their own initiative in other community activities. As a significant group within the community, it is assumed that their activities would have had a wider impact and contributed to community development.

Theory of change component 5: sustainable peace?

It is possible to look at trends in reduction of violence and look for where activities by different agents may have contributed, but it would be impossible to claim any one activity or agency is responsible for sustainable peace. A combination of efforts will always be needed and it is finding the right combination that is the greatest challenge. Whilst the problems in eastern DRC are huge, the situation in North Kivu does seem to be improving. When looking at the response from all civilian respondents across each sample group, there is a clear reduction in the number of armed groups and, as the perceptions of security pie charts above demonstrate, whichever sample group, the civilians feel security has increased. Of course, with 46% of all civilians still feeling they live in ‘very dangerous’ or ‘dangerous’ areas, this is no cause for celebration, but it does suggest that, with combined efforts, life can improve and the challenging task of DDR can succeed.

COST-EFFECTIVENESS

This section draws on unpublished research for Peace Direct (see www.peacedirect.org/andre-kolln-ddr-drc) drawing together evaluation reports of the three main DDR initiatives since 2002:

- PNDDR – DRC’s main DDR programme, implemented by the government with technical support from external sources.
- Programmes specifically aimed at child soldiers, implemented by various UN and NGO organisations.
- Two special programmes implemented by UNDP.
These programmes formed part of the World Bank managed Multi-Country Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme (MDRP) which had $500 million available and was based on three overarching principles – partnership between different organisations, a regional approach and national ownership.

There is not enough information available to make a comprehensive comparison of the costs of different programmes, especially as much of the information produced was before programmes had been completed. There is also very little information available that has evaluated the impacts of this work (although a report is expected in December 2011), making it even harder to draw cost-effectiveness comparisons. Nevertheless, it is useful to draw out some indications of different costs along the spectrum:

- A DAI report (2007, p.15) on the ‘Special Projects’ aimed at reintegration of child soldiers cited that between $21.67 million had been disbursed, but as of March 2006 only 604 children had completed the reintegration process.21
- A report by Philip Lancaster (2005) is critical of CONADER (at that time the implementing body of PNDRR) for its allocation of $300-450 per ex-combatant for reintegration, claiming it to be far below the international average (p.22). The report also refers to the Community Reconstruction, Reintegration and Reduction of Small Arms (ComRec) programme which had spent $3,258,081 but had only reintegrated 83 combatants.22
- Currently in DRC, anecdotal evidence suggests that UNDP allocates $750 per ex-combatant.
- CRC’s project costs directly associated with DDR ($96,000) plus 50% of CRC’s running costs ($103,000) totals $199,000 spent on DDR related activities. This puts CRC’s approach at $153 per ex-combatant – significantly below other programmes and significantly below Lancaster’s recommendations. 23

The fact that CRC’s approach appears initially to be significantly cheaper than other approaches does not necessarily make it good and further comparisons will undoubtedly reveal huge differences between the programmes, many of which will justify the large costs per ex-combatant of the other programmes. However, the reports available do indicate that often very large amounts of money are spent with sometimes little achievement. This again supports a need for a serious debate about how best to deploy limited resources within the DDR process in DRC or elsewhere.

**CHALLENGES AND LESSONS LEARNED BY CRC**

In the course of the external evaluation (2011), Task Force members and others pointed to many difficulties ahead, particularly the uncertainty of funding available to CRC to continue its work, and the continued discrimination and stigmatisation of former combatants. Members of the Butembo Task Force summed up what they had learned during the programme in five points:

- Firstly, they emphasize that return is a process of transition and not a singular event, and support to ex-combatants must be sustained.
- Secondly, a ‘re-entry’ process that includes civic education is needed so ex-combatants can learn how to live in communities again.
- Thirdly, their families must be prepared for their return – especially vital for child soldiers.
- Fourthly, the type and level of support provided to ex-combatants must be appropriate to their capacity.
- And finally, promises made by agencies in encouraging ex-combatants to leave armed groups must be carried out.

This last point is crucial. Every promise not kept makes it harder to win the trust of combatants for a new initiative.

More generally, CRC has also recognised that as violence reduces, IDP return increases. This can lead to new kinds of conflict over land and property. As part of CRC’s new approach, the Task Forces will be given further training, specifically in land conflict.

Based on these lessons learnt, CRC has revised its model. The main additions are:

- Use ex-combatants as labour for community projects as part of the reintegration and sensitisation process but also as a way to stimulate local development.
- Equip the Task Forces with greater land conflict resolution skills in order to respond to conflicts associated with IDP return.
- Limit the core number of co-operative members to 70 (30% civilians) but extend assistance beyond the core group through a micro-finance scheme.
• Provide specific assistance to support the reintegration of female ex-combatants.
• Expand the number of Radio Clubs and provide each with a small grant to stimulate community development.

This new model will be implemented in 38 communities in North Kivu by CRC, from 2012-2015.

SCALING UP

The above describes one case study from one local organisation which has assisted 4,276 ex-combatants. This is a long way from the 52,172 that the PNDDR reintegrated and it is understandable that programme planners may feel local organisations are limited in their capacity. It might be thought that only an exceptional local organisation could achieve what CRC has achieved. However, even during the period of this case study, two other organisations (PEREX and IJAD) working in North Kivu demobilised a further 4,030 between them.24

The map here features local organisations known to have experience of DDR and cited on www.insightonconflict.org. If each received similar support to CRC, then potentially each could also assist over 4,000 ex-combatants, totalling over 25,000 ex-combatants. While this is still smaller than the overall PNDDR programme it shows that there is real potential for local partners to make a contribution on a scale that is appropriate to the DDR problem in DRC.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This case study has sought to demonstrate the advantages of ‘second generation DDR’ and provide evidence that the involvement of local organisations can make a significant contribution to the level of demobilisation of armed groups, the sustainable reintegration of ex-combatants and community violence reduction.

It is clear from the literature available that the methodology for Second Generation DDR is still to be refined and this is evident from the multiple attempts at traditional and second generation DDR in DRC. Although the optimum methodology is yet to be realised, the ingredients for best practice are present in DRC. What is needed now, is greater effort by donors and the government to look at more innovative and inclusive ways of implementing DDR in DRC and other countries facing similar challenges. It is essential that this includes a serious assessment of existing local capacity and that roles and responsibilities are allocated based on results based evidence and cost-effectiveness. In this way, the optimum combination of international, national and local resources and expertise will be deployed and DDR will have a much greater chance not only of succeeding in sustainably reintegrating combatants, but also of contributing to wider development and ultimately sustainable peace.

The recommendations for next steps are as follows:
1. The optimum approach to DDR in DRC has not yet been achieved, but the essential components do exist, if resources and expertise are combined from international, national and local organisations. Organisations should be selected to fulfil particular roles based on cost-effectiveness, sustainability and contextual awareness.
2. Local capacity for supporting DDR tends to be underestimated, although NGOs offer a cost-effective means to scale up the complex and nuanced responses for second generation DDR.
3. In order to make full use of local capacity, an exercise mapping local organisations will need to be carried out at the start of the
planning phase. Insight on Conflict (www.insightonconflict.org) has been designed to support this.

4. DDR must be planned as an integrated programme, and disarmament and demobilisation should not be initiated until a reintegration plan has been developed.

5. Reintegration should be seen as an opportunity to further the development of entire communities, including the embedding of local peacebuilding mechanisms.

6. Local peacebuilders are uniquely able to build and deploy the relationships that are vital for social reintegration.

7. While funding for a DDR programme may come from different sources, it is essential that the funding for a programme is planned as a single system.

8. DDR needs to be evaluated over a long period of time, with different models and institutions sharing a common evaluation approach, and ideally with follow up of individual participants to assess the long term effectiveness of the programme.

ANNEX 1

PEACE IS AN ICEBERG: EMERGENT, TRANSFORMATIONAL AND PROJECTABLE CHANGE

‘Emergent’ change is when communities and people are just beginning to recover from trauma or conflict; the most appropriate strategy is ‘accompaniment’ – walking with people as they slowly learn to work together once again, providing specific help as they identify their need for it. Transformative change involves ‘unlearning’ – such as ‘unlearning’ how to be in conflict in a community – and can be a challenging time for those who work with the community. ‘Projectable’ change tends to happen when a community can identify its needs clearly and is able to plan and carry out a ‘project’.

I visualise this as an ‘iceberg’, with projectable change being the small part visible above the waterline, resting on a large body of work in emergent and transformative change that is done largely by local peace builders but is largely unseen. Projectable change is the stage at which communities are healthy, strong and organized enough to develop and manage ‘projects’. This tends to be the area of focus for many international development projects, without always recognizing that ‘projectable’ change rests on a great deal of work already by local people.

Most project budgets don’t specifically include such trust-building and relationship-building costs, yet these are equivalent to bricks and mortar for a house building project. At present, the only way to support such vital ‘emergent’ work is through supporting the organization’s operational costs as an investment in supporting this peacebuilding capacity.

– Rosemary Cairns, Peace Direct external evaluator, 2010

ANNEX 2

OVERVIEW OF APPROACHES TO DDR IN THE DRC

DDR comprises a number of stages:

- Disarmament – the collection, control and disposal of small arms, ammunition, explosives and light and heavy weapons.
- Demobilisation – the distribution of non-transferable ID cards, collection of socio-economic data and the establishment of a database of the beneficiary population.
- Reinsertion – transition assistance to enable participants to return to their home communities and sustain themselves and their families for a period of time.
- Reintegration – support in the form of training/materials/enrolment into the army or police to enable participants to have a sustainable livelihood.

In practice DDR can mean many things – from the simple exchange of a weapon for cash, to the integration of former combatants into the army or police force, to the kind of holistic and extended process described in this case study. All three approaches have been tried in the DRC in recent years. However, at the time of writing, the DRC
government has put a stop to simple ‘cash for weapons’ programmes, on the grounds that they do not deliver long term results. The Congolese army, FARDC, has no room for further recruits (and is in fact dismissing 30-40% of its least effective members, thereby creating a new security challenge in the form of ‘the residuals’).

This section draws on unpublished research for Peace Direct (available at www.peacedirect.org/andre-kolln-ddr-drc) drawing together the findings of evaluation reports of the three main DDR initiatives (see ‘Cost-effectiveness’ section above).

These programmes formed part of the World Bank managed Multi-Country Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme (MDRP) which was based on three overarching principles – partnership between different organisations, a regional approach and national ownership. The last proved to be a limitation on the programme’s success. Estimated costs and results for these programmes, and for CRC’s community based programme, are given in the table above.

CONADER formed the major part, in the DRC, of the World Bank’s Greater Great Lakes Regional Strategy for Demobilisation and Reintegration. In total, this programme demobilised 279,263 (102,014) combatants in seven countries, and reintegrated 232,107 (52,172). Angola and DRC (figures in brackets) were the two largest countries. As such, it was the most ambitious DDR programme ever attempted.

What follows is a brief overview of the first three programmes listed above, all funded by the Multi Donor Task Force and IDA.

**CONADER**

The planning of CONADER took account of a number of lessons learned from previous DDR programmes. Unfortunately, the implementation in the hands of the Congolese government was uneven, with success in setting up a non-falsifiable identity card system and ensuring that monthly payments via cell phone to around 100,000 ex-combatants were made. Financial management was less successful and support in this area from the international community was resisted.

CONADER was a particularly large scale approach, and perhaps illustrates the challenges of working on a large scale for a process which ultimately depends on changing hearts and minds. Despite the large sums involved, there has been no independent evaluation of CONADER to date. However, the programmes for child soldiers, and the special programmes run by UNDP were much more comparable in scale to CRC’s programme.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Implementer</th>
<th>Target group</th>
<th>Cost in US$</th>
<th>Participants on programme at time of evaluation</th>
<th>Participants completed programme at time of evaluation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CONADER Adults</td>
<td>186,000,000$</td>
<td>102,014</td>
<td>No reliable information</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNICEF/NGOs Children</td>
<td>21,670,000</td>
<td>12,511</td>
<td>604</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP Adults</td>
<td>19,100,000</td>
<td>3,083</td>
<td>3,083</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRC Adults &amp; children</td>
<td>199,000</td>
<td>4,300$</td>
<td>1,300$</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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1. Cost of the overall programme less allocations for UNDP and child soldier special programmes.
2. 102,014 combatants had been demobilised by end 2008 and had received reinsertion payments but there is no reliable information about the number that were permanently reintegrated.
3. This includes project costs directly associated with DDR ($96,000) plus 50% of CRC’s running costs ($103,000).
4. Total number of former combatants demobilised.
5. Number of former combatants taking part in community based reintegration (as opposed to e.g. enrolment in the army/police).
• Over reliance on UN to return children to their families – some waiting over a year just for transport.
• Lack of capacity to support reintegration activities in remote rural areas leading to a bias towards urban livelihoods.
• Poor reintegration monitoring and followup, particularly in rural areas.
• Lack of capacity of local partners.

The huge disparity between the numbers entering the programmes and those completing reintegration shows how even the most capable operators can struggle to successfully implement a time bound programme, in a field with as many variables as DDR.

**UNDP special projects**

UNDP received $7.3m for a Rapid Reaction Mechanism and $11.8m for Community Recovery and Reintegration projects. The Rapid Response Mechanism supported the national programme PNDPR, in providing funds and expert consultants. It was designed to be able to make a very rapid response to emerging opportunities (3-5 days target) but this proved difficult to achieve within normal UNDP procurement guidelines. According to (Lancaster) it managed to bridge the gap between demobilisation and reintegration by creating interim employment activities for 3,000 out of 15,000 ex-combatants in Ituri, which had a significant impact on communities in all areas.

The Community Recovery and Reintegration Project was less successful, placing a mere 83 ex-combatants out of a target of 10,000 in reintegration projects. This appears to have been due to a combination of passive management and an implementation strategy more appropriate to a normal development project in a peaceful society than to one in a conflict-affected region. Where community projects were implemented they had, according to Lancaster, a ‘near miraculous effect’. But there were far too few of them.

**REFERENCES**

2. ibid, p.5
3. The eastern regions of the DRC are rich in gold, diamonds, coltan, cassiterite, copper, cobalt, wolfram, zinc and oil, as well as timber, coffee and palm oil. (Amnesty International: 2003).
4. Rural villages lack electricity, reliable water supplies, public services, communications networks and good roads, and have only skeletal local government structures and services. Even cities like Beni face major challenges for water and power.
5. Rwanda and Uganda, in alliance with Congolese armed political groups, have systematically plundered the region on a vast scale, justifying their military intervention and control of the area by the threat to their own security from the activities of Rwandese and Ugandan insurgent groups operating from within DRC. The ambition of all these combatant forces to exploit eastern DRC’s mineral and economic wealth has been the biggest single factor in the continuing violence. The major beneficiaries have been senior members of the Ugandan and Rwandese armed forces, foreign businesses and leaders of armed political groups.... These economic interests have led to the emergence of a pattern of violence by all forces in the region that is aimed primarily at Congolese civilian communities and is predatory in character.’ (Amnesty International: 2003).
7. A 2001 UN report suggested the Rwandan army through Rwanda Metals netted at least $250 million from coltan exports from eastern DRC when production increased in 1999-2000. This income sustained the Rwandan army’s presence in DRC, providing protection and security for individuals and companies extracting coltan. The report also said Ugandan and Burundian rebels looted and smuggled coltan, using illegal monopolies, forced labor, prisoners and murder. (UN: 2001).
8. In June 2003 a small ‘rapid reaction force’ led by the French (IBIMP) was deployed to Bunia. However, its mandate was very limited and was withdrawn on 1 September 2003 to be replaced by a larger contingent of MONUC.
9. The Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement was the first attempt to end the war through a ceasefire. UN peacekeepers were deployed and, in an indication of regional involvement, it was signed by Angola, Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe and DRC (Rouw, H. and Willems, R. 2010). The Pretoria Agreement between Rwanda and DRC stipulated removal of 20,000 Rwandan troops from eastern DRC and disarmament of interahamwe and FAR (Rouw, H. and Willems, R. 2010).
16. ibid, p14.
17. ibid.
22. ibid.
Too often DDR programmes have been designed with little or no consideration for either ex-combatants or the communities they are to be reintegrated into. In many cases, donor communities are more concerned about fundraising for the DDR kitty and less about the programming of the reintegration process. By the time the reintegration stage is reached, the funds are usually exhausted, or donor fatigue will have set in, thereby crippling the realisation of the most critical element of the DDR process.

— Nelson Alusala, Pretoria Institute for Security Studies