Security Promotion in Fragile States: Can Local Meet National?

Exploring the Connections between Community Security and Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR)

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Working Group Community Security and Community-based DDR in Fragile States

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Executive Summary

The connection between community security and Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) is a largely omitted topic in most current policy approaches and is relatively unexplored in both academic and policy literature. The few available reports indicate that community security and community-based DDR initiatives have something to offer and can not only complement state-centred approaches, but may even substitute them when the state is unable, unwilling or unavailable to carry out its tasks. For instance, in many conflict and post-conflict settings, local-level security initiatives provide local forms of protection or security zones, or involve communities in disarmament and reintegration or the monitoring thereof. They may further act as interlocutors between vulnerable populations and formal and non-state security actors.

This report reviews the existing literature on the link between community security and DDR processes. It was produced by the working group Community Security and Community-based DDR in Fragile States that is part of the Peace Security and Development (PSD) network. This working group has three main objectives. The first objective is to examine the current state of affairs with regard to community security and DDR policies and programmes, whether initiated from above by state or multilateral agencies or from below by NGOs and communities. This is the main focus of this report, and also constitutes the first phase of the research project. The second objective is to design context-specific approaches for community-based DDR that can enhance the human security of populations affected by conflict and can help prevent the proliferation of (small) arms (and light weapons). While the present report intends to provide a first impetus to this, follow-up research and field work will be undertaken in four countries – Burundi, Colombia, Democratic Republic of Congo, and Sudan. The third objective is the sharing and dissemination of the results to relevant audiences, both while the study is ongoing and after the completion of the work.

**Community Security**

Security is to a large extent in the eye of the beholder: it depends on the perceptions individuals and communities have of their security. Community security is defined to constitute both an *end state* – in which communities feel secure from threats exerted by violent conflict, arms proliferation, crime, and a lack of protection or direct threat by the state – and a *process* – in which communities participate in identifying and prioritizing their security needs as well as appropriate responses to meet these needs. Various ways can be identified in which communities organize their own security, such as traditional systems and peace committees, Gun-Free Zones or community-based policing. Communities find these ways to provide for their own security sometimes with, but also without outside help. Initiatives like these may provide entry points for DDR programmes to become more community-based and hence more sustainable from a community security perspective. However, little literature exists about community security and more research is necessary.
Community-based DDR
Community-based DDR may help link community security and DDR, thereby filling some of the gaps that are left by traditional approaches to DDR. However, ‘community-based’ has become a label attached to any development and security project that aims (or claims) to have an impact on communities. Thus, large numbers of projects may be ‘community-based’ in name only, rather than in practice. In this report, community-based DDR programmes are defined as programmes that target ex-combatants as well as the wider war-affected communities and that actively and truly involve these communities in the process of assessment, design and implementation. We can identify a continuum that runs from a more to a less community-based approach. At one extreme of this continuum, we find programmes based in local realities and security needs and implemented by the community itself. At the other extreme, we find the more traditional DDR programmes implemented by international organizations, national governments and large donors.

Weaknesses of State DDR Programmes
‘State DDR programmes’ are designed at the national level, usually jointly by donors and national governments and are centrally implemented. When analyzing these programmes, we still take community security as our starting point, asking how such programmes can, and do, connect to community security. Although DDR is not a panacea for the entire range of security threats in a post-conflict environment, it is part of a wider spectrum of activities to overcome armed conflict. In recent years, a number of critical weaknesses in DDR processes have been identified. First, they tend to be relatively isolated from wider reconstruction, SSR and peacebuilding processes. Second, DDR programmes often lack national ownership and local involvement. Third, they pay little attention to the special needs of vulnerable groups such as female, handicapped and child combatants. Fourth, although the reintegration component is the most difficult and long-term aspect of DDR, it receives insufficient attention and funding. Our analysis suggests that these weaknesses emerge because community security is not sufficiently taken on board in most DDR processes. A critical problem is that DDR processes need to start within a limited timeframe to prevent disappointment due to unmet expectations. This time pressure complicates community involvement. Identifying community security structures that could be linked up with, and involving community themselves in DDR planning, are activities that take time. This means that a balance has to be found between two competing objectives.

A Human Security Approach to State DDR
In order to provide a conceptual basis for linking DDR and community security, this report explores the link between the concept of human security and DDR. Instead of focusing exclusively on the military security of the state, human security is people-centred. The concept embodies a shift from security through armament to security through sustainable development. It is assumed that improvements of human security through development will reduce the possibility of violent conflict. In addition, the notion of human security implies people’s empowerment. Rather than treating people as helpless victims, a focus on human security brings out people’s agency to improve their own security. Taking a human security approach to DDR may help addressing the shortcomings of many DDR programmes, in particular their failure to connect to wider peacebuilding processes, their lack of local ownership, their short duration which is inconsistent with the long-term nature of reintegration, and their lack of attention to vulnerable groups and their special needs. The human security approach also corresponds to existing
trends in DDR policy, such as the inclusion of broader groups (dependents, communities) and linking reintegration to other (community) development activities. However, while DDR policies increasingly pay attention to human security, the implementation of this idea is limited in practice. This is due to time pressure, context factors (government capacity and willingness, peace process, security, socio-economic development), and dynamics within the coalition of actors that is implementing DDR.

Connecting Community Security and State DDR
The literature mentions several ways to link community security and state DDR. First, the *end state* of community security can be seen as the overall *aim* of DDR processes. In practice, however, DDR programmes aim primarily at state security. Second, if we take a *process* view, community security can also be a *characteristic* of DDR processes. This requires taking community participation in programming seriously. Here we find that participation and empowerment only play limited roles in the implementation of DDR programmes. This is due to a lack of conceptual clarity on what these concepts mean and what they imply for DDR in practice. It remains also unclear what security means to local communities and how this could be assessed quickly. Third, DDR programmes can be connected to *community security initiatives*, such as traditional systems and peace committees, gun-free zones and community-based policing. Such linkages would require DDR programming to be flexible and open to community involvement. Fourth, DDR programmes may connect to *community-based DDR initiatives*. While some interesting examples of community-based DDR exist, ‘state’ DDR programmes often find it difficult to link up with such activities. Finally, community security may be seen as a *precondition* for DDR. In other words, proper community security may convince combatants to submit to DDR. This could imply a different sequencing of DDR, with reintegration preceding disarmament, to assure people’s willingness to hand in their weapons. In practice, however, community security and DDR are rarely connected. It is seldom questioned how DDR could contribute to longer-term security and influential handbooks -such as the UN IDDRS and the OECD handbook on SSR- treat community security in a very narrow way. We conclude that it is important to connect community-level initiatives with a national strategy for security and disarmament. Centralized DDR programmes and community security arrangements should complement each other.

Cooperation among DDR Actors
The report further analyzes how ‘state’ actors (donors and national governments) cooperate with locally active actors (CBOs, NGOs, local government and the private sector) and explores the added value of each actor in such cooperation. The main conclusion is that the influence of local actors is very limited. This in turn limits the possibilities for DDR programmes to reinforce community security arrangements, and vice versa. Although detailed guidelines – such as the IDDRS – create opportunities for better coordination, a blueprint approach to DDR limits possibilities for flexibly designing and adapting DDR to prevailing community security needs and existing local arrangements. In practice there is little room for civil society input in the programming and NGOs are turned into subcontractors rather than partners. This negates their potential added value as connectors between communities and DDR programmes and as actors who have experience with capacity building approaches. Although the way DDR programmes are implemented – by chains of contractors from trust funds to local NGOs – makes it difficult, there is thus a need to better involve NGOs, CBOs and the local private sector in the formulation of DDR policies and programmes. Although NGOs face problems of their own, they are better placed than ‘official’ actors
to assist in longer-term development and to adopt an empowering approach to DDR, as they have better local contacts and knowledge. This means that state DDR actors should provide more room to NGOs to act as intermediaries between local and state levels rather than only as subcontractors. It also means that NGOs should take more initiative and actively participate in the development of policies with regard to DDR and its connection with community security.

Donor Policies
The final section of the report analyzes the donor policies of the multilateral and bilateral donors that have played a significant role in the implementation of DDR programmes, namely: the European Union (EU), the United Nations (UN) and the World Bank (WB) (including the WB-led MDRP project) and nine bilateral donors, i.e. Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Japan, The Netherlands, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States. The section analyzes in how far donor policies take into account community security, and how rules and frameworks enable or limit a community security approach to DDR. As it turns out, there is a lack of a common position in terms of DDR policy. While some donors have an explicit policy or pay attention to DDR as part of a larger security and peace framework, other donors completely lack a clear policy or are still in the process of developing one. The absence of explicit policies on community security does not stop them from participating in or funding DDR programmes, whether coordinated by other actors or initiated by themselves. Although some policies pay attention to aspects of community security, in general donors tend to apply a more state-based approach. Where community-based policy intentions have been formulated as part of policy, it has proven difficult to operationalize these properly. Reasons mentioned include bureaucratic problems and the ‘logic’ of programming. Time pressure, mentioned earlier, plays a role in this as well. The top-down and state-led characteristics of the policies are also difficult to overcome due to the earlier mentioned implementation chains from the top down and the limited community (and NGO) involvement in the design of DDR. Local people, ex-combatants and communities rarely possess the voice to be heard. There is a tension between on the one hand the need to have standards in place to enable swift action, and on the other hand, the need to be flexible and to allow space for local research, community involvement, and context-specific planning. Donor convergence towards widely accepted standards and funding and operational mechanisms have opened possibilities for collaboration and coordination that hitherto were often found lacking, but they also inhibit flexibility and openness to local input.

Conclusions and Recommendations
The literature and policy studies carried out so far leave us with a number of interesting and challenging conclusions.

- Ensuring better complementarity between community security and centralized DDR programmes will be difficult, but may help address some of the shortcomings of DDR programmes. It would require linking local initiatives to centralized programmes, and adjusting centralized programmes accordingly. One way of doing this could be to alter the sequence of the D, D and R phases (with community-based reintegration preceding disarmament) and/or by approaching DDR programmes in a more community-based manner.
• ‘State’ DDR actors (including donors, INGOs, etc.) lack knowledge of existing informal structures for security provision. More research and community involvement in the early stages of DDR programming is required. Although this is severely complicated by logistical difficulties and time pressure, it is nonetheless important for effective approaches that aim at sustainable human security.

• Locally active actors have only limited involvement in DDR planning and implementation. On the one hand, processes and mechanisms for DDR should be more inclusive of local knowledge; on the other hand, local actors should assert stronger roles for themselves vis-à-vis donors. NGOs could play important intermediating roles in this process, something which they are not doing at present.

• One-size-fits-all approaches do not work. There is a key role to be played for national and local actors: government, civil society, private sector, community, and former combatants. There is a need, first, to map the local resources available in terms of knowledge, community security arrangements, ‘social fabric’, local business, and the needs and capacities of former combatants, vulnerable groups, and wider communities. Second, programmes need to build on these resources, aiming to strengthen them further.

• The implementation of diverging approaches towards DDR is only possible when the current predominant ‘blueprint approach’ is abandoned in favour of more flexibility in policy and implementation. However, this runs counter to recent developments in DDR policy towards greater convergence around a commonly accepted set of standards and procedures. From the points of view of coordination and rapid implementation, this convergence has great value. However, the important objective of coordinated and swift action needs to be balanced with the objective of community security. Including local research and community involvement in DDR planning as standard elements of DDR guidelines could be one way to work towards such a balanced approach.

• The context in which DDR takes place is highly complex, and largely beyond the control of DDR programmers. At the same time, the context is of paramount importance for DDR success. People’s willingness to disarm depends on their belief in the peace process, and more importantly on the sense of individuals that their security is guaranteed. This concerns not only physical security, but also socio-economic factors. On the one hand, these contextual factors limit what DDR programmes can achieve. On the other hand, this also means that DDR should be embedded within wider peacebuilding activities. More holistic thinking about DDR is needed, in order to move beyond ad-hoc operations to a more strategic view of how different activities, including DDR, can work together.

• Informal community security structures can sometimes be of an illiberal nature, which places ‘state’ DDR actors before difficult dilemmas when it comes to cooperating with them.
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<td>3D</td>
<td>Defense, Development and Diplomacy</td>
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<td>ACIN</td>
<td>Asociación de Cabildos Indígenas del Norte del Cauca</td>
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<td>AMF</td>
<td>Afghan Military Forces</td>
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<td>ANBP</td>
<td>Afghanistan’s New Beginnings Programme</td>
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<td>African Union</td>
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<td>Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia</td>
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<td>Armed Violence Reduction and prevention</td>
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<td>BMZ</td>
<td>Bundesministerium für Wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung</td>
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<td>Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups</td>
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<td>DDRRR</td>
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<td>Free Aceh Movement</td>
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<td>Gun Free South Africa</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
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<td>GPSF</td>
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<td>GTZ</td>
<td>Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit</td>
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<td>HIV/AIDS</td>
<td>Human Immune-deficiency Virus / Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome</td>
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<td>ICISS</td>
<td>International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty</td>
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<td>IDDRS</td>
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<td>South Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Arms and Light Weapons</td>
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Introduction

The Peace Security and Development network (PSD) including its working group Community Security and Community-based DDR in Fragile States was funded with a subsidy decision of the Minister for Development Co-operation dated 22 September 2008. The Dutch partners involved in this working group are: the Centre for Conflict Studies of Utrecht University (CCS) (co-chair Georg Frerks), IKV Pax Christi (co-chair Jan Gruiters), the Centre for International Conflict Analysis and Management (CICAM) of the Radboud University Nijmegen, the Conflict Research Unit of the Netherlands Institute of International Relations ‘Clingendael’ (CRU), the European Centre for Conflict Prevention (ECCP), PSO (Capacity Building in Developing Countries) and Vluchtelingenwerk Nederland. The Dutch government is represented by the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense.

This study is focusing foremost on community security and community-based Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) processes. The reason for this is that this forms to a large degree an omission in a majority of the current policy approaches and also is a relatively unexplored area in both academic and policy literature. The relatively scarce reports available, however, indicate that community security and community-based DDR initiatives have something to offer and can not only add and complement state-centred approaches, but even may substitute them in conditions where the state is unable, unwilling or unavailable to carry out its tasks. In view of the intimate relationship between community-based and other approaches to DDR we intend to deal with all of these in their mutual interconnection, but clearly put community-based DDR centre stage. Secondly, in many countries and post-conflict situations, DDR initiatives take place within a larger Security Sector Reform (SSR) effort and there is a mutual relationship. Sometimes, demobilized soldiers are offered new jobs in the reformed security sector, in other cases security sector reform and associated cuts in bloated armies require that superfluous soldiers and ex-combatants are demobilized and reintegrated. This study will do justice to the inter-linkages between DDR and SSR, but will emphasize the first one. Hence, it will not deal with the nature, implementation and technicalities of SSR programs per se, but only will discuss SSR in the context of DDR. Thirdly, there are scattered, but growing local-level security initiatives in many conflict and post-conflict settings. These may provide local forms of protection or security zones, but also involve community roles in disarmament and reintegration and the monitoring thereof. They may further act as interlocutors between vulnerable populations and formal and non-state security actors.

Objectives

The working group has three main objectives. The first objective is the examination of the current state of affairs with regard to DDR policies and programmes, both initiated from above by state or multilateral agencies and from below, such as those carried out by NGOs and communities. This is the main focus of this report. The second objective is to design a context-specific approach for community-based DDR and follow-up activities that can guarantee the human security of populations affected by conflict and the proliferation of (small) arms (and light weapons) by carrying out field work in the form of a set of pilot action researches. While this report intends to be a first step in this, follow-up research and field work will be undertaken in a later stage of the working group’s existence. The third objective is the sharing and dissemination of the results to relevant audiences, both while the study is ongoing and after the completion of the work.
From the normative concept of human security (and its empowering focus on agency) this research adds value by complementarily researching this component of local security in addition to more conventional approaches like state-led DDR. In the latter, local participation, empowerment and ownership are constantly stressed, yet unfortunately they are rarely truly achieved. As we shall see, this is often not due to unwillingness, but to the deficiency of structures needed to implement DDR and to adverse programmatic ‘logic’. Local participation, empowerment and ownership should therefore be achieved in a different manner. We aim to do so by focusing on local perceptions of security, the ways in which security needs are addressed by communities themselves, and how these realities and initiatives connect to DDR programmes.

**Structure of the report**

This report is divided into five parts. The first part focuses on community security and community-based DDR. While acknowledging the fact that a community is not a monolithic whole and should not be ‘romanticized’, we look at how communities perceive and address their security needs. Community security is defined to be both an end state – in which communities are relatively safe from violent threats – as well as a process in which communities address their own security needs in ways they find appropriate. As the notion ‘community-based’ is often attached to a variety of programmes by a diversity of actors, we suppose community-based DDR to be programmes that both target communities and actively involve them in the entire process from the assessment of the issues to be addressed, to the design and implementation. This is thus opposed to ‘state’ DDR that is generally entirely top-down implemented (although donors do often claim to include bottom-up perspectives and ideas). By ‘state’ DDR we mean programmes that are designed and implemented at the national level, as also defined by the UN (UN IAWG, 2006: 1.10, 2). The table below clarifies the distinctions between the concepts used in this report.

| The concepts DDR, community-based DDR, and community security (as process) |
|---|---|---|
| DDR (‘state’ DDR) | Community-based DDR | Community Security (as process) |
| Intervention from outside | Intervention from outside and inside | Intervention from inside |
| Top-down implemented | Both top-down and bottom-up implemented (dialogue) | Bottom-up implemented |
| Macro level | Macro and micro levels | Micro level |
| Focus on national security | Focus on both local and national security (and its connection) | Focus on local security |
| Limited timeframe | Longer timeframe needed | No predetermined timeframe |
| Ownership by donor and national government | Ownership by donor, national government and communities | Ownership by community |

Community-based DDR thus finds itself somewhere on a continuum between ‘state’ DDR and community security. When talking about DDR it should also be noted that there is a distinction between
the DDR programme that is implemented and the DDR process that it aims to influence. Whereas the programme has a fixed start and end as well as a clear goal, the process does have neither. The distinction clarifies that a DDR programme does not have to entail all components of the process, but it should be carefully and constructively placed in the wider process context of a specific geographical area. Throughout this report DDR is used as DDR programme, and when the process is meant this is clarified.

In Part II the mounting criticism on ‘state’ DDR programmes is related to the concept of human security as defined in the 1994 Human Development Report (UNDP, 1994). Although a very broad definition, it does justice to the multidimensional nature of security threats, allowing for an integrated approach. For practical purposes, however, we limit ourselves to threats to human security other than development issues and only including threats affecting significant groups of people and the stability of society at large. The third chapter of the report translates the human security approach into a number of operational elements by comparing theory to practice. The fourth chapter then analyses the connection between community security and centralized DDR programmes from a number of different angles. Community security is discussed both as an aim and process as is the extent to which DDR programmes link up with community security arrangements and community-based DDR. The last angle is viewing community as a precondition for DDR. These angles are related to questions of sequencing DDR; whether DDR is most pertinent for enhancing community security and on whether community security can be viewed as a criterion for DDR. The chapter also reviews how a wide variety of actors could work together in DDR programmes towards enhancing community security as far as this is possible from a literature research. As community security as a process entails communities actively engaged in their own security provision, policy documents and lessons learned reports identify ownership, participation and capacity-building as core components for successful programming. Ownership is generally found to be achieved through involvement of local stakeholders; thus by means of their participation, which in turn often entails strengthening their capacities. This chapter finds that the possibilities for DDR programmes to reinforce community security are limited, partly because the influence of local actors on the DDR programmes is limited. Apart from building capacities, empowerment could thus also entail the provision of conditions for local diversity and autonomy by transforming top-down standardized international systems. The chapter also looks into the way ‘state’ DDR actors can cooperate with community security actors, yet given the fact that such cooperation is context-specific and difficult to assess behind a desk this will be further investigated during forthcoming fieldwork.

In Part III a review of the main donors attempts to uncover the state of the art with regard to policies on DDR. The choice for the reviewed donors is based on their role in the implementation of DDR programmes. Besides nine bilateral donors, the European Union, the United Nations and the World Bank are reviewed from a community security perspective. The emerging donor policies of these donors are assessed and the DDR funding mechanisms are reviewed as these might in part explain limitations on the donors’ behalf.

Part IV then draws overall conclusions and looks at the policy implications. After the conclusions, the annex aims to bridge the desk research with the upcoming field researches. As one of the objectives is to design context-specific approaches for community-based DDR, the Annex looks into the context in which DDR is implemented. We investigate the notion of ‘fragile state’ which constitutes the context of the work of this initiative, and further explore the distinct characteristics of the context in which DDR and community security find themselves. Summarizing these characteristics we propose a model in which
various types of conflict that DDR and community security initiatives might aim to address, are drawn in relation to the context characteristics that may influence the situation. These various types of conflict are here presented as conflict typologies, which we hope can provide opportunities for finding context-specific security interventions. Such security interventions then may include interventions from outside (‘state’ DDR), from inside (community security) or a combination (community-based DDR).

This desk study deals mostly with secondary evidence on DDR and local security issues, based on literature and policy documents, and therefore is inherently limited in its depth of research. This necessitates modesty on our behalf, specifically when talking about the community security perspective. Our own institutional backgrounds and western frames of reference may shade our eyes from seeing priorities in fragile situations other than based on our own assumptions and norms. Also, we have found that there is relatively little literature available on community security, which in all likelihood is more due to the lack of attention to it by donors, rather than it not being present in the field. This report should therefore also be viewed as an investigative preparation within the wider work of this initiative. The questions raised in and by this report will further be investigated during the forthcoming field researches.

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Part I. Community Security and Community-based DDR
Introduction to Part I: Communities, Security and DDR

This Part of the report focuses on community security and community-based DDR. In spite of the fact that security related interventions, such as DDR, acknowledge the importance of community involvement and aim to address security issues as they are perceived on the ground, in practice the experience is that these interventions fail to truly do so. Why these interventions often are mostly ineffective in addressing community security issues despite their best efforts and good intentions will be discussed later in this report. This, of course, does not mean that DDR interventions are always completely off the mark when it comes to community involvement. As we shall see, there are indeed cases that were relatively successful in this, and from which lessons can be learned.

Part I consists of two chapters. The first chapter looks into the notion of ‘community security’. We first explore what a ‘community’ is, how it can be perceived, and following from that what ‘community security’ is. The chapter also elaborates on what security can constitute to different people in different circumstances. With this in mind, we investigate how community security is organized and illustrate this with a number of examples.

Chapter 2 then looks at community-based DDR. We first elaborate on why we look at a community-based approach that can complement the more traditional DDR interventions. Admittedly ‘community-based’ has become a label attached to any development and security project that slightly aims (or claims) to have an impact on communities, which creates the image that there are large numbers of projects that are ‘community-based’ in name, although perhaps not in practice. Therefore we discuss how community-based DDR is defined by us, and consequently discuss a number of DDR experiences based on this definition. The chapter then sums up the conclusions of the literature on community-based DDR. It summarizes the discussions with regard to the scope and depth of DDR, the sequence of the phases and who should be in charge of the design and programming.
1. What is Community Security?

1.1. Defining ‘Community’

In order to investigate what constitutes community security and community-based DDR and how this can be organized, the notion ‘community' has to be defined. However, especially in complex societies characterized by people’s mobility, and post-conflict situations with ethnic divisions, displaced persons and other factors that fragment the fabric of society, such a definition is rather problematic. As an operational term the ‘community’ refers to the level of intervention, as opposed to state or individual level, but the term is often used in two different ways (Baaré, 2006; Caramés & Sanz, 2008: 28). It signifies a place like a neighbourhood or village, or a social grouping like an ethnic group or tribe. Rural communities are often seen as the easiest to define, as it is primarily defined in residential terms (Richards, et al. 2004). However, such a definition remains highly disputed and often considered to be merely a Western ‘romantic’ vision of Southern realities. A community is not “a homogenous and welcoming entity corrupted by outside influences – violent conflict, fighting forces – which now needs to be restored” (Buchanan & Widmer, 2006: 13). A community cannot simply be defined by means of physical boundaries as it is part of one’s identity. In addition to physical boundaries, identity factors determine what makes up a community, such as demographic composition, occupations, socioeconomic boundaries, activities, etc. However, group identities cannot simply be equated with communities. Defining a community along such lines potentially leaves out certain parts of a community, which is contradictory to the inclusiveness that characterizes a community-based approach.

Avoiding such rigid definitions, the community refers to the focus of interest (as opposed to individual or state level) and it should “be viewed as a set of meaningful social relations that constantly define and redefine the territorial dimension and that weave the economic and political dimensions together” (Piselli, 2007: 877). By regarding communities as social networks that may coincide with location, rather than regarding everyone in a specific location to form a community, one increases the understanding of social linkages within the community. Because one is focusing on what the community is, rather than what it could look like on paper. Moreover, it will presumably decrease intra-community and inter-community tensions since one treats the community (and its relations with other communities) in its reality, rather than as how one perceives the community to be (or how one would like it to become). For a community-based approach this also entails working with a realistic lens on existing communities and their capacities, where the existing structures and capacities form the default of the intervention, and where the programme design constantly has to be adapted to the changing situations. See in the box below the working definition of the notion ‘community’ as used in this report.

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**The community**

A community is a social network of changing relations that weave the economic and political dimensions of society together. A community does not necessarily coincide with location, should not be seen as a monolithic whole, and as a social network is linked to other local, national and international social networks.
1.2. Understanding Community Security

Maintaining security is a fundamental objective of a government and security is a precondition for other goals. “Yet, security is not a one-dimensional concept. It is multi-faceted consisting of human, physical, economic and socio-political security, failure of which has resulted in structural violence and demand for arms” (Mkutu, 2004: 7). With this realization the concept of human security emerged, re-balancing debates on security away from an exclusive focus on military security of the state, towards a security of the people whom the state serves (Boyle & Simonsen, 2004: 6). Building on Roosevelt’s four freedoms, the UNDP (1994) defined the concept to have seven main aspects of which ‘community security’ is one. Community security then refers to the security people derive “from their membership in a group – a family, community, an organization, a racial or ethnic group that can provide a cultural identity and a treasuring set of values. Such groups also offer practical support” (Ibid. 31). Essentially it then relates to perceptions of security derived from a sense of trust of neighbours and participation in and belonging to a community (CICS, 2006b).

However, having defined the community as social networks – and not necessarily overlapping with ethnic communities – community security should be viewed broader than aiming “to protect people from the loss of traditional relationships and values and from sectarian and ethnic violence” (UNDP, 1994: 32). In the literature relating to community security in practice, community security also includes issues like the proliferation of SALW, criminal violence by opportunists and vigilante groups, mistrust and lack of faith in the security forces to provide security to ordinary people.1 In this sense community security is seen as a response to the security threats of the community. Community security can also, however, be seen as a precondition for interventions such as DDR programmes; community security is then a state of affairs (Saferworld, 2008a: 20). In this report community security is seen both as an end state and the process in and of itself “in which communities participate in identifying and prioritizing their security needs as to develop appropriate and effective responses” to achieve this end state (Ibid.).

### Community Security

*Community security as an end state* is the situation in which communities feel secure from threats exerted by violent conflict, arms proliferation, crime, and a lack of protection or direct threat by the state.

*Community security as a process* means that communities participate in identifying and prioritizing their security needs, as well as in the development and implementation of appropriate responses for their security needs.

1.3. The Local Meaning of ‘Security’

However, community security is not the only perspective on security. Different perspectives are used by different actors. For DDR there has generally been a state perspective of security, as it aims to restore the monopoly of legitimate violence of the state. This in turn can create circumstances for development and

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improvement of human security. As we will see further on in this paper, some have argued in favor of a stronger human security perspective on DDR as it should be part of a longer-term peacebuilding and development process rather than being a short-term security solution. However, Miller and Rudnick (2008: 37) argue that – whether starting with military or human security – current operational planning is based on lessons learned and best practices and thereby designed to be independent of, rather than account for, cultural variation. “Yet, knowledge of culture is central to understanding local security from the point of view of communities.” The Security Needs Assessment Protocol (SNAP) they developed for the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) states that “it is what makes security problems different from one community to another that is most important when designing activities specific to a community” (Ibid. 31). The protocol enables the generation of explicit community-level knowledge about security concerns in a rapid manner, the interpretation of these findings for the benefit of the project and the reconciling of the findings with standing agencies and practices (Miller, 2007: 2). An assessment with the engagement of local communities will be able to identify not only the local security concerns, but also the local concepts of security and the associated practices. The OECD-DAC (2008: 8) similarly aims to enhance “state and civil society capacities to address insecurity as defined and perceived by the people and communities affected by armed violence.”

1.4. How is Community Security Organized?

Having defined community security as a process, and with the interest to find commonalities and possibly build bridges between community security as a process and DDR and community-based DDR, we first need to elaborate on how community security is organized. According to Susan L. Woodward (2007), creating sustainable peace requires addressing the reality created by war, as opposed to addressing the ‘root causes.’ “The focus for both prevention and peace,” she argues, “should not be on causes as conventionally understood but on how mechanisms that keep limits on the use of violence as a means to political ends are destabilized or restored.” Fragile states are often characterized by the decay of socio-cultural and institutional processes that normally keep limits on the use of violence and the goal is to restore or create such processes and bring back security. As the proliferation of arms is a big obstacle to security, disarmament is a logical measure. However, complete disarmament is often not feasible (at least initially) and registration of firearms, establishing clear criteria, and regulating use (e.g. not carrying guns in the open) can be a first step (Buchanan & Widmer, 2006: 14). Yet, fragile states are far from the most desired environment to enforce laws, assuming SALW proliferation can indeed be managed by controlling supply. In the case of landmines campaigners successfully claimed that they had no military or police utility, creating a ban not only de jure but also de facto. In the case of SALW, however, there is a military and policy utility and there is a demand by civilians (Regehr, 2004: 4). Efforts to control availability are thus frustrated by demand. The following will first elaborate on the need for bottom-up approaches in SALW demand and community security issues, and then give a number of illustrations of how community security can be organized.

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2 See also Part II, chapter 3 in this report.
3 An example being the project “DDR and Human Security: Post-conflict Security-building in the Interests of the Poor” led by CICS of the University of Bradford.
4 It should be noted that as the focus of this research is on DDR and disarmament issues, community security initiatives with relation to peacemaking and peacebuilding are not elaborated on here. That is not to say that such initiatives are not relevant for DDR and community-based DDR.
1.4.1. SALW Demand

Darryl Whitehead (2007) argues that the demand for small arms in fragile states or after conflict remains high because individuals are increasingly viewing their security as a privately provided good. “As a result of diminished relative and absolute state capacity to provide for security, gaps exist that have been filled by more individualist approaches that make more intensive use of SALW” (Ibid. 6-7). According to him, a number of considerations relating to personal security – which one can assume are higher in the context of fragile states – lead individuals to retain high levels of demand for SALW in spite of the negative effects and risks associated with SALW. This follows primarily from the context of fragile states, which by definition already lack the capacity or the will to provide security collectively. The high costs to organize security in a collective way versus the reduced barriers to rent seeking behaviour – i.e. rebel behaviour, cattle rustling, looting, etc. – caused by the availability and low costs of SALW, have caused security to be perceived as a privately provided good.

Whitehead also refers to a theory of Bo Rothstein (2005) called ‘social trap theory,’ which combines the assumption of game theory that individuals are utility maximizers with the assumption that individuals will use past experiences, accounts of other’s experiences and rumours to form information constructs guiding their decisions about social interactions. This then means that in a context of years of failed political leadership and failure to provide proper security – which can be said for many, if not all fragile states – even a regime change or slightly changed environment will not easily lead to a change in perception of security as a privately provided good. “As a result, programmes, including well funded ones from the international community, have had difficulty finding traction towards meaningful results because individuals are not yet ready to trust others with the ultimate provision of their own security” (Whitehead, 2007: 24; italics added).

Based on Whitehead’s analysis that the demand of SALW is a phenomenon that occurs at the individual and community level, it can be argued that a response to the demand of SALW must also – at least in part – be targeted at the individual and community level. The motivations and means are rooted in the context in which people find themselves. Therefore, according to Whitehead, approaches aimed at the grassroots level would be more successful at curbing the demand for SALW than national programmes (Ibid. 27). One of the difficulties mentioned earlier is the lack of trust in state police and military caused by bad experiences. In the short term this can be tackled by building and supporting community-based security, which can then fill the security-gap while creating room for security as a collective good, rather than a private good. Moreover, community initiatives will be more able to tackle the issues that are prevalent at the local level; the direct environment of the target groups.

1.4.2. Traditional Systems and Peace Committees

The demand for SALW is influenced by a number of factors such as (perceived) security and traditions. As such motivations vary among communities (as well as among community members), a common way to address local security issues locally is in the form of peace committees or through traditional systems. These community security mechanisms consist of a number of community members and can be organized to address one specific issue – e.g. the proliferation of arms in the community – or a multitude of goals. They can play monitoring roles to ensure accountability of locally-based security forces (see
community policing), bring political parties together and make them accountable to their constituents, and create a space for dialogue to address fears, mistrust and issues of exclusion. Also they can “provide a non-violent dispute resolution role that is established and monitored by communities to strengthen local legitimacy and ownership over local security and justice” (International Alert & Friends for Peace, 2007: 9). Where state failure creates an impetus for the revival of traditional systems and creation of peace committees, this does not mean such mechanisms are not affected by local power struggles. Indeed, often the same elites are placed in power in organized peace committees, risking the same groups within a community to be marginalized and the same war-politics between communities to emerge.

In Southern Kenya the Kuria tribe revived the sungusungu, which is the new term for a traditional system of governance. It investigates, judges and punishes, but also has room for appeal. The sungusungu was established in 1998 after a great increase of cattle raiding since the 1980s. Although it does liaise with the police in case arrests are made, the main problem is that it lacks a legal framework. Nevertheless this system was able to greatly reduce the number of cattle raids and other violent incidents (Marwa, 2002). A sungusungu movement had been initiated earlier just over the border in Tanzania among the Sukuma and Nyamwezi and this has been legalized since (Bukurura, 1996). The system has been both applauded for its achievements and criticized for suffering from similar weaknesses as the state system.

Where such traditional systems do not (or no longer) exist, an effort can be made to create (or revive) them. The World Bank has some experience with community support and development of local institutions in the form of committees, which ideally are based on existing mechanisms (to which the community is familiar) but in such a (restructured) way that it does not exclude certain parts of the community (Cliffe, et al. 2003; Richards, et al. 2004). Whatever model is chosen, the World Bank emphasizes that downward accountability within the community is very important and suggests mandating open meetings and the display of council decisions, budgets and expenditure on public notice boards as two basic ways to encourage this. Institutional and implementation arrangements of projects occupied with such local institutional reforms “need to be simple and understandable to people who are not used to this way of doing business, even more so as education levels in post-conflict rural contexts are generally low” (Cliffe, et al. 2003). The contents and presentation of procedures and processes have to be adapted to local circumstances, such as customs, language, and media.

Examples of organization along existing structures are for instance the barza communautaire (meetings of the community members) in the DRC, in which civil society, the local administration, police, army, and representatives of the population jointly discuss their issues. Another method that is generally recognized is a local committee, which can be elected at the end of a barza (Van Puijenbroek, et al. 2008: 42; Frerks & Douma, 2007). Research in South Sudan suggests that, where existing structures cannot be identified, field committees organized around issues important to individual community members are generally more easily and effectively organized compared to committees organized around more abstract issues. Examples are for instance committees managing the community borehole, or those which are involved in schools and churches (Willems, 2008).

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5 The World Bank speaks of ‘community councils’ and organizes them for ‘community-driven development’ or ‘community-driven reconstruction’ but does nevertheless view them as a way to resolve conflicts at a local level.
An example of such an initiative in Sri Lanka are the peace committees formed as a result of a ceasefire by the Resources for Peace and Reconciliation (RPR) in Mannar to help the war returnees and to reestablish a sense of ‘we feeling’ in the community. The RPR team would ask a village to elect twenty persons to work in newly formed Village Reconstruction Committees (VRCs). These were then trained in human rights, mediation skills, and non-violent communication. From there on, the committees have been relatively successful in resolving disputes between individuals, groups, as well as communities, and they are asked to address issues that hitherto were referred to the military or LTTE. Over the years their confidence in handling local disputes has increased and they also are assessing their capacity in dealing with the proliferation of small arms (Williams, 2005: 32). Another example were the ‘District Peace Committees’ in Northern Kenya formed at the initiative of a number of CSOs in order for communities to find home-grown solutions and peace initiatives for the security problems they encountered. They have been successful in a number of cases to address (and reduce) incidents of banditry and cattle rustling, as well as in the voluntary collection of illegal arms. It should be noted, however, that where cattle warlords have emerged internationalizing and commercializing cattle raids – i.e. where the problem became too large and institutionalized – they have not been so successful (Muchai, 2003: 123-4).

Where a state is not able, but willing nevertheless, to fulfil basic services such as the provision of security, that state may be forced to pursue a mediated strategy and outsource some governance issues to local intermediaries. Where outsourcing of tasks usually is limited to organizations working for the state, “local authorities in a mediated state arrangement operate beyond the state, its legal code, and its most coveted possession – its ‘monopoly on the legitimate use of violence within its territory’” (Menkhaus, 2006). Of course, for such a strategy to work as a peacebuilding and governance strategy, the sources of local authority have to be relatively legitimate and committed to inclusive governance. Traditional systems, without guarantees that the rules are equal for all community members, risk being exploited by powerful members in a community for political, economic or other personal gains. If certain groups are marginalized, such systems aimed at security can create roots for more conflict. As pointed out by the UN Secretary-General, “where the use of armed violence becomes an engrained means for resolving individual and group grievances and conflicts, legal and peaceful dispute resolution mechanisms are eroded and the rule of law cannot be upheld” (2008: 3). Outsourcing security issues to local mechanisms is thus certainly not without risks. The question will be how to tackle these risk factors and keep local initiatives subject to the law; not unproblematic in a situation where the local initiatives arise precisely because the state is not enforcing the law.

1.4.3. Gun-Free Zones

Another example of community-based initiatives to improve community security are so-called ‘Gun-Free Zones (GFZs). This has been an initiated by the NGO Gun Free South Africa (GFSA) in a reaction to the proliferation of arms and involves communities creating GFZs; a social space where guns are prohibited (Kirsten, et al. 2006). Community leaders are provided with a workshop kit by the GFSA with which they can prepare people in the community to declare a GFZ. In this way, communities “interpret the campaign according to their needs and implement according to what is appropriate in their context” (Bassingthwaighte, 2005: 211).

Although people still own guns and the impact differs from GFZ to GFZ, people are not carrying firearms as often as before, gun-use is de-normalized, and perceptions of safety have improved. Also, it enhanced the social cohesion in communities and provided residents with a forum to express their commitment to a more secure environment (Kirsten, et al. 2006: 62-78). Moreover, the GFSA’s initiative had a direct influence in the government installing the Firearms Control Act (FCA), and under this Act the provision of Firearm-Free Zones (FFZs). A big difference, however, is that FFZs are declared by the government and thus generally do not involve communities in the decision-making process (Ibid. 55). In some cases, however, communities asked the government to make their GFZ into an official FFZ, or communities were truly involved in the creation of an FFZ. Such cases are a good example of how grass-roots level initiatives can be linked to top-down government decision-making. The demand for guns has also dropped as, between 2004 (when the FCA came into force) and 2004, over 200 gun dealers closed their shop (Atwood, et al. 2006: 31).

Another example is the peace zones in Mindanao in the Philippines (Verkoren, 2008). Created by local communities and helped by NGO pressure, these are zones where the warring parties promise not to attack. For instance, in Piket the NGO Mindanao People’s Caucus asked the main active rebel group, the Mindanao Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), and the army to treat Pikit as an area for peace, on which the parties agreed. The ‘space for peace’ concept then expanded to seven other villages.

1.4.4. Community-based Policing

Communities organizing themselves to address their insecurity can have a positive effect like in the cases presented above. However, it also risks diminishing the state’s opportunities to obtain a monopoly on legitimate violence by creating parallel structures. Moreover, there have been cases where governments supplied remote communities with arms intended to help them to provide in their own security. In the context of fragile states, however, this can often feed into tensions between rival groups creating more insecurity (Regehr, 2004: 7). The Kenyan government, for instance, armed the Masai ‘home guards’ but not the Kuria, which triggered an arms race between the two communities (Marwa, 2002: 26).

Although it is not a bottom-up initiative in itself, community-based policing (CBP) gives a voice to communities in their security provision while at the same time – and more importantly because of this – strengthening the police in their capacity to address security issues. CBP is therefore “increasingly recognized as an approach to policing that meets many of the post-conflict safety and security challenges” (SEESAC, 2006: i). Defined as “an approach to policing that brings together the police, civil society and local communities to develop local solutions to local safety and insecurity concerns” (Saferworld, 2008b, 16), CBP is both a way of thinking as well as an organizational strategy to carry out this thinking (SEESAC, 2006, 3). A CBP approach of course depends on the context, but it generally involves a mechanism in which the community is organized and meets on a regular basis with police creating an opportunity for constructive engagement.

In Kenya, for instance, Saferworld organized joint trainings to police officers and civil society representatives, conducted by both civilian and police trainers. Committees were formed of key stakeholders, and a joint police-community forum was established to meet monthly, “enabling members of the community, civil society and the police to identify appropriate strategies to tackle crime in the area” (Saferworld, 2008b, 16). Also an open police day was organized, and a medical camp where police
provided free medical check-up and other services, which helped to build trust and enabling the community and the police to interact (Ibid.). In another case in Kosovo, trust was build by first addressing problems such as reckless driving and wild dogs, gradually building links for more police patrols and difficult issues such as possession of firearms (SEESAC, 2009, 24). Moreover, CBP strategies can also be used to build linkages and trust between traditional structures and community peace committees on the one hand, and the police and other national security forces on the other hand.

It should already be noted here that such community security initiatives are not a panacea for the security issues in post-conflict situations. Local systems are also liable to be hijacked by local strongmen in order to gain or keep political influence and they also may neglect vulnerable groups and minorities. This said, however, local initiatives may indeed bring the much needed local relevance into DDR interventions.
2. What is Community-based DDR?

2.1. Why a Community-based Approach to DDR?

A military perspective on security of the state is often the starting point of DDR programmes, laying the focus on targeting young male ex-combatants – those perceived to pose the greatest threat to the state’s monopoly on violence. This is often believed to result in a focus on the disarmament and demobilization phase at the cost of attention, financing and resources for the reintegration phase. This has led to growing critiques, as it is realized that the success of ex-combatants largely depends on the community’s socio-economic ability to receive them, and voices in favour of a ‘decentralized approach to DDR’ (Faltas, 2005). Moreover, the ultimate goal of DDR programmes is the reintegration of ex-combatants into civilian life and (state) security is the effect that it pursues. As we will see in Part II, taking human security as point of departure results in the aim to address the root causes of arms in societies. This arguably is more effective than to expect that taking away firearms will make the change. While firearms in society indeed cause many problems and conflict, there are also incentives to pick up firearms which cause conflict. And without addressing those, the conflict will not end, especially as gun control in fragile states is not as easy as one would hope.

The focus on combatants in ‘classic’ DDR programme design – a focus on those responsible for past violence – can cause communities to feel their problems in the post-conflict situation are underappreciated. Moreover, only targeting former combatants could be interpreted as an invitation to also take up arms to be able to benefit as well, and can lead to resentment within the communities who often perceive DDR to reward those responsible for past violence with support. The context in which DDR programmes take place is often characterized by unemployment and impoverished economies, leaving little for ex-combatants to reintegrate into. Bringing ex-combatants ‘on par’ with the rest of the community, it is argued, is not enough and DDR should be linked to programmes aimed at community development and reconciliation between communities and ex-combatants. Development is then seen as a key for successful disarmament, just as disarmament is seen as a requisite for development (Haden & Faltas, 2004; also USAID, 2005: 5-8; Pouligny, 2004: 17; Koyama, 2005: 75; and Swarbrick, 2007: 51-2).

The comparatively limited involvement of affected communities and primary stakeholders in DDR design, implementation and evaluation is seen as a fundamental weakness (Muggah, 2005: 2), and also ex-combatants themselves stress for a more integrated approach (Barron, et al. 2006: 60). Giving communities a larger role in the DDR process can contribute “to building up accountability at the level of families and communities – a way of ensuring social control over former combatants” (Pouligny, 2004: 11). Moreover, community engagement “helps to provide balanced assistance packages given to ex-combatants while addressing the needs/perceptions of communities they are coming back to” (Ibid.). And building on local customary structures and empowering communities to define their own objectives generally gives more suitable solutions than measures proposed by outsiders (Ibid.). Community support projects have been able to blur the polarization of ex-combatant versus society (Asusala, 2008: 10), and one report even found that it was “through community engagement, rather than DDR programming, that

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8 It should be noted, however, that security (both state as human security) is a requisite for successful reintegration.
widespread violence was averted” (Solomon & Ginifer, 2008: 35). According to USAID the benefits of a community-based approach are therefore threefold; it acknowledges that community life is broadly affected by conflict; it can build communal trust; and it can contribute to the economic and social reconstruction of communities (USAID, 2005: 6).

2.2. Defining Community-based DDR

‘Community-based’ approaches have become fashionable in the last few years and in the literature various names for this and aligned concepts can be found; community-based development, community-driven development, community-driven reconstruction, community empowerment, and community-focused reintegration to name a few. The idea of community-based approaches is not new, however, as colonial administrators suggested community development to develop basic education and social welfare in the British colonies (Mayo, 1975: 130), and from the 1950s onwards the United Nations also started using the term (Midgley et al, 1986: 16). Although the main philosophy behind community-based approaches is capacity building and an approach to development rather than a set of top-down interventions (Eade, 1997: 2-3), it has received criticism for being merely another way to pursue top-down agendas (Parfitt, 2004: 537). And indeed, defining community-based approaches brings its contradictory elements to the surface. Irwin Sanders (1970: 9), for instance, defines community development as “the linkage of community organization, which stresses local action and the usage of local resources, with economic development, which emphasizes national planning, careful allocation of resources, and systematic movement toward well-defined goals.”

With regard to community-based DDR this contradictory element remains evermore present. DDR programmes are generally undertaken by a constellation of international agencies and national governments (Muggah, 2009: 2), whereas community-based DDR would imply that it is people-centered and locally owned engaging locals from the outset (Solomon & Ginifer, 2008: 42). This ambiguity in definition – plus the term being in fashion with those managing funds – is a reason why DDR and reintegration efforts are often labelled as ‘community-based’, even though such projects might have large conceptual differences. Some community-based programmes merely intervene at the community level, while others aim not only to target the community but also involve them in the decision-making and implementation. This report will see the latter, the direct involvement of the community in the whole process – as being a requirement for community-based DDR. Assessments should be people-centred and focus on the communities’ real and perceived security needs. Another characteristic is that the community benefits from the programme, and supports the community in its own development and providing it with the skills and resources to support reintegration of ex-combatants. Social mobilization and awareness-raising should aim to involve all elements of the community in a programme when realizing that a community is not a monolithic whole.

Even defined as such many differentiations can still be made between community-based approaches to DDR. For one, where some initiatives focus on all three phases of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, many initiatives leave the DD and Reinsertion to centrally orchestrated mechanisms and focus on Reintegration. Apart from its focus on certain elements of DDR, the target group also differs between programmes. While some programmes focus on the entire war-affected community, others focus

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9 See also Part II, paragraphs 3.2.3. and 3.3.3. in this report.
on ex-combatants while also benefiting the community, for instance, by employing ex-combatants in linked programmes for community development and (re)construction of community facilities and infrastructure (Haden & Faltas, 2004: 11). On the following pages a number of these various community-based DDR experiences will be discussed.

Community-based DDR

Community-based DDR programmes are programmes that not only target ex-combatants but also the wider war-affected communities and actively and truly involve these communities in the process of assessment, design and implementation.

2.3. Community-based DDR Experiences

2.3.1. Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration

As the definition presented above already implies, there can be different forms of community-based DDR as there are various ways and levels in which communities can be involved. We could thus visualize this as a continuum, in which DDR programmes can be more or less community-based. Here we use a number of examples from practice, and based on policy papers in this desk study we cannot make judgments where on this gliding scale a certain programme should be ranked. Moreover, as programme design should depend on the desires of the context, we here do not intend to imply that more community-based is by definition better.

Only a small number of community-based initiatives have been identified which apart from reintegration also aimed at disarmament. Generally, it is argued, DDR does not spontaneously arise from below, but is part of a broader project to secure the legitimate control of force from above (Muggah, 2009: 2).

Nevertheless also the first phases of DDR can involve the grass-roots level. One example involving communities in disarmament is given by a UNIDIR publication written by civic leaders from Sierra Leone (Lappia, 2006: 131-139). Recommendations include the arrangement for community heads and war commanders to meet in an atmosphere of friendliness to engender confidence in all parties and reinforce the message of ‘no more war’. Secondly, community leaders themselves should work out modalities for disarming groups. A message must be sent out that supplies of arms and ammunition can easily undermine the fragile peace process, and it should be an urgent priority to publicly and openly collect and destroy all weapons and ammunitions. Thirdly, the opposing forces should meet in an atmosphere of festivity. Moreover, the flow of combatants should be enabled, so that they can visit each other, strengthening confidence on all sides. People could also be encouraged to monitor the evolution of events in opposite camps. Other suggestions are to promptly put in place local, democratic structures of governance to enhance the transfer of power from combatants to official structures under law and to provide attractive conditions for combatants in the demobilization camps.

Another example of community-based DDR is found in the DRC. In Maniema province civil society organizations, organized in la Société Civile de Maniema, called for the return of Mai Mai militia members into civil life. Subsequently, Oxfam Novib and the Conseil Régional des Organisations Non
Gouvernementales de Développement au Maniema (CRONGD) started a pilot project of the Social Cohesion/DDR programme. The first phase of the programme had three main objectives; restoring social cohesion and confidence in the communities by means of socio-economic rehabilitation; medical and psychological support for victims of sexual violence; and the restoration and improvement of the barzas, large community meetings and the traditional structures of community conflict mediation (CRONGD-Oxfam, 2006). The initiated activities were directed towards sensitizing for a voluntary disarmament of which first steps were taken in the second phase of the project. During this phase agricultural support continued to concretize the ‘weapons for development’ philosophy and rehabilitation of infrastructure was organized (CRONGD-Oxfam, 2007b). One of the elements of the project was to rehabilitate and equip two schools and a health centre in exchange for weapons handed in or the advance of a true process of community reconciliation and restoration, possibly without handing in weapons (CRONGD-Oxfam, 2007a). According to Oxfam Novib the barzas played a central role in conflict resolution and in reintegrating perpetrators and victims, and contributed to the success of the programme (Oxfam Novib, 2008: 4, 10). Concerning disarmament, however, another report found the project to be limited in scope and not having a major impact (Douma & Van Laar, 2008: 57). And indeed only a very small number of weapons was collected in a relatively small part of the province (CRONGD-Oxfam, 2007a). However, currently the third phase of the project (2008-2010) is being implemented, and one of the goals of the project is to voluntarily disarm about 60% of the 13,470 ex-combatants. Of this number, 35% is to be followed up by barzas and follow-up committees (CRONGD-Oxfam, 2007b). The project may thus still yield results in the near future, and according to one report it already yielded interesting information about possibilities for community-based disarmament within the broader objective of post-war reconciliation and post-war reconstruction (Douma & Van Laar, 2008: 57). A similar project is being initiated by IKV Pax Christi in Ituri, DRC (IKV Pax Christi, 2008).

A quite unique instance of community-based disarmament occurred in Somaliland; the secessionist part of the text book example of a fragile state, Somalia (OECD-DAC, 2008: 43). Armed young men extorting taxes from the civilian population for protection and robberies were a great security problem. The government of Somaliland initially formally announced a disarmament process but lacked the capacity and authority to implement it. Instead a community-based effort involving civil society groups, traditional and religious leaders and women’s groups set up a campaign to ban firearms from the streets. The strategy was to stigmatize the possession and use of firearms and men with guns were shunned, hackled on the streets and refused services. In a matter of weeks the streets were cleared of weapons and popular support was created to persuade clan militias to disarm and join the national security forces.

2.3.2. Reintegration

Most community-based DDR initiatives found in the literature do not concern themselves with disarmament but focus on reintegration. Although not (always) initiated from grass-roots level, the cases discussed here do intend – at least in the proposals – to involve the communities in the whole process (design, decision-making, implementation, evaluation). As mentioned the way communities are involved as beneficiaries varies between projects. In the Republic of Congo (Brazzaville) the UNDP and IOM jointly launched a disarmament and reintegration programme between 2000 and 2002 (Haden & Faltas, 2004: 9-11). After being criticized to be rewarding perpetrators of violence the UNDP (2000) linked it with
its Community Action for Post-Conflict Recovery\textsuperscript{10} project (Action communautaire). In this project community infrastructure was (re)constructed and communities themselves identified, and where possible executed (e.g. local NGOs), the activities that required funding. Ex-combatants participated in highly labor intensive activities, such as the reconstruction of bridges and roads (Haden & Faltas, 2004: 20).

In Liberia, the focus shifted within the UNDP’s DDRR\textsuperscript{11} programme that closed in 2007 after 90,000 ex-combatants had been reintegrated. During the DDRR programme the UNDP eventually expanded its target group from ex-combatants to war-affected communities. A Community Based Recovery (CBR) programme was initiated, which aimed for the consolidation of peace and stimulation of governance at the grass-roots level. The CBR programme restored existing community-level governance structures strengthened by developing ‘District Development Committees.’ This enabled communities to identify community projects and it supported “the sustainability of economic and social reintegration at the grassroots level” (Ibid.). The UNDP’s ex-combatant reintegration and community support project in the Central African Republic (CAR) involved the communities in a different way in the reintegration of ex-combatants (UNDP, 2004). Each combatant received a reintegration voucher to hand in at the local office for reintegration in the community into which they wanted to resettle. Each community would then receive the amount of funds equivalent to the number of vouchers collected.

The United States Agency for International Development (USAID, 2005) has also developed a model community-based reintegration\textsuperscript{12} and implemented it in Burundi, DRC and Liberia. All of them have a number of core elements, which includes training for mixed groups of ex-combatants and other community members, as “one of the most pressing problems in all countries was the need to provide skills to ex-combatants and others in order to involve them in the re-building of communal life” (Ibid. 20). These involve leadership training – covering topics such as conflict resolution, reconciliation, democracy, elections, good governance, health, reaffirmation of values (including gender and psychosocial assistance), etc. – as well as vocational training programmes which can involve courses in brick and tile making, carpentry, masonry, furniture making, tailoring, and bread making, as well as literacy, numeracy small-business management and civic education. They first train a group of ‘master trainers’ who then pass it on community-level ‘learning facilitators’ (who come from the community itself) which duplicate the training at community level. The cycles of training are then generally followed by support for a community project. Each of the country programmes has important variations, but the core principle is to promote reintegration by bringing together ex-combatants and community members for training and the implementation of small projects. However, some elements such as the topics of the courses as well as the length of the programme are adapted not only to each country, but also to each region (e.g. rural versus urban).

The largest international programme in Timor Leste, also developed and managed by the UNDP, was the Recovery, Employment and Stability Programme for Ex-combatants (RESPECT) (Peake, 2008: 15-7). The

\textsuperscript{10} Previously named Community Action for Reintegration and Recovery.

\textsuperscript{11} The national programme in Liberia was named Disarmament, Demobilization, Rehabilitation and Reintegration (DDRR).

\textsuperscript{12} USAID calls it ‘community-focused’ reintegration which may imply a more top-down intervention or with some local involvement rather than a very community-based programme as defined in this report. Or, a place more towards traditional DDR then towards more community-based DDR on the continuum discussed above.
programme was designed to support vulnerable groups, including ex-combatants, widows, unemployed youth and others, with employment, skills development and other livelihood opportunities. Commitment and engagement of communities in targeting beneficiaries, designing, planning, and implementation of micro-project activities, etc. was considered crucial and in the mid-term report of the programme the UNDP claimed to have had a positive impact (UNDP, qtd. in Peake, 2008: 15-6). However, the CICS evaluation is more sceptical. It finds that apart from “a range of flaws from conceptualization to delivery that impaired severely intended impact” and that “the sheer complexity and ambition of the intervention prevented it from achieving all of its goals” and establishing clear goals or benchmarks (Peake, 2008: 16). The critique of a local NGO was that the RESPECT programme lacked coordination with local leadership structures at the village level, lack of grassroots community participation in decision-making and freedom to determine priorities outside those determined by RESPECT (Ibid.). The programme therefore raises questions about the difficulties around programmes benefiting communities, especially concerning who is in charge of the implementation, and we will come back to this shortly.

2.4. Conclusions of Literature on Community-based DDR

Since the arguments in favour of a community-based approach to DDR have been discussed earlier this paragraph will first give an overview of a number of lessons learned from community-based DDR initiatives. It will then elaborate on four discussions on which the literature touches. This working group aims to contribute to each of these within the context of community-based security and DDR.

Again it is stressed that careful assessment of the context is critical; even more so because the logistical complexity of a community-based programme and its longer commitment makes it not as easy to change the area of focus (USAID, 2005: 20-1). Such assessments should be based on the local context and the security needs as perceived by those affected by the violence.¹³ Another observation made by USAID was that community-based reintegration is best suited to attract rank-and-file combatants, but creating political space for commanders “to redirect their energies in a post-war environment is important for shifting the conflict from the battlefield to the political arena” (Ibid. 22). Stressed is also good planning on follow-up in order to prevent exacerbating tensions due to raised expectations. Ideally, programmes therefore incorporated follow-up opportunities, such as the formation of small businesses, etc.

According to the OECD-DAC’s Armed Violence Reduction and prevention (AVR) policy, programmes should be based on an understanding of the multifaceted and multi-level nature of armed violence. It states that although each situation of armed violence is unique, there are also shared patterns of structural and proximate risk factors among different manifestations of armed violence (e.g. conflict, post-conflict, criminal). Linking different approaches and interventions, such as community security, community-based DDR, and state-centred approaches connected in this report, the OECD-DAC (2008: 3) finds that identifying and acting on the shared patterns in different manifestations of violence can open up opportunities for cross-pollinations. It proposes “multi-sector and multi-level responses that address elements and interrelationships across the armed violence lens” (Ibid. 51).

The training and courses given are generally, as in other development programmes, adapted to local relevance and interests, taught in local languages, independent of literacy with much interaction.

¹³ See, for instance, OECD-DAC (2008); and Miller & Rudnick (2008)
Nevertheless some problems were encountered with the difficulty of the curriculum and available hours and USAID aimed to cover for this by having master trainers present on the ground to reinforce the message received in training on a regular basis (USAID, 2005: 23-4). The hours of courses also had to be scheduled in such a way that most people could attend, and were not overlapping with daytime work, e.g. farming. It was also found that the best results were attained when community trainings were combined with strategic small grants. “Capacity-building of communities in post-conflict situations appears to be very useful for reconciliation and reintegration,” but they should be integrated with small community grants, as collective rehabilitation projects are best conceived as a practical application of the lessons on reconciliation and conflict resolution learned during the capacity-building training (Ibid. 7). Reintegration and reconciliation are also believed to be consolidated by the process of reconstruction and development, especially where poverty predominates as a more important cause of conflict than identity or religion. DDR should therefore not only be focused on the reduction of firearms but also the promotion of human security and the development of society (Caramès, 2008: 31). Indeed weapons are not handed in purely in return for incentives in the form of development projects. In the community-based weapon collections studied by UNIDIR, the initial motivations of people to disarm were to bring peace and security, whereas the development projects where seen as a way to consolidate peace. As many believed that a lack of jobs was in part reason for people to take up arms, development is supposed to prevent this. “This shows that development, especially its intangible, psychological aspect, is not only a result of successful disarmament, but, more importantly, it is crucial to the implementation of successful disarmament in post-crisis society” (Koyama, 2005: 76-7). If well executed, it is argued, community-based reintegration “can promote reconciliation and provide the tools to prevent local conflicts from recurring” (USAID, 2006: 7). By addressing local issues, among which are issues such as reintegration and reconciliation, on a local level, for instance by means of peace committees, this could mollify local tensions that are at the core of the conflict. As argued by Kalyvas (2003), these local issues are the real issues that individuals are fighting over and when properly addressed through peaceful means this can take away political space for conflict at the national level.

2.4.1. Scope and Depth

The first discussion that community-based DDR touches upon is about the scope of DDR. There is a debate around what issues DDR can and should address, and what issues should be left to other initiatives. Especially the target group of DDR is debated on in this regard, which will be discussed further in Part IV. There are also voices in the DDR policy community that argue in favour of reinsertion instead of reintegration and the gaps this creates should be filled in other ways (CICS, 2006a: 14). The discussions over support of the wider community, as opposed to focusing on ex-combatants, draws away attention from the “differentiation within these broad categories – reflecting a tendency to regard all ex-combatants as vulnerable and to treat “communities” as homogenous entities” (CICS, 2006b: 22). Nevertheless special attention is needed for ex-combatants, even when the target group is broadened to include the whole war-affected community. And different kinds of attention are needed for different kinds of ex-combatants, e.g. child soldiers, female soldiers, and disabled (Willems, 2008: 39). Also the needs of groups within the community cannot be neglected, and youth are most mentioned in this regard. They have often missed education and socialization as a result of the conflict (USAID, 2005: 21-2), and often have less voice in community decision-making. (Solomon & Ginifer, 2008: 27). Moreover, as

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14 See also Part II, paragraphs 3.2.2. and 3.3.2. in this report.
(male) youth are often primary actors in violence (Small Arms Survey, 2006: 296), attempts should be made to involve youth “as agents in community security” initiatives such as peace committees (Tsuma, 2004: 86).

Apart from the scope in target groups also the scope of the aimed results of DDR processes is under discussion. Where community-based DDR acknowledges the linkage of security and development, it is also argued that the aim of DDR “is not to foster that development” (CICS, 2006a: 13). As stressed by the UNDP in its practice note on DDR, it is necessary to clearly identify which objectives a programme can directly address and to which it can only contribute (UNDP, 2005a: 18). It is important to define realistic boundaries of DDR initiatives in order not to create high expectations of outcomes that cannot be met. The linking of DDR and Community Security and Arms Control (CSAC) initiatives, further complicated by the often blurred distinction between combatant and civilian, has caused such initiatives to become increasingly mixed. Some argue against this blurring and favour of making distinctions “between the two complementary but substantially distinct areas of programming” (Saferworld, 2008a: 20). Others, however, propose instead of such packaging of DDR and CSAC initiatives to start from a typology of armed violence and seek to understand how this violence is best addressed through either DDR, SALW control or a combination” (CICS, 2006a: 7).

2.4.2. Sequencing of D, D, and R

There is – as also mentioned in the discussions on target group and scope of DDR programmes – already a call for a transition from the security-related activities such as disarmament to more development-focused activities such as reintegration. One model suggested de-links “reintegration programming (not planning) from disarmament and demobilization processes” (Pugel, 2009: 88-90). In certain cases this could thus mean disarmament and demobilization (and possibly some form of reinsertion) through conventional programming and reintegration through community-based programming. The (likely more community-based) reintegration component can then be initiated alongside DD programming and focus on the whole of war-affected communities, while the DD phases can continue to serve the security issues with a special focus on ex-combatants.

The possibility of different sequencing of the phases will further be discussed in Part II, paragraph 4.6., and it is something that has long been suggested in the DDR policy debate. The process does not have to be linear, and programme design should consider this reality (Specker, 2009: v). Community-based programmes seem especially capable of undertaking DDR in a different sequence, such as the example of CRONGD and Oxfam in the DRC has illustrated.

2.4.3. Who is in Charge?

Addressing local tensions and reconciliation, organizing development, and tackling reintegration issues can and should be undertaken, it is argued in the literature on community-based approaches to DDR, by members of the local community itself. They have to be in charge and the international community facilitates. The issues that need to be addressed for successful reintegration and increasing security – the aimed outcomes – are for a large part issues with local implications and need to be addressed in a process

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15 See also Part II, paragraphs 3.2.3. and 3.3.3. in this report.
with local ownership. However, DDR is an instrument used to dismantle and disarm armed groups,
usually undertaken by international agencies and national governments. This contradiction leads not
only to an ambiguity over the definition of ‘community-based DDR’ as discussed earlier, but more
practically to the fundamental question concerning who is in charge of planning and implementing the
programme. For community-based DDR it is presumed to be essential that the community is empowered
and is not only beneficiary but also contributor and is carrying the weight of the decision-making process
(Caramés, 2008: 31). However, as we will see in Part II, chapter 4, this ideal has proven difficult to realize
in practice.

2.4.4. Assessing Results

Generally problematic for DDR programmes – and for development programmes as a whole – is to assess
its results. What continues to serve as a measurement of success are numbers of weapons collected and
combatants that went through training programmes rather than the extent to which security has
improved (Muggah, 2006: 197). The paradigm should thus shift from outputs to outcomes (Pugel, 2009:
76). However, the contribution of a project to the reduction of violence is hard to measure. A research
initiative in the Republic of Congo, for instance, could not go further than recognizing the importance of
“the effect that the project had on diverting youths away from the life of the gun” (Haden & Faltas, 2004:
29). A study in Colombia finds that paramilitary DDR did appear to have reduced homicidal violence,
but these results also seemed to disappear over time (Restrepo & Muggah, 2009: 40). Also the
reintegration of ex-combatants is difficult to measure, as it is assessed more qualitatively and has a lack of
effective indicators (Caramés, et al. 2007: 10). Moreover, the multidimensional character of DDR
programmes and the whole peace process in which they are embedded makes it very difficult to assess
the individual contribution of specific programmes. Except for a few studies, literature on empirical
evidence on the effectiveness of DDR is very scarce. Recently, there have been attempts to bring more
rigor to the evaluation of DDR and its impact, notably in the work of Macartan Humphreys and Jeremy
Weinstein (2007) and a bundle of essays edited by Robert Muggah (2009). However, there is still a
significant lack of knowledge on the outcomes and impact of DDR programmes, and even on the question
whether it is realistic to attribute certain outcomes to DDR programmes in a context with multiple actors
and factors involved.
Concluding Part I: Balancing Community-based DDR between DDR and community security

From Part I a few matters deserve to be highlighted. First, the definition of the community as a social network of changing relations is crucial. This report aims to investigate community security and how this is organized, as well as the possible connections traditional DDR programmes could make with them. However, the community should not be seen as an uncomplicated single unit and we do not claim community involvement is a panacea; it is merely one tool that could improve the effectiveness of DDR programmes.

Secondly, community security is both an end state and a process. As an end state, it is a goal towards which community security initiatives and community-based DDR initiatives should aim to work. It could, however, also be seen as an end goal for traditional DDR programmes, which will be discussed further in Part II. Defining community security as a process however zooms in on the ways in which communities themselves act in response to security threats. From this perspective a number of initiatives have been discussed, showing that communities themselves can indeed find constructive ways to provide for their own security, sometimes with but also without outside help.

Community-based DDR is defined as programmes that not only target wider war-affected communities but also involve them in the process of assessment, design and implementation. We started looking at community-based initiatives based on the demand for more community involvement in DDR. At the end of the second chapter of this Part, however, we also found that the notion of community-based DDR fits into some of the wider discussions in the field of DDR, such as on the scope and depth of DDR, who should be in charge, and on the sequencing of the phases. Compared to ‘traditional’ DDR programmes, community-based DDR is broader in scope and depth, places more ownership with the communities and it allows for more flexibility in the sequencing of the D, D, and R.

When looking at community-based DDR initiatives, there seems to be a continuum that runs from a more to a less community-based approach. At one extreme of this continuum, programmes have more characteristics of community security initiatives, being more based in local realities and security needs and implemented by the community itself. At the other extreme, we find more characteristics of the traditional DDR programmes implemented by international organizations, national governments and large donors. It should also be noted, however, that programmes are sometimes inclined to claim to be more community-based than they appear to be in practice.
Part II. Analyzing Centralized DDR Programmes From a Community Security Perspective
Introduction to Part II: ‘State’ DDR and Mounting Criticism

This Part of the report focuses on “state DDR” programmes, by which we mean programmes that are designed at the national level\(^{16}\), usually jointly by donors and national governments, and that are centrally implemented. We will not address all aspects of these centralized DDR programmes. A large body of literature already exists about them. Instead, we continue to take community security as our starting point as we analyse national DDR processes, asking how they can, and do, connect to and reinforce community security.

In recent publications there has been much criticism of the limited success of DDR programmes. For example, the latest book by Robert Muggah (2009) assesses the impact of DDR programmes in various countries and concludes that its overall outcomes are, at best, mixed. The challenges for DDR presented by fragile states are particularly dire. Compared with the achievement of tangible targets such as collecting arms or demobilizing soldiers, it is much more difficult to ensure that safety and security levels are enhanced and that the rehabilitation of former fighters and their dependants proceeds smoothly. Effective reintegration of ex-combatants into potentially hostile communities is even more ambitious (Muggah, 2009: 14). The question whether DDR actually contributes to any improvement in security is not much helped by the fact that there is little evidence on whether DDR actually works in the longer term.

Muggah suggests that expectations of the potential success of DDR may be unrealistic. We should not expect DDR to be a panacea to the entire range of security threats in a post-conflict environment. Indeed, this is not what DDR aims to do in the first place. There is no inherent relationship between DDR and the resolution of conflict per se. In the aftermath of war many security threats can come to the fore, such as political and criminal violence, which DDR is not designed to contend with. DDR alone is not sufficient to counter those particular types of violence.

Nonetheless, DDR is a significant aspect in a wide spectrum of post-conflict strategies aimed to overcome armed conflict. The place of DDR herein, however, remains unspecified, and how DDR can better contribute to post-conflict stability is a fundamental question to be asked. Answering the question involves achieving agreement about how DDR is understood across the wide range of actors involved in its practice. Different conceptions of what DDR constitutes (such as livelihood promotion, the conferring of legitimacy from above, the acquisition of legitimacy from below, or a reward for ‘war heroes’), what it should accomplish, and what amounts to success, have impeded effective execution of the process in too many countries (Muggah, 200: 268-9).

Klem and Frerks (2007: 63) draw together much of recent literature about DDR by formulating a number of critical lessons learned: first, DDR processes often tend to be relatively isolated from wider reconstruction, security reform and peacebuilding processes, and this severely limits their success. Second, there is a need to start DDR programmes quickly to prevent widespread disappointment due to

\(^{16}\) Or, in the case of the MDRP, at a regional level, involving seven countries at once.
expectations that are not met. Third, a lack of national and local involvement undermines the sustainability of programmes. Fourth, in many cases DDR needs to take a regional approach to recognize the cross-border elements of many conflicts. Fifth, the reintegration component is the most difficult and long-term aspect of DDR, which needs sufficient attention and funding. Finally, there needs to be particular attention for the special needs of vulnerable groups such as female, handicapped and child combatants.

The relation between the community security perspective and the limited overall success of DDR programmes is nowhere explicitly acknowledged in the literature. However, our analysis suggests that many of the problems summarized by Klem and Frerks are connected to a lack of attention for community security in DDR programmes. In particular, the need for DDR to connect to wider peacebuilding processes, the importance of local ownership and community empowerment, the long-term nature of reintegration, and the special needs of vulnerable groups all bear direct relation to community (and human) security, as we will see. Although these are all aspects that are increasingly recognized in DDR literature and policies, we find that too often, they are not implemented in practice.

Part II consists of three chapters. In order to provide a conceptual basis, chapter 3 relates DDR to the concept of human security. After briefly discussing human security in general, the chapter compares how human security and DDR can be connected in theory, and how they are connected in the practice of DDR. The chapter translates a human security approach to DDR into a number of operational elements. It finds that although some DDR policies pay attention to human security and its elements, in practice, the implementation of these ideas is limited.

Chapter 4 addresses the connection between community security (as elaborated in Part I) and centralized DDR programmes. It analyses this connection from a number of different angles. Community security is discussed both as an aim and a process characteristic of DDR. In addition, the extent to which DDR programmes link up with community security arrangements and community-based DDR is discussed. As a final angle, community security may also be seen as a precondition for DDR. Having taken these different angles, the chapter moves on to a number of basic questions which a community security perspective has led us to pose about DDR. They bear upon the sequencing of DDR phases, on whether DDR is the best solution to community security problems, and on whether community security is a criterion for judging DDR results. Finally, we take a look at influential DDR and SSR handbooks, asking to what extent they deal with community security.

The final chapter of Part II, chapter 5 focuses on how various actors, international, national and local, interact in the implementation of DDR. In particular, it analyses how ‘state’ actors (donors and governments) cooperate with locally active actors (NGOs, other CSOs, local government and the private sector) and whether each adds value to the cooperation. The chapter finds that the influence of local actors on DDR strategy is very limited, which also limits the possibilities for DDR programmes to reinforce community security arrangements.

17 As we will elaborate further on in this report, there is some tension between the second and third issue, because involving national and local-level stakeholders takes time.
3. Human Security and DDR

3.1. What is Human Security?

The end of the Cold War, the increasing proliferation of intra-state (rather than inter-state) conflicts, and the blurring of the distinctions between warfare, crime and human rights violations, led to the rise of a new security concept in the 1990s: that of human security. Instead of an exclusive focus on the military security of the state, human security is people-centred. It entails the security of the people whom the state serves. Sometimes the state itself is a threat to people’s security, when it is unable or unwilling to live up to its ‘responsibility to protect’ its citizens from harm (ICISS, 2001). This does not mean that human security is necessarily contrary to state security; rather, it should be seen as complementing it by adding a focus on the individual and the community (CHS, 2003).

The first major manifestation of the human security concept was the 1994 Human Development Report (UNDP 1994). The report defined the concept with seven main aspects: economic security (an assured basic income), food security (ready access to food), health security (prevention of disease and access to health care), environmental security (safety from environmental threats), political security (upholding human rights), personal security, and community security. Personal security entails being protected from physical violence carried out by governments, wars, crime, or domestic violence.

Community security – of special interest to the current study – is defined in vague terms. The report mentions the safety that communities can provide, but also discusses how communities can be oppressive and sometimes even become sources of inter-communal violence. Beyond these different security aspects of the community, the meaning of community security is not clarified in the report. (UNDP, 1994: 24-33) However, from the perspective of community security as we have defined it in this report, another aspect of human security is significant: it provides an empowering perspective. Rather than treating people as helpless victims of insecurity, it focuses on their agency to act for the betterment of their own security. As the Human Development Report put it, “all people should have the opportunity to meet their most essential needs and to earn their own living” (UNDP, 1994: 24).

The concept of human security embodies a shift from security through armament to security through sustainable development as it is assumed that improvements of human security through development will mitigate the chance that conflict is addressed through violence. This closely links it to the concept of human development, defined as “a process of widening the range of people’s choices safely and freely” (Frerks & Klein Goldewijk, 2007; cf. also Sen, 2001). In fact, the two concepts have become difficult to separate. This merging of development and security has been subject to criticism. Development, some say, is increasingly ‘securitized’ and made part of a ‘radical’ agenda that includes the imposition of wide-ranging reforms (Duffield, 2001). In more practical terms, the broad and all-encompassing nature of the original human security concept has raised questions about its use: “a concept that lumps together threats as diverse as genocide and affronts to human dignity may be useful for advocacy, but it has limited value

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18 See also Part I, chapter 1 in this report.
In order to make the concept more workable, some have argued for a more narrow conceptualization, proposing to limit the definition of human security to violent threats to the individual (Ibid. 19), excluding health-, food-, and environmental issues, which are seen to be more usefully part of human development. The Human Security Report of the Centre for Human Security at the University of British Columbia uses such a narrow definition (Mack, 2005).

However, a broad definition of human security does have benefits. It does justice to the multidimensional nature of threats to security, allowing for an integrated approach (Frerks & Klein Goldewijk, 2007). Looking through the lens of human security helps to take into account the interrelatedness of issues such as war, hunger, disease, crime, political oppression, and domestic violence. For example, in many wars more people die because of epidemics (due to a lack of access to health care, large population movements and the concentration of large numbers of people in refugee camps) than of direct physical violence. Another example is that immediately after war societies often witness a sharp rise in domestic violence and violent crime, which may be due to returning soldiers who need an outlet to vent their frustration and war-induced trauma (Muggah, 2006).

Still, the issue of the all-encompassing nature of the human security concept remains. If everything is human security, then how to formulate a policy response? In response to this problem, attempts have been made to delineate threats to human security from other development issues (e.g., Owen, 2004: 20-21). Proposed criteria for challenges to be considered a human security risk include that they have to affect significant groups of people and that they should threaten the stability of society at large (Frerks & Klein Goldewijk, 2007: 35-38). In the current report, we take a broad view of human security whilst using those ‘threshold criteria’ as limits to the concept.


Approaching DDR from a human security perspective implies a much more ambitious aim for DDR. National security is a necessary, but not sufficient condition for human security. One may wonder whether this stretches DDR to the point that it becomes almost impossible to achieve success. But we can also turn this reasoning around: improved human security is a necessary condition for successful DDR, even if success is defined in terms of national security. After all, as mentioned elsewhere in this report, assurances of personal protection are a condition of disarmament (CICS, 2006b, 3).

Depending on the situation, the perspectives of human and national security can be mutually reinforcing, but there can also be tension between the two. In any case, the perspective that is adopted is likely to lead to the adoption different priorities and instruments for dealing with security threats. For example, approaching the fragile states phenomenon from a national security perspective, as is often done after 9/11, may lead to approaches in which human security is compromised rather than enhanced.

More specifically, looking at DDR through a human security lens draws our attention to a number of issues, each of which is discussed in more detail below. In theory, the following characteristics of DDR

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19 Indeed, recently, the question whether or not the concept of human security has had significant practical impact so far has been subject of debate (Chandler, 2008; Owen, 2008).
programmes are desirable from a human security perspective. DDR programmes help human security when they:

- not only aim at national or group security but at the security of individuals, particularly the most vulnerable among them;
- focus not only on ex-combatants but on wider communities (particularly during reintegration);
- empower local people and communities;
- be part of broader peacebuilding processes; and
- connect to longer-term development.

Here, we address these aspects of a human security approach to DDR at a conceptual level. In paragraph 3.3 we return to each of them to see in how far they are implemented in practice. It will become apparent in that chapter that a large gap exists between policy and practice.

3.2.1. Protecting Individuals During Demobilization

The need to assure personal security as a prerequisite for disarmament means that DDR should pay ample attention to the protection of individuals whose human security is under threat – such as demobilized fighters who are being moved or placed in encampments. In addition, human security implies a special focus on the most vulnerable groups – such as youth and women (IPA, 2002; World Bank, 2002; UNSG, 2006: para. 9m). This may require taking a wider view of ex-combatants (for example, women often were not fighters but logistical helpers or sex slaves) as well as paying attention to groups who do not enrol in DDR programmes. According to CICS (2006b: 25), women often tend to ‘self-demobilize’ and disappear from view without accessing assistance and opportunities provided by DDR.

A human security perspective also draws attention to the fact that during demobilization, attention needs to be paid to the provision of food security and health security. Immediate basic food provision and health care are needed; in addition, ex-combatants have specific physical and mental health problems that need to be dealt with before reintegration can successfully be undertaken. In doing so the different issues and needs of children, women, men, and disabled need to be taken into account (CICS, 2006b: 24-6).

3.2.2. Broadening the Target Group for Reintegration

It is increasingly acknowledged that the reintegration phase should be community-based and part of wider post-conflict stabilization efforts (Kingma, 1997: 162). Taking human security as the starting point confirms this idea. Extending support also to the families, social networks and wider communities into which ex-combatants are (re)integrated has been increasingly acknowledged as an important element of DDR (CICS, 2006b: 7). This contrasts with previously implemented reintegration processes focused almost exclusively on providing support to individual ex-combatants. The key assumption of this type of programming was that by providing ex-combatants with skills and resources, these individuals would re-integrate into civilian life on their own terms. However, to date, the long-term results of this approach have been mediocre at best (CICS, 2008: 30). Therefore, for a reintegration process to be successful, it is necessary to ensure that the local community to which the ex-combatant is re-introduced is ‘sensitized’

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20 See also Part I, chapter 2 in this report.
21 See also the discussion on scope and depth; Part I, paragraph 2.4. in this report.
and involved in decision making regarding the planning of the re-integration of ex-combatants into their home community (Ngoma, 2004: 83). Below, we will see to what extent this belief has been implemented in practice.

### 3.2.3. Empowerment

As we have seen, human security is agency-focused. This means that DDR should not aim simply to *protect* people and *provide* security – but to *empower* people and communities to take care of their own security (Tadjbakhsh, 2005: 3; JICA, 2006: 55). Here we come close to the concept of community security as ways in which communities ensure their own security. The question then becomes, how can DDR programmes reinforce community security by empowering people and communities? In response, many policy documents and lessons learned reports identify *ownership*, *participation* and *capacity-building* (of state and civil society) as core components of successful programming (e.g., UNDP, 2005; UN IAWG, 2006; IPA, 2002; World Bank, 2002).

*Ownership* is generally considered to be achieved by involving representatives of direct beneficiaries, local authorities, and local communities in project design and implementation. A crucial link between the DDR mission and its target groups are the members of the local civil society in which the programme is implemented. Joint planning between implementing actors and receiving communities is of paramount importance for both ex-combatants and local communities in the aftermath of war when trust between these two groups is often lacking. Care should be taken to include such representatives as early as possible in the planning process as part of a broader ongoing strategy to involve local communities in sensitization and information sessions about the DDR process itself (Thusi, 2004: 23-4).

Pouligny (2004: 11) adds that communal consultation is necessary to become acquainted with the local conditions to which DDR programmes are to be tailored. She lists several reasons why communal consultation is critical to achieve successful and sustainable DDR. First, it helps to establish accountability norms within communities, thereby ensuring some level of societal control during the reintegration process. This would address potential grievances on part of the community emanating from the war and encourage the community and the ex-combatant to take first steps toward a reintegration (and rehabilitation) process. Secondly, communal consultation directly addresses community concerns with regard to special treatment of ex-combatants when given financial aid in return for agreeing to participate in a DDR process. Thirdly, community consultation will address memories of violence and open up discussion to arrive at some form of justice, which would be left unanswered when not consulted.

Additional benefits of participatory processes may be to define priorities from a local perspective, include the specific needs of participants and communities, and draw on local experience and resources (UNSG, 2006: para. 41; UNDP, 2005a: 59). This is also important because without such local embeddedness, reintegration is unlikely to succeed (CICS, 2006b: 5). This genuine intention of DDR programmes to draw on local experiences and resources is crucial from the perspective of connecting to existing community security arrangements.

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22 See also Part I, chapter 2 in this report.
23 See also Part I, paragraph 2.4.3. in this report.
The aim of *strengthening* the security *capacities* of communities, local and national state institutions, civil society organizations and the private sector may be seen as a next step after local security resources have been identified and integrated into strategy. For example, the MDRP Guidelines proscribe targeted capacity building of partner organizations, including local governments and communities, in order to enhance programme effectiveness (qtd. in Ibid.).

What should capacity building look like so that it can empower people and communities to take care of their own security? First of all, participation in decision-making in itself can contribute to capacity building. In addition – from the perspective of empowerment and community security – capacity building entails identifying existing security arrangements and other elements of civil society which may be strengthened and connected to centralized DDR programming. In chapter 4 below, we will see what this could mean in practice, and to what extent DDR programmes have begun to operationalize an empowering approach to DDR.

### 3.2.4. Part of Broader Peacebuilding

Human security resonates with what Klem and Douma (2008: 10, 37) call the transformational perspective on DDR, which aims not only at short-term security but at tackling the root causes of conflict so as to put guns out of use. In other words, like wider discourses on peacebuilding, a human security perspective on DDR draws attention to the fact that efforts and activities should not only bring an end to existing violence but also help prevent further violence in the future. This makes DDR part of a wider and longer-term peacebuilding process. Some policy documents now call for DDR to directly address issues of reconciliation and confidence-building (CICS, 2006b: 6 mentions UNDPKO, 1999). In practice, this can mean for people to work together on community development activities; the organization of community dialogues; supporting public healing ceremonies and traditional cleansing rituals; or the creation of transitional justice instruments (CICS, 2006b: 7).

The question, however, is whether such activities should be part of DDR proper or be interpreted as a call for coordination or cooperation with other peacebuilding actors. In order not to stretch DDR beyond its limits, the second interpretation seems the most feasible: whilst the core business of DDR is to provide security by demobilizing and reintegrating combatants, it needs to recognize that it can only reach these aims by connecting strategically to other peacebuilding programmes. These include not only reconciliation projects of the type mentioned above. It is also important for DDR programmes to connect to security sector reform (SSR), transitional justice, rehabilitation, and governance strengthening and reform. Indeed, a major lesson learned has been that “DDR cannot stand alone” (CICS, 2008: 11; cf. also World Bank, 2002; IPA, 2002). If no conducive security and political context is achieved, then DDR is often reversed (Klem & Frerks, 2007: 65).

Unlike national security, human security also entails an end to oppression and discrimination, both as an end in itself (such ‘structural violence’ threatens political and personal security) and as a means of conflict prevention. After all, ‘horizontal inequalities’ between groups in society (characterized, for example, by unequal access to services, land, or public office) are an important factor in many conflicts (Stewart, 2002).

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24 See also Part I, paragraph 2.4.1 and the annex of this report.
For DDR this may mean that special attention needs to be paid to those groups that have been most excluded before and during the conflict (SIDDR, 2006: para. 53).

3.2.5. Connecting to Longer-term Development

From a human security perspective, a person is successfully reintegrated not only when (s)he refrains from taking up arms again in the short term, but when her/his human security has improved to such an extent that also in the longer term peace can prevail. This entails an increase of people’s economic, social, cultural, environmental and political security (UNDP, 2004). In addition, a human security approach to reintegration and development would not be one-size-fits-all but be tailored to the specific needs, backgrounds and aspirations of former combatants, and involving them in the design and implementation of the programme is an important part of this.

An additional, and crucial, element is to ensure that reintegration matches the local socio-economic context. A thorough analysis needs to be undertaken to map the “opportunity structure into which ex-combatants will be absorbed – both country-wide and in the specific communities of settlement – in terms of land, labour and other markets, as well as education and training opportunities, micro-credit services and other business development opportunities” (CICS, 2006b: 34). In order to enhance the sustainability and relevance of reintegration, the local private sector could also be much more involved in its planning and implementation (Specker, 2008; 20-2). More generally, as acknowledged by UNDP (2005a; 20-2), needs assessments for reintegration need to make use of local interlocutors with strong knowledge of the political, economic and social context.

GTZ (2004: 42) explicitly connects the concept of human security to the need to take a long-term view of reintegration. For social and economic security to be ensured, improvements in health care, education and infrastructure are likely to be needed. Socio-economic development is a prerequisite for reintegration and security, and vice versa. “Economic security and development provide alternatives to violence and help to secure and maintain peace and security, while a secure environment can provide minimum basic conditions to enable social and economic reconstruction and longer-term development” (CICS, 2006b: 11).

DDR should aim not only at socio-economic reintegration, but also at political reintegration through participation in public affairs on the part of former combatants, based on the principle of political security (CICS, 2006b: 9; GTZ, 2004: 67). It is important from that perspective that political parties represent the interests of former combatants. However, political participation may only be possible after the political system is reformed towards more democracy. As with broader peacebuilding policies, governance reform should not be part of DDR programmes per se, but it matters for the overall success of DDR processes. What human security calls attention to is not so much the need for DDR to do it all (peacebuilding, development, political reform) but rather the need to take a long-term view of reintegration and to link up with these wider and more long-term processes. This can be summarized in the flow-chart presented in figure 1.

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25 See also Part I, paragraph 2.4.1 in this report.
3.2.6. Human Security in DDR Policies

At the policy level, human security plays an increasingly prominent role, at least where policies for the reintegration phase are concerned. The Integrated DDR Standards (IDDRS), which emerged in 2006 as a dominant framework for DDR, state that a,

...primary objective of DDR is to increase human security. UN-supported DDR processes are therefore based on international humanitarian law and promote the human rights of both programme participants and the communities into which they integrate. To ensure that the human rights of all persons are respected at all times, mechanisms must be established to minimize reprisal, stigmatization or discrimination. Human dignity is a fundamental principle. [...] The requirement to

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26 See Part III, chapter 6 in this report for a broader examination of donor policies on DDR.
apply humanitarian principles implies an obligation to offer, and the right to receive, humanitarian assistance (UN IAWG, 2006: 2.10, 9).

GTZ and JICA provide two other examples of policy documents that take human security seriously. It should be noted that these two organizations focus primarily on the reintegration phase of DDR. Donors that focus on disarmament and demobilization are not known for their emphasis on human security – instead, they tend to place national security centre stage.

The GTZ (2004) Field and Classroom Guide takes human security as a guiding principle for DDR. It considers DDR as part of a peace process which should aim to provide human security. DDR contributes to this, but other things are needed, such as an end to armed conflict, governance reform, and relief and development cooperation. More directly to the point of DDR, programmes should emphasize ‘quality’ and ‘efficiency’ and pay special attention to minority representation (GTZ, 2004: 27). In addition, human security means to not only take an institutional approach to DDR but to also take an individual point of view. For the guide this primarily means to give support to civil society as a means to further the interests of individuals (GTZ, 2004: 21). GTZ does not mention the term “empowerment”, but stresses participation by ex-combatants and communities. About ownership it writes that ideally,

...local rather than international organizations should take responsibility and the initiative. Yet international organizations should assume tasks in a state of emergency with the aim of involving the national government and local organizations at the planning stage, so that there is a transition to national ownership for this process, with international assistance and validation. However, civilian rather than military organizations should take the lead (GTZ, 2004: 109).

A policy document that pays particularly thorough attention to human security is JICA’s (2006) Handbook for Transition Assistance. This handbook presents an interesting policy document from the perspective of linking DDR to human- and community security. Therefore, we will discuss it here at some length. Although, much like the GTZ guide, the JICA handbook treats human security as part of broader peacebuilding rather than connecting it to DDR directly, it complements the GTZ approach (as well as the IDDRS) by emphasizing empowerment and bottom-up processes. This provides a conceptual lens for connecting DDR to community security:

The human security concept also addresses the critical importance of social safety networks and the empowerment of individuals. [...] It is therefore important that external support is planned and organized in such a way that it effectively combines top-down measures with bottom-up empowerment. [...] Applying a human security framework in transition situations presents challenges but if it is done successfully, the framework will provide a useful tool for ensuring so-called ‘seamless assistance’ from the immediate post-conflict to the sustainable development phase (JICA, 2006: 55).

JICA (2006: 56) goes on to state that two mutually reinforcing strategies are needed to achieve human security: protection and empowerment. “One is provided through a top-down approach, the other through a bottom-up style”. For protection, the role of the state is vital, and this includes the strengthening of institutions that link people and the state, such as judicial institutions. Empowerment is achieved through education, social mobilization and participation in public life. This will make people,
...better equipped to deal with threats confronting them in their daily lives. Even more than ensuring people access to water, schools and health facilities, what is essential is for the communities to build the capacity for self-reliance. Self-reliance is a stronger shield for people and communities even during times of sudden economic downturns or eruption of conflict. The core of the human security approach [...] lies in linking the top-down approach that expands state capacity with the bottom-up approach that empowers people (Ibid.).

JICA (2006) operationalizes these ideas primarily in the areas of democratic governance and what it calls “rebuilding the social fabric” (Ibid. 157-180). Regarding governance, the “bottom-up democratic empowerment of communities” (Ibid. 129) ought to complement state-centered reform. In the realm of the social fabric, the handbook refers to “community building” which may include the establishment or strengthening of community groups that engage in trauma healing and reconciliation and that can assist in the “social reintegration” of former combatants and other returnees (Ibid. 170-7).

Humanitarian assistance, too, should strive from an early stage to engage in “capacity building support at the community level” so as to alleviate the gap between humanitarian aid and sustainable development (Ibid. 57). Such capacity building can be achieved through the participation of communities in programming and implementation, requiring “solid partnerships at the community level [since] working through the central government alone will not be sufficient” (Ibid. 58). These ideas are not connected explicitly to DDR processes, however.

So far, so good for the proponents of human security. However, by and large the practice of DDR has not yet caught up with these policy developments. Solutions tend to continue to be sought in increased responsibilities of states and of the international community. There is little emphasis on empowerment and agency, on individuals as agents of change. “Human security as public good constitutes a responsibility for the state, but there is a complementary duty for the people themselves to become engaged in the process” (Tadjbakhsh, 2005: 3). However, since 9/11, the national security paradigm is again on the rise (Ibid. 1; Frerks & Klein Goldewijk, 2007).

Let us again examine the elements of a human security approach to DDR, as outline above, and see in how far they are part of actual DDR practice (in as far as we can determine this based on the literature).

3.3. A Human Security Approach to DDR: in Practice

Before looking at the practice of DDR in relation to the aspects of human security outlined above, we first examine the place of human security as a concept in DDR policies.

3.3.1. Protecting Individuals During Demobilization

Earlier we mentioned that a human security approach places the security of the individual at centre stage. This seems obvious, but in practice it can happen that collective security is given preference over individual security. For example, in Sierra Leone women who had been forced to marry RUF commanders were placed in the same encampment as their former captors (CICS. 2006: 4-5).
The protection of vulnerable groups, which we also induced from the human security notion, is increasingly part of DDR policies. More than was previously the case, former fighters are disaggregated into categories. The IDDRS (UN IAWG, 2006: 2.10) specify five categories of people that should be considered for DDR: male and female adult combatants; children associated with armed forces and groups; those working in non-combat roles (including women); ex-combatants with disabilities and chronic illnesses; and dependants. The Standards add that each of these categories needs different, specialized attention. In addition, the IDDRS further stipulate that special attention should be paid to particularly vulnerable groups, such as those that have been abducted.

A recent and large-scale DDR programme, the MDRP, illustrates the gap that often still exists between policy and practice. MDRP policy prescribes special attention for women, children and handicapped soldiers. In practice, however, this has not always been achieved (Klem & Frerks, 2007: 66-8). In the DRC, for example, political-patrimonial meddling with the selection of ex-combatants led to exclusion of women. People also bribed their way in. In addition, to be eligible for DDR people had to produce a weapon, something which those who had played supporting roles in the armed groups – often women – could not (Klem & Douma, 2008: 26). Dependents are not explicitly included in MDRP policy. Indeed, in the DRC dependents were excluded from reintegration assistance as a matter of course (Douma & Van Laar, 2008: 40).

3.3.2. Broadening the Target Group for Reintegration

The broadening of the target group for DDR beyond a narrowly defined category of former combatants tends to be seen not merely (or primarily) as a human security-based matter of principle, but as a necessity in order to prevent new tensions. After all, providing assistance only to ex-combatants (‘perpetrators’) in a context in which all are deprived can lead to resentment on the part of other community members. In addition, successful reintegration is increasingly considered to require an integrated, community-broad approach.

However, actual projects that target the potential reception communities (of substantial populations of ex-combatants) have been a minority pursuit within the DDR sector, and in particular, are not a significant feature of the United Nations Integrated DDR Standards (IDDRS) (CICS, 2008: 30). Still, there are exceptions. Programmes in Chad, Niger, Aceh, the Central African Republic, and the DRC, have included community participation in the reintegration phase (Özerdem & Podder, 2008: 35). In the DRC, a joint government-UNDP project in the framework of the MDRP has aimed at the creation or reinforcement of local networks and village committees in order to disseminate project information, promote community participation in socio-economic rehabilitation, and increase confidence and peaceful co-existence between communities and ex-combatants (MDRP, 2008c). Also from the perspective of empowerment and community capacity building, discussed above, this is an interesting initiative. However, it has proven difficult to find information about its implementation.

In Afghanistan, some argue that the failure to adopt a community-based reintegration programme imperiled the peace process. When military units had been demobilized the process moved to the level of

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27 The IDDRS stipulate that dependants are to be included only in the R-phase.

28 See also the discussion on scope and depth; Part I, paragraph 2.4 in this report.
the individual. Each soldier entered reintegration on an individual basis. This part of the process could have been made a community-based program where the community from which the soldiers came could benefit from the reintegration. That this was not done made individual soldiers susceptible to manipulation by commanders who were able to maintain their influence and authority over their soldiers. If a community-based approach had been adopted for the programme the problems encountered with the non-cooperative commanders might have been reduced. A community-based approach would have strengthened the ties between soldier and community, thereby reducing the chances the soldier would need to seek alternative forms of security (Thruelsen, 2006: 42).

3.3.3. **Empowerment**

Policies pledge national ownership, but in practice this is often limited (Specker, 2008). One reason for this is that the desire for rapid implementation of DDR programmes leads donors to pushing the process forward, fearing that consultation would slow it down too much (Ball & Hendrickson, 2005). This, indeed, is a real dilemma, considering that a rapid implementation of DDR is considered to be vital for success as well. Another reason is that donors may hesitate to relinquish control over DDR to recipient governments altogether due to the limited legitimacy and capacity of these governments. After all, post-conflict governments are often severely weakened institutionally and lack the means to provide basic services. In such cases international donors may have a valid claim to oversee the DDR programme on their own behalf (Muggah, 2009: 278). However, a lack of government ownership over DDR can limit its success in the longer term. Reintegration projects may not be sufficiently inserted within the framework of national and local development. Often-mentioned aspects of this include a lack of social activities reaching women and children as well as the often very short period available for reintegration (SIDDR, 2005: 29).

More fundamentally, the concept of ownership is often limited to the national government, and sometimes the rebel leaders, to the exclusion of other key stakeholders (CICS, 2006b: 6). In the cases of Sierra Leone and Liberia it was noted that simply “creating a ‘national commission’ is insufficient to ensure national ownership, in particular in facilitating social reintegration” (Solomon, 2008: 4.2). No wider representation of people and communities was achieved. As a result “citizens in both countries feel excluded from the planning and implementation of certain key programmes, which in turn impacts on the sustainability of the programme” (Ibid.). The MDRP, too, placed much emphasis on ownership by the host countries, particularly during its initial phase. However, many of the governments lacked the necessary capacity and/or willingness (DAI 2005). After a mid-term evaluation criticized the MDRP for confusing national ownership with government ownership, the programme realized that ownership should not mean to give the host government a *carte blanche* (DAI, 2005; Klem & Frerks, 2007: 64-6).

As with other issues, the IDDRS illustrate a learning curve in this regard, stressing that national ownership is “more than central government leadership” and involves “a broad range of State and non-State actors at national, provincial and local levels” (UN IAWG, 2006: 2.10, 12). This means that “[l]ocal authorities and populations, ex-combatants and their dependants must all be involved in the planning, implementation and monitoring of DDR activities” (UN IAWG, 2006: 2.10, 12). In addition, “civilians and

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29 See also Part I, paragraph 2.4.3 in this report.
30 See also Part III, chapter 6 in this report for more on the discrepancies between intended policies and practice.
civil society groups in the communities to which [former combatants] will return need to be consulted during the planning and design phase of DDR programmes, as well as supported and informed in order to assist them to receive ex-combatants and their dependants during the reintegration phase” (UN IAWG, 2006: 2.10, 8).

Similarly, the European Union (EU)’s concept for DDR states that “DDR programmes should be planned and delivered within the framework of community level development and include communities in all stages of the process” (EU, 2006: 25). In practice the European Commission (EC) has applied this approach to DDR in Colombia, where it supports the Colombian peace process through so called “laboratorios de paz”. These peace laboratories are comprehensive programmes aimed at supporting peace initiatives at the local level (Koth, 2005: 52).

However, in spite of a few such examples, the inclusion of a local ownership component in DDR support activities remains the exception rather than the rule. According to publications such as CICS (2006b: 6) and Muggah (2005: 2), programming often fails to promote effective participation. One issue is that programmes only allow for very short reintegration periods, which necessitate rapid planning and implementation, thereby limiting the possibilities for participation and ownership. The following example from a practitioners’ perspective makes clear that ownership indeed cannot be quickly infused as “stakeholders should: perceive non-violence to be in accordance with their own values and interests (meaning), believe they are in control of their own situation (self determination), can alter the conditions under which they operate (impact), and recognize they depend on others and have to co-operate to achieve something (group orientation)” (Chappon, 2004a: 41). Another issue is the tension between on the one hand the commitment to a participatory approach with local ownership and building on local resources, and on the other hand, the detailed international blueprints for DDR that limit the possibilities for adjusting them to the specific context and needs. As CICS concludes, “it is important for the key stakeholders not to be unnecessarily locked into a perspective that limits the flexibility of DDR managers and higher-level decision-makers to adapt the rich mixture of peace and security policy-programme ‘tools’ available to them, to the actual needs of the local context” (CICS, 2008: 10-1).

Some programmes, such as the one in Mozambique, even include coercive elements like involuntary resettlement. However, other programmes have managed to employ broader participation, at least by the former combatants themselves. This appears to have been the case particularly in Central America (GTZ, 2004: 70). For example, during the DDR programme in Nicaragua former combatants were engaged in devising programmes of training and mediation as well as in building their own houses (CICS, 2006b: 6).

From the perspective of human- and community security, we concluded above, an empowering approach is called for that strengthens the capacity of communities to provide security and regulate conflict. In this regard, the IDDRS state that “[b]esides national institutions, civil society is a key partner in DDR programmes. The technical capacity and expertise of civil society groups will often need to be rebuilt, particularly when human and financial resources have been reduced by conflict. Doing so will help create a sustaining environment for DDR and ensure [its] long-term success.” The IDDRS also talk about strengthening local communities and authorities, particularly with regard to rebuilding their capacities for strategic planning and programme management (UN IAWG, 2006: 3.30, 12). However, empowerment could also serve less technical goals considering a party is empowered by “gaining new awareness and understanding of (1) its goals (including underlying values, norms, fears), (2) its options, (3) its skills, (4)
its resources, and (5) its decision-making, and is able to utilize these new insights in mediation and negotiation” (Bush & Folger 1994: 85-87).

Again, so far these are, for the most part, only words on paper. The ways in which, in practice, “DDR can foster participation, ownership and the empowerment of individuals and communities in ensuring their own human security demands further investigation” (CICS, 2006b: 6). This goes particularly for the capacity building component and the connection with community security. Are there any DDR programmes that have devoted significant effort to identifying existing security arrangements and other potentially supportive civil society structures, which DDR could help strengthen?

In this regard, Muggah (2009) discusses what he calls ‘second generation’ DDR programmes, which focus on preventing and reducing armed violence, as opposed to ‘conventional DDR’ approaches that focus on structural stability and only on military objectives. Second generation programmes that specifically aim to prevent and reduce violence by containing arms and spoilers have been implemented in Haiti, Sudan and are emerging in Latin America and the Caribbean. They involve “existing and formal customary institutions at the sub-national level” (Muggah, 2009: 276) and privilege bottom-up approaches by focusing on community and people-centered security promotion. Examples include weapons for development programmes, weapons lotteries and gun-free zones. In other words - activities which we have termed ‘community security initiatives’. Programmes launched in Colombia, Nicaragua, Haiti and Brazil during the 1990s and early 2000s combined a number of activities, such as voluntary weapons collection, temporary weapons-carrying and alcohol restrictions.

A lesson learned from these initiatives, according to Muggah, is that involvement on the part of international agencies should transform into a more scaled-back and facilitative role and not be over involved in project implementation. The initiative, control and responsibility of overseeing such activities rest much more with local partners than with donors. A corollary with regard to empowerment would be that this concept is regarded as a “means transforming the normal and bureaucratic reflexes to standardize, simplify and control in a dominating top-down mode to provide instead conditions for local diversity and autonomy” (Chambers 2007: 73). This trend toward more ownership on the part of local communities is welcomed in comparison with conventional DDR programmes which tend to neglect the many ways in which activities are interpreted by local actors (Bhatia & Muggah, 2009). Thus far, second generation DDR programs have demonstrated significant reductions in armed conflict. One example is Colombia, where homicide rates dropped significantly due to focused interventions that targeted the various dimensions of arms availability (Muggah, 2009: 276-7). It appears that these initiatives fall more within the realm of community security than of ‘state’ DDR. However, these cases may lend inspiration to DDR and suggest ways of linking DDR and community security. Indeed, Klem and Douma (2008: 11) suggest that DDR programmes should take a similar approach as SALW projects, which “provide public facilities to communities that hand in their weapons”. We shall return to this in the next chapter.

3.3.4. Part of Broader Peacebuilding

Conceptualizing DDR as part of a peacebuilding process can draw attention to identity-related aspects of reintegration. According to Peake (2008), in East Timor, the grievances of the ex-combatants have been

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31 See also Part I, paragraph 2.4.1 and the annex of this report.
motivated as much by concerns about inclusion and social status as by their economic well-being. Veterans felt let down, expecting to be rewarded in some way for having been freedom fighters in the past. The technical approach of DDR programmes and handbooks does not provide much help in dealing with such grievances:

> Often enumerated in dizzying detail, these manuals and handbooks offer guidance on how to ‘do’ DDR as if it amounted to little more than a technical exercise. But such manuals give few insights on how to address the genuine sentiments of individuals and their communities. (Peake, 2008: 21)

Discrimination and minority issues, too, are rarely mentioned in policy documents – although this omission is corrected by the IDDRS who stipulate paying special attention to minority communities (UN IAWG, 2006: 2.10, 12). However, little more guidance is offered. More generally, there is limited recognition in the policy community of the need to take account of legacies of exclusion and marginalization (CICS, 2006: 8). Donors are reluctant to address structural inequalities and discrimination, since these are very political issues. Indeed, most would agree that to redress such historical injustice is probably beyond the scope of DDR (Hoffman and Gleichmann 2000, 30; CICS, 2006: 36). That does not mean, however, that they should be ignored. Instead, a ‘do no harm’ approach may need to be adopted, whereby those involved in DDR programmes are aware of structural inequalities and ensure that interventions do not make them worse (CICS, 2006: 36).\(^\text{32}\)

In addition, as mentioned, there is a need to connect to other activities such as reconciliation, SSR and governance reform. In practice, this does occur, albeit usually only to a limited extent. The MDRP created coordination structures for this purpose (World Bank, 2002: 12), but in practice it did not really link up with activities such as arms reduction and SSR. The MDRP also largely failed to take account of the complex political and peacebuilding context, at least in its initial stage (Klem & Frerks, 2007: 65). However, the Dutch government – a major donor of the MDRP – did carry out other activities designed to complement the MDRP, particularly in the field of SSR (Klem & Frerks 2007: 71).

In Uganda, connections with other programmes were established not at the level of conceptual planning but only as an effort to improve coordination with other programmes while DDR was already ongoing (Finnegan & Flew 2008: 24). In Nepal, with regard to the linkage between DDR and SSR, the reverse has been the case. DDR and SSR are “both deeply interlinked in the very structure of the peace process, and frustratingly undeveloped programmatically” (Rynn & Greene, 2008: 24).

When DDR is conceptualized as part of the broader peacebuilding process the tension between international blueprints for DDR and the dynamic character of local peacebuilding again should be considered. The point here is that structures and procedures of donors do not necessarily relate to what is found to be necessary from a practitioner’s perspective on community security and peacebuilding as:

> …it must be understood that the peace process cannot and should not be tied down to organizational structures. An important characteristic of grassroots peace initiatives is that they are undertaken on an ad-hoc basis, are performed by people from all segments of society, and do not happen according to established procedures (Chappon, 2004a: 45).

\(^{32}\) See also Anderson (1999) for the well-known Do No Harm framework.
3.3.5. Connecting to Longer-term Development

A difficulty for DDR has often been achieving a smooth transition from disarmament and demobilization to reintegration. This again hampers the transition from the programme of DDR, which has fixed starts and ends, to the process of DDR, which has neither a fixed length, nor a defined end goal or state. A smooth transition from demobilization to reintegration should not take too much time. When one fails to capitalize on the dividends of successful disarmament and demobilization by failing to initiate integration programmes timely, the progress made can be undone. This so-called reintegration gap could have serious consequences for the overall result of a DDR programme and thereby the success of the DDR process. When ex-combatants are left without at least a somewhat bright prospect for the future with work and vocational training after they have been demobilized, a return to armed militias may occur due to the financial incentives it offers.

The actors implementing the DDR programme may also be contributing to reintegration failure. It may prove difficult to establish an effective DDR programme tailored to the local context during the period between a peace-agreement and the start of post-conflict recovery programmes. This is partly due to the under-conceptualization of the reintegration concept. The concept of reintegration is poorly understood by the various actors involved in orchestrating and executing the reintegration phase of a DDR programme (Muggah, 2009: 19). Competition between security and development priorities has emerged because of differing opinions about the scope of each programme. This potentially undermines community-based initiatives from local actors themselves (Ibid. 11). To overcome this problem, a closer connection has been advocated between the reintegration phase of a DDR programme and longer-term development priorities.

The reintegration phase (as distinct from immediate ‘reinsertion’ assistance, which provides case or in-kind assistance to meet immediate basic needs) tends to be defined as a longer-term process that is intimately tied up with the building of sustainable livelihoods through broader development processes. However, there is a divergence between policy and practice (Specker, 2008: v). The R-phase of many DDR programmes has often lasted only a year, whereas most analysts agree that reintegration is a process that takes much longer. In addition to being limited in time, reintegration tends also to be limited in scope. Often, training programmes are too short and start-up kits insufficient to kick-start earnings and compete with existing economic actors. (Klem & Douma, 2008: 27).

The MDRP was criticized for limiting reintegration to money and in-kind assistance (DAI, 2005), the provision of some minimal schooling, and the facilitating of people’s return to their communities. After the former combatants had completed these formal steps of DDR, they disappeared from view (Klem & Frerks, 2007: 65). The intent was to link up with more long-term programmes by the UN and NGOs, but this proved difficult, in part due to tensions between the World Bank and UN (Klem & Douma, 2008; Klem & Frerks, 2007). For example, Burundi’s national DDR programme aimed at making reintegration assistance more long-term by establishing partnerships with other development programmes at community level. In addition, it aimed at strengthening the capacities of relevant state institutions and veteran organizations. In practice, however, these aims have not yet been achieved. The reason seems to

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33 See also Part I, paragraph 2.4.1 in this report.
be that there has simply not been enough priority allocated to these aspects in a situation of high time pressure (Lamb, 2008a). This again draws our attention to the tension between two necessary characteristics of DDR: swift implementation and community involvement.

However, the long-term and complex nature of the R-phase of DDR receives increasing recognition and attention. Indeed, policy documents (such as those analyzed by CICS, 2006: 13) increasingly emphasize the importance of integrating reintegration into long-term development planning. The problem is that post-conflict economic environments tend to be characterized by high unemployment and limited prospects for putting newly acquired skills to use. ISS (2004) calls reintegration “the Achilles heel of DDR”: the aim is to provide an economic alternative to living by the gun, but in post-conflict countries, job opportunities are scarce, and sometimes communities are hesitant to employ ex-combatants. Additional structural obstacles to creation of livelihoods include exclusionary policies and a lack of land ownership (Klem & Douma 2008, 13). It is important to avoid unrealistic expectations, followed by disappointment, on the part of former combatants (Hoffmann & Gleichmann, 2000: 33; Ngoma, 2004: 83).

Another problem is that the planning of the R-phase is often started too late in a peace process, leading to funding shortages and inadequate long-term preparation. As a result, ‘quick fix’ responses are often adopted. Planning should include participatory analysis of the context, in an integrated manner that connects security, governance and development. It should also include an in-depth analysis of socio-economic conditions, including the capacities of former combatants, the demands and opportunities of the labor market, and the basic features of the local formal and shadow economies. Usually, this is not done (Specker, 2008: 11-2; Klem & Douma, 2008: 27).

Based on studies of Sierra Leone, the DRC and Afghanistan, Klem and Douma (2008: 27) conclude that due to such shortcomings, “reintegration activities provided mostly short-tem benefits and opportunities to ex-fighters, but often failed to deliver sustainable results. Many ex-combatants were unemployed and they had trouble eking out an income despite the training and assets they received.” Based on research done by International Alert, Specker (2008: 21) writes that the failure rate of businesses set up by ex-combatants is estimated to be between 60 and 80 per cent.

Clearly, then, much remains to be done for reintegration to succeed in the longer term. Although there is general agreement that a better connection to processes of development is needed, what often remains vague in literature and policy is what exactly that entails. According to ISS (2004), the qualitative information necessary for better analysis and development of reintegration guidelines is generally lacking. For example, there is little clarity about where DDR ends and development begins. There may be a need to develop criteria for an exit strategy for DDR programmes (Baaré, 2006: 9), which explicitly deal with the transfer to longer-term development and poverty reduction. Moreover, a context-specific and tailored approach, that builds on the socio-economic reality on the ground as well as on the wishes and capabilities of former combatants, is uncommon in practice, if existing at all (Specker, 2008; Klem & Douma, 2008). However, this is a necessity for making the transition from DDR to development.
### A Practical Example of Community Security and Disarmament

The above paragraph reviewed the human security approach to DDR in practice on the basis of existing literature as it is part of a desk study. This inherently limited view will be elaborated upon in case studies but it might serve clarity at this point to add an example of local perceptions of security in relation to disarmament. This example is based on a community security initiative that was facilitated by donors and thus does not exactly fit the DDR programmes as were discussed in this section, nor does it concern conventional rebels or soldiers as such but armed civilians. The example is based on Chappon (2004b).

In November 2003, Pax Christi Netherlands and the Ugandan Human Rights Commission organized a 4-day workshop in Moroto, Uganda titled ‘Community Responsibility and Development as Conditions for Sustainable Disarmament in Karamoja’. 120 People participated, among which warriors, community representatives, other civil society representatives, members of the Local Defense Units, disbanded militias and senior government officials. The proceedings of the workshops are related here to the needs of security demands at the community level, as elaborated upon before.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Protecting individuals</th>
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<tr>
<td>“Government should provide impartial protection after disarmament,” for which, among others, “capacity of the army to protect citizens after disarmament needs doubling” and improvements must be made to the “[l]ack of dialogue between local communities and Civil Military Operation Centers (CMOCs) during disarmament.”</td>
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<th>Broadening the target group</th>
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<td>“Traditional security institutions for information collection, vigilance and appraisal of potential conflict need to be supported and strengthened,” while for local reintegration it is necessary to also include the “Emuron who bless the karacuna (youth/warriors) and are a major and destructive force in this process, this group needs counseling.”</td>
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<th>Empower local people and communities</th>
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<tr>
<td>Participation is overall seen as a vehicle for empowerment and ownership, as disarmament in the past failed due to “lack of community ownership and awareness; lack of consultation and communication,” which in part resulted in “continued inter-communal conflicts.” Furthermore, “[c]ommunity ownership of CMOCs was denied and thereafter the community lacked confidence in it.”</td>
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<th>Be part of broader peacebuilding processes</th>
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<td>“There is a need to turn away from the appreciation of evil and for the population to embrace the concept of peace” which could be furthered through “peace education and sensitization” as well as by supporting “peacekeeping and community policing” and “the conflict resolution capacity of the council of elders needs to be strengthened.”</td>
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<th>Connect to longer-term development</th>
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<tr>
<td>“NGOs should be accountable and are advised to concentrate on action rather than wasting funds on peace meetings,” while the “key issues in peace and development are coordination, coherence in the process and ownership by the local communities.” “Development concerns should be part of this process so that those who are disarmed are involved in constructive and gainful employment.”</td>
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3.4. Concluding Remarks: Theory versus Practice

Taking a human security approach to DDR may help in addressing some of its shortcomings, in particular the need for DDR to connect to wider peacebuilding processes, the importance of local ownership, the long-term nature of reintegration, and lack of attention for vulnerable groups and their special needs. It also confirms existing trends in DDR policy, such as the inclusion of broader groups (dependents, communities) and the emphasis on connecting reintegration to other (community) development activities.

Indeed, in the policy world, human security is increasingly used as a guiding principle for DDR, starting in 2004 with the GTZ guidelines. Particularly noteworthy is the JICA (2006) Handbook for Transition Assistance, which, unlike most other policy documents, takes the concept of empowerment seriously. This concept is central to human security and it also provides a connection to community security by focusing on strengthening the capacities of communities and institutions for conflict prevention and security provision.

The IDDRS represent many lessons learned, such as a more explicit and operational differentiation between different categories of DDR target groups, a need to pay special attention to minority communities, recognition that national ownership is much more than central government leadership, and reference to civil society capacity building and the strengthening of local communities and authorities. It remains to be seen to what extent the IDDRS as a whole, and these provisions in particular, will be implemented in practice.

So far, there have been large discrepancies between policies and practices. Practical application of human security-centered DDR still has a long way to go (CICS, 2008: 10). Reality on the ground severely complicates matters:

> DDR Managers have to work in a country context that is emerging from conflict and characterized by delicate political negotiations, an often flawed peace process, limited information, weak national governance, presumptive authorities, fragile economies, devastated livelihoods, rising expectations, widespread social trauma, grave insecurity and seriously damaged and/or very limited social structures (CICS, 2008: 10).

Thus, the problem is that context factors (government capacity and willingness, peace process, security, socio-economic development) are of paramount importance, whilst these are not, and cannot be, the direct responsibility of DDR programmes. In addition, the coalition of actors that is implementing DDR presents its own difficulties, such as,

> …a complex and changing international context of overlapping political agendas, institutional competitions, differing points of view, weak management, poor coordination and communications, fragmented leadership, waning political will, short attention spans, rapid staff turnovers and scarce resources (Ibid.).

An important lesson is that one-size-fits-all approaches do not work. There is a key role to be played for national and local actors: government, civil society, private sector, community, and former combatants. There is a need, first, to map the local resources available in terms of knowledge, community security
arrangements, ‘social fabric’, local business, and the needs and capacities of former combatants, vulnerable groups, and wider communities. Second, programmes need to build on these resources, aiming to strengthen them further. This will lead to diverging outcomes depending on the context, and is only possible when the currently predominant ‘blueprint approach’ is abandoned in favor of more flexibility in policy and implementation.

In addition, more holistic thinking about DDR is needed, in order to move beyond ad-hoc coordination with other elements of the peacebuilding process to a more strategic view of how different activities, including DDR, can work together. CICS concludes that this requires three things: (1) more resources to made available in timely fashion, (2) a long-term and detailed planning process, based on good analysis, and (3) proper consultation process with host government and affected population based upon principles of participation, ownership and empowerment (CICS, 2008: 11).
4. ‘State’ DDR Programmes and Community Security

Earlier in this report, we defined community security as both an end state and a process. In the end state of community security, communities feel secure from threats that may be exerted by conflict, mistrust, arms proliferation, crime, and a lack of protection by the state. This comes close to the concept of human security, but it concentrates on security from physical violence and does not generally include other aspects of human security, such as security from poverty or disease. The process of community security is one in which “communities participate in identifying and prioritizing their security needs as to develop appropriate and effective responses” to achieve this end state (Saferworld, 2008a: 20).

How can we look at DDR from a community security perspective? We suggest five ways of doing so:

- First, the end state of community security can be seen as the overall aim of DDR processes (arrow 1 in figure 2.).
- Second, if we take a process view, community security can also be a characteristic of DDR processes, which then need to take community participation in programming seriously (2).
- A third way of approaching this issue is to connect DDR programmes to community security initiatives, such as for example as those described earlier in this report: traditional systems and peace committees, gun-free zones and community-based policing (3).
- Fourth, we may also ask to what extent DDR programmes connect to community-based DDR initiatives (4).
Finally, perhaps community security should be seen as a precondition for DDR (5). In other words, what role does the level of community security play in convincing combatants to submit to DDR?

When visualized these five aspects are connected as illustrated in figure 2. It also shows that the community security mechanisms ‘state’ DDR could connect to, are created by community security as a process (6), which in turn could be a requirement for community-based DDR (7) (having defined community-based DDR to include active participation of communities). This connection between community security mechanisms and DDR would then imply that DDR would become more community-based on the continuum described in Part I (8). Finally community security as end state should be, like for ‘state’ DDR (1), an aim of community-based DDR (9).

In this chapter, we treat each of the five aspects mentioned above in bullets in turn. Having done so, we ask several additional questions:

- From a community security perspective, what should be the recommended sequencing of DDR programmes?
- From a community security perspective, is DDR necessarily the best strategy?
- Is the extent that a programme contributes to community-level security used as a criterion for establishing success?
- What do often-used handbooks (such as UN IDDRS and the OECD handbook on SSR) have to say about the connection to community security?

4.1. Community Security as an Aim

In terms of what is needed for DDR programs to meet the need for security at the community level, Norbert Elias argues that an attitudinal shift away from violence is a necessary prerequisite. From a historical perspective he shows that the development of social norms of self-restraint and polite manners is crucial to attain ‘civility’. In order to achieve this, the monopolization of physical force and assurances of security are crucial underpinnings of post-conflict stability. Elias notes that:

*The monopolization of physical violence, the concentration of arms and armed men under one authority, makes the use of violence more or less calculable, and forces unarmed men in the pacified social spaces to restrain their own violence through foresight or reflection; in other words, it imposes on people a greater or lesser degree of self-control* (Elias, 1982: 239).

Thus, a monopoly of violence in these pacified spaces makes violence less likely to occur. Indeed, an important aim of DDR programmes is to achieve a state monopoly of violence. However, in post-conflict environments the process of monopolizing violence into the hands of the government often leads to a security dilemma. Sudden disarmament right after the war has ended is unlikely to occur because of fear of being dominated or defeated by the government, often one of the actors in the conflict. Indeed, as Keane (1996) notes, the state’s monopoly of violence could imply that citizens live under “a permanent cloud of threatened violence” (qtd. in Devetak, 2007: 12). In addition, disarming rebels may fear repercussions from other rebel movements. The question is how this security dilemma can be overcome or circumvented. What stands out is that fear of the other side and cheating on the post-conflict stability
needs to be addressed so that mutual trust can develop. Clearly, transforming the government from a party to the conflict to a more inclusive representation of citizens is part of such trust building. In addition, the community has a role to play, not only as a recipient of security offered by the state, but as a crucial locus of trust- and peacebuilding. Reinforcing community security mechanisms, as discussed below, then becomes part of the effort to achieve community security as an end state.

The above chapter on human security and DDR provides a number of ideas on what is needed for DDR programs to better meet the security demands at the community level. It argued that if DDR programmes are to contribute to human security, they should:

- not only aim at collective security but at the security of individuals, particularly the most vulnerable among them;
- focus not only on ex-combatants but on wider communities;
- empower local people and communities;
- be part of broader peacebuilding processes; and
- connect to longer-term development.

What we saw above when assessing these aspects is that in the practice of DDR, most of these objectives have turned out to be difficult to achieve.

### 4.2. Community Security as a Characteristic of DDR: Participation and Empowerment

This aspect, too, has been discussed at some length in the previous chapter on human security and DDR. As we saw there, although the importance of participation is increasingly recognized, a top-down approach still characterizes most DDR programmes. Too often, these programmes overlook potentially valuable inputs from grass-roots organizations and the communities themselves which are supposed to benefit from the DDR programme. As a result, they run the risk of not matching with the particular social, economic and political context in which DDR programmes are being implemented. The bottom line is that however DDR programs are being run, their legitimacy and local embeddedness are of the utmost importance. This also applies to the related activity of SSR. If the newly established armed forces are irresponsible to the needs of local communities, various African experiences show, citizens will take matters into their own hands by creating non-state security forces, with potential negative consequences for the peace-process (Moller & Cawthra, 2007: 197).

What are reasons for the insufficient application of participatory principles? One issue, touched upon earlier, is that DDR programmes are deemed too technocratic. As a result, they are inflexible, too narrowly focused and operate alongside the wider peace-building strategies that are being undertaken. DDR and SSR are artificially grafted on vulnerable post-conflict societies (Muggah, 2009: 2). Another issue is that DDR actors have only limited understanding of how to make community involvement a reality. It is not enough merely to acknowledge the necessity of local ownership; it also matters how communities are consulted, on what issues, and to what effect.

To elaborate on this last issue, we may draw inspiration from critical security studies, which address security as a concept and aim to grasp the socially constructed nature of security and insecurity. This goes
to the heart of DDR and security at community level. In order for community security to be improved a DDR programme needs to take into account the way communities conceive of security. Neither the actors to be made secure nor the actors designated as threats are pre-given. Nor is there agreement on what ought to be made secure. These questions are important for they help us understand what communities themselves perceive to be necessary to achieve post-conflict stability and security. For instance in many countries weapons have an economic, cultural, and/or security value attached to them. This is even more so in societies emerging from conflict where people (though war weary) still distrust the state as a provider of security. This understanding of the value of possessing a weapon helps explain why people may be reluctant to disarm. It shows that the opinion of the community should be taken as the backbone in the design of the DDR programme (Fierke, 2007: 161).

4.3. Connecting State DDR to Community Security Arrangements

How can national-level DDR programmes connect to existing ways to organize community security (or, as included in Muggah’s term, ‘second generation’ DDR programmes) such as weapons demand reduction, traditional systems and peace committees, gun-free zones and community-based policing? What appears central to this is for DDR programmes to adopt an empowering approach to community security structures. This can be done by strengthening existing arrangements and institutions or by establishing new ones, such as, for example, community policing panels. As a connector between the national and local levels, civil society organizations and local government may have important roles to play. The next chapter discusses these roles in detail.

The IDDRS acknowledge that although the primary role of disarmament within DDR is to disarm combatants in the immediate post-conflict period, two wider dimensions need to be taken into account: that commonly it is also desirable and necessary to reduce and control the weapons held by the civilian population; and that short-term disarmament measures must be linked to longer-term small arms and light weapons (SALW) control. Thus, the removal of weapons from combatants is only one aspect of disarmament within DDR. Initiatives that go beyond formal cantonment and weapons destruction by DDR implementers become necessary. Community-based weapons collection and control programmes, as discussed in Part II, may be a valuable addition in this regard (Greene et al, 2008: 13) Community benefits in for instance weapons for development schemes or the reconstruction of community property by ex-combatants are not necessarily community-based in itself. They can, however, be linked to community councils or peace committees through which communities can themselves determine the targets for reconstruction.

However, there are various obstacles that complicate efforts to reinforce community security arrangements as part of DDR or otherwise. First, the viability of community security mechanisms can be undermined by authorities that fear such bottom-up approaches to security can turn into a source of opposition. In Somalia for example, hardliners in both the Transitional Federal Governments as well as the Council of Islamic Courts have embarked on policies designed to undercut rather than partner with local security initiatives (Menkhaus, 2007: 68). This was initially also the fear of the Tanzanian government with the sungusungu mentioned in Part I, paragraph 1.4.2. Second, the evolution of local, informal systems of security has often been invisible to external aid agencies that mostly focus on formal

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34 See also Part I, paragraph 1.3 and the annex of this report.
state structures. External state-building initiatives have at times undermined public security by
disregarding existing informal security structures (Ibid. 70). One reason for this may be the illiberal
nature of local security systems – a third issue. In, Somalia, local security systems are the main if not sole
source of security and protection for households and communities, but they often do not live up to
international human rights standards. When aid agencies are committed to the promotion of human
security, they are faced with the dilemma of whether or not to strengthen these structures. (Ibid. 92-3)
Finally, a fundamental issue is that communities do not necessarily have shared values and beliefs,
particularly in divided and fragmented societies (Baker, 2007: 138). This means that programmes for
community involvement in DDR should have built-in mechanisms for reconciliation and dealing with
disagreement.

There may also be instances in which the connection between DDR and community security
arrangements runs in the other direction: not national DDR programmes trying to link up with
community mechanisms, but community mechanisms helping to shape DDR programmes. For example,
the OECD (2007a: 35) notes that pilot projects in Haiti that promote community-based armed violence
reduction in slums have formed the template of national DDR and SSR strategies for Haiti. For this to be
possible, DDR should not be one-size-fits all and entail constructive community involvement in its
design, something which, as we will see, is still quite rare.

4.4. Connecting State DDR and Community-based DDR

A push towards more community-based and developmental perspectives to security and disarmament is
based on the idea that “peace building is essentially a developmental initiative with a crucial security
component, rather than the other way around” (Bush, 2004: 30). Among others, John Paul Lederach (1997:
39) sees peace building as a long-term transformation of a war system into a peace system, inspired by a
quest for the values of peace and justice. He proposes a triangle with elite leaders and decision makers at
the top, leaders of social organizations, churches, academics in the middle, and the grassroots community
leaders at the base. Thus a more top-down approach does not become superfluous when community-
based approaches are initiated as the two should rather reinforce each other. Strong coordination of
community-based projects with the official state-focused DDR programmes, however, proved to be rather
difficult in some cases. Uncertainty surrounding the timing of the state-focused DDR programmes,
combined with the required time to hire staff and set up offices for the community-based reintegration
programmes, made it difficult to have the latter operational when ex-combatants were returning from
cantonment sites (USAID, 2005, 25-6). Summarizing various articles in the introduction of his book,
Muggah finds that many of the issues with DDR originate in the overly technical nature of DDR design.

DDR should not be pursued as a technical activity by development agencies (as is currently the case).
Rather, it should be conceived as a strategic ‘interaction’ connected to state consolidation and not a
discrete technical intervention. (…) conventional approaches to DDR tend to neglect the many ways
in which discrete activities are interpreted by local actors. Externally-imposed interventions tend to
ignore locally existing security arrangements in areas of limited governance (Muggah, 2009: 18).
However, it is not always clear what a community-based approach entails when reviewing policy documents. Unclear objectives and differing views about this reflect controversies surrounding the question whether to target individual families and households as opposed to all vulnerable households or the community as a whole (Chrobok, 2005: 34). A balance must be struck between supporting ex-combatants’ specific needs and the needs of the wider community in order to prevent resentment. Emphasis should be placed on moving quickly from ex-combatant-specific programs to community-based programmes. Failure to do so will result in ex-combatants continuing to identify themselves as belonging to a special group outside society, retarding their effective reintegration into local communities (UNDP, 2005: 5).

The degree of reliance on community-based initiatives as compared to state DDR programmes is likely to vary depending on the context. For example, in cases where the distinction between combatant and civilian is blurred, demobilization through national camps will have only limited success, and a community-based initiative would be more in place. Where a community-based approach can link to state-focused approaches will also differ from case to case. This may, for example, depend on the strength and accessibility of existing community arrangements. As mentioned earlier in the discussion on the sequence of DDR, one option would be to leave disarmament and demobilization (possibly including some form of reinsertion) to a state-focused approach and at the same time complement this with a community-based reintegration and rehabilitation programme. The first programme will then turn the combatants into ex-combatants, while the second programme focuses on the war-affected communities including ex-combatants (Haden & Faltas, 2004: 20-1).

### 4.5. Community Security as a Precondition for DDR

Community security is one of the determinants that impacts on the decision to participate in a DDR programme. Some degree of security and prospect for security is needed in the aftermath of war to convince ex-combatants to disarm. It becomes far harder to convince ex-combatants and commanders of the utility of disarmament and the benefits it may bring for their own situation when a sufficient level of trust and security is absent.

Humphreys and Weinstein (2007) identify two underlying mechanisms that influence the decision to join a DDR programme. The first mechanism derives from the logic of the security dilemma. In an immediate post-conflict environment, the institutional infrastructure is usually very weak. Therefore, mutual mistrust may lead to unwillingness in taking the first step toward disarmament. However, credible third party enforcers and credible commitment to community ownership of the DDR programme can mediate in such crises of confidence and foster a degree of transparency that mitigates feelings of mutual suspicion. The second mechanism is the role of spoilers who seek to maintain the structure of their armed groups to use violence to undermine the peace efforts so they can bargain for more favorable returns. Both these mechanisms significantly impact on the decision whether to join a DDR programme or not. Some additional factors that add to the explanation why post-conflict settlements can be fragile are the fact that individuals are less likely to have broken ties with their armed faction when distrusting the opponent even after the conflict.

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35 See Part I, paragraph 2.2 for the definition used in this report.
Rebel forces therefore tend to be reluctant to disarm in the absence of security guarantees. Even though external actors may provide security for the transition period in the form of peacekeepers, for the rebels to be persuaded to lay down their arms additional assurances are often needed, for example in the form of rebels retaining their own armed forces or becoming integrated into the new army, rather than being unarmed (Moller & Cawtra, 2007: 180). Often there is a preference on part of the government to retain the monopoly on the legitimate use of force and therefore to suggest military integration into the new army as the most feasible option. However, in the longer term armies have to be downsized and demobilization becomes inevitable.

What is important in this regard is that policy makers understand from the outset that DDR involves much more than a mere “technical fix”. The local population is likely to perceive every intervention as a political initiative that upsets the existing power balance, and, accordingly, will calculate what they stand to gain or lose from the effort (O’Neill, 2005: 2). The challenge therefore is to demonstrate the positive impact of a new approach, for example through pilot projects that build legitimacy and credibility for wider reform programs (OECD, 2007a: 35).

Because disarmament is such a highly political and sensitive issue, trust is the essential ingredient for success. Trust takes time to develop and therefore disarmament may be easier to agree on once a certain degree of stability has been achieved. Usually, the immediate post-conflict environment came into being after a certain balance of power or stalemate emerged, for example because all parties had exhausted their resources. Keeping arms in such a situation means maintaining the balance of power, whereas disarmament risks upsetting it. Disarmament then becomes a very sensitive issue that cannot be resolved in the short-term. However, this does not mean reintegration programs should be halted. Thus, the preconditions that need to be present for a successful DDR intervention should at least be an environment in which trust and confidence can be built.

Combatants’ reluctance to disarm is related not only to the need for security guarantees in the short-term. Prospects for successful reintegration in the long term also play a role. Dissatisfaction with a peace accord can be associated with unemployment since people who have not found a job judge the peace accord more harshly. This affects one’s perceptions of future security, which may lead one to conclude that having a gun offers more security than having none.

This paragraph has made it clear that for combatants to submit to disarmament, they have to feel sufficiently secure - both physically and economically. Prospects for successful reintegration can help convince combatants to disarm. In some cases, this can mean that reintegration measures should precede disarmament. We turn to such discussions over DDR sequencing now.

4.6. Sequencing of DDR Programmes

The presentation of the processes of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration in programmes as DDR assumes it is a linear, sequential process, implying DDR consists of three separate processes each with a distinctive start and end. Even though the elements within DDR are strongly interlinked, different actors are involved and implement the different stages of a DDR programme. In reality, DDR phases

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36 See also Part I, paragraph 2.4.3 in this report.
overlap and run parallel (Muggah, 2009: 279). How precisely they overlap depends on the context in which DDR takes place. There is increasing recognition of the limits of a one-size-fits-all approach to DDR. Rather, context-specific programmes are advocated. Detailed context analyses should foster the design of flexible DDR programmes, tailored to the needs of the country or region in question. This can have consequences for the sequencing of DDR.

As the discussion of SALW demand in Part I illustrates, in complex and fragile situations, characterized by the above-described security dilemma, disarmament can only occur after a number of preconditions have been established. As also mentioned in chapter 2, in such cases DDR programmes may yield better results when reintegration precedes disarmament and demobilization.

Starting with reintegration and trust building, if successful, reduces the need to carry arms. In addition, it can create time and space to strengthen non-violent norms and mechanisms of conflict management and to (re)construct functioning government institutions. The dominance of warlords in brokering agreements to submit to DDR programmes can only be avoided when a functional state is capable of providing security and stability (Özerdem, 2002: 962).

As mentioned earlier, letting go of the standard sequence of D, D and R also creates room for different divisions of labour. Disarmament and demobilization (and possibly some form of reinsertion) could take place through state-based programming and reintegration through community-based programming. The reintegration component can then be initiated alongside DD programming and focus on the whole of war-affected communities, while the DD phases can continue to serve the security issues with a special focus on ex-combatants.

4.7. Community Security as a Criterion for Success

In general, there are few publications that suggest any criteria for a successful DDR programme, let alone the extent to which a programme contributes to community-level security. Most of the time success is measured by means of the numbers of weapons submitted, the number of soldiers disarmed and the number of soldiers reintegrated. However, such statistics say little about the actual improvements in security and stability. While levels of state security can be measured to some extent, it is nearly impossible to draw conclusions with regard to improvements of human- and community security. This may be due to the broad scope of these terms, making it generally hard to assess levels of security on all the aspects that comprise human- and community security.

DDR in general lacks clear benchmarks of success, which is increasingly troubling policy-makers. This is due to differences of opinion on whether DDR amounts to a minimalist emphasis on security promotion alone or whether it should adopt a maximalist approach that includes development aims and changes in government. Problematically, however, there is little evidence available that suggests whether either of these changes are occurring. As indicated earlier, the perennial question whether DDR actually

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37 In addition to our earlier discussion of this, see Berdal (1996: 24) and Kingma (2000: 29).
38 As part of wider peacebuilding programmes rather than exclusively being part of the DDR programme itself.
39 See also Part I, paragraph 2.4.4 in this report
40 See also Part I, paragraph 2.4.1 in this report
contributes to sustainable improvements in security is not much helped by the fact that there is little evidence how DDR contributes to human security in the longer term.

We should not overestimate the extent to which the outcomes (let alone impact) of DDR programmes can be measured. Extremely challenging, complex and rapidly changing circumstances limit the predictability of outcomes and the extent of change that can be achieved. Improvements in the situation (or a lack thereof) are difficult to attribute to any specific intervention. Moreover, each intervention influences others and the success of DDR processes is contingent upon the outcomes of other elements of the peacebuilding process. That said, however, gathering better data on the immediate outcomes of DDR interventions may help to understand them better. Beyond numbers of arms received and integration payments allocated, such data could consist of qualitative information about why and how fighters are demobilized, what happens to them when they are disarmed and demobilized, and whether reintegration is effective.

The lack of data on such aspects may be explained by a focus on delivery, rather than monitoring and evaluation. As Humphreys and Weinstein (2009: 47) note, “at the macro-level, DDR studies have typically not engaged in comparison of outcomes in countries that did and those that did not receive interventions. At the micro-level, many studies fail to examine why some individuals and not others are able to successfully reintegrate after conflict and whether participation in DDR programs accounts for this variation.” Evidence-based interventions with appropriate parameters of success are badly needed (Muggah, 2009: 3-4).

However, there is an increased demand by donors to learn about the effectiveness of the programmes they are funding. They are eager to know how their money can be better spent in order to improve the accountability and effectiveness of their programmes as well as improving the contextual appropriateness of development assistance and security promotion (Ibid.). Klem and Douma (2008) have listed several theoretical perspectives from which different criteria for success can be derived. First, the ‘spoiler-contingency perspective’ aims to achieve short-term pacification of ex-combatants. Thus, only ex-combatants, and not their supportive networks, are targeted because they are believed to be directly affecting levels of stability and security. The focus is on disarmament and demobilization, whereas reintegration is of later concern. Measures of success in this regard thus focus on the numbers of weapons collected and destroyed, and the number of ex-combatants demobilized. A ‘transitional perspective’ is focused more on obtaining development-related goals. Longer-terms goals of reintegration are emphasized under this header. As such, it aims to deconstruct the existing patterns of power and structure of factions, and replace them with new means of inter-communal relations powered by social capital and economic ties. Finally, the ‘transformational perspective’ aims to address the root causes of conflict as well. It measures levels of success by assessing the extent to which human security has been attained (Klem & Douma, 2008: 9-10).

In the chapter on human security and DDR, we wrote that the transformational perspective resonates with a human security perspective. It followed that DDR should connect to broader processes of peacebuilding. However, such broader (and longer-term) processes are even harder to assess in terms of results. Even if peacebuilding progress can be observed, it is impossible to attribute it to any particular intervention. This calls for more modesty about the extent to which developments can be planned and assessed. Still, more discussion about the larger framework for DDR, and the elements that this
framework should include in order to lead to sustainable peace, would help achieve clarity about exactly what it is we are trying to achieve and how a specific DDR intervention is placed in view of wider goals. Without consensus among policymakers and academics alike about the criteria for determining the success of a DDR programme, little can be said about whether contributing to community security is one of these criteria.

4.8. Community Security in DDR Handbooks

In the chapter on human security and DDR we saw that the IDDRS comprise many elements of what a human- or community security perspective would imply, including a more explicit and operational differentiation between different categories of DDR target groups, a need to pay special attention to minority communities, recognition that national ownership is much more than central government leadership, and reference to civil society capacity building and the strengthening of local communities and authorities. Indeed, the document states that “[t]he primary responsibility for the successful outcome of DDR programs rests with the national and local actors, and national stakeholders are responsible for planning, coordinating and running institutions set up to manage different aspects for the peace agreement” (UN IAWG, 2006: 2.10).

However, if we take a more specific focus here, namely on the institutions and mechanisms of community security, then we find that the IDDRS remain quite vague. The IDDRS state that community-based organizations must be supported where they already exist, and established where they do not, to sustain a secure environment (Ibid.). That leaves some ambiguity about ownership. Neither does it specify the roles and responsibilities of community-based organizations and/or community security mechanisms. It remains fuzzy whether community-based organizations will have genuine ownership by means of constructive participation or are involved in the DDR process. Their function is to sustain a secure environment, but it remains unclear how they are supposed to do so.

The OECD Handbook on SSR does not acknowledge ownership as a cardinal principle of security sector reform. It states that it is important to seek the direct views of local people who are the consumers of justice and security services, yet does not specify whether local people will actually be involved in planning and implementing a programme (OECD, 2007a: 49). However, the role of community-based security initiatives is acknowledged to increase trust between the police and local communities. Accordingly, community security organizations can play an important role in addressing such tensions between the police and local communities. Partnerships between the police and the public, such as community-based policing forums, should be started to build confidence and curb crime (Ibid, 224). Moreover, the OECD states that increasing safety at the community level requires action on a wide range of SSR issues including strategic military planning, personnel management (in particular recruitment policy and salaries), and the delegation of authority to lower ranks (Ibid. 167). Yet again, however, even though action is advocated, the Handbook does not specify explicitly that local communities must be involved in undertaking these reforms.

These two documents are generally exemplary for other policy literature as well. Often it appears that community-security is merely meant to serve the implementing international actors and NGOs. It is acknowledged that local security contexts matter, but not in a sense that it implies local ownership over the design and implementation of DDR programmes. Genuine ownership and community empowerment
would require a considerable investment in analyzing the field of community security actors and arrangements before an intervention is undertaken. In the words of O’Neill (2005: 8), DDR actors should be thoroughly familiar with local traditions, practices and conditions regarding policing and security. The major policy documents on DDR do not devote any significant attention to these aspects.

4.9. Concluding Remarks: Connecting DDR and Community Security

In this chapter, we have suggested five ways of looking at DDR from a community security perspective.

First, an end state of community security can be seen as the overall aim of DDR. In this regard, we may ask whether DDR programmes meet human- and community security needs. As became clear in the previous chapter, in practice, they often do not.

Second, if we take a process view, community security can also be a characteristic of DDR processes, which then need to take community participation in programming seriously. This brought us back to the earlier discussion on empowerment and capacity building, approaches which play only very limited roles in the implementation of most DDR programmes. Part of the reason for this may be that there is little clarity on what empowerment means and how it should be done. A (participatory) analysis of community arrangements and institutions is needed which can show which of them are potential carriers of community security across the lines of conflict, and what it takes for them to achieve their potential. In addition, more insights are needed in what security means to a community. Given the short time frames employed for DDR, such analyses are rarely done, and are not mentioned by most policy documents as a step to be undertaken. The SNAP project mentioned earlier in this report might provide practical possibilities to fill this knowledge gap but there is currently insufficient information available on its operational status.

A third way of approaching the issue is to connect DDR to the community security arrangements, as they were described earlier in this report: SALW demand reduction, traditional systems and peace committees, gun-free zones and community-based policing. Upon closer inspection, this way of approaching the issue is intimately tied up with treating community security as a process: one way to connect DDR to community security arrangements would be for DDR actors to strengthen these arrangements as a matter of policy. In addition, the connection between DDR and community security arrangements may also run in the other direction, with community mechanisms helping to shape national DDR programmes, as happened in Haiti. This requires DDR programming to be flexible and open to community involvement.

Fourth, as opposed to the broader concept of community security, we may also ask to what extent DDR programmes connect to community-based DDR initiatives. There are many interesting examples of community-based DDR, some spontaneous, others facilitated by NGOs, some supported directly by donors. In general, however, ‘state’ DDR programmes have found it difficult to link up with these activities. Reasons include a lack of community and civil society involvement in DDR design, trouble with finding a good local partner, short time frames, and an overly technocratic and top-down DDR approach.
Fifth, some level of community security is also a *precondition* for DDR. Convincing combatants to submit to DDR requires a basic level of confidence that they will be secure, both physically and economically, after they give up their arms. This can mean that efforts at reintegration should already be introduced before disarmament is undertaken. In other words, the sequencing of DDR may need to be changed. The precise way in which this is done depends on the context. Elements that play a role include the level of state fragility and insecurity, the extent to which all groups buy into a peace agreement, and the number of combatants that can be integrated into national armed forces.

In response to the question, whether community-level security is used as a criterion for establishing DDR success, basically the answer is no. There is in any event much confusion about the criteria for evaluating DDR. Larger questions, such as whether DDR programmes contribute to longer-term security, are rarely asked. More generally, influential handbooks such as the UN IDDRS and the OECD handbook on SSR treat community security only in a very narrow way. They acknowledge the importance of connecting to community institutions, but are unclear about where ownership should lie.

Whether DDR is the best strategy to achieve community security depends on the way DDR is given shape. If it includes a focus on community security and empowerment of community-level institutions, then DDR can be an important tool for furthering security at community level. It is, in any case, important to complement community-level initiatives with a national strategy for security and disarmament. Centralized DDR programmes and community security arrangements should complement each other.
5. Cooperation between ‘State DDR’ Actors and Local Security Actors

5.1. Division of Labour in DDR Programmes

The central government of the country at stake usually has a leading role in DDR programmes. Often, a specialized government agency is created to coordinate the process. In addition, a host of foreign actors is involved. These include UN complex peace missions, which often have wide, military-civilian mandates, UN specialized agencies such as the UNDP, and other international organizations, such as the International Organization for Migration (IOM).

On the donor side, the World Bank has played an increasingly prominent role. Bilateral donors join the Bank’s funding frameworks or provide parallel funds. Some donors, particularly the GTZ, also play more operational roles. In addition, various operational tasks are outsourced to NGOs. Both international and local NGOs are involved at this level, in addition to, occasionally, private enterprises. The role of NGOs is particularly prominent in reinsertion and reintegration assistance. (Klem & Douma, 2008: 16; Hoffmann & Gleichmann, 2000: 33) According to the SIDDR especially in the absence of strong state and local capacity, the private sector and civil society can provide supporting and substituting roles. The private sector can revitalize the local economy through investments and NGOs can help mobilize communities and encourage activities (SIDDR, 2006: 29).

A difficult issue, of course, is to find adequate ways for all these actors to work together. In the quest for an ‘integrated approach’, increasingly sophisticated coordination mechanisms and frameworks have been designed. However, this has not put an end to coordination failures and even “turf battles” (Klem & Douma, 2008: 16). For example, in the MDRP tensions have arisen between the UNDP and the World Bank (Klem & Douma, 2008; Klem & Frerks, 2007).

A long chain of policy implementation and funding has been established. Reintegration policies and finances tend to flow from the donor to a trust fund, and then onwards to the central government, which subcontracts an INGO. The INGO often contracts a local NGO, which in turn works together with local craftsmen for vocational training and employment (Klem & Douma, 2008: 28; Specker, 2008: 19). This complex chain means that there is a large number of layers between decision-makers and beneficiaries, making it difficult for the latter to hold the former accountable. In addition, it makes for large overhead costs.

5.2. The Actors Involved in Community-based Initiatives

As mentioned in Part I, paragraph 1.4.1., it can be argued that in the context of fragile states security is increasingly perceived as a privately provided good. In the end the state (i.e. police, army and other security forces) should provide security, but generally the problem is a lack of capacity and a lack of trust in the state security forces (e.g. due to a lack of capacity and/or its role in previous conflict). Community-based security initiatives are then an attempt to turn this privatization around, by providing security on a community level. Characteristic to community security, therefore, is the involvement of the community
itself in the provision of its security. For instance, this can be done through traditional systems in a community, which may or may not be supported by NGOs. If such systems are revived or created at the initiative of an NGO or international organization, the discussion on ‘who is in charge’ discussed above again comes to the surface. Similar observations can be made about the GFZs in South Africa, where GFZs initiated by communities function differently than the FFZs created by the government. Actors in community security initiatives thus 

"can be the police or other government agencies, they can also involve INGOs, other international agencies like UN agencies, the World Bank or national development agencies such as USAID or GTZ, but community security initiatives always involve communities."

With regard to community-based DDR, similar observations can be made, as it by definition should involve communities. However, since DDR is a top-down instrument involvement of international agencies and a national government is almost inevitable. As we have seen, often support is also given by national development agencies and NGOs. In activities around community security and community-based DDR similar actors are thus involved, albeit sometimes in different roles. And indeed both activities aim to increase security and both activities aim for active community involvement. Notable are the different roles played by NGOs. In community security activities they seem more able to play the role of facilitator for communities and representatives to international organizations and states. In community-based DDR activities, however, they often act (similar as in state-focused DDR activities) as service-providers for international agencies.

5.3. Cooperation Between ‘State’ and Local Actors

This paragraph distinguishes four types of locally active actors: NGOs, other civil society organizations (CSOs), local governments, and the local private sector. Few publications exist on the role of these actors. Although policy documents and academic studies often include a basic recognition of the important role that civil society has to play in DDR, they usually do not specify what this role is or should be. However, a recent study commissioned by Cordaid contributed to filling this gap – at least with regard to NGOs. The study, which used case studies of Afghanistan, Sierra Leone and the DR Congo, deals explicitly with the role of NGOs in DDR. This paragraph will draw on it relatively extensively. For non-NGO civil society organizations and the private sector, very little information is available.

5.3.1. NGOs

Let us begin with the role of NGOs. Like the policy papers by the UN, World Bank and bilateral donors on which they build, the IDDRS stipulate that “NGOs often provide expertise in specific areas and can be a significant actor in ensuring that the needs of the community are met. The NGOs should be collaborated with and consulted with throughout the DDR process” (UN IAWG, 2006). In practice, however, this collaboration starts only at the implementation stage, and there is little or no NGO involvement in the development of DDR policies and programmes. Strikingly, for example, there was no NGO involvement in the formulation of the IDDRS. Thus, NGOs lack influence over the overall design and planning of DDR programmes, including aspects that directly affect their activities, such as the

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41 In particular, on its synthesis study (Klem & Douma, 2008) and to a lesser extent, its DRC case study (Douma & Van Laar, 2008).
modalities of DDR benefits or eligibility criteria for reintegration. (Klem and Douma, 2008: 25) On their part, INGOs generally have not developed any policies regarding DDR (Ibid. 20).

The role of NGOs in DDR programmes is largely confined to that of subcontractors that carry out specific, but major, aspects of national DDR programmes. Indeed, in the implementation of DDR there is large-scale NGO involvement, particularly in reinsertion and reintegration (Hoffmann & Gleichmann, 2000: 33), but also, in some cases, during disarmament and demobilization. In regard to these two D’s, NGOs have provided assistance in demobilization camps, for example through finance for the camps, food, mosquito nets, sanitary facilities, medical aid, recreational activities, and sensitization programmes (Hoffmann & Gleichmann, 2000: 33; Klem & Douma, 2008: 26). NGOs have played particularly prominent roles in the demobilization of underage combatants and other children associated with armed forces and groups, for example in their selection (Klem & Douma, 2008: 25-6).

Reinsertion and, particularly, reintegration rely heavily on NGO involvement. In the reinsertion stage, NGOs provide kits and organize manual labor projects. In the reintegration phase, NGOs provide vocational training and apprenticeships, assist ex-combatants to start up farms and small businesses, and enroll children in education. NGOs also engage in awareness raising about DDR programmes through their contacts with communities42. In some cases these activities are carried out directly by INGOs, in other cases they are subcontracted to local NGOs. Local artisans are hired to assist with vocational training and work programmes.

In the cases studied by the Cordaid project, NGOs were contracted for these activities by international agencies such as UNICEF, UNDP and IOM, and bilateral aid agencies, in particular the GTZ. In some cases reintegration activities were contracted to private companies43. NGOs had little autonomy in opting for a specific activity. Often they “were tasked with a specific sector or batch of ex-combatants and they had to compete to ‘get’ a project.” (Klem & Douma, 2008: 26-7) This clearly impedes downward accountability, as well as inclusion and conflict sensitivity of projects.

Such a subcontracting role contrasts with ideas about NGOs as independent actors that represent civil society, scrutinizing government and donors and putting forward issues on behalf of communities. Klem and Douma (2008: 25) conclude that this “watchdog role that may be associated with civil society as a representative of society and a counterweight to the state did not come forward with regard to the design of DDR programmes.” This fits in with broader discussions about the decreasing autonomy of NGOs vis-à-vis bilateral and multilateral donors, their increasing professionalization, and their often weak connections to grassroots constituencies (e.g. Edwards & Hulme, 1996; Duffield, 2001).

Some NGOs choose not to participate in DDR in order to protect their autonomy. As far as can be determined, however, this is not primarily a response to the limitations of subcontracting as such. Rather, doubts about joining DDR efforts primarily arise in high-risk, politicized contexts, such as Afghanistan, where wider dilemmas of civil-military cooperation are prevalent and being associated with government and military presents staff with immediate security risks (Klem & Douma, 2008: 32).

42 Despite these efforts, though, “inflated expectations and misunderstandings were still a common occurrence” (Klem & Douma, 2008: 27).
43 Most notably Chemonix in Ituri, DRC (Douma & Van Laar, 2008).
It should be noted here that NGOs contribute to DDR outside of DDR programmes as well. Here, they have more decision making autonomy. NGOs engage in activities that may be seen as complementary to DDR, for example by filling gaps in national DDR programmes. For instance, the local NGO Caritas Makeni in Sierra Leone started a Girls Left Behind project for women who had been part of RUF but who had not been allowed or dared to enroll in DDR (Klem & Douma, 2008: 29) The same organization also offered a programme to promote women’s health at the reintegration stage through alternative income generation for sex workers and reproductive health and safe sex education (CICS, 2006: 26).

Non-DDR programmes carried out by NGOs, such as training, reconciliation and micro-credit can also complement DDR as they include ex-combatants and their communities. In some cases this is a deliberate strategy, based on the idea that it is better to mix former combatants with other beneficiaries. In other cases, the inclusion of former combatants simply follows from their membership of the community in which a project is carried out. (Klem and Douma, 2008: 28) It also happens that projects that were initially for ex-combatants open up to other beneficiaries later on (Hoffmann & Gleichmann, 2000: 33).

In analyzing the role of NGOs in DDR, it is important to distinguish between international and local organizations. There are large inequalities between them. In tendering procedures to obtain contracts for DDR activities, INGOs often crowd out local actors because they have better access to donors, larger cash reserves, and stronger institutional capacities (Klem & Douma 2008: 27-8). If they do not compete directly with local NGOs, INGOs subcontract activities to them, which also creates an unequal relationship.

In some cases national DDR authorities had difficulty finding suitable implementing partners (Klem & Douma, 2008: 27). Looking for partners who can immediately take on particular aspects of a DDR programme, there is a tendency to prioritize those – usually INGOs – who already have the operational capacity to do so. Capacity building of local NGOs, though important from a longer-term perspective of sustainability and human- and community security, does not get prioritized in such a situation.

5.3.2. CSOs
CSOs are a highly diverse category of actors, whose common denominator is that they are organized elements of society that exist outside the realm of the state. CSOs include NGOs, community-based organizations (CBOs), religious groups, traditional authorities, workers’ associations, women’s organizations, human rights groups, as well as arguably the private sector.

Coletta (1999: 209) writes that revitalizing civil society entails the promotion of local associations, community participation, and peer accountability – all of which may help to reduce individual fear, enable collective condemnation of violence, and strengthen local security. In addition, civil society institutions organize citizens and communities and provide a link to national programmes. Swarbrick (2007: 51-2) also notes the importance of civil society for a number of reasons. Firstly, having the support and cooperation of civil society may break down barriers between the local population and DDR officers,

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44 In the DRC, the tendering procedure required bidders to contribute ten per cent of project costs. This effectively excluded local organizations (Specker, 2008: 18).
and win the confidence of combatants who are sceptical of the DDR process. Since combatants often reside in the same area as their dependents, civil society can act as a mediating channel between combatants, their dependants and the local population. In the DRC territories of Walungu and Kabare in South Kivu, for example, members of civil society were important to the establishment of contacts between the FDLR and outside organizations. Secondly, CSOs also have important knowledge of the local area that DDR officers often lack. This knowledge makes them an important source of information about the activities of combatants and the dynamics within armed groups that DDR programs might need to exploit.

The IDDRS state the following about the role of CSOs in DDR:

*Civil society organizations based in local communities are stakeholders in the policy development and planning phases of DDR, and should be consulted through formal and informal mechanisms. During the implementation phase, they are local partners and service providers. [...] Although their capacities may have been weakened by conflict, CSOs can become partners in DDR by providing individual opportunities for reintegration through employment and training as one of many industry and economic recovery strategies. At the local level, partnerships with small businesses support the creation of sustainable reintegration opportunities for ex-combatants and their dependants.* (UN IAWG, 2006: 2.30, 8)

However, the IDDRS (Ibid.) see two potential difficulties that complicate CSO involvement. The first is a lack of neutrality: “[a]fter war, these organizations may be polarized along political, religious or ethnic lines, and may represent specific interests” (cf. also Swarbrick, 2007: 51-2). The solution proposed is that prior to partnering with a CSO, its legitimacy and representation should be checked. The second issue is CSO weakness as a result of warfare, which tends to erode civil society capacities. In response,

*…international assistance will usually be necessary to build their capacity in networking, strategic planning, programme development, financial management and communications strategies. Such support is one means through which DDR increases capacities within communities for post-conflict peace-building and also for recovery in the broader sense.* (UN IAWG, 2006: 2.30, 8)

In practice, again, it has often proved difficult to implement these ideas. For example, Douma and Van Laar (2008) found that in the DRC, international and local NGOs lobbied for more community involvement in DDR, but were unsuccessful. However, in various countries there have been attempts to involve and reinforce local CSOs. Modalities for this have included consulting traditional village councils (e.g. Afghan *shuras*) in reintegration planning and working to strengthen community mediation institutions, such as the *barzas* in the DRC (Klem & Douma, 2008). In other cases, new community institutions are set up. Added to this can be the examples from Congo-Brazzaville, Liberia, the Central African Republic and Timor-Leste that we described in Part I, paragraph 2.3.2. in this report. What these projects have in common is a real attempt at involvement of former combatants and communities in project design and implementation and a linking up of reintegration with reconstruction and other community development activities. However, as discussed in paragraph 2.4.3., the question is often whether the community is really in charge of such initiatives.

45 See also Part I, paragraph 2.3.1 in this report.
46 Such as the District Development Committees in Liberia (see Part I, paragraph 2.3.2)
5.3.3. **Local Government**

Little is written about the role of local government institutions in providing of facilitating community security mechanisms and linking to national DDR programmes. In theory, they are considered to be an important player. In practice, their role differs. In some extremely fragile situations, local governments do not function at all. However, care should be taken not to prolong or even worsen this situation by establishing parallel service delivery structures that run from donors, via NGOs, to local civil society organizations, and that do not involve government institutions at all. Instead, strengthening the capacities of local government can be an important element of community security-focused DDR programming. There are some examples on which we can draw in this regard. In Afghanistan and Tajikistan, authorities engaged with local councils, or *Shuras*, in the planning of reintegration programmes. In Uganda and Rwanda, local administrative structures have provided, at local cost, a popular, legal and effective policing structure that provides police services even in remote areas where state-led policing is absent (Baker, 2007: 141).

5.3.4. **Private Sector**

Finally, the local private sector has an important role to play in the socio-economic reintegration of former combatants. As noted earlier, local craftsmen and other businesses are often subcontracted to provide vocational training and apprenticeships. However, this can only lead to longer-term employment if there is a market for ex-combatants’ newly acquired skills. As we saw in chapter 3, reintegration programmes tend to neglect analyzing the labour market, nor do they usually carry out broader economic assessments of the state of the private sector, trading patterns, or the functioning of formal, informal and criminal economies. More relevant reintegration practices could also be achieved by involving private sector actors much more in the planning of reintegration, something that does not seem to occur anywhere (Specker, 2008: 20)

5.4. **Added Value of the Different Cooperating Partners**

Do the various players active in DDR add value to the aim of community security, the process of community participation, and/or the mechanisms of community security and community DDR?

The necessity to include the national government is obvious for the achievement of longer-term security, as it is instrumental in creating a context in which the security of communities is no longer under threat. Equally important from a community security perspective (as well as from a human security perspective) is the inclusion of local communities in DDR – but as we have seen, this is less consistently done. NGOs and other CSOs could be intermediary actors, provided that they strive to include communities and to contribute to strengthening the capacities of communities for conflict prevention and security provision. In addition, as discussed in the previous chapter, DDR may directly link up with CBOs and other community institutions.

NGOs certainly add value to DDR processes, although it may be questioned whether they add value to community security as a process and aim. The added value of NGOs is grounded in the fact that “a number of pertinent challenges in DDR programmes correspond with activities that NGOs are generally good at”. In particular, “[i]nadequate or unsustainable social and economic reintegration and lack of
sensitivity towards special groups are recurring points of criticism and it seems that NGOs are well-equipped to contribute to a cure for these ills” (Klem & Douma, 2008: 33) Regarding reintegration, NGOs are sometimes able to combine activities such as family reunification and guidance for underage soldiers with ongoing community projects. This may help to connect reintegration to longer-term development, aided by the field presence and community connections that NGOs often have (Ibid.). Regarding special groups, we have seen above that NGOs have proven to be more amenable to support and include vulnerable groups such as female and underage combatants.

However, the value of NGOs as DDR actors for community security is reduced by the fact that they often act as subcontractors with limited downward accountability towards the community. They do not act as representatives of local communities or enhance consultation and participation in DDR programmes. Instead they replicated many of the shortcomings of national DDR programmes, springing from their top-down and blueprint-like approach. This resulted in important reintegration failures:

\[\text{V}o\text{cational training without a labour market assessment (e.g. a surplus of tailors), training of insufficient quality (e.g. resulting in ex-combatants building houses that collapse), and inadequate material assistance (e.g. a cow for someone who has no space to keep it) (Klem & Douma, 2008: 34).}\]

In such cases, reintegration leads to limited improvements in community security – interpreted as an aim. Community security as a process of participatory DDR planning and implementation is also constrained by the practice of top-down implementation and subcontracting. Klem and Douma (2008: 35) conclude that while “[i]deally, local NGOs benefit from capacity building and training by agencies higher up in the funding stream, […] few positive examples came forward from the case studies.” After all, local NGOs were either dependent implementers or left out altogether. However, under particular circumstances, partnerships with local NGOs in the implementation of the reintegration phase have been seen to contribute to strengthened capacities of these local organizations. This appears to have been the case with the MDRP in Angola, which encouraged NGOs to shift from emergency aid to longer-term development work and to strengthen their administrative capacities (Specker, 2008: 18).

The lack of structural CSO, community and private sector involvement in DDR planning and implementation\(^{47}\) is another important shortcoming from the perspective of community security, as is the failure to connect to existing community security and community DDR initiatives\(^{48}\).

Before we move on, it is important to note that actors involved in DDR activities can also be problematic from a conflict perspective, and thus possibly work counterproductive. The state was involved in the conflict and, whether another party is leading the state or not, its actions relating to security can remain to undermine the trust-relationship with communities (Whitehead, 2007: 6-7). Where state actors generally see disarmament as a measure needed in order to provide security (either for its citizens or the state itself), local communities may see their arms as necessary in order to provide in their own security not trusting the state institutions to do this for them. Part of this trust might be restored by the activities described in this report, yet more interventions outside the realm of community-based security and DDR will often be needed to improve trust in the context of fragile states. Moreover, communities may find

\(^{47}\) See also Part I, chapter 2, and Part II chapter 3 in this report.

\(^{48}\) See also Part I, chapter 2 in this report.
that arms are necessary to reach their goals, having seen those in charge of state institutions acquiring their positions through violence as well. Even if they are willing to disarm, this generally has to be within the boundaries of their social structures and traditions (where a weapon may have cultural meaning).

Interventions by international agencies and NGOs, on their part, can also be inducing conflict by creating real or perceived tensions between groups in society. In the DRC, for instance, it was found that insufficient information was given about who gets assistance, what assistance is available and how this can be requested, which caused dissatisfaction with both communities and ex-combatants, exacerbating frictions between them (Bouta, 2005: 28-9). Frustrations can also rise where communities feel they are not sufficiently involved in the decision-making process and they feel that their empowerment remains without contents. Moreover, empowering communities that are or were in conflict with others can also create or renew frictions between communities. Another aspect that may obstruct the positive effects of an intervention are possible hidden (and conflicting) agendas of participating countries (in a UN or AU framework).

Important is also to keep in mind that communities itself are not unitary and unproblematic entities, “as struggles over leadership, status, membership, rights and economic resources disrupt alliances and alienate factions and individuals” (Jensen & Stepputat, qtd. in Buchanan & Widmer, 2006: 13). The traditional authority of elders in communities can feed into patrimonial systems, marginalizing particular groups. For instance, the marginalization of youth in Sierra Leone was found to be an important cause of the war (Richards, 1996), but also the exclusion of other groups can lead to tensions within communities. Moreover, youth can have an ambiguous role in security, by traditionally being the ones armed in pastoralist communities to protect the community and its cattle, but also being the ones raiding cattle and creating insecurity.

These final cautionary remarks draw attention to the importance of context for determining which approach is appropriate, which actors to work with, etcetera. Again, this leads us to emphasize the need for thorough context analysis before activities can commence – difficult as this is given the problems of collecting data in fragile situations and the pressure to act quickly before the momentum for DDR is lost.

5.5. Concluding Remarks: How to Improve Cooperation for Community Security?

First, there is a need to put policy into practice when it comes to the involvement of NGOs, CSOs and the private sector in the formulation of DDR policies and programmes. Second, for DDR to contribute to the end state of human- and community security it should, among other things, pay special attention to vulnerable groups, connect to broader peacebuilding processes as well as to longer-term development, and adopt an empowering, capacity developing approach. This last element also corresponds with the process view of community security. As noted earlier, NGOs appear well placed to add value in precisely these areas. However, as of yet state DDR programmes have not accorded them the autonomy to do so.

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49 See also Part II, chapter 3 in this report.
Third, for DDR to link up with the mechanisms of community security (SALW demand reduction, traditional systems and peace committees, gun-free zones and community-based policing), it needs to work with local CSOs, communities and local authorities. This is not easy in a conflict environment, both because these actors tend to be weak and because they usually will have played some role in the conflict. DDR programmes are often conceived and implemented under high time pressure: security needs to be improved quickly and the population needs to see a ‘peace dividend’. This time pressure is in tension with the imperative of cooperation with local actors, which requires analysis (to find out who the relevant local actors are and what their place is in conflict and peacebuilding) as well as capacity development. International and local NGOs may play crucial intermediary roles here, using their local contacts and knowledge and applying their experience with capacity building. But again, they can only carry out this function if they operate as more than subcontractors.

Finally, state DDR could link up much more with community-based DDR initiatives. In chapter 4 we made it clear that top-down DDR and community-based DDR activities are complementary activities that may be mutually reinforcing. There, we also saw that coordination between the two types of activities has proved difficult. One reason for this is the limited role that NGOs and CSOs have played as independent intermediaries between the local and state levels. Again, this role could be strengthened much more.

The weak role played by NGOs in connecting community security and DDR is explained not only by ‘state DDR’ actors (donors, governments) treating them as subcontractors. NGOs themselves have taken little initiative in this regard. Few NGOs have developed policy in regard to DDR. Some have been active in the realm of community security or community DDR, but have not made an effort to link up with state DDR programmes.

In addition to NGOs and CSOs, local governments could receive much more attention as intermediaries between community and the state; although this depends very much on the context (in particular, factors such as the extent to which government is democratic and the role it has played in the conflict).
Concluding Part II: ‘State’ DDR and Community Security

If we are to identify a red line that runs through this part, it is the gaps that exist between theory (in terms of both literature and policies) and practice (meaning, the way DDR programmes are designed and implemented). Lip service is paid to human- and community security, as well as to elements that can help make these a reality, such as strategies of empowerment and capacity building, the involvement of community and civil society representatives in DDR design, treating DDR as part of both wider peacebuilding and longer-term development efforts, and providing assistance not only to former combatants but to communities as a whole. However, overall, this support is not translated into practice. As a result, there is a disconnection between community security arrangements and community DDR (or ‘second generation DDR’) initiatives on the one hand, and ‘state’ DDR programmes on the other.

There are various reasons for this. Here, we mention four. First, according to much of the literature, DDR tends to be treated as a technocratic issue. There is insufficient attention for the fact that DDR is a very political intervention, which upsets existing power balances, and that therefore, careful attention should be paid to not only ‘do no harm’ but also contributions to the wider peace process. Second, there is little understanding of what empowerment and capacity building should actually entail. There is far too little discussion about this. Little use is also made of experiences which NGOs and others have with these strategies. Third, the dominant blueprint approach to DDR (exemplified by the detailed guidelines contained in the IDDRS) limits possibilities for flexibly adapting DDR to whatever community security needs and arrangements there may be in a given context. This approach also leaves little room for civil society input into DDR programming. It turns NGO partners into subcontractors, which negates their potential added value as connectors between communities and DDR programmes and as actors who have experience with capacity building approaches.

Finally, the short time frames employed for DDR leave little time for the analysis of community security structures and the identification of suitable partners that may be strengthened to achieve sustainable community security. In addition, short time frames limit possibilities for starting integration early on and for connecting it to longer-term community development processes. Both the blueprint approach and the short time frames used spring from the need to have DDR programmes operational as early as possible in a peace process, so that they can start removing the security dilemma and show combatants and community some ‘peace dividends’. However, these imperatives have to be weighed against the requirements for achieving long-term success.
Part III. Donor Policies
Introduction to Part III: DDR Policies of the Main Donors

Part III focuses on donor policies. It was decided to focus on those multilateral and bilateral donors that had played a significant (financial) role in the implementation of DDR programmes and expectably had formulated policies accordingly. This was ascertained by an exploratory scan of available evidence and expert judgment. This resulted in the selection of three multilateral donors: the European Union (EU), the United Nations (UN) and the World Bank (WB) (including the WB-led MDRP project) and nine bilateral donors, i.e. Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Japan, The Netherlands, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States.

This Part draws the main general inferences on multilateral and bilateral individual donors’ DDR policies. It does not present all data on the donors’ individual policies gathered for this report, but uses part of that material to underline or illustrate the general findings. We focus on whether or not donor policies take into account community security, and how rules and frameworks enable or limit a community security approach to DDR.

This Part consists of sections on specific on multilateral and bilateral donor policies and on some related overarching issues. It is based on the perusal and analysis of policy documents of the major donors in the field of DDR and some key-informant interviews with donor officials in charge of the topic. This chapter shows that there is not one single donor policy on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) or, for that matter, on community security and DDR. Some donors do have a DDR-policy or are developing one; others have broader policy orientations which may include DDR issues to a larger or lesser degree and more or less explicitly, while again others effectively lack an explicitly formulated policy. Many donors have only minimally developed DDR policies, if they have them at all. However, this does not imply that these donors refrain from participating in or funding of DDR programmes. In fact, these donors do actively take part in such activities, which are often coordinated or implemented by other actors, but sometimes also initiated by themselves. Below we first deal with the funding mechanisms used to implement DDR and then give an overview of the major multilateral and bilateral donors’ policies. After that we discuss whether and how these are placed in a wider security or socio-economic development framework. We then discuss whether these policies include community-based security and DDR components and draw a number of main conclusions.
6. Donor policies

6.1. DDR Funding Mechanisms

The system of funding of DDR varies according to the different involvement of international actors. If the World Bank has a leading role, generally all funding is provided through its Multi-donor Trust Fund. If the UN takes the lead, a number of sources for funds will likely be directed into a national DDR programme. Funds may then include contributions from the peacekeeping assessed budget; core funding from the budgets of UN agencies, funds, programmes and related organizations; voluntary contributions from donors to a UN-managed trust fund; and bilateral support from individual countries (UN IAWG, 2006: 3.42, 1). In thirteen of the programmes in operation in 2007 (out of nineteen) there was a National Commission on DDR created to help carry out the activities (Caramés & Sanz, 2008: 19). According to the Escola de Cultura de Pau (ECP) the World Bank is the main institutional financer of DDR, either through regional funds (as with the MDRP) or in direct assistance to specific countries. The UNDP is the second largest contributor with the EU as a close third (Ibid. 24-5). Of the countries contributing directly, Japan is a salient donor, particularly in Afghanistan, where they alone spent a total of $107.9 million. The US which often contributed through USAID, is one of the major contributors, too. Other large contributors mentioned by the ECP are Great Britain, Germany, Canada and the Netherlands. With the Netherlands having contributed about $125 million to the MDRP trust fund (totaling half of the trust fund) (MDRP, 2008a), it is one of the largest players in the field in terms of total contributions to DDR. Several countries have a preference to finance through international agencies, such as the UN, World Bank or EU.

An acknowledged problem with DDR funding is a gap between disarmament and demobilization on the one hand, and reintegration on the other, due to the absence of adequate, timely and sustained funding and the proper articulation of linkages conceptually and practically (UNSG, 2006: 15). The military components are relatively circumscribed and hence, often more easy to fund, plan and implement, while the latter depends on longer-term contributions, expertise and conditions. Disarmament and demobilization are funded through assessed UN budgets, mainly from the peacekeeping assessed budget. Reintegration funding comes from development assistance budgets and through bilateral channels, which take longer to raise and disburse (Bryden, 2007: 25). Moreover, many donors have policies restricting the use of development and humanitarian assistance for activities supporting security-related purposes, such as disarmament and demobilization, compounding flexible arrangements and handover. Although these restrictions remain a complicating factor, Ball and Hendrickson (2005: 24) see the creation of multi-donor trust funds (provided donors do not excessively earmark their donations) and pooled resource funds of the UK and the Netherlands as a recognition of the need to coordinate donor financing of DDR processes. Even in these cases however, the problem of linking up to local actors and realities still remains valid.

6.2. Multilateral Policies

All multilateral donors in our study have a fairly explicit DDR-policy. The UN is at the forefront of DDR policy and practice. It has extensive practical experience with DDR programmes and projects both
through its peacekeeping operations, which often have mandates that incorporate DDR\textsuperscript{50}, as well as through activities of its agencies, in particular the UN Development Program (UNDP) and the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF). Moreover, the UN has often been the coordinating agency, implementing actor and one of the lead donors for multilateral DDR activities (UNGA, 2006: para 5,6,7). The Department for Peace Keeping Operations (DPKO) takes the lead on DDR in those areas where there is a peacekeeping operation (UNGA, 2006), while the UNDP plays an important role in the design, planning and implementation of DDR programmes in those areas where there is no UN peacekeeping operation. The role of the UN is especially noteworthy since it has undertaken an internal exercise that resulted in the formulation of the Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards (IDDRS). The IDDRS are intended to serve as an overarching strategy and set of guidelines to facilitate a coordinated approach to DDR both within the UN as well as among the various external actors and they are increasingly considered to have become the state-of-the-art in DDR-related work, despite some weaknesses in design. The IDDRS consists of 26 chapters on five levels that outline the UN’s definitions and strategic concepts; the planning and implementation structures used at Headquarters and in the field; options and tools for undertaking DDR; and a number of cross-cutting issues such as gender, HIV/AIDS, health, and food security.

The European Union (EU) has adopted a people-centred DDR-policy in late 2006, while making use of its comprehensive instruments for the funding and implementation of DDR activities. The EU’s DDR policy finds it conceptual basis in the EU Concept for Support to Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (EU, 2006). The Concept stresses that it is important to learn from earlier work of the International Community on DDR including the UN IDDRS and the Stockholm Initiative on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (SIDDR). It draws heavily from this earlier work, in particular from the IDDRS by adopting definitions for DDR as well as some of the thematic focuses from the IDDRS such as children and gender issues. Support for DDR can consist of assistance to strategic planning and the setting up of national coordination mechanisms as well as support to the demobilization and reintegration phases, funded through the European Development Fund or multilateral programmes and multi-donor trust funds (Ibid. 16). Under the umbrella of the Common Foreign and Security Policy/European Security and Defense Policy (CFSP/ESDP) technical, advisory, mentoring and monitoring missions can be undertaken. An example of this is the ESDP Aceh Monitoring Mission that was carried out between September 2005 and December 2006 and which monitored the demobilization and reintegration of the ex-combatants of the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) as well as to assist with the decommissioning and destruction of its weapons, ammunition and explosives (Bell & Watson, 2006: 22; EU, 2006). Through this monitoring role for the DDR programme, it attempted to contribute to confidence and trust building between the parties – as part of the wider peacebuilding agenda.

The World Bank’s DDR policy is largely derived from its general Community-Driven Development (CDD) approach. The World Bank’s CDD approach claims to treat “poor people and their institutions as

assets and partners in the search for sustainable solutions to development challenges,” rather than seeing them as targets for development (World Bank, 2008). In CDD documents there is, however, hardly any mention of DDR or ex-combatants, while CDD has been critiqued for being implemented in a top-down and instrumental manner (Parfitt, 2004: 537), for being dominated by local elites and, hence, undermining the empowerment of the poor (Mansuri & Rao, 2004). Nevertheless, the World Bank has started to implement CDD-approaches in its DDR programming as illustrated by the GAM Reintegration Needs Assessment: Enhancing Peace through Community-level Development Programming (Barron, et al. 2006). The World Bank’s DDR experience mainly developed in the framework of one major programme, the Multi-country Demobilization and Reintegration Programme (MDRP), which was its first exercise in this field and which is discussed in more detail below.

6.2.1. MDRP

Launched in 2002, the MDRP targeted an estimated 450,000 former combatants in Angola, Burundi, the Central African Republic (CAR), the DRC, the Republic of Congo (RoC), Rwanda and Uganda. The MDRP aimed to complement national and regional initiatives by helping to establish standard approaches throughout the region and coordinating partner initiatives. It also provided support for the social and economic reintegration of former combatants by giving technical and financial support. Due to the Bank’s limited mandate, disarmament could not be funded through the programme, but within the MDRP there were other partners included who facilitated disarmament (MDRP, 2008b). The MDRP was driven by the “belief that no single donor or agency alone can address the challenges of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR)” (Ibid.). In the programme’s design the specific socioeconomic profiles of the ex-combatants, nature of the conflict, as well as national characteristics and dynamics were taken into account (Lamb, 2008b: 9). The Programme distinguished between three possible groups that, other than regular armed combatants, required special attention: special ex-combatant target groups (i.e. child soldiers, female soldiers, disabled and chronically ill soldiers), non-combatants associated with armed groups, and other war-affected populations (World Bank, 2004). The MDRP assisted ex-combatants and the special target groups as direct beneficiaries, the non-combatants associated with armed groups in a limited way, while other war-affected groups had to be addressed by other programmes. The MDRP was criticized for having a structurally weak link with the disarmament components (Muggah & Gainsbury, 2003), a too heavy focus on quantified output and a limited view of local ownership that was too much equated with central government only (MDRP, 2007: 6). Recognition of the link between DDR and broader sustainable development issues was found growing among MDRP staff, but was not yet translated into real changes in policy on the ground (Lamb, 2008b: 16).

6.3. Bilateral Policies

Among the bilateral donors Germany, Japan and Sweden can be considered as having fairly explicit policies on DDR. Sweden stands out as it took the initiative in 2004 to organize what has become known as the Stockholm Initiative on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (SIDDR, 2006) to review current DDR practice and formulate recommendations to improve interventions. However, the SIDDR did not, as it initially claimed, challenge existing assumptions and advance new and creative programming. Instead it largely reinforced conventional approaches to DDR (Lamb, 2008b: 18). The German policy mainly focuses on the civilian aspects of reintegration. Within its framework of development cooperation Germany provides assistance to DDR programmes in post-conflict states, while
in acute conflict and post-conflict situations it supports confidence-building and dialogue programmes as well as socio-psychological and projects for traumatized children and adolescents (Bundesregierung Deutschland, 2004: 62). Japan is one of the largest bilateral donors to DDR. This is, among others, due to its role of DDR lead donor in Afghanistan.

The Canadian, Dutch and British have broader security policy foci of which DDR is a more or less explicit part. Much of Canada’s support to DDR is funded through the Global Peace and Security Fund (GPSF) – a fund established in order “to provide financial and operational resources to facilitate timely, effective and accountable conflict prevention, crisis response, peace operations, and civilian protection and stabilization interventions in fragile states in line with Canadian foreign policy priorities” (DFAIT, 2008). It provides funding through multilateral channels and national DDR commissions. The Dutch policy note on fragile states focuses on the improvement of security for civilians, the contribution to a legitimate government with sufficient capacity and the creation of a peace dividend (Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2008: 7). The note stresses that security operations and development must be mutually reinforcing. The Netherlands finances DDR initiatives through its ‘Stability Fund’ that in turn supports multi-donor funds, but also provides diplomatic support and (technical) advice. The United Kingdom’s whole-of-government approach focuses on post-conflict stabilization and peace-building and thereby emphasizes the linkages between security and development. The UK is at the forefront of SSR policy development and DDR seems to have received somewhat less attention, or was considered rather a part of SSR than a separate issue in itself (Stabilization Unit, 2008; DFID, 2003: 12). Most of the UK’s funding for DDR is made available through its Conflict Prevention Pool (CPP) that is jointly managed by the Ministry of Defense, the Department for International Development and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. In accordance with common donor practice, UK does not design or implement DDR programmes, but merely funds them through implementing agencies such as the World Bank (MDRP) and the UN or through local authorities.51

In the case of the US, DDR is part of their larger foreign policy framework. DDR is often part of peacekeeping operations. A number of offices within the Department of State and USAID are responsible for implementing DDR, but coordination and management is compounded by the policy that distinguishes between funds for military purposes and funds strictly prohibited to be used for military purposes (Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, 2006: 10). Although the US has contributed to a number of multi-donor trust funds, there is a tension between the US “desire to exercise full control over how the money is spent and the [donor group’s] preference to aggregate donor funds and maintain flexibility during implementation” (Ibid. 14). For the US this is an issue to be considered before involvement in multi-donor trust funds, which is how more and more DDR programmes are funded. Most reintegration efforts are undertaken by USAID. A prerequisite for USAID involvement is that ex-combatants are disarmed and settled in demobilization camps and that a minimum of security must be established. Activities supported include the reconstruction of infrastructure, the creation of temporary jobs, education and vocational training, income-generating activities (e.g. through micro-finance), and counselling (USAID, 2008).

France is in the process of formulating a policy. In 2004 it has contributed to the SIDDR by emphasizing the need for educational, social and economic activities for ex-combatants. France’s contributions have

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51 Email correspondence, Stabilisation Unit official, 26th February 2009.
been largely channeled through the MDRP (MDRP, 2008a: 2) and UNDP (France Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs, 2007a: 4). As for Belgium, despite its role in funding specific DDR components, such as on child soldiers and support to national governments, it does not avail of a DDR-policy yet.

Despite a certain variety in stated policies and their level of articulation, most donors researched do have partial or more fully developed DDR policies, and nearly all have set up special funding and implementation mechanisms or use those established by multilateral agencies, such as Multi-donor Trust Funds. The study also shows that donors have put fairly different substantive emphases within their policies and practices. This applies to the way they conceive of DDR, the way they integrate it into their wider policies and the real life context in conflict-affected countries, and finally the way policy is implemented. Where some donors have formulated explicit policies, others have placed DDR within a wider security policy. And where some donors actively participate in the design and implementation of programmes, others limit themselves to donating funds and monitoring. Simultaneously there is, however, a tendency to converge on a number of specific issues and also a trend towards better coordination due to the publication of overarching policy standards and the evolvement of joint institutional funding and implementation arrangements. Below we elaborate on those findings.

6.4. An Emerging DDR Policy

In terms of policy development in the field of DDR, we are talking about a very young field of endeavour. Nearly all donor policy documents encountered in our literature search, date from 2004 onwards. Though this does not imply that donors did not support DDR activities before that date, it shows that most policy development occurred in the last five years. Individual donor governments have published policy documents on DDR or broader security themes. Donor governments also have commissioned studies on DDR that have influenced the debates. Such studies also have been published by think tanks, academics and NGOs. Some of these were written in response to ongoing DDR programmes that were critiqued or became a topic of debate in the wider donor or NGO security and development community. This applied, for example, to experiences in individual countries like Afghanistan, Liberia or Sierra Leone, that became highly visible among others via the media. It also happened in the case of the heavily funded and widely debated MDRP. Many lessons learned were derived from this multinational large-scale programme. There was also a considerable increase in evaluation studies done on DDR both by individual donors as well as NGOs and academic institutions. All these influences converged into the direction of an emerging DDR policy and more explicitly worded policy orientations in the world of multilateral and individual donors as well as among the few NGOs that were involved in DDR programmes.

It could be said that the formulation of the IDDRS formed the culmination of this process and that subsequent initiatives simply may have to relate to, if not to follow those steps. This was for example the case with the newly formulated EU policy that refers explicitly to the IDDRS in several instances. This trend towards a certain ‘harmonization’ is surely to be welcomed, as earlier there was little evidence-based guidance to go by. Nevertheless, reality may show its own dynamics and, therefore, guidelines should not lead to reification and never be blindly applied. Hence, continuing monitoring and, where needed, adjustment of such guidelines remain of the essence. Moreover, too much emphasis on harmonization between the donors risks hampering flexibility that is required to effectively operate within different contexts and work with the input of local stakeholders, such as the communities on which this report focuses.
6.5. The Place of DDR in Wider Policy Frameworks

Most donors recognize that DDR is an essential part of a wider security, socio-economic or development policy and context. Many of them are cognizant that it is in fact a long-term societal process with complicated linkages and implications at regional, national and local levels. Nearly all donors have some instruments and policies where those different types of links are articulated. These include the British Conflict Prevention Pool, the Canadian Global Peace and Security Fund, the Dutch Stability Fund (and earlier Peace Fund), the French Fragile States Policy and SSR Concept, and the German Action Plan Civilian Crisis Prevention, Conflict Resolution and Post-Conflict Peace-Building, to mention a few. In several of these policies links to wider security issues are articulated and most of them also mention the security-development nexus. The EU, for example, recognizes that reintegration does not stop with the end of DDR programs, but involves a much longer and wider process of socio-economic development that includes societies and countries as a whole. The Netherlands make a clear distinction between the DDR process, which is part of a broad, long-term development, and the DDR programme, which is short-term and aimed at security.

Nevertheless, several other donors have stressed mostly the immediate security context or only paid lip-service to the wider ramifications. Even if this is motivated by security concerns for the common citizens, their main concern lies in the stabilization of the security situation and in neutralizing the destabilizing ex-combatants, militias and army-units. For instance, according to the British Issues Note on DDR, the objective of DDR is “to contribute to security and stability in post-conflict environments so that recovery and development can begin” (Stabilization Unit, 2008: 1). In that sense, DDR should not be seen as a support programme for the entire conflict-affected population or as a tool for socio-economic recovery – which should be the objective of complementary programmes – but as a tool to eliminate the threat posed by ex-combatants (Stabilization Unit, 2008: 8). This limitation to security and stabilization can easily cause that insufficient attention is (also) paid to localized and community-based socio-economic and cultural aspects.

Moreover, this conceptual focus often is accompanied by a choice for top-down and state-led DDR approaches as mentioned earlier in this study. Obviously, UN agencies and the World Bank can in practice hardly bypass national governments, even if they maintain a strong conceptual people-centered and community-level focus. This top-down focus is also due to the size of some programmes, including the MDRP, that virtually impose top-down managerial designs, if only for bureaucratic reasons. Though most bilateral donors have embraced some of the human security and integrated discourses, in practice a more limited security and state-led focus prevails. To a certain degree this seems to be the case with countries such as France, Canada, Japan, The Netherlands and the UK. One reason to focus on the state is the obvious need to involve the state as an important actor in DDR. DDR is a highly political process and, amongst other actors, state involvement and cooperation is indispensable. With regard to engaging local communities the British Issue Note argues that first progress has to be made in a number of other areas before community involvement is appropriate. Thus, DDR is seen as a state-level activity at least in the initial phases.

Another reason why DDR programmes tend to be top-down implemented rather than very flexible and highly sensitive to local needs has to do with a more general problem of policy implementation. This is
because any advanced notion about a ‘long-term, societal’ DDR process with all its complications has – in order to be carried out – to be operationalized into a programmatic framework or, as some would suggest, straightjacket. Programmes usually impose their own logic, along with bureaucratic strictures, simplifications, budgets, time-lines and procedures, and lots of flexibility and nuance are thereby ‘lost in translation’. It is here that the notion of ‘process’ conflicts with the dictates of ‘programme’. Another factor to be considered is that most donors only fund programmes implemented by others and unavoidably remain at a certain distance from real practice. Finally different types of relevant community-based programmes are often not integral part of the DDR programming, but carried out in parallel or separately.

In fact, there are several institutional interfaces of which DDR programmes form part and which affect the way these programmes are effectuated. At the donor levels itself, there are already the larger security approach of which DDR is part, the wider integrated (‘comprehensive’ or ‘3-D’) conflict approaches it belongs to, and finally the overall foreign policy framework that may dictate what to do or not. In most cases, moreover, contributions to DDR are delivered through specialized institutional or funding mechanisms that carry with them their own policy imprints. The degree of coherence, coordination and collaboration between the different partners in the DDR process obviously varies. Yet, there is nearly always collaboration with other donors in multilateral frameworks or recipient nation-led programmes. Though this should be regarded as progress compared to fragmented donor flag-planting, it simultaneously implies the risk of playing safe and hence of complying to the largest, often least ambitious common policy denominator. These larger frameworks also have a disadvantage in that they are more difficult to fine-tune to local requirements and specificities.

6.6. Community Security and DDR

Partly in view of the limitations already mentioned above, it seems difficult to present strong and clear conclusions on the place of community security and DDR in donor policies. This is caused in part because donors do readily use some of the language related to community-based approaches, while it remains unclear to what extent this is also factually practiced in reality. This can only be brought out definitely through country-based in-depth evaluations. Our preliminary reading of the situation on basis of the policy documents is, however, that there remains considerable scope for strengthening this aspect. In fact, most policy documents themselves were already (somewhat) deficient in this respect.

On a more positive note, the EU makes special reference to local ownership, local communities, job opportunities, socio-economic development and recipient communities that all comprise elements of a people-centred approach. Its DDR Concept argues that DDR should take into account the real and perceived historic, geographical, ethnic, religious grievances that lay at the root of a conflict, and should ensure that DDR activities do not perpetuate or aggravate these (EU, 2006: 23). Consultation and participatory approaches are not only required to enable consensus building prior to starting the DDR process, but also to manage expectations of both the target group and potential host communities (Ibid. 11). Communities are seen as central in the reintegration phase and their capacity to absorb ex-combatants in terms of job opportunities need to be assessed carefully (Ibid, 12). The Concept also pays attention to child soldiers and other vulnerable groups. Yet, the outsourcing of EU-programmes through a long chain of actors does not sufficiently guarantee that all these policy intentions are also properly effectuated.
As also mentioned in Part II of this report, there is no doubt that the UN system has perhaps the most advanced concept in terms of comprehensiveness and human security, as witnessed through the IDDRS. The Standards emphasize people-centred, rights-based, context-specific, transparent and accountable, integrated and well-planned DDR programming. The IDDRS take a long-term view of DDR and emphasize the importance of national ownership, which is defined broadly and includes facilitating the involvement of local authorities, affected communities, as well as combatants and their dependents in the DDR programming and process (UN IAWG, 2006).

Beneficiary groups include male and female adult combatants; children associated with armed forces and groups; those working in non-combat roles (including women); ex-combatants and chronically ill; and dependants. We have seen earlier in this report that wider communities are mentioned in relation to their role as receptors of ex-combatants in the reintegration phase: they should be consulted during the planning and design phase and informed and supported to receive ex-combatants to facilitate proper reintegration. However, those ideas are much less applied to the two D-phases than to the R-phase and with regard to community security mechanisms it remains quite vague. In the WB-led MDRP it was not easy to make the appropriate linkages between the military and development components, while also the position of non-combatant target groups, those accompanying the combatants and the larger recipient communities was unsatisfactorily dealt with. Finally there were problems of national ownership.

Many of the problems the multilaterals face in practice are shared by the bilateral donors, as most of them contribute to these larger programmes or to the specially installed Multi-donor Trust Funds. As mentioned, the problem with these funds is that they create a bidding chain of organizations involved, from the Fund to INGOs to local NGOs. Though local NGOs are supposed to represent local communities, they rather tend to please their contractors in the bidding chain; in such cases programme design can easily become largely based on policies and theories designed in the headquarters in Europe and the US rather than on the ideas of the local communities. The needs assessments carried out in advance can only partly overcome this problem as, due to reasons of logistics and urgency, they are limited by nature, while adjustments during the ‘roll-out’ are also often more difficult to realize than is sometimes suggested. The Dutch, for example, assert that DDR planning has to be ‘rolling’ and that all stakeholders must be involved from the beginning, including NGOs. NGOs are also the ones expected to translate DDR implementation to the local communities. Yet, it is also admitted that the hiring-chain itself creates its limitations and problems and decisions just have to be made to keep the process going. Similarly, while government ownership is deemed very important, limited capacity, corruption and legitimacy are often reasons not to be dogmatic about it in practice.

Canada has reportedly a strong focus on community level peace and security work and on local capacity building, though this is not always explicitly linked to DDR. The French do stress the need for reintegration to be strongly linked to broader socio-economic development and education for ex-combatants, but they do not expand this to include the recipient communities themselves. Germany supports “targeted confidence-building measures, dialogue programmes and peace education as well as psychological and social counselling projects for traumatized children and adolescents”

An example of BMZ involvement is a project implemented by GTZ under CONADER for the reintegration of child soldiers in Maniema, DRC. In this project GTZ provides psycho-social support through talks, dancing and music, catch-up classes on primary education level, vocational training and small trade workshops (GTZ, 2008). As in a post-conflict situation socio-economic possibilities are rare and only a small proportion of ex-combatants can be taken into the regular security forces, Germany argues that kick-starting the local economy and rebuilding the economic and social infrastructure are key components of the DDR process (Bundesregierung Deutschland, 2006: 29).

Reintegration programmes sponsored by Germany therefore “always include, alongside components tailored specifically to the needs of ex-combatants, support measures for the local community” (Bundesregierung Deutschland, 2006: 30). In Burundi, for instance, a sponsored reintegration programme focused on both refugees and ex-combatants. With regard to community security initiatives, the German government has particular attention to community-based policing, “especially the promotion of cooperation between community decision-makers, the police and, where existent, other civil society groups at local level” (Bundesregierung Deutschland, 2004: 63). Japan, as we have seen, embeds its DDR policies explicitly in a human security framework. Most notable is Japan’s involvement in Afghanistan as the DDR lead country (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2008). In February 2003 the Afghanistan’s New Beginnings Programme (ANBP) was initiated at the Tokyo Donor Conference in order to dismantle and remove the command structures of the Afghan Military Forces (AMF) compromising different groups formerly known as the Northern Alliance and pave the way for a new Afghan army. The ANBP removed 93,000 former soldiers from the MoD payroll (Frerks, et al. 2008: 16-7). The programme later evolved to include the dismantling of anti-personnel mines and the destruction of ammunition. In 2004 remaining armed groups and militias were declared illegal and were targeted by the Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups (DIAG) programme (ANBP, 2008). Especially JICA has been focusing on vocational training while promoting local empowerment and community involvement. Generally Japan funds DDR initiatives through multilateral channels. The Swedish SIDDR limits itself mainly to the security goals of DDR. The Netherlands made a major contribution to the MDRP and within the MDRP the Netherlands supported a number of projects aimed at strengthening local civil society organizations and local peace dialogues. Other projects in which the Netherlands have been involved are the DIAG programme in Afghanistan and programmes for individually demobilized combatants in Colombia (Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2008: 8). Research supported by the Dutch government includes a study on gender and DDR (Bouma, 2005) and a study focusing on the reintegration phase (Specker, 2008). Though the Dutch policy framework is in principle comprehensive, long-term, flexible and based on ‘rolling planning’, there is yet little explicit focus on community-based security and processes in practice. Also here, the nature and logic of programmes seem to be the major determining factors in the implementation process. The UK basically sees DDR as providing security, while after that other actors can take up longer-term issues of a developmentalist nature. In their view there is effectively no need for community involvement, as those first steps need whatsoever to be taken in the overall framework of state security that also will be promoted through their SSR programmes. The US policy is strongly divided in military and non-military components making linkages difficult, complicating DDR programme implementation and a smooth transition from the first two phases (military) to the last phase (non-military). There are also guidelines with regard to spending and control which compound participation in larger frameworks and collaboration with other actors. Yet, the US is a large contributor to both disarmament and reintegration, but is following their own policy preferences and sometimes interests rather than the views of local communities and NGOs.
Concluding Part III: Community Security and Policy

This admittedly limited overview of donor policies enables us at least some tentative answers to the research questions posed at the beginning of this study. In answering those questions, this report outlined the lack of a common position among donors in terms of policy. Positions ranged from lacking a DDR policy, being in the process of developing one, to having an explicit policy or -as in most cases- paying attention to DDR issues as part of a larger security and peace framework. In reality, however, all donors in this study did contribute to DDR activities in practice though they varied in terms of quantities disbursed and substantive focus.

Though in discourse most donors also paid attention to aspects of community security and DDR, the results of this left much to be desired. Some donors adhered in effect to a state-based approach and prioritized the state security perspective above a more comprehensive or human security approach. In some other cases, community-based policy intentions were not operationalized properly or could not be translated into practice due to bureaucratic problems and the ‘logic’ of programming.

It was evident that top-down and state-led approaches still created a bias in reality and that those issues were difficult to overcome even for donors that had a more explicit focus on community security and DDR. This also had to do with the design and operation of implementation chains from the top down and the lack of community (and often NGO) involvement in the design of the programmes. Local people, ex-combatants and communities rarely possess the voice to get heard. Institutional interfaces or discontinuities may also plague a smooth and flexible operation of community-based DDR programmes.

On the other hand it must be said that the donor convergence towards widely accepted standards and funding and operational mechanisms such as trust funds have opened possibilities for collaboration and coordination that hitherto were often found lacking. There are also already various examples of practical community-based work mainly in the post-conflict reintegration phase. To draw lessons from those experiences and expand them to other areas seems to be now a first priority. To do this, one must keep the systems flexible and accountable, secure local participation and stimulate national ownership. These three preconditions for community security and community-based DDR seem to be the most urgent remaining challenges at this moment. Seemingly, this also creates a dilemma between the streamlining of coordination that current standards aim to achieve and the flexibility and downward accountability that community security requires; a dilemma that will be addressed in the case studies.
Part IV.  Overall Conclusions and Policy Implications
7. Overall Conclusions and Implications

We have defined community security to be both an end state – in which communities feel secure from threats exerted by violent conflict, arms proliferation, crime, and a lack of protection or direct threat by the state –, and a process – in which communities participate in identifying and prioritizing their security needs, as well as appropriate responses to meet these needs. Community-based DDR programmes are programmes that not only target ex-combatants but also the wider war-affected communities and actively and truly involve these communities in the process of assessment, design and implementation. We have reviewed to what extent community security and community-based DDR are linked to traditional ‘state’ DDR programmes. These ‘state’ DDR programmes are programmes that are designed at the national level, often jointly by donors and national governments, and that are centrally implemented. Such linkages can be realized in many different ways, for instance, by involving community level initiatives and integrating existing security arrangements at a community level. An explicit link was drawn between DDR and the concept of human security, emphasizing the importance of sustainable development to reduce violence, as well as the roles local people can play in their own security. The literature review suggests that in general DDR programmes are more effective in increasing human security if they include a focus on communities, community security arrangements and community-based DDR initiatives.

This concluding chapter summarizes our main findings. It starts by discussing the contextual conditions that impinge on DDR. Although these tend to constrain to what DDR programmes can hope to achieve, there are still many opportunities for improving current DDR practices. First, embedding DDR in wider peacebuilding activities increases human security. Second, we should ensure complementarity between centralized DDR programmes and community security arrangements and community-based DDR initiatives, and remove existing obstacles hindering this complementarity. Finally, we discuss the implications of our findings for donors and NGOs.

The Importance of Context

Context factors are of paramount importance for DDR effectiveness. Whether or not DDR succeeds in increasing human security and returning the monopoly on violence to the state, depends not only on programme design, but also on the context in which the DDR programme takes place, and on the actors implementing the process. For example, whether DDR is effective in demobilizing and disarming depends on the capacity and commitment of the implementing government. At the same time, it requires the willingness of the ex-combatants to disarm, demobilize and integrate in society as civilians. This again depends on their faith in the peace process, their confidence that their security is guaranteed. Another requirement is the availability of economic and social opportunities when they return to their communities. These opportunities are not only dependent on the ex-combatants’ training and education, but also on the presence of attractive incentives to leave the life of combatant behind.

These contextual factors limit what DDR can achieve, and to a certain extent DDR programmes themselves are shaped by them. Consequently, DDR programmes need to be modest in their aims. The solution to these limitations is not to widen DDR programmes to address all these contextual factors.

53 See also the annex of this report.
These are not, and should not be, the direct responsibility of DDR programmes. Instead, we argued that to increase the effectiveness of DDR we need to embed DDR programmes more firmly within wider peacebuilding and developmental processes.

In addition, the fact that DDR programs are often implemented by a coalition of actors presents its own difficulties. These include overlapping or competing political agendas, institutional competition, differing points of view and interpretations of the DDR concept and programme, weak management, poor coordination and communication, fragmented leadership, waning political will, short attention spans, rapid staff turnovers and scarce resources. Increasing continuity, coordination, coherence and communication therefore provides another important opportunity for increasing the effectiveness of DDR. In this area, important steps have been taken in recent years, as exemplified by the development of the Integrated DDR Standards (IDDRS), but there is still room for further improvement, especially with respect to coordination between actors.

**Embedding DDR Within Wider Peacebuilding**

A more holistic thinking about DDR is needed, in order to move beyond ad-hoc operations to a more strategic view of how different activities, including DDR, can work together. CICS concludes that this requires DDR programmes to address three issues: (1) more resources need to be made available in a timely fashion, (2) a long-term and detailed planning process, based on good analysis has to be carried out, and (3) a proper consultation process with host government and affected population based upon principles of participation, ownership and empowerment should be held (CICS, 2008: 11). These elements also make sense from a community and human security perspective: a thorough analysis of the context and of existing community security structures as well as an empowering approach that involves local communities directly in security promotion can help DDR to connect to community-level initiatives.

There are several obstacles that need to be overcome to achieve the above. Firstly, many programmes are funded by bilateral or multilateral donors who are dependent on budget cycles and project cycles that often limit how quickly resources can be made available. In addition, procurement regulations for fund disbursement and hiring and staffing procedures often hamper the rapid disbursement of funds and the deployment of staff members. However, there are examples of donors having found ways to disburse funds rapidly. The European Commission’s Instrument for Stability could be used as a model; and similarly the UK’s Conflict Prevention Pools, or the Dutch Stability Fund provide examples of this. Similarly, rapidly deployable Pools of Experts could be set-up on which DDR programmes can draw when the need arises.

**Complementarity between Centralized DDR and Community Security Arrangements**

There are a number of ways to ensure that central DDR programmes and community security arrangements better complement each other. One possibility is to assume flexibility in the sequencing of Demobilization, Disarmament and Reintegration. For ex-combatants to be willing to give up their weapons, they need to have a sense of security. This includes a physically safe environment, but also a secure income. If ex-combatants see no alternative to the gun as a way to provide for themselves and their families, it will be hard to convince them to demobilize and disarm. As such, it may sometimes be suitable to start with reintegration, before attempting to disarm and demobilize ex-combatants. At the
same time, successful reintegration is only possible if the communities in which ex-combatants (re-) integrate are willing to accept them. This may require ex-combatants to disarm and demobilize first, and necessitate a process of healing and reconciliation. Under such circumstances, it may be suitable to start the three tracks of the programme simultaneously, rather than sequentially.

The above also underlines the necessity of including communities in the planning, implementation and assessment of DDR programmes. Through participatory approaches programmes can be better adjusted to the desires of the local context, while communities are likely to have more and better access to information to monitor the process. Another way to ensure complementarity between DDR programmes and community security is to carry out disarmament and demobilization through a central programme, and reintegration in a community-based manner. This would allow communities as recipients of the ex-combatants to be involved in the reintegration phase. The sequencing of DDR activities and the division of labour between community and centralized programmes depends very much on the context.

Finally, we found that centralized DDR and community security can complement each other when DDR programmes connect to community security arrangements. There are several ways in which communities organize their own security, including attempts to address SALW demand, Gun Free Zones, community-based policing and traditional mechanisms and peace committees. Since these community security arrangements increase security and reduce potential security dilemmas, they make it easier for ex-combatants to disarm, and for communities to accept ex-combatants. DDR programmes could become more effective by connecting to such arrangements. At the same time, community-based institutions may also help shaping national DDR programmes, as happened in Haiti.\(^{54}\) This requires DDR programming to be flexible and open to community involvement. In practical terms, linking DDR and community initiatives requires detailed knowledge of community security arrangements, ‘social fabric’, local business, and the needs and capacities of former combatants, vulnerable groups, and wider communities. It requires research at an early stage of DDR design, in close cooperation with local communities. The United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR)’s Security Needs Assessment Protocol (SNAP) could lend inspiration in this regard as it aims to generate explicit community-level knowledge about security concerns in a rapid manner. Engagement of local communities will assure a better identification of local security concerns and related local practices.

**Challenges to Linking ‘State’ DDR and Community Security and Community-based Initiatives**

Although there may be many benefits to linking centralized DDR programmes and community security initiatives, in practice little connection can be observed. There are many reasons why this is so.

First, DDR by definition needs to be done under great time pressure. After a peace agreement, it is deemed necessary to act quickly to seize the momentum and generate the ‘peace dividend’. As a result, the time frames for DDR are short. This is not conducive to time-consuming participatory approaches. Hence, there is a tension between the urgency with which DDR needs to take place, and the necessity of community involvement in DDR. Another process that takes time is that of fostering trust and confidence among former combatants and their communities. Communities do not necessarily have shared values and beliefs, particularly in post-conflict situations where years of violent conflict have left societies highly

\(^{54}\) See Part II, paragraphs 3.3.3 and 4.3 in this report.
divided. In these situations, it may be difficult for external agencies to involve the communities in promoting security, without engaging in reconciliation and consensus building. Moreover, the chain of organizations involved in DDR implementation – from trust funds down to local NGOs – seriously impedes downward accountability.

A further complication is the identification of community security structures to be strengthened, considering that ‘state DDR’ actors – governments, donors and international NGOs – lack knowledge of the existing informal systems of security. Most external agencies focus on the easily visible formal state structures. Local and informal systems are less visible and therefore harder for outsiders to identify. In addition, many post-conflict societies exhibit multi-layered systems of governance, where besides the state many actors of different levels are involved in the provision of security. Linking centralized DDR programmes to community security initiatives requires a close knowledge of this complex situation, which is often lacking. Furthermore, the post-conflict environment in which many DDR programmes take place is not conducive to finding good local implementing partners. Often, local community organizations and NGOs in post-conflict countries lack the required capacity or are tainted by the past conflict. Within the short period in which DDR programmes need to be started, there may not be time enough to find capable, trustworthy partners. In addition, not all local community security arrangements are in line with international human rights standards. For example they may exclude particular groups, or violate the rights of women or children. In addition, some local security providers are involved in criminal activities. In these cases, external agencies may be unwilling to link formal DDR programmes to existing local security structures.

Besides these challenges in identifying community security initiatives and linking DDR programmes to them, there are practical and political obstacles. DDR has often been approached as a highly technical, top-down activity. This has not allowed for much interaction with local DDR initiatives or community security arrangements. At the same time, there is often little room for such interaction because of the political nature of the DDR process and the interests of the actors involved. Rather than aiming for human security, most DDR programmes aim at installing the monopoly of violence of the state (which often has never been there before). State level authorities may disapprove of support to community security arrangements, fearing that those may turn into a source of opposition. As such, there is great sensitivity about which groups are supported and how, and the need to navigate between the interests of the different parties can be an obstacle to engagement with communities.

Finally, donor convergence towards widely accepted standards, and new funding- and operational mechanisms have opened possibilities for mutual collaboration and coordination that hitherto were lacking, and enable more rapid implementation. Though these are very important achievements, they risk leading to ‘blueprint approaches’, inhibiting flexibility and openness to local input. What thus emerges again and again is the need to balance the important objective of coordinated and swift action with the objective of community security. Including local research and community involvement in DDR planning as standard elements of DDR guidelines could be one way to work towards such a balanced approach.
**The Role of Civil Society Organizations**

Due to their lack of detailed knowledge of community security arrangements, donors are perhaps not the best actors to assure the connection between community security and DDR. Although this does not relieve them of the responsibility to do so, NGOs and CBOs are much better placed to make this connection and to work with communities. However, in practice, their role is often limited to that of subcontractors. How can NGOs and other CSOs function as mediators between elites and grassroots levels? And how can donors strengthen the capacities of CBOs and local NGOs? Although these are questions to be elaborated through further field research, we venture to make some tentative suggestions.

First of all, working together gives CSOs a stronger, independent voice vis-à-vis donors. Yet, while various platforms and networks exist, their effectiveness is limited due to internal competition for donor contracts. Donors could reduce these problems by disbursing funds to coalitions of CSOs who jointly develop strategy. CSOs should be involved in both DDR policy and strategy formulation and implementation. This requires more openness to CSO involvement on the part of donors, and a more proactive approach on the part of CSOs. In addition, capacity building of local organizations should receive much more attention, especially in the fields of context analysis and strategy development.
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Annex
Annex: From Desk Study to Practice

As mentioned in the introduction of this report, one of the objectives of this initiative is to design a context-specific approach for community-based DDR and follow-up activities that can guarantee the human security of populations affected by conflict and the proliferation of SALW. What does the term ‘second generation DDR’ dubbed by Muggah (2009) exactly mean for donors in terms of supporting DDR activities? What opportunities and obstacles would it entail? For example, would relying more on local partners also lead to more ‘risk’ for donors? And how could they deal with that? What does it mean for NGOs such as IKV Pax Christi? How can they become the missing link between community and state? Extensive field research is required to find answers to such questions, and this is the next step of this initiative. Field work will be planned in Burundi, Colombia, DRC and Sudan to look deeper into the issues raised in this report.

While writing, however, we have also considered the tension between the need of guidelines to implement DDR programmes on the one hand and the demand for local sensitivity on the other. While this report has been focusing on finding a link between community security and traditional state DDR (and with community-based DDR programmes balancing somewhere in between), we have to acknowledge that DDR programmes take place in a certain context. Indeed, from a community security perspective we have been criticizing blueprint approaches. How can we design an approach for community-based DDR that at the same time is context specific? Although developing “best practices” of DDR may help to develop efficient systems, such cross-country best practices are completely de-contextualized, ignoring local realities. This is why, for instance, SNAP of the UNIDIR discussed in Part I aims to acquire a local understanding of security, involving local concepts, norms, rules and values and proposes an assessment with the engagement of local communities (Miller & Rudnick, 2008: 41-5).

To refrain from just calling for thorough analysis and assessments before undertaking security and DDR interventions, we have aimed to identify a number of context particularities. Doing so, it is hoped to provide a number of context-specific guidelines for intervention. The aim is to answer the question ‘how?’ without falling back into one-size-fits-all approaches. We start with examining the context of the state in which security interventions are being undertaken, the context of the conflict, the community security context, and the state-building context. After this we propose a model showing how the different aspects of the context of security intervention programmes affect the violent conflict it aims to address. We also identify a number of types of violent conflict, which after examination could provide more context specific guidelines for intervention.

Before undertaking a DDR programme, a proper analysis of the context is needed, especially concerning the reintegration (and reinsertion) assistance provided as there is a great demand for flexibility, context-sensitivity, and thus constant assessment and adaptation (CICS, 2006a: 5). Information that should be assessed in anticipation of DDR and weapon collection programmes described in the literature are (Buchanon & Widmer, 2006: 13; Specker, 2008, 11; UNDP, 2005a: 21):

55 ‘Security interventions’ refers here in this introduction to traditional ‘state’ DDR, community-based DDR, and community security initiatives. Intervention in this regard is then not necessarily an intervention by the international community, but can also refer to an intervention from within a local community.
• The nature of war and peace (e.g. was it a war of liberation; was there a winner; the nature of the peace agreement; are all parties involved in the agreement, etc.);
• What kind of violence is taking place at the moment and what are the social, economic and psychosocial costs;
• The amount and type of weapons and ammunition that circulates;
• What categories of arms owners and users there are; what kind of attitudes and perceptions there are on gun ownership, including motivations to acquire firearms;
• What sources for new weapons there are;
• Which existing laws and policies are in place relating to arms control;
• What is the role of the government and the available capacity and resources;
• What existing vectors of peace (e.g. existing or previous values, civil society groups, models of leadership, etc.) are available,
• What basic and socio-economic needs there are for civilians and combatants alike in the post-conflict situation;
• What the main characteristics, capabilities and needs of the local economy are and which sectors are most suitable for ex-combatants;
• What effects of the reintegration processes on the local market economy, state and society should be taken into account as the ex-combatants reintegrating into civilian society can be a heavy burden on an already strained labor market.

State Context

Context of Fragility

This initiative focuses on so called ‘fragile states’. An assumption underlying DDR is “that some sort of legitimate force can fill the security vacuum. (...) Usually, the legitimate force filling the security gap is either the official army of the state or a sufficiently-sized international peacekeeping force” (Schrameck, 2003: 9). Other assumptions of national DDR programmes are that the government enjoys recognition by the majority of the population and the international community, that there is some form of political consensus among the warring factions, and that the national economy is capable of absorbing and sustaining an influx of new labour (Ibid. 10). In the context of fragile states, however, such assumptions usually do not hold. Although there is no agreed definition of ‘fragile states’ and organizations and countries all produce their own lists (Cammack, et al. 2006: 16-7), characteristic of fragile states is that one or more of the underlying assumptions are lacking. The World Bank describes fragile states as Low Income Countries Under Stress (LICUS) defined as “low-income countries scoring 3.2 and below on the Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA)” (World Bank, 2007: 2).56 Canada’s Country Indicators for Foreign Policy (CIFP) differentiate three aspects of country failure – i.e. authority, capacity and legitimacy – as countries can be strong in one aspect but fail in the others (CIFP, 2008). Others define a scale with developing states and institutional states (i.e. Western Europe, Canada, US) on the positive side of the spectrum, and on the negative side failing states to failed states to collapsed states (Schrameck, 2003: 12). There is thus a wide variety of definitions, however, most converge around the one proposed

56 The CPIA rates countries against a set of 16 criteria grouped in four clusters: economic management; structural policies; policies for social inclusion and equity; and public sector management and institutions.
by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), which defines a state to be “fragile when state structures lack political will and/or capacity to provide the basic functions needed for poverty reduction, development and to safeguard the security and human rights of their populations” (OECD, 2007b: 2).

There are, however, a number of problems with this definition, as it assumes fragility is best solved by strengthening the state and thus is neglecting the importance of private actors, social movements, civil society organizations, etc. Fragility in this sense is seen as a national issue, rather than linked to global and grassroots phenomena. Moreover, political will is hard to assess and labelling a state ‘unable’ or ‘unwilling’ can cause diplomatic harm. Lars Engberg-Pedersen, Louise Andersen and Finn Stepputat therefore prefer to define fragility as “institutional instability undermining the predictability, transparency and accountability of public decision-making processes and the provision of security and social services to the population” (Engberg-Pedersen, et al. 2008: 21-4). They find three significant distinctions when defining fragile states, which are all variable in degree and over time (Ibid. 35-43). The first is the intensification or reduction of social tensions and violent conflict. Secondly there can be low or high levels of policy formulation and implementation capacity, which is related to the relationship between the state and society and the legitimacy the state has. Third is the existence or absence of a government in policy agreement with the international community. If there is disagreement on policy between the government and the international community, the international community should carefully consider whether this disagreement is based on ideology and the government enjoys legitimacy, or whether it has to do with despotism and self-enrichment of a government.

This report will follow the definition used by the OECD as it is most widely accepted and used. Although the problems with the definition are considered, the report sees state fragility not only as a function of the capacity of a state to implement and enforce policy but also of the level of trust between state and society. The ‘willingness’ is here then defined as the strength of the social contract between state and society. The capacity of the state and the social contract with society are the most important characteristics of state failure influencing community security.

**Systems of Patronage**

One aspect influencing DDR, community security and other development issues are systems of patronage. They can cause resources and wealth to be relocated to a small elite instead of benefiting those who need it the most and the entire society as a whole. But with such a system in place – and without contrary influences such as organizational reforms, high education, foreign interventions, etc. - communities remain highly reliant on these patrons for everyday needs. Apart from obstructing development it also undermines a functional democracy and the functioning of law, as it can make politicians account upwards instead of downwards. Moreover, systems of patronage can exclude particular groups reinforcing old or creating new tensions in society which could sow seeds for future conflict. Diana Cammack finds that donors and governments alike behave as though the power resides within the government institutions and that they function as designed. “Moreover, when they do not, they are labelled ‘dysfunctional’ rather than their behaviour being seen as logical according to a frame of reference that is rooted outside the rational, democratic state in traditional socio-economic and political processes” (Cammack, 2007: 599-600). And it is this delusion that helps to maintain these structures. According to Elias K. Bongmba (2006: 96-7) societies need to be countered by civil society. He finds that
civil society should be encouraged, and it is a strong civil society that can counter and negotiate with the hierarchical state. Noted to this should, however, that civil society is just as much under influence of patrimonial systems, and can just as well exclude certain groups in a society.

The official legal system is often also found to be ineffective where patrimonial systems are prevalent (Richards, et al. 2004: 40). Similar observations are made by Cammack (2007: 609-11), who also states the importance for donors to understand “the political context of a country, the informal as well as the formal processes.” Complementary to this, donors should also “help local people understand their own national informal power systems and structures and how they undermine their development and democracy.” However, systems of patronage have a long history and cannot simply be overthrown or set aside, which is possibly not even desirable. Indeed, the habit of professionals in business, politics, academia, etc. of ‘networking’ to establish relations with the ‘right’ people shows that light forms of patrimonialism are also prevalent in the West and can have a constructive function as well. Moreover, it is exactly traditional systems of power (e.g. local councils, elders, etc.) that can provide opportunities to provide community security, notwithstanding the possibility they might exclude particular groups within a community.

Economies of War

Apart from systems of patronage, taking place in a post-conflict context the design of DDR programmes also has to take into account a variety of economies. As war often lowers or ends taxations and removes regulations, the formal economy usually covers only a small fraction of the total economic activity. There is also an informal economy, but more importantly an international aid economy (including DDR programmes itself) and a criminal economy (Kamphuis, 2005: 186). Joanna Spear (2006: 170), borrowing from Karen Ballentine and Heiko Nitzschke (2005), ascribes a number of characteristics to war economies:

• They involve the destruction or circumvention of the formal economy and that effectively blurs the lines between the formal, informal and criminal sectors;
• Predation, extortion and violence against civilians is used by combatants to acquire control over assets and trade networks;
• Combatants increasingly rely on exploitation of and trade in natural resources; they are highly decentralized and privatized;
• They thrive on cross-border trading networks, regional kin and ethnic groups (thus also systems of patronage) and have a vested interest in the continuation of conflict and instability;
• They are in a context of fragile states regarded as opportunities by external organized crime groups, which seek to exploit the lack of regulation;
• And most formal authority that does exist is involved in predation where the capture of government offices and ministries is exclusively for economic opportunities.

As argued by some scholars, this creates an economic ‘conflict trap’ (Collier, 2004), where the impact of war makes the outbreak of further conflict more likely. Some argue that this is because poverty leads to increased rebellion (Brainard & Chollet, 2007), while others argue that perceived inequality leads to discontent, and ultimately conflict (Gurr, 1970). Moreover, a large group of people will benefit from the war economy, giving them an interest in instability and conflict. Spear then continues to investigate how DDR can help facilitate the shift from economies of war to economies of peace and gives an analysis of the influences of the command structure dynamics on reintegration prospects. Disarmament then should
aim for “a situation where the fighters do not particularly want to use the guns they have, nor do they want to get more” (Spear, 2006: 173). This would suggest a different sequencing of activities, undertaking demobilization and reintegration prior to disarmament. Demobilization – having lost their normal income and not knowing how to support themselves and their dependants in the short term – is a point of great economic vulnerability for ex-combatants and they are likely to resort to crime or war. Spear therefore suggests that this can be mitigated by reinsertion payments, prospects of future employment and training (Ibid, 175). For reintegration, it is argued, it must be recognized that some of the motives for fighting were economic and that apart from physical security, there is also a need for economic security.

There are distinct differences in motives to fight between individual fighters, middle-level officers and leaderships, which have different implications for creating economic security for former combatants. For the rank-and-file Spears suggests that projects employing ex-combatants aimed at rehabilitating and restoring services and community structures can assist in reintegration (Ibid. 180-1). As illustrated by the name of the Sierra Leonean rebel offensive ‘Operation Pay Yourself’ combatants often benefit from looting (Bergner, qtd. in Ibid, 171). However, it is also suggested that often only higher ranking militia members get the real profits of looting and exploitation of resources and reinsertion assistance could then form a powerful incentive for the rank-and-file to leave the militias (Bouta, 2005: 27-8). Whereas “conventional approaches tend to focus on the levels above and below” middle-level commanders leading the fighting units are a key group that needs to be accommodated. They often have enough connections into the illicit economy and when opting to join the new army force they are often frustrated with the rank and status offered to them. According to Spears they should therefore be encouraged to set up small and medium-sized enterprises. Leaders are in the best position to survive in the post-conflict state, having often retained access to economic networks that supported them during the war and sometimes attained government posts enhancing their economic positions (Spear, 2006: 181-2). This obviously creates risks of corruption, crime and predatory behaviour, feeding into the systems of patronage discussed above. Another issue, one that applies to all types of ex-combatants, is that promoting prospects of future employment can create a discrepancy between their expectations and the possibilities in the post-war context. As argued by some scholars the tension between the actual state of ex-combatants’ and the state they expect to achieve can again induce conflict (Gurr, 1970: 37), something that is also noted by practitioners in the field (USAID, 2005: 27).

Conflict Context

When sketching the context for DDR programme it is useful also to characterize the conflict that has taken place, as well as to pay attention to the peace process of which DDR is a component. In characterizing conflicts, a distinction that can be made is between interstate conflict, defined as being between two or more states (possibly in the form of bilateral or multilateral forces), and intrastate conflicts. The latter can be characterized between conflicts over state control, state formation (e.g. secession or autonomy) and what Project Ploughshare (2008) defines as “failed state conflicts”; conflicts over local issues and disputes in the absence of effective government control. After examination of the literature five types of violent conflict have been identified in fragile states. The first category is an interstate war, such as (arguably) the war between Ethiopia and Eritrea. A second type constitutes a single large rebel opposition group against the state, such as the RUF against the state in Sierra Leone or the LTTE against the state in Sri Lanka. A third category is a conflict involving a larger number of different rebel groups and militias, which for instance was the case in the war between North and South
Sudan which involved a large number of proxy forces. Looking at community security, a fourth type involves a group or region that is largely disconnected from the state security apparatus, which has been the case in Karamoja in Uganda and many other pastoralist regions in Africa. Closely linked is the fifth and final category, constituting gangs and armed violence, such as for instance in South Africa. Of course, this number of categories is not exhaustive as there are many dimensions of potential influence. Moreover, a conflict can be characterized by two or more of the mentioned typologies; the Second Congo War (1998-2003), for instance, involved both rebel groups within Congo, as well as military forces from surrounding countries. Also, an intrastate war between an oppositional rebel group and the government can evolve into a conflict with multiple rebel groups and lead to a situation where a certain area is disconnected from a security apparatus infesting the civilian population with armed violence. However, further differentiation would make us arrive at a very large number, making it difficult to operationalize.

**Regional Context**

Although the focus of this research is on linking community-based initiatives with national DDR programming, and although contemporary conflicts are predominantly intra-state conflicts, the regional and international influence and dimensions of the conflict cannot be neglected. Recent conflicts have often involved neighbouring countries (or other foreign countries) whose position remains equivocal. In some cases political and historical associations can make it undesirable to give primary responsibilities for demobilization to regional forces, even where they possess the necessary expertise and capacity, and international observers from outside the region will then be preferable (UNSG, 2000: 13). Differences in cash benefits between countries (e.g. between Côte d’Ivoire and Liberia, and between Croatia and Serbia) can also cause ex-combatants to move across borders and stimulate arms trade (Isima, 2004: 3). This calls for cooperation between the different DDR programmes in the region of which the World Bank’s Multi-country Demobilization and Reintegration Programme (MDRP) in Africa’s Great Lakes Region is an example.

On a different level, violence can rapidly diffuse across borders such as during clashes between rival pastoralist groups. Criminal groups may be trafficking arms across borders, increasing the number of firearms in circulation and with that insecurity.

**Peace Process**

Apart from the context of governance and economy in which DDR takes place, it also takes place in the context of armed conflict and a peace process with the participation of the international community. The stage of the conflict influences the design of a DDR programme: the literature generally prescribes a peace agreement to be a precondition for DDR implementation, as this would entail agreement on a policy framework for DDR and voluntary collaboration of the involved parties (Ball & Van de Goor, 2006: 5; Caramès & Sanz, 2008: 11-3; Hottinger, 2005; UNSG, 2000: 3). A peace agreement must therefore provide specific details for DDR from the start, including flexible target dates marking both the beginning and end of the disarmament and demobilization phases, a sufficient number of cantonment sites, the building of solid institutions for the DDR implementation (e.g. a national commission on DDR), and security sector reform (Edloe, 2007: 2-5; UN DPKO, 1999: 18-9). The potential success of a DDR programme therefore also partly depends on the contents of the peace agreement and the inclusion of the involved parties (i.e. potential spoilers).
Achieving an agreement of all involved parties would imply that DDR is easiest to organize if a limited number of different parties (with different agendas) is involved. This is also the case to achieving cooperation between the parties in new security sector structures. Moreover, a peace agreement as a precondition for DDR implies that implementation is usually close to or after the end of a violent conflict. Traditionally, two types of DDR programmes could be identified; programmes with a focus on demilitarization after a decisive military victory in order to reduce military personnel and expenditures, and programmes in a war-to-peace transition designed as part of the peacekeeping operations (Knight, 2008: 3). However, there are exceptions to this. In Colombia there are ‘individual’ DDR programmes – funded through the Organization of American States (OAS) and managed by the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and Centro Mundial – for ex-combatants who left the armed groups on their own initiative. These desmovilizados from all armed groups (AUC, FARC, ELN) in the conflict then received a monthly allowance, housing, education, vocational training and (some minor) psychological support during a two year period (Pax Christi, 2006). A similar individual reintegration and reintegration project is organized by Asociación de Cabildos Indígenas del Norte del Cauca (ACIN 2005a; 2005b; 2007) with support of IKV Pax Christi for indigenous ex-combatants in North Cauca. The indigenous deserters often do not want to enroll in the government programme since they want to reintegrate into their communities, instead of in the cities where the government projects are located. The limited number of combatants involved and the voluntary commitment to the programme of each individual combatant here – assisted by the relative favourable economic conditions in Colombia – create good reintegration prospects. Moreover, as deserters they cannot go back to the FARC or ELN regardless.

Statebuilding Context

As mentioned above a peace agreement with a framework for DDR is viewed as a crucial precondition. This not only illustrates the importance of DDR in the peace process but it also illustrates the embeddedness of DDR within a wider peace process and the process of state-building. Indeed when discussing DDR in a peace process, it is found to be advantageous to this “as part of the continuum alongside security sector transformation, justice security reform, humanitarian concerns” Buchanan, 2008: 35).

DDR, SSR and Arms Control

The prospects for reintegration and the design of DDR programmes is not only influenced by the way in which former army and militia forces were structured, but also by the decisions on the interim and future compositions of the security forces. Charles T. Call and William D. Stanley (2001: 156-61) differentiate between four interim security options. The first is a “hastily formed transition force from civilian personnel” which only works in a context with much public support and little organized crime and violence. A second option is the use of pre-existing local security forces (e.g. the use of the KLA in Kosovo by KFOR) or the remnants of local police and security forces, although it is remarked that these “often include large numbers of individuals with histories of political violence, provocation and extensive human rights violations.” On the other hand there are the options of an intervention of international

57 See also Part II, paragraphs 3.2.4 and 3.3.4 in this report.
military forces, such as UN peacekeeping forces or international civilian police personnel. The greatest limitation of these is usually its availability.

DDR is often closely linked to security sector reform through professionalization of security institutions, and training focused on human rights and international law and decisions made to reform the security sector may reverberate throughout the DDR process. The future composition of the security forces greatly influences the design of DDR programmes as well as possible eligibility criteria for ex-combatants of armed opposition groups to enter the official military (Caramés & Sanz, 2008: 17). The number of the prospected security forces determines the number of combatants to be demobilized and reintegrated into society. Also, former opposition members and militias are often incorporated into the national military and police forces. This incorporation of previously disenfranchised political and social groups into the security forces is both a political means for reconciliation as well as a source of legitimacy of the new security force (Call & Stanley, 2001: 165-7). This can, however, also lead to conflict as all parties will strive to attain as many influential positions as possible in the new structures. Moreover, the future structure of the army can cause frustrations over rank and status among all sides, as one armed force may have been easier with granting promotions than another. The influx of high-ranking officers from other armed groups into the national army, will also effectively reduce the position in the military hierarchy of the officers already serving the national army.

As DDR is an effort to increase security in order to prevent further violence and new conflicts, exertions should be made to organize control efforts that go beyond DDR programmes, such as firearm legislations and CSAC initiatives. As the UNDP states, in “many crisis and post-conflict contexts, addressing small arms availability and dynamics underlying violence and conflict at the local level are critical to creating and sustaining an enabling environment for economic recovery and reconstruction as well as the re-establishment of democratic governance” (UNDP, 2005b: 20). A similar argument is made by scholars (Kalyvas, 2003: 475-94). Proposed initiatives relating to SSR and SALW issues include decreasing demand by influencing motivations generating the need for arms, controlling supply through legislation and registration, and public destruction of arms (Caramés & Sanz, 2008: 17). Gun legislation in this case not only would prohibit or limit the use of firearms for civilians, but also regulate the circumstances under which security forces are allowed to use them.

**Development and Statebuilding**

Development and disarmament are closely related. The initiative of the KNPSD for this research originates from the knowledge that security considerations – in fragile states in particular – have to be taken into account to meet the Millennium Development Goals. But not only is “the accumulation of small arms and light weapons (…) a serious threat to peace, stability and development” (UNSG, 2005: 32). Development is on the other hand also recognized to be a key to successful disarmament, which has resulted in the tying of weapon collection projects to community-based development schemes (Koyoma, 2005: 75). This mutual relationship between development and security is also expressed in the debate between a military or state perspective on security and a human security perspective.  

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58 See also Part II in this report.
Community Security Context

The location of communities also influences reintegration as it is often more successful in rural areas than it is in urban areas. This is explained by the likelihood of having stronger supporting societal networks in rural than urban areas (Knight, 2008: 5). Other factors ascribed to urban reintegration processes making it more complex are the diverse social and economic background of ex-combatants and the tightness of the urban labour market (Specker, 2008: 25). Moreover, ex-combatants who are seen as war heroes – such as for instance the Kamajors in Sierra Leone who defended their communities against rebel and army troops – integrate more easily into their communities than ex-combatants who are seen as perpetrators.

Within a community, a number of factors influence the security situation and the incentive for individuals to acquire or desire firearms. First of all, there might be a culture of violence and the art of war may be glamorized, or one needs arms to protect one’s cattle from wild animals or bandits with firearms. In many pastoralist communities, for instance, “male youth are expected and required to provide security to the community. However, this call for “security” is often premised on animosity, enmity, revenge and manifested through violence in the form of cattle raids and revenge attacks and in urban areas through highway robberies” (Tsuma, 2004: 86). Demographics are closely linked to this as “most research identifies young men as the primary actors in contemporary violence” (Small Arms Survey, 2006: 296; Urdal, 2004). Apart from the threat to personal and public security caused by the conflict and the availability of firearms itself, arms proliferation also can cause a social and cultural breakdown. For instance, where in South Sudan elders and their traditional rule used to be respected, youth today have learned they can acquire respect and status with a gun (Willems, 2008: 57-8). Other factors influencing security and the incentive to acquire arms are social and economic deprivation, political motivations, as well as deterrence such as gun laws and financial costs. According to Merçay, these external factors are then determining the flow of people from the non-susceptible, to the susceptible, to the gun-owners and back; i.e. influencing the likeliness someone acquires firearms (Merçay, 2006).

Different Types of Ex-combatants

After a period of civil war the term combatant is often not so easily defined, which makes it difficult to determine the requirements of ex-combatant status. Instead of clearly uniformed opposing armed forces, conflicts now are also fought by civil defence forces, militias, paramilitaries, criminal groups, armed gangs, child soldiers, private military and security companies, and inadequately demobilized and reintegrated combatants from previous cessations of war and hostilities (Buchanan & Widmer, 2006: 6). It is also not uncommon for weakened governments to supply small arms to selected groups of their own citizens. Rivalries between communal groups are fuelled in order to defend the state, or simply to foster chaos and keep opponents of the government divided. “Such groups also use their state-supplied weapons for their own purposes, to pursue traditional practices such as cattle raiding or to manage relations with rival communal groups over access to land and resources – and, of course, the supply to

59 Although social and economic deprivation does not necessarily result in more violence and crime, there is evidence that violence and crime occur on a greater scale in certain contexts. Social and economic frustration may cause people to acquire arms expecting this will offer new opportunities.

60 For instance in the December 2007 elections in Kenya, where politicians escalated conflict by supplying weapons and instigating violence.
one group generates new demand (and a market) in others” (Regehr, 2004: 5). Excess armed combatants are thus only a small part of the problem after conflict, as an estimated 650 million firearms, seventy-five per cent of the global stockpile, is in civilian hands (Small Arms Survey, 2007). Moreover, after armed conflict there is often a rise in violent crimes and armed criminal gangs. “Ironically in places such as El Salvador and South Africa, civilians faced greater risk of violent death or serious injury after the end of the conflict than during it” (Call & Stanley, 2001: 151).

For targeted assistance to ex-combatants a clear definition of combatant status is necessary, as a vague or broad definition could include – as described above – almost everyone, including civilians. A narrow definition, such as someone in a military structure and engaged in conflict, will exclude individuals eligible for support, e.g. those working as support staff in guerrilla forces. Moreover, “armed actors need to be differentiated, as their motivations vary” (Buchanan & Widmer, 2006: 7). As mentioned above there is a difference between rank-and-file, middle-level commanders and the elite. The World Bank distinguishes between three possible groups that, other than regular armed combatants, could or should require special attention: special ex-combatant target groups (i.e. child soldiers, female soldiers, disabled and chronically ill soldiers), non-combatants associated with armed groups, and other war-affected populations (World Bank, 2004). The question is then who of these groups will be assisted within DDR programmes. The World Bank’s MDRP assists ex-combatants and the special target groups as direct beneficiaries, the non-combatants associated with armed groups in a limited way, and suggests that other war-affected groups are to be addressed by other programmes linked to DDR programmes (Ibid.). Resisting the limitation of DDR programmes to ex-combatants and their dependents, however, there is discussion over the expansion of DDR programmes to include community rehabilitation and development as mechanisms for the reintegration of ex-combatants (Specker, 2008: 7-8).

Conflict Typologies

The importance of context analysis and assessments is based on the knowledge that there is no one-size-fits-all approach to DDR and community-security possible. Nevertheless a preexisting framework can be an important tool in programme design and implementation, as well as during discussions on the matter during peace talks (SIDDR, 2006: 18). To be able to formulate more specific advice on DDR and community security programme design without falling back on the useless provision of a one-size-fits-all approach, a number of conflict typologies will be formulated. Making used of such a typology of course does not take away the need for context-specific analysis and design; rather it can be a starting point for determining the context.

When the information above is mapped, the various types of conflict – or conflict typologies – that one can encounter when addressing disarmament and DDR are set in relation to the factors that in more or lesser degree influence the context (see figure 3.).
Starting point for the figure are the earlier mentioned three distinctions of fragile situations; the intensification or reduction of social tensions and violent conflict (here classified as ‘conflict typologies’; low or high capacities of policy formulation and implementation capacity; and the existence or absence of agreement on government policy with the international community. The grey box stands for the context of a fragile state or a fragile situation. The state, as mentioned above, can be ascribed with the properties authority (its ability to enact binding legislation), legitimacy (the ability to command public loyalty and to generate domestic support for government legislations and policies) and capacity (the power to mobilize public resources for productive uses). A state can fail in one or all of these properties, in part or all of its territory, leading to a fragile situation or state. Inherent to the state’s policy formulation and implementation capacity, is its legitimacy and the level of trust between state and society. This social contract between the state and society is not only influenced by the state’s strength and qualities but also by the strength of the society. The degree in which the society is able to enforce its social contract with the state, ensuring it lives up to its responsibilities to provide services to its citizens, depends on its organizational strength and capacity. The relationship between the state and society is also influenced by other context characteristics of a given territory or society, such as the levels of patronage and war economies (e.g. by strengthening elites, leading to predatory use of governmental institutions, etc.), but also factors influencing arms demand and the perceived need of individuals to provide in their own
security. Influencing factors of arms demand, such as insecurity and cultural deprivation, are the types of violence as mentioned in the paragraph on conflict context, which we here classify as our conflict typologies. The type and level of violence and conflict is again influenced by the state’s capacity to enforce and implement its policies, and thus again the relationship between state and society. Outside the box representing the fragile situation or state are external influences, such as regional influences (e.g. spill-over of war), global economy (e.g. oil, diamonds, etc.), arms flows and refugee flows. While the intervention is based on the context, the intervention itself also becomes part of the context, and the type of intervention is influenced by the level of policy agreement of a state with the international community, as well as the level of agreement among members of the international community.

A similar exercise – and one of the few – was undertaken by Joris Voorhoeve (2007), who distinguishes between the aspects security, acceptance, effectiveness, domain, and poverty. Acceptance and effectiveness refer to what this report calls the state’s legitimacy and capacity. Security is here divided into types of conflict and violence, and poverty is categorized among the context characteristics and viewed in relation to other’s social and economic wealth. Domain, referring to the level of government control of functional areas and sectors of society, is not directly named in this report but would here refer to the relationship between society and state in connection with the state’s capacity and authority. While based on other theoretical inputs than Voorhoeve’s model, the model proposed in this report thus observes similar characterizing aspects and relations. Dealing with disarmament and security, the focus here, however, lies on the type of violent conflict and how this is influenced. It should also be noted that the type of violent conflict and the factors influencing it may be different on state level, sub-state levels and local levels.

From Identifying Conflict Typologies Onwards

While the figure presented in this fourth Part of the report concludes the exercise undertaken here, as mentioned it is intended that this will lead to policy recommendations that go further than stating “we should involve more of this” or “give more attention to that”. On the other hand we have been criticizing blue-print approaches as local realities should be the corner-stone for sustainable security improvements.

The distinction of violent conflict types described in this annex of the report could then be a first step for describing the types of interventions that seem most effective. For instance, in case of interstate conflict, traditional ‘state’ DDR would be a viable option, where in the case of communities disconnected from the state security apparatus the support of local community security initiatives could be part of the solution. Nevertheless the other aspects of the model described in the figure have to be assessed as well, and interventions should be designed taking the particular characteristics of each case into account. The cultural value of weapons, for instance, may be of high significance in one area, while more or less negligible in another.

It is too early, however, to come to real conclusions about what exact security intervention strategies can be attached to the types of violent conflict identified, or to the usability of the proposed model. More importantly, such conclusions should not be made from behind a desk in the Netherlands. Follow-up

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61 The list provided here is not exhaustive, nor do all elements have to be relevant in a given situation or on a certain level of focus.
activities of this initiative therefore include fieldwork in which we will further investigate the questions raised in and by this desk-study. The model of conflict typologies will be one of the issues to be further investigated in the case-studies.
Working Group Members:

Centre for Conflict Studies (CCS), Utrecht University
The Centre for Conflict Studies (CCS) at Utrecht University comprises an interdisciplinary focal point that has a unique expertise in the emerging international field of conflict studies. The Centre is working on a programme of cutting edge research themes that are closely linked to its educational programme comprising undergraduate and graduate courses. Its work reflects contemporary and innovative trends in academic thought. Its studies aim at contributing to intellectual debates with regard to current conflict and to prevailing policy practice in the fields of conflict prevention and management, and peacebuilding.

Centre for International Conflict Analysis and Management (CICAM), Radboud University Nijmegen
The Centre for International Conflict Analysis and Management conducts research and offers academic courses on the dynamics and transformation of contemporary, large-scale conflict, focusing in particular on practices of peacebuilding intervention and the role of international organizations, the state, and international and local civil society.

Conflict Research Unit of the Clingendael Institute (CRU)
The Conflict Research Unit of the Clingendael Institute conducts research on the nexus between security and development with a special focus on integrated and comprehensive approaches on conflict prevention, stabilization and reconstruction in fragile and post-conflict states.

European Centre for Conflict Prevention (ECCP)
The European Centre for Conflict Prevention (ECCP) is a non-governmental organization that promotes effective conflict prevention and peacebuilding strategies and actively supports and connects people who work for peace worldwide.

IKV Pax Christi
IKV Pax Christi works as a movement of concerned citizens and partners in conflict areas on the protection of human security, the end of armed violence and the construction of just peace.

Netherlands Ministry of Defense
The Ministry of Defense coordinates the military of the Netherlands. The Dutch armed forces have a threefold mission: to protect the integrity of the territory of the Netherlands and that of allied countries; to help maintain stability and the international legal order; and to help civil authorities enforce the law, control crises, respond to disasters and provide humanitarian assistance either in the Netherlands or abroad.

Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs
The Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs promotes the interests of the Kingdom of the Netherlands abroad. The Ministry coordinates and carries out Dutch foreign policy at its headquarters in The Hague and through its missions abroad. It is likewise the channel through which the Dutch Government communicates with foreign governments and international organizations.

PSO (Capacity Building in Developing Countries)
PSO is an association that consists of fifty Dutch development organizations. The association focuses on capacity development at civil society organizations in developing countries.

Dutch Council for Refugees
Dutch Council for Refugees defends the rights of refugees and helps them to build a new life in the Netherlands.